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Veljko Korać, Gajo Petrović (ed.)

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A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL

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POWER AND HUMANITY – R. Supek, V. Korać, V. Sutlić, L. Goldmann, G. Petrović, A. Krešić, Lj. Tadić, K. H. Volkmann-Schluck, E. Paci, J. Lewis, A. Künzli, P. T. Brockelmann, D. Pirjevec, I. Kuvačić, W. Hofmann, F. Marek, H. Fleischer, Đ. Šušnjić, P. Broué ● E. BLOCH AND G. LUKACS – Ehrendoktoren der Universität Zagreb, E. Bloch: Worte des Danks ● IN MEMORIAM – G. Petrović: Bertrand Russell, A. Šarčević: T. W. Adorno ● PORTRAITS AND SITUATIONS – P. Restuccia: K. Marx, D. Jähnig: F. Nietzsche ● THOUGHT AND REALITY – M. Kangrga: Utopie und Geschichte, V. Rus: On Egalitarianism ● BOOK REVIEWS – On the books by G. Lukács, U. Cerroni, D. Grlić, P. Blumberg.

POWER AND HUMANITY

1/2 · 1970

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INFORMATION

A la réunion du Comité de rédaction et du Comité de soutien de la revue Praxis, tenue le 26 août 1969. à Korčula, il a été décidé d'amplifier le Comité d'édition internationale de la Praxis pour une meilleure division du travail. Auprès des membres actuels du Comité de rédaction, le Comité amplifié a embrassé également les membres présents du Comité de soutien: Veljko Korać, Andrija Krešić, Mihailo Marković, Vojin Milić, Svetozar Stojanović, Ljubomir Tadić et Miladin Životić. A la réunion du Comité amplifié d'édition internationale tenue à Belgrade le 6 mars 1970, Veljko Korać et Gajo Petrović ont été élus les rédacteurs en chef de l'édition internationale Nous mentionnons que l'édition yougoslave et l'édition de poche de la Praxis continueront à sortir dans le Comité de rédaction actuel. Toutes les trois éditions de la Praxis retiendront et continueront à développer leur forme actuelle et leur orientation.

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I N F O R M A T I O N

At the meeting of the Editorial Board and the Support Committee of the journal Praxis, held on August 26, 1969, in Korčula, it was decided to enlarge the Editorial Board of Praxis for a better division of labor . Along with the current members of the Drafting Committee, the Enlarged Committee also embraced the present members of the Support Committee: Veljko Korać, A ndrija Krešić, Mihailo Marković,

Vojiin Milić, Svetozar Stojanović, Ljiubomiir Tadić and Miladin Životić. At the meeting of the Amplified Committee for International Publishing held in Belgrade on March 6, 1970, Veljko Korać and G ajo Petrović were elected editors-in-chief of the international edition. Praxis will continue to come out in the current Editorial Board. All three editions of the Praxis retain and continue to develop their current form and focus.

DISCOURS D'OUVERTURE

Rudi Supek

Zagreb

Un éternel Caïn tue à jamais Abel.
(Victor Hugo, Dieu II, 6)

Le rapport entre la puissance et l'humanisme nous préoccupe aujourd'hui peut-être plus que jamais: n'avons-nous pas été temoins, ces derniers temps, des immenses succès de la puissance humaine dans la domination de la nature et du cosmos, et en même temps, n'étions-nous pas révoltés et honteux de l'incapacité, de l'impuissance de l'Homme a surmonter sa propre nature dans les rapports sociaux et interhumains? Il y a un an, ici, à Korčula, nous avons été bouleversés d'apprendre qu'un pays socialiste pour la première fois en attaquait un autre, lui arrachait l'indépendance et le droit de décider de son propre destin, et ceci au nom d'une idéologie qui se réclame aujourd'hui, dans la plus grande mesure, de l'égalité et de l'humanisme, au nom du socialisme, de sa sécurité, de son droit au développement! Quand il s'agit du socialisme et des idéals qu'il défend, cet événement n'est

[1] La Sixième Session de l'Ecole d'été de Korčula s'est tenue du 20 au 29 août 1969. L'allocution d'ouverture a été prononcée par Rudi Supek, président de l'Ecole. Au cours des assemblées générales, 15 conférences ont été tenues: Andrija Krešić (Belgrade): La violence, forme de coexistence humaine – Branko Bošnjak (Zagreb): Les problèmes de l'humanisme dans le christianisme politisé et dans le marxisme idéologisé – John Lewis (Londres): L'unicité de l'homme et la dialectique de l'histoire – Mihailo Đurić (Belgrade): La crise de l'autocompréhension humaine – Enzo Paci (Milan): L'intersubjectivité de la puissance – Vanja Sutlić (Zagreb): Puissance et humanité – Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Cologne): L'ethos politique de la démocratie – Ivan Kuvačić (Zagreb): Les formes contemporaines de la violence spirituelle – Pierre Broué (Grenoble): L'unité européenne et mondiale les luttes révolutionnaires aujour-d'hui – Veljko Korać (Belgrade): Le progrès et l'humanité – Dušan Pirjevec (Ljubljana): Nation et puissance – Ljubomir Tadić (Belgrade): La puissance, les élites et la démocratie – Franz Marek (Vienne): Puissance et démocratie directe – Lucien Goldmann (Paris): Puissance et humanisme – Gajo Petrović (Zagreb): Puissance et violence.

En assemblée générale a été également organisée une table ronde, avec une discussion portant sur le thème suivant: L'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie et le socialisme. Participants: Paul Brockelmann (Durham-USA) – Valentin Dusek (Dur-

Rudi Supek

Zagreb

An eternal Cain kills Abel forever.

(Victor Hugo, God II, 6)

The relationship between power and humanism concerns us today perhaps more than ever: have we not witnessed, in recent times, the immense successes of human power in the domination of nature and the cosmos, and in at the same time, were we not revolted and ashamed of the capacity, of the impotence of Man to overcome his own nature in social and interhuman relations? A year ago here in Korčula we were shocked to learn that a socialist country for the first time was attacking another, snatching away its independence and the right to decide its own destiny, and this in the name of a ideology which claims today, to the greatest extent, equality and humanism, in the name of socialism, of its security, of its right to development! When it comes to socialism and the ideals it stands for, this event is 1 The Sixth Session of the Korčula Summer School was held from August 20 to 29, 1969. delivered by Rudi Supek, President of the School.

During the general assemblies, 15 lectures were held: Andrija Krešić (Belgrade): Violence, a form of human coexistence - Branko Bošnjak (Zagreb): The problems of humanism in politicized Christianism and in ideologized Marxism - John Lewis (London): The uniqueness of man and the dialectic of history - Mihailo Đurić (Belgrade): The crisis of human self-understanding - Enzo Paci (Milan): The intersubjectivity of power - Vanja Sutlić (Zagreb): Power and humanity - Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Cologne): The political ethos of democracy - Ivan Kuvačić (Zagreb): Contemporary forms of spiritual violence - Pierre Broué (Grenoble): European and world unity revolutionary struggles today - Veljko Korać (Belgrade): Progress and humanity - Du-San Pirjevec (Ljubljana): Nation and power - Ljubomir Tadić (Belgrade): Power, elites and democracy - Franz Marek (Vienna): Power and direct democracy - Lucien Goldmann (Paris): Power and humanism - Gajo Petrović (Zagreb): Power and violence.

In general assembly was also organized a round table, with a discussion on the following theme: The occupation of Czechoslovakia and socialism. Participants: Paul Brockelmann (Durham-USA) - Valentin Dusek (Dur-3

pas seulement un problème de rapports entre pays socialistes, entre pays en général ou entre partis politiques: il concerne chacun de nous, parce qu'il met en oeuvre le pouvoir qui met en question notre humanisme.

Il n'est pas étonnant que nous songions dans cette situation, aux vers d'un poète qui considérait »la révolution comme le souffle de Dieu«, et qui s'intéressait, il y a plus d'un siècle, sous l'influence d'événements révolutionnaires semblables, au thème du fratricide. Victor Hugo voyait, dans la vieille légende biblique de Caïn et d'Abel, un fils recherchant la faveur du Père ou du Créateur par la douceur ou le dévouement, et l'autre découvrant la possibilité d'éliminer la rivalité par la violence et d'acquérir ainsi la position singulière d'un élu ou d'un héritier. Si nous comprenons que le Créateur n'est autre que l'Histoire, formée par la violence de même que par l'humanisme de l'homme, nous assistons depuis les origines à un drame éternellement répété jusqu'à nos jours.

Il semble que le problème du rapport entre le pouvoir et l'humanisme ait toujours été lié à la manière ambiguë et contradictoire avec laquelle l'homme vit et réalise sa liberté: tantôt en tant que domination sur les forces naturelles, expression de ces mêmes forces naturelles, tantôt en tant que présence et participation à son propre humanisme, à ses formes directes et symbolisées, aux états interindividuels et collectifs. La première forme se réalise par la force, c'est-à-dire aussi par la possibilité de l'abus de la force; c'est pourquoi un autre homme peut devenir la pierre avec laquelle Caïn a frappé Abel. Mais la liberté de la participation ne peut être réalisée que dans l'accord et le consentement, dans le dialogue et la compréhension humaine. Et ceux auxquels l'Histoire a permis d'être grands et puissants, ont fait souvent de l'accord un chantage, arrachant le consentement par la violence. Ils n'ont pu par là éloigner »la mauvaise conscience« qui naît de ces procédés et pour les justifier et mystifier, ils ont eu recours à différentes idées et idéologies.

»Les clairons devant moi jetaient de longs éclats;
J'étais puissant; j'allais, levant haut ma bannière,
Comte chez l'empereur, lion dans ma tanière;
Mais, tandis qu'à mes pieds tout n'était que néant,

---

ham–USA) – Serge Mallet (Paris) – Trivo Indić (Belgrade) – Arnold Kunzli (Bâle) – Francis Pithon (Paris) et Rudi Supek (Zagreb).

L'Ecole a été divisée en quatre sections correspondant à chacune des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand et croato-serbe. Les sections ont eu en tout 10 réunions de travail, au cours desquelles ont été entendus 16 co-rapports, Parmi les participants étrangers, on peut citer les noms suivants: S. Avineri (Jérusalem) – A. Bellu (Bucarest) – G. Block (Paris) – W. van Dooren (Utrecht) – H. Dieter Bahr (Tubingue) – H. Fleischer (Berlin) – G. Wolandt (Bonn) – W. Hoffmann (Marburg) – G. K. Kaltenbrunner (Munich) – R. Tucker (Princeton) – Parmi les philosophes et sociologues yougoslaves ayant participé aux co-rapports et priss part à la discussion, citons entre autres: M. Caldarević (Zagreb) – V. Mikecin (Zagreb) – Vojin Milić (Belgrade) – M. Mirić (Zagreb) – R. Muminović (Sarajevo) – Z. Posavec (Zagreb) – K. Prohić (Sarajevo) – Veljko et Vojan Rus (Ljubljana) – D. Sergejev (Zagreb) – Svetozar Stojanović (Belgrade) – Z. Vidaković (Sarajevo) – S. Vrcan (Split). Ce qui porte à 350 environ le total des philosophes et sociologues yougoslaves et étrangers ayant participé aux travaux de la Sixième Session de l'Ecole d'été de Korčula.

not only a problem of relations between socialist countries, between countries in general or between political parties: it concerns each of us, because he implements the power that calls into question our

humanism.

It is not surprising that we are thinking in this situation of the verses of a poet who considered "revolution as the breath of God", and who was interested, more than a century ago, under the influence of revolutionary events similar to the theme of fratricide.

Victor Hugo saw, in the old biblical legend of Cain and Abel, a son seeking the favor of the Father or the Creator by gentleness or devotion, and the other discovering the possibility of eliminating rivalry by violence and thus acquiring the singular position of a chosen one or an heir. If we understand that the Creator is none other than History, formed by violence as well as by the humanism of man, we are witnessing from the origins a drama eternally repeated until our days.

It seems that the problem of the relationship between power and humanism has always been linked to the ambiguous and contradictory way in which man lives and realizes his freedom: sometimes as domination over natural forces, expression of these same natural forces, sometimes as presence and participation in one's own humanism, in its direct and symbolized forms, in inter-individual and collective states. The first form is realized by force, that is to say also by the possibility of the abuse of force; this is why another man can become the stone with which Cain struck Abel.

But the freedom of participation can only be achieved in agreement and consent, in dialogue and human understanding. And those whom history has allowed to be great and powerful have often blackmailed agreement, extorting consent by violence. They couldn't get rid of the "bad conscience"

which arises from these processes and to justify and mystify them, they have had recourse to different ideas and ideologies.

“The bugles in front of me gave long bursts; I was powerful; I went, raising my banner high, Count to the emperor, lion in my lair; But, while at my feet everything was nothing, ham-USA) - Serge Mallet (Paris) - Trivo Indie (Belgrade) - Arnold Kunzli (B&le)

- Francis Pithon (Paris) and Rudi Supek (Zagreb).

The School has been divided into four sections corresponding to each of the following languages: English, French, German and Croatian-Scrbian. The sections had a total of 10 working meetings, during which 16 co-reports were heard. Among the foreign participants, we

can cite the following names: S. Avineri (Jerusalem) -

A. Bellu (Bucarest) - G. Block (Paris) - W. van Dooren (Utrecht) - H. Dieter Bahr (Tubingue) - H. Fleischer (Berlin) - G. Wolandt (Bonn) - W. Hoffmann (Marburg)

- G. K. Kaltenbrunner (Munich) - R. Tucker (Princeton) - Parmi les philosophes et sociologucs youugoslaves ayant participć aux co-rapports et priss part a la discussion, citons entre autres: M. Čaldarević (Zagreb) - V. Mikecin (Zagreb) - Vojin Milić (Belgrade) - M. Mirić (Zagreb) - R. Muminović (Sarajevo) - Z. Posavec (Zagreb)

- K. Prohić (Sarajevo) - Veljko et Vojan Rus (Ljubljana) - D. Sergejev (Zagreb)

- Svetozar Stojanović (Belgrade) - Z. Vidaković (Sarajevo) - S. Vrcan (Split). This brings to about 350 the total of Yugoslav philosophers and sociologists and Grangers who participated in the work of the Sixth Session of the ćtć School of Korčula.

Mon crime, nain hideux, vivait en moi, géant,
Riait quand on louait ma tête vénérable,
Et, me mordant au coeur, me criait: Misérable!«

(Les Burgraves)

Depuis que »les géants« se parent de la science et de la technique, des puissantes réalisations de l'industrie moderne et de l'organisation sociale, des canons, des fusées, des satellites artificiels et naturels, ils ont commencé à croire qu'il était facile de faire taire »ce nain hideux« grâce à la propagande et à la publicité modernes, qu'on pouvait produire le phénomene de la conscience et de la responsabilité par réflexes conditionnés, d'après la méthode de Pavlov, que l'obéissance canine et l'oubliance humaine se réunissaient facilement. Ils veulent nous convaincre naïvement qu'il faut le plus tôt possible couvrir la violence d'un voile de silence, et là, ils montrent du doigt »des tyrans encore plus grands et plus puissant«, et ces tyrans plus grands et plus puissants, qui n'en trouvent pas d'autres encore plus grands et plus puissants, montrent simplement du doigt – la lune!

Pourtant, si la confiance en la justice et en l'égalité, en la victoire de l'égalité et de la raison, a flamboyé en nous un seul instant, comme une vive torche humaine, rien ne peut nous empêcher de poser une série de questions qui sont peut-être plutôt l'expression d'un jugement froid et raisonnable, que de la conscience humaine révoltée.

La révolution en tant que changement décisif dans les rapports et les valeurs humaines, ne peut se réduire à des coups politiques, à des complots, à des coteries. Elle est l'oeuvre de tous les membres de la société, de tout le peuple, de ses parties les plus progressistes, de la classe ouvrière, de l'intelligentsia sociale, et nullement des groupes particuliers et des partis politiques. Elle représente ce moment heureux de l'inspiration historique d'un peuple où les classes les plus progressistes et les meilleurs esprits s'unissent dans une action unique de tranfsormation de l'organisation sociale, pour répondre aux aspirations séculaires de toutes les couches sociales. C'est là le caractère décisif de la révolution socialiste! Cette révolution ne peut être importée du dehors, elle ne peut être ni imposée par la force étrangère militaire ou politique, ni controlée par un appareil policier mercenaire, parce qu'elle se heurtera à la résistance et au mépris de presque tous les membres de la société. Elle ne sert pas à la construction d'une nouvelle communauté sociale, mais à sa destruction, et encore plus, à l'anéantissement du sens historique même de cette communauté. Qui peut parler du socialisme et de la révolution socialiste en enlevant en même temps à un peuple sa souveraineté, son droit de former sa propre communauté sociale? Le rôle de la classe ouvrière, n'est-il pas d'être émancipateur des aspirations les plus profondes de tout le monde?

Un grand retard est nécessaire dans l'autoconscience d'une société et dans les forces motrices de sa transformation, pour que cette société puisse vivre »la libération« en se trainant sur les traces d'une autre société, conduite par une volonté étrangerè, interprétée par des idées étrangères au point de n'être qu'un objet pour une mission étrangère

My crime, childish dwarf, lived in words, giant, Laughed when my venerable head was praised,

And, biting my heart, cried out to me: Miserable!

(The Grave Burs)

Since the "giants" adorned themselves with science and technology, with the mighty achievements of modern industry and social organization, with cannons, rockets, artificial and natural satellites, they began to believe that it was easy to silence "that kiddy dwarf" thanks to modern propaganda and publicity, that the phenomenon of consciousness and responsibility could be produced by conditioned reflexes, according to Pavlov's method, that canine obedience and oblivion human came together easily. They want to convince us naively that we must cover violence as soon as possible with a veil of silence, and there they point to "even bigger and more powerful tyrants", and these bigger and more powerful tyrants, who find nothing even bigger and more powerful others, just point the finger - the moon!

However, if confidence in justice and in equality, in the victory of equality and reason, blazed within us for a single moment, like a living human torch, nothing can prevent us from asking a series of questions which are perhaps - to be rather the expression of a cold and reasonable judgment than of a revolted human conscience.

Revolution as a decisive change in human relations and values cannot be reduced to political coups, conspiracies, coteries. It is the work of all members of society, of all the people. of its most progressive parts, of the working class, of the social intelligentsia, and by no means of particular groups and political parties. It represents this happy moment of the historical inspiration of a people where the most progressive classes and the best minds unite in a unique action of transformation of the social organization, to respond to the secular aspirations of all social strata. This is the decisive character of the socialist revolution! This revolution cannot be imported from outside, it cannot be imposed by foreign military or political force, nor controlled by a mercenary police apparatus, because it will meet with resistance and contempt from almost all members of society. It is not used for the construction of a ˆ

new social community, but to its destruction, and even more, to the annihilation of the very historical meaning of this community. Who can speak of socialism and socialist revolution while at the same time depriving a people of its sovereignty, of its right to form its own social community? Isn't the role of the working class to be the emancipator of the deepest aspirations of everyone?

A great delay is necessary in the self-consciousness of a society and in

the driving forces of its transformation, so that this society can experience "liberation" by following in the footsteps of another society, led by an alien will, interpreted by foreign ideas to the point of being only an object for a foreign mission 5

de »libération« ou d'»émancipation«, comme celles dont se réclament au cours des siècles tous les oppresseurs et tous les colonisateurs. Mais que faire si ce retard n'existe pas du tout, si c'est justement le contraire: si l'on tâche, dans le cas de notre développement social, de rendre impossible une forme supérieure d'organisation sociale, pour imposer par la force une forme inférieure, une organisation sociale réellement plus retardée? Dans ce cas-là, la référence à »la révolution socialiste« et à »l'internationalisme prolétarien« ne peut même pas obtenir les caractéristiques que possédaient les colonisateurs par rapport aux pays sous-développés. Nous assistons alors à la dénaturation profonde du sens même de la révolution socialiste et du socialisme en général, et tout prend un sens détourné, inhumain. Le révolutionnaire se change en mercenaire, le combattant en fonctionnaire, le dirigeant en policier, le travailleur en esclave, le citoyen en nain et encore moins, les idéals annoncés deviennent mensonge, le pouvoir étatiste devient seulement moyen de la violence et de la contrainte inhumaine, et le socialisme un masque nouveau porté par l'hégémonie étrangère.

Lénine n'a-t-il pas défendu l'indépendance et la souveraineté de toute action progressiste et libératrice, même celle qui se déroulait pendant la Révolution d'Octobre sous la forme de la révolution bourgeoise et nationale, c'est-à-dire à un degré inférieur du mouvement historique? Ne mettait-il pas en relief, à ce même point de vue, que la révolution socialiste dans un pays développé »dépasserait immédiatement« la Russie, bien que cette dernière ait commencé plus tôt son action révolutionnaire? Il est difficile de contester cette attitude, parce que la révolution socialiste ne signifie pas seulement le renversement de l'autorité bourgeoise par une action politique, mais aussi la construction positive de la société socialiste, qui se développera plus vite là où les conditions socio-économiques et culturelles sont déjà créées.

L'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie n'est pas seulement, pour la première fois dans l'histoire, l'attaque d'un pays socialiste par un autre et la spoliation de sa souveraineté, mais en même temps, et peut-être encore plus, la spoliation du droit »à une voie propre vers le socialisme«, à l'édification de la communauté socialiste conformément aux idéals réels par lesquels un peuple lie son passé è son avenir: n'est-ce pas la revolution qui se tranforme en contre-révolution? Ne nous est-il pas bien connu que l'étatisme et le bureaucratisme ont provoqué dans le socialisme ce dont Marx et Lénine avaient tellement peur, à savoir que »l'âme politique« de la révolution socialiste dévorerait »l'âme sociale«, que le régime politique du gouvernement, dans le fond bourgeois, rendrait impossible la construction réelle de la société socialiste indépendante, que cet état, nommé par les théoriciens soviétiques par euphémisme »le culte de la personnalité«, montrerait de nouveau son vrai visage – la méfiance et le mépris envers le contenu humain, ou envers »le socialisme à visage humain«, comme l'ont nommé nos amis tchécoslovaques.

N'est-il pas temps que le mouvement ouvrier s'occupe des questions théoriques essentielles sur le devenir des différentes formes du socialisme – du pluralisme socialiste, qui correspond à des bases histori-

of »liberation« or »emancipation«, like those claimed over the centuries by all oppressors and all colonizers. But what if this backwardness does not exist at all, if it is precisely the opposite: if we

try, in the case of our social development, to make impossible a higher form of social organization, in order to impose by force an inferior form, a social organization really more retarded? In this case, the reference to "socialist revolution" and to "proletarian internationalism" cannot even obtain the characteristics that the colonizers possessed in relation to the underdeveloped countries. We are then witnessing the profound denaturation of the very meaning of the socialist revolution and of socialism in general, and everything takes on a devious, inhuman meaning. The revolutionary turns into a mercenary, the fighter into a civil servant, the leader into a policeman, the worker into a slave, the citizen into a dwarf and even less, the ideals announced become lies, state power becomes only a means of violence and inhuman constraint. , and socialism a new mask worn by foreign hegemony.

Didn't Lenin defend the independence and the sovereignty of all progressive and liberating action, even that which took place during the October Revolution in the form of the bourgeois and national revolution, that is to say on a lower level? of the historical movement? Did he not emphasize, from this same point of view, that the socialist revolution in a developed country "would immediately overtake" Russia, although the latter had begun its revolutionary action earlier? It is difficult to dispute this attitude, because the socialist revolution means not only the overthrow of bourgeois authority by political action, but also the positive construction of the socialist society, which will develop faster where socio-economic conditions and cultures are already created.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia is not only, for the first time in history, the attack of one socialist country by another and the spoliation of its sovereignty, but at the same time, and perhaps even more, the spoliation of the right "has its own way to socialism", to the building of the socialist community in conformity with the real ideals by which a people binds its past to its future: is it not revolution which is transformed into counter-revolution? Is it not well known to us that statism and bureaucracy have brought about in socialism what Marx and Lenin were so afraid of, namely, that the "political soul" of the socialist revolution would devour "the social soul"? “, that the political regime of the government, basically bourgeois, would make impossible the real construction of the independent socialist society, that this state, euphemistically called by Soviet theorists “the cult of personality”, would again show its true face - mistrust and contempt for human content, or for “socialism with a human face”, as Vonl calls our Czechoslovak friends.

Isn't it time for the workers' movement to deal with the essential theoretical questions about the future of the different forms of socialism - of socialist pluralism, which corresponds to historical bases?

ques sur laquelle naissent les révolutions socialistes et aux différentes phases évolutives de la construction même de la société socialiste? N'est-il pas temps de rejeter, au nom du libre développement de la société socialiste, toutes les théories qui prétendent défendre, sous le masque du »marxisme-léninisme«, le monopolisme et l'hégémonisme politique? Ceci n'est-il pas nécessaire, non seulement dans l'intérêt des pays qui ont passé par la révolution socialiste, mais encore plus dans l'intérêt des pays qui se trouvent devant elle? Le mouvement ouvrier, ses représentants politiques et l'intelligentsia de gauche n'ont pas le droit de se taire sur ces questions essentielles du développement contemporain, même sous le fallacieux prétexte que ce silence est »utile« dans la lutte contre l'impérialisme capitaliste, car, on ne mène pas la lutte contre les défauts d'autrui par la dissimulation de ses propres imperfections.

Pourquoi mettons-nous l'accent sur ces questions justement aujourd'hui, en parlant du rapport entre le pouvoir et l'humanisme?

Nous vivons une crise de la compréhension de la liberté humaine et de la dignité personnelle. La mise en évidence constante »de la sécurité de la société« en tant que partie de la politique militariste et sociale, et la théorie économique vulgaire sur »le progrès constant de l'humanité vers un bien-être de plus en plus grand«, ont affaibli chez certains le sentiment de la liberté individuelle et collective. Les étatistes et les bureaucrates de toutes les couleurs trouvent un allié puissant dans cette philosophie. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire d'opposer à la philosophie »d'une vie chaque jour meilleure«, la philosophie de la liberté humaine, de la Liberté au sens originel du droit, pour chaque individu, de participer à toutes les formes essentielles de la vie sociale, à la décision et à la pleine responsabilité dans les organisations sociales plus ou moins étendues, depuis l'usine et la commune jusqu'à la représentation du peuple. La dignité de l'homme se mesure depuis toujours par le droit à la parole dans la vie publique et dans la communauté productive. C'est pourquoi nous intercédons pour le socialisme autogestif, pour le socialisme qui élimine les représentants ou les intermédiaires qui »au nom de la classe ouvrière« ou »au nom du peuple« règnent sur le peuple et sur la classe ouvrière.

On ne peut imposer la communauté sociale à l'homme. Ce n'est que par sa libre volonté et son action, qu'il peut lui-même la construire, en demandant la reconnaissance et la réciprocité pour son humanisme dans un autre homme, en créant la communauté dans laquelle vraiment »le développement libre de tout individu sera condition préalable pour le développement libre de tous« (Marx).

Aucune vraie communauté humaine, nationale ou internationale, ne peut être construite sur l'inégalité de ses membres. L'emploi de la force et de la violence sous prétexte »de l'aide fraternelle«, transforme cette communauté en prison du peuple. Dans »La Fin de Satan«, Victor Hugo nous signale que la pierre avec laquelle Caïn frappa Abel, par l'action de la magicienne Isis-Lilith, est devenu prison.

». . . . . Toi, pierre,
Vis, creuse-toi, grandis, monte sur l'horizon,
Et le pâle avenir te nommera Prison«.

on which socialist revolutions are born and at the different evolutionary phases of the very construction of socialist society?

Is it not time to reject, in the name of the literal development of socialist

society, all the theories which claim to defend, under the mask of »Marxism-Leninism«, monopolism and political hegemonism? Is this not necessary, not only in the interest of the countries which have gone through the socialist revolution, but even more in the interest of the countries which are ahead of it? The labor movement, its political representatives and the leftist intelligentsia have no right to remain silent on these essential questions of contemporary development, even under the fallacious pretext that this silence is

»useful« in the fight against capitalist imperialism, because one does not lead the fight against the faults of others by concealing one's own imperfections.

Why do we emphasize these questions precisely today, when speaking of the relationship between power and humanism?

We live in a crisis of understanding of human freedom and personal dignity. The constant emphasis on "the security of society" as a part of militaristic and social policy, and the vulgar economic theory of "humanity's constant progress towards greater and greater well-being", have weakened in some the feeling of individual and collective freedom. Statists and bureaucrats of all stripes find a powerful ally in this philosophy. This is why it is necessary to oppose to the philosophy "of an ever better life", the philosophy of human freedom, of Liberty in the original sense of the right, for each individual, to participate in all the essential forms of the social soul, to decision-making and full responsibility in more or less extended social organizations, from the factory and the commune to the representation of the people. The dignity of man has always been measured by the right to speak in public life and in the productive community. This is why we intercede for autogestive socialism, for socialism which eliminates the representatives or intermediaries who "in the name of the working class" or "in the name of the people" reign over the people and over the working class.

One cannot impose the social community on man. It is only through his free will and action that he himself can build it, by asking for recognition and reciprocity for his humanism in another man, by creating the community in which truly "the free development of every individual will be a prerequisite for the free development of all" (Marx).

No true human community, national or international, can be built on the equality of its members. The use of force and violence under the pretext of "brotherly help", transforms this community into a people's prison. In »The End of Satan«, Victor Hugo tells us that the stone with which Cain struck Abel, by faction of the magician Isis-Lilith, has become a prison.

» ..... Tot, stone, Live, widen yourself, grow, rise on the horizon, And the pale future will name you Prison“.

7

PARADOXES OF POWER AND HUMANITY

Veljko Korać

Belgrade

The power of humanity manifests itself as the most paradoxical phenomenon in the world: without it man has no existence, but with it even his existence becomes uncertain. It is thus an unusual union of opposites or, as Marx would say, »a union of impossibilities«. Man might most appropriately express his relationship toward it with the old Latin proverb: Nec tecum vivere possum nec sine te!

This paradox is more obvious now than ever before. The rapid progress of science and technology (and with it growth of the power which it produces) provides more and more arguments for the theory that man has a privileged position in the world, while at the same time it proclaims the death of man and the end of humanism »in principle«. What is the power which man creates if it becomes alienated from its creator and operates in an alienated and inhuman fashion? Do power and mankind exist in any real relationship and harmony?

The answer to these questions must be sought in human praxis. Man is a practical being who deliberately masters nature for his *human* needs and thus constantly confirms his potentialities and consolidates his special place in the world. The more universal human experience is, the more pronounced is the tendency to transform all human knowledge into real human power. Thus, it is as if the Hegelian formula for cunning of reason were realized in the interest of man and mankind – a formula which means essentially that reason is powerful to the extent that it is cunning and that precisely because of this cunning, man asserts his »right« to nature and to a privileged place in the world.

The enthusiasm people experienced when they saw the first man on the moon with their own eyes showed what strong illusions man has about his special position in the world – illusions which gave rise to modern humanism – and how much these illusions affect human aspirations and intentions. People are carried away by the notion that the progress of science and technology raises man over all other living beings, and this notion is one of the basic elements of the mod-

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ern way of thinking. The optimism which it engenders could be expressed in the single pathetic fourhundred-year old cry: The sciences are flourishing, spirits are awakening and it is wonderful to be alive!

Although this cry is four hundred years old, it has not lost meaning even today. The knight-errant and hopelessly enthusiastic humaniast Ulrich von Hutten used it accurately to express the general mood of the time, even though amid bloody peasant uprisings and class wars, massacres and destructions of the population the length and breadth of Europe, in a time when Europe was like a madhouse, it was more than visionary to think and speak of the attraction of life. But modern humanism as the ideology of morality, as faith in man and mankind was born precisely at that time, after a long succession of centuries of dehumanization and demeaning of everything human. It was therefore a genuine manifesto of morality, worthy of men on the very threshold of the modern age who, in the words of Friedrich Engels, were great both in virtue and vice. They were anything but cautious pedants, for after the theological violence which forced people to behave like angels and servants of the Lord they knew full well that man was neither an angel nor a devil, but a man, and that precisely this was his great privilege. Shakespeare expressed this pride in everything human in Hamlet when he presented man as a true work of art, as a being with a noble mind, boundless potentialities and abilities, and a harmonious and purposeful form and motions. In this spirit man became accustomed to marveling at himself and bolstering his own self-confidence.

History demonstrates that this self-confidence was essential to man when he dethroned the almighty God. He elevated himself to the vacated throne with this self-confidence, and embarked on adventures across distant seas. He explored the globe, the mysteries of the Solar System, the laws of mechanics, etc. Thus he discovered what was necessary in order to free himself from theological thinking and to begin to build a new world. He would never have achieved this without faith in the progress of knowledge and power, and so he developed new concepts about himself under the illusion that harmony of knowledge and power was in the interest of man and humanity. Not only did great social crises not disabuse him of this, but they impelled him to new concepts, for it seemed that only this path led to final vitory. The Cartesian »cogito« was the first philosophical expression of this self-confidence and self-awareness, and the rationalism for which Descartes provided a base found its logical conclusion in the philosophical system of Hegel.

We know today that without this humanistic self-confidence, which is expressed in the most varied forms of anthropocentrism, there would be no Modern epoch. But we know even more than this. Marx gave humanism a new content and meaning with his thesis of »universal human emancipation«, starting from the premise that the root of man is man himself. The concept of man in the Marx's interpretation gained in addition a dimension which it did not have in traditional humanism or in any earlier conception. This is the historical dimension. When essentially discovered, man was defined as neither a political, ethical or theological postulate, nor a mere product of

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nature, but rather a being of praxis who historically produced himself. This is the meaning of Marx's statment that man is a product of history and not its starting point. This also gave new meaning to the concept of humanity, morality and humanism. Man discovered himself as a being of praxis, for whom humanism is the only true goal.

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Although the idea that man has a privileged position in the world developed from faith in the omnipotence of man and in his exclusive »right to nature«, the great thinkers also understood those existential contradictions on which no form of humanist optimism such as that championed by Ulrich von Hutten could be based. Pascal, however, was the most profound when he wrote that man is a midpoint between everything and nothing, namely a single exceptional potentiality. The truth of Pascal's words has been confirmed every day, from his own time right up to the present, and it explains the origin and nature of the existential contradictions which make faith in absolute progress and in the harmony of power and humanism an illusion. That is to say, it is demonstrated daily that man is truly suspended between everything and nothing, between heaven and earth, between existence and essence, that he wants more than he can have and that he changes the impossible into the possible, and that this is the enduring reason for that restlessness which moves him to action and is the essence of his experience. Suspended between the possible and the impossible, man lives in constant existential social crises, but despite all, he holds and cherishes the illusion that he has a privileged place in the world and that men have potentialities which broaden and consolidate, mastering the world for their human needs. Yet this is no longer an illusion of Renaissance humanism, which held that power and humanity advance in harmony.

From Descartes, who provided the rationale for modern philosophy and science, to Hegel who taught that man hardly can imagine the greatness of the strenght of his spirit, the belief in human progress grew constantly. The consequence was a belief that there is nothing in the world so dense and obscure as to be impenetrable by the human spirit. Thus the stage of mind was reached in which man became the greatest concern to himself and came to be interested in the conditions of his own existence. But only in this stage was it possible to realize that human history does not proceed in a unilinear fashion toward its highest goal, but that it follows a contradictory path of development.

Hegelian philosophy was the first to show clearly that in reality there is no harmony between power and humanism and that such harmony manifests itself as an illusion in the sphere of the metaphysics of power, in that type of metaphysics in which humanism dissolves in power. Hegel gives the concept of essence (the idea) attributes of absolute power, and he explains existence as being purely ephemeral and impotetn, so that everything comes into existence as the self-development of the idea. To enter into existence means for Hegel »to change but to remain the same«. This is why he can say that the spirit which moves world history »does its work on a grand scale«

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Although the idea that man has a privileged position in the world developed from faith in the omnipotence of man and in his exclusive

»right to nature«, the great thinkers also understood those existential contradictions on which no form of humanist optimism such as that championed by Ulrich von Hutten could be based. Pascal, however, was the most profound when he wrote that man is a midpoint between everything and nothing, namely a single exceptional potentiality. The truth of Pascal's words has been confirmed every day, from his own time right up to the present, and it explains the origin and nature of the existential contradictions which make faith in absolute progress and in the harmony of power and humanism an illusion. That is to say, it is demonstrated daily that man is truly suspended between everything and nothing, between heaven and earth, between existence and essence, that he wants more than he can have and that he changes the impossible into the possible, and that this is the enduring reason for that restlessness which moves him to action and is the essence of his experience. Suspended between the possible and the impossible, man lives in constant existential social crises, but despite all, he holds and cherishes the illusion that he has a privileged place in the world and that men have potentialities which broaden and consolidate, mastering the world for their human needs. Yet this is no longer an illusion of Renaissance humanism, which held that power and humanity advance in harmony.

From Descartes, who provided the rationale for modern philosophy and science, to Hegel who taught that man hardly can imagine the greatness of the strenght of his spirit, the belief in human progress grew constantly. The consequence was a belief that there is nothing in the world so dense and obscure as to be impenetrable by the human spirit. Thus the stage of mind was reached in which man became the greatest concern to himself and came to be interested in the conditions of his own existence. But only in this stage was it possible to realize that human history does not proceed in a unilinear fashion toward its highest goal, but that it follows a contradictory path of development.

Hegelian philosophy was the first to show clearly that in reality there is no harmony between power and humanism and that such harmony manifests itself as an illusion in the sphere of the metaphysics of power, in that type of metaphysics in which humanism dissolves in power. Hegel gives the concept of essence (the idea) attributes of absolute power, and he explains existence as being purely ephemeral and impotetn, so that everything comes into existence as the self-development of the idea. To enter into existence

means for H ege1

»to change but to remain the same«. This is why he can say that the spirit which moves world history »does its work on a grand scale«

10

and that for *its* needs and aims, which are apart from all human needs and aims, it sacrifies not only individuals, peoples, but also entire generations. In a system in which man, as existence, is purely ephemeral, there is no place for humanism. This is why the main reactions against Hegelian philosophy have been on humanistic grounds. The really radical critics of Hegelian philosophy held that it was necessary to assert a philosophy of man (first of all Feuerbach, later Marx) as opposed to Hegelian existentialism, to rehabilitate neglected existence (Kierkegaard) and the phenomenon of life (Nietzsche, Dilthey). It is obvious that these reactions followed precisely those lines whereby the philosophy of absolute self-development totally neglected man and life in order to affirm total existentialism.

It is typical that man as man also remained outside the dimension of so-called »positive philosophy« and the positivist manner of thinking in general, whether in so-called »classical positivism«, in which human existence is sacrificed to sociological realism, or in the latest forms of positivist strivings, in which man as man is reduced to words, functions and structures, in which in the final analysis man as man is lost and one can even proclaim that he is dead.

Structuralism has so far gone furthest in negating humanism and in its efforts to demonstrate its lack of validity. It rejects the historical dimension of man and humanism as a most banal myth, and it does so in the name of the reality of a social structure in which man is realized and in which his humanity is confirmed. It is typical that structuralism has rejected humanism as an ideology in favor of science and the scientific method but has itself been transformed into an ideology which in the name of social structure dissolves man and mankind into totally rationalized and mathematicized systems and structures. Of course, it is most characteristic of structuralism that it denies that man has a privileged position in the world. From the structural point of view this possibility is only obsolete humanistic illusion that man is the subject of history. In great systems this loses all meaning and precisely for this reason proclaims the death of man, who in reality is nothing other than the man of humanism in the traditional sense.

If humanism were really only subjectivism, such conclusions would not only be possible but unavoidable. But reality cannot be reduced to the dichotomy of subject-object. Such a dichotomy is a vestige of traditional metaphysics and the naturalistic view of the world which took shape at the very beginning of the modern epoch. It is an expression of common sense, against which Marx wrote his well-known *Theses on Feuerbach* and introduced the category of praxis, in which the opposition of subject and object is overcome, providing new opportunities for interpreting reality.

If the essence of man is considered from the standpoint of praxis, the question arises as to whether it is possible to overcome the contradiction between power and humanism, which is rooted precisely in praxis. The essence of the question is precisely whether it is possible to reconcile power and humanism so that power, as a human achievement, can be the instrument of humanism or human praxis and not the implement of inhumanism.

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11

This question cannot be answered from the standpoint of structuralism, for man disappears in the structure, and the entire problem reduces to the rationalization of structure. Pushed to its extreme, this is nihilism. But this nihilism postulates the abandoning of all forms of humanism and of the historical interpretation of human existence. Yet it is precisely from the viewpoint of praxis that solutions are possible. Modern social development also points to them. That is to say that even now in industrially developed countries production depends less and less on the amount of labor and the quantity of capital invested and more and more on the level of science and technology. Science and technology no longer follow industry but advance with it or even precede it. In so doing, they become the basic production force and create a condition in which a need will arise for social change. Of course, this is not a simple process. Moreover, it contains latent and profound contradictions for automation not only frees the worker from direct labor, but leads to total integration of production processes, centralized planning and the development of tremendous systems. But this means the rationalization and concentration of all functions of production and consumption. Yet, as this paves the way for a reduction in working time and for real liberation of the worker, it also leads to the phenomenon of tremendous system which equalize and destroy people as individuals. Under structuralism this would be the end of man and the death of humanism. Actually, this would be the total subordination of man and mankind to omnipotent society. But here one can ask whether man, to the extent that the becomes a free being which rises above the social division of labor, will accept this form of non-freedom and non-humanism. For the essence of humanism is precisely that it opposes such human degradation and develops and affirms the awareness that man is the final goal for man.

*

The humanist attitude that man must triumph in the contradictory movement of society is one of those human beliefs without which man would not be man. In the final analysis this attitude is nothing other than the secularized heir of old eschatological visions of the ideal culmination of history. But without this belief man would be unable to realize his human capacities, let alone have any human prospects. This is why one can ask whether humanism is only a useful illusion or whether it is well grounded in science and philosophy.

Man can prove empirically that he is the creator of his own history. The empirical facts of his history show that his human capacities develop contradictorily and that this is the essential mystery of his existence. Various views on alienation are the most obvious expressions of existential and social contradictions because of which even power, which man creates for the sake of his existence, is manifested in an extremely ambivalent manner as lever of progress but also as implement of inhumanity. The workers who wrecked machines at the very beginning of modern capitalism showed convincingly how unbearable this ambivalence is when the power of technology operates

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inhumanly. Every fear of the advance of technology is manifested in similar fashion, especially in our day. Power which is based on the headlong development of science and technology so overpowers all existing forms of social relationships and social organizations that dissatisfaction with what exists is often expressed in a criticism of technology as well. This is why the problem of technical progress has become exceptionally acute. But it has really been acute from the very beginning of the modern age.

Here, too, Pascal was ahead of others. In contemplating the relationship between thought and power he submitted two opposed theses. In the first he submitted that power and not thought is the queen of the world, whereas in the other he answered that thought makes use of power. This implies that power always acts and that the problem is only whether it acts humanly or inhumanly. The notion that criticism of technology is an expression of abstract-humanistic bias which results from failure to perceive its value as an instrument and which is so common today even among Marxists, is in essence nothing other than a superficial, common-sense negation of the critical approach to fundamental questions of existence which Marx asked in passing more than one hundred years ago. That is to say, he wrote that in »our« time everything seems burdened with its own contradictions and that this is best illustrated by machines, which possess »amazing power« to shorten human labor and make it fruitful but which instead lead workers to hunger and poverty. Marx also added that it seemed that all our inventions and all our progress end in material forces gaining intellectual life while human life is being reduced to a state of dull material force.

Technology is the main source of material force and hence it gives rise to technocratic illusions as to the possibilities for technical solution of all the mysteries of the world, as well as to radical doubts that technology in the future, in a society without exploitation, class division and inhumanity, can become the instrument of humanity. The truth can be found between these two extremes only by analysis of human experience and the existential crises which arise in it. Only thus can one see conclusively that man is indeed a midpoint between himself and nothing and that Marx rightly pointed out that in our time man seems to be suffering enslavement by other men, or by his own baseness with the same speed that mankind is gaining power over nature. But Marx by no means believed that man might someday assert absolute power over nature and overcome all existential contradictions to become eventually a perfect being. In general, Marx was not looking for a perfect man in future history but rather for a man who would develop all human needs and potentialities unhindered. This is why the notion of M. Merleau-Ponty that *to be a man means to be something more but also something less than a man* is closer to truth and humanism, which Marx established on the basis that the root of man is man himself. In keeping with such a concept, man will be most human if he is able to transform the power which he creates and which is manifested in a paradoxical manner into an instrument of real human needs and potentialities.

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MACHT UND MENSCHLICHKEIT

Vanja Sutlić

Zagreb

Die Frage des Verhältnisses zwischen Macht und Menschlichkeit, d. h. zwischen dem Sein und dem Wesen des Menschen, ist eine geschichtliche Frage, und zwar in einem Sinne, der die historische, real-genetische Erforschung der Konstellation der sgn. Wirklichkeit (als des »real-faktorischen« Ursprungs und des Bodens, von dem die Frage emporwächst) radikal überschreitet, genauso wie sie eine disziplinarisch, sektorenmäßig bestimmte systematische Artikulation überragt. Das ist eine Frage, die ein metaphysisches Niveau impliziert, es aber in einem wesentlich geschichtlichen Sinne zersetzt.

Schon diese Verwahrung gegen den Historizismus einerseits, und gegen die überkommene traditionelle Systematisierung andererseits, weist auf das Gewicht der Frage, welche nicht nur unsere Angehörigkeit zu der Epoche, nicht nur die Epoche im Ganzen mit allen unseren erfahrungsmäßigen, theoretischen und handlungsmäßigen Verhältnissen innerhalb der Regionen des Seienden dieser Epoche einschließt, sondern zugleich, in ihrer geschichtlichen Konkretheit, das Thematisieren der Epochalität der Epoche selbst bedeutet. Durch diese Frage würden wir also unser Wollen bekunden, über die Epoche außerhalb des Historizismus und außerhalb der Grenzen der systematischen Artikulation zu sprechen, und zwar auf die Weise, daß sich uns ihr Wesen kundgeben würde, und daß wir, aufgrund dieser Kundgebung, noch einmal eventuell imstande wären, ein eigenartiges geschichtliches Verhältnis zu versuchen, oder es wenigstens vorzubereiten – innerhalb des Gefüges des Seins und des Wesens des Menschen.

Zwei große Denker gewinnen ihr Programm des Denkens und Wirkens im epochalen Sinne durch die Überwindung, die Aufhebung der Metaphysik; das ist Nietzsche: durch die Reduktion der wahren Welt auf das Werden des Lebens selbst, dessen Grundcharakter der Wille zur Macht ist, und die Seinsweise: die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen; und das ist Marx: durch seine Verwirklichung der Philosophie in der streng gedachten wissenschaftlichen Geschichte.

Fassen wir das Verhältnis zwischen Macht und Arbeit philosophisch auf, und das heißt immer: metaphysisch, dann ist diese Frage für uns

MACHTUNDMENSCHLICHKEIT

Vanja Sutlić

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The question of the relationship between power and humanity, i. H. between being and the nature of man is a historical question, in a sense that the historical, real-genetic research of the constellation of the so-called. Reality (as the "real-factorial" origin and the ground from which the question grows) radically transcends, just as it transcends a disciplinary, sectoral, systematic articulation. This is a question that implies a metaphysical level, but decomposes it in an essentially historical sense.

Already this rejection of historicism on the one hand, and against the outdated traditional systematization on the other, points to the weight of the question, which not only our belonging to the epoch, not only the epoch as a whole with all our experiential, theoretical and action-related relationships within of the regions of beings of this epoch, but at the same time, in its historical concreteness, means addressing the epochal nature of the epoch itself. By asking this question, then, we would express our willingness to speak about the epoch outside of historicism and outside the limits of systematic articulation, in such a way that its essence would be revealed to us, and that, because of this statement, we would still were once possibly able to attempt a peculiar historical relationship, or at least to prepare it -

within the fabric of being and human essence.

Two great thinkers attain their program of thinking and working in an epochal sense by overcoming, the abolition of metaphysics; that is Nietzsche: through the reduction of the true world to the becoming of life itself, whose basic character is the will to power, and the mode of being: the eternal recurrence of the same; and that is Marx: through his realization of philosophy in strictly conceived scientific history.

If we take a philosophical view of the relationship between power and work, and that always means: metaphysically, then this question is for us

heutzutage möglich nur wenn wir das von jenen Denkern angekündigte Ende der Philosophie-Metaphysik respektieren; und das eigentliche Datum, das wesentlich-zeitliche Datum der Epochalität der Epoche liegt gerade in diesem Denken des Endes, das zugleich die Vollendung der Metaphysik ist und keineswegs ein bloßes Absterben oder Degeneration.

Hier wollen wir uns nicht eingehend mit Nietzsche befassen. Es scheint uns, daß die Macht in der Formel »Wille zur Macht« keinesfalls der durchschnittlich-phänomenalen Vorstellung der »Macht« näher kommt als jene Macht, die sich im Rahmen der Marxschen Kategorien verbirgt, wenn überhaupt solch ein Durchschnittsverständnis irgendein Kriterium für die Erforschung sein kann. Gerade deshalb hat Marx, indem er anscheinend die Nähe des »Phänomens« verließ, erstens die Macht radikaler aus dem Schein der Gewalt, der Gewalttätigkeit, der herkömmlichen soziologisch-psychologischen Behandlung hergeleitet, und hat sie in einer Dimension angesiedelt, wo man sie kaum erwartet hätte, und zweitens er hat sie jedes Pathos entblößt, jeder überhöhter Affirmation, indem er sie in der Prosa der alltäglichen Praxis der Arbeit auflöste. Seine Entdeckung der Macht und des von ihr abhängigen, an ihr mitwirkenden Wesens des Menschen, steht aber auch selbst noch in der nachhegelischen Situation, im Horizont der nichtproblematisierten Humanität und des ihr entsprechenden »Humanismus«. Daher kommt es, daß die Dimension der Macht, die er entdeckt hat, meistens den Interpreten entgangen ist, die sich mehr auf dieser Oberfläche seines Gedankens aufhielten. Deshalb wird auch unsere Analyse seiner Zentralgedanken aus diesem ideen-geschichtlich und dann auch durch die Sache selbst motivierten Rahmen bis zu jener seinen wirklichen Entdeckung vordringen müssen, d. h. bis zur freien, nur auf sich selbst gestellten Produktion, die ihren Grund in nichts anderem hat, sondern Alles in seinem Was und Daß es ist begründet, seien es menschliche oder nicht-menschliche Wesen.

Im Rahmen des Marxschen Werks kündigt ein kurzes Dokument aus dem Frühjahr 1845 den Horizont seines weiteren Denkens und Wirkens an.

Sowohl die »Deutsche Ideologie« als auch alles, was nach ihr als literarisches Dokument oder als unternommene Aktion in organisatorischer Hinsicht oder einem anderen politischen Sinne folgte, steht im Lichte der Entdeckung, die in diesem, eben erwähnten Dokument lapidar formuliert ist, in der Arbeit, die uns philologisch vermittelt ist als »1. ad Feuerbach« und die dann später von Engels als Anhang seiner Schrift »Ludwig Feuerbach und das Ende der deutschen klassischen Philosophie« (1888) veröffentlicht wurde.

Sich später auf dieses Dokument berufend, haben Marx und Engels von der »Selbstverständigung« gesprochen, die zugleich auch ein Einverständnis mit sich selbst ist, was alles angeblich in diesen sgn. Thesen über Feuerbach enthalten ist. Das ist die Selbsterklärung des eigenen »Standpunktes«, das ist gewissermaßen ein Selbstbericht, eine Selbstgewißheit, von der aus sich dann die ganze Welt als Gegenstand eines möglichen Denkens und einer möglichen Aktion zeigt.

nowadays possible only if we respect the end of philosophy-metaphysics announced by those thinkers; and the actual date, the essential temporal date of the epoch's epoch, lies precisely in this thinking of the end, which is

at the same time the completion of metaphysics and by no means a mere dying away or degeneration.

Here we do not want to deal in detail with Nietzsche. It seems to us that power in the form of "will to power" in no way corresponds to the average, phenomenal idea of "power."

comes closer than that power hidden within the framework of Marx's categories, if at all such average understanding can be any criterion for investigation. For this very reason Marx, apparently emphasizing the nearness of the "phenomenon"

first derives power more radically from the appearance of violence, from violence, from conventional sociological-psychological treatment, and has settled it in a dimension where one had hardly expected it, and secondly he has stripped it of all pathos, of all exaggerated affirmation , by dissolving them in the prose of the everyday practice of the work. However, his discovery of power and of the human nature that depends on it and contributes to it still stands in the post-Hegelian situation, in the horizon of unproblematized humanity and the "humanism" that corresponds to it. Hence it is that the dimension of power he discovered has mostly escaped the interpreters who dwelled more on this surface of his thought.

Therefore our analysis of his central ideas will have to advance from this framework, which is motivated by the history of ideas and then also by the thing itself, to his real discovery, i. H. up to free, self-reliant production, which has its ground in nothing else, but everything is grounded in its what and that it is, be it human or non-human beings.

In the context of Marx's work, a short document from the spring of 1845 announces the horizon of his further thinking and work.

Both the »Deutsche Ideologic« and everything that followed after it as a literary document or as an action taken in organizational terms or in any other political sense, stands in the light of the discovery, which is succinctly formulated in this document just mentioned, in the work , which is conveyed to us philologically as »1. ad Feuerbach" and which was then later published by Engels as an appendix to his work "Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of German classical philosophy" (1888).

Referring later to this document, Marx and Engels spoke of "self-understanding," which is at the same time an agreement with oneself, all of which is allegedly contained in these so-called.

theses on Feuerbach. This is the self-declaration of one's own "point of view," this is, so to speak, a self-report, a self-certainty from which the

whole world then shows itself as the object of possible thinking and possible action.

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Da wir nicht auf alle Einzelheiten dieser Thesen eingehen können, scheint es uns von entscheidender Wichtigkeit, daß wir uns mit der zentralen von diesen 11 Thesen, d. h. mit der *zweiten* These befassen.

»Die Frage, ob dem menschlichen Denken gegenständliche Wahrheit zukomme – ist keine Frage der Theorie, sondern eine *praktische* Frage. In der Praxis muß der Mensch die Wahrheit, i. e. Wirklichkeit und Macht, Diesseitigkeit seines Denkens beweisen. Der Streit über die Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit des Denkens – das von der Praxis isoliert ist – ist eine rein scholastische Frage.«

In dieser knappen Formulierung ist mehr als eine Theorie der Wahrheit gegeben, die ihre Quelle und ihr Kriterium in der Praxis sehen möchten, in dieser knappen Formulierung ist der Horizont des gesamten Marxschen Denkens-Wirkens abgesteckt.

Und wie es immer geschieht, wenn jemand aus einem Horizont über das, was in demselben Horizont ist, spricht – wurde der Horizont selbst nicht thematisiert. In dem gesamten umfangreichen Werk von Marx und Engels war die Praxis als Praxis oder das *Wesen* der Praxis nie als Frage aufgeworfen. Im Gegenteil, sie war gerade das, als was sie sie bezeichnet haben: die Selbstgewißheit, die Selbstverständigung, die Verständigung mit sich selbst, das Erschauen des Lichts, das die ganze Möglichkeit der Aktion und die ganze Möglichkeit des Denkens erleuchtet hat.

Es fällt sofort auf, daß es sich anders als bei den traditionellen Theorien der Wahrheit, die die Wahrheit an das Urteil binden, das sich auf diese oder jene Weise auf die Dinge bezieht, die also den Ort der Wahrheit in der Äußerung finden – daß es sich hier also um eine Wahrheit handelt, die durch ein »ist es« erklärt ist und zugleich als Wirklichkeit und Macht, als Diesseitigkeit des Denkens bezeichnet ist. Offensichtlich handelt es sich hier um eine »Wahrheit«, an die wir nicht gewöhnt sind, da wir von verschiedenartig orientierten Erkenntnistheorien ausgehen, für die es aber auch kein Präzedens in einer anderen philosophischen Disziplin oder in dem vorreflexivischen Verständnis gibt, falls wir dieses Wahre und Wahrhafte nicht als Metapher für etwas anderes auffassen, wie z. B. »wahres« Geld für echtes Geld. Bei Marx handelt es sich jedoch um keine Metapher. Es handelt sich um dasjenige, das sowohl das theoretische Denken als auch das praktische Wirken im engeren Sinn ermöglicht, und das beiden – der Theorie und der Praxis im engeren Sinn – Wirklichkeit, Macht und Diesseitigkeit verleiht. Offensichtlich ist die Rede von etwas, von dem alles, was wir in der so oder anders artikulierten Welt kennen, bereits von vorneherein abhängig ist. Offensichtlich ist die Rede von jenem dritten, das beides, dem es vorangeht, erst ermöglicht. Dieses dritte ist vor allem weder durch sich selbst eine Eigenschaft der Dinge, noch ist es ein Charakter des Urteils, der Äußerung oder der Aussage. Dieses dritte nennt Marx »Praxis«.

Die »Praxis« befindet sich im Gefüge seines Denkens genau dort, wo sich im Mittelalter der Garant für die adaequatio rei et intellectus befunden hat: die verocitas dei, die Wahrhaftigkeit Gottes. Genau an der Stelle steht die Praxis, an der sich bei den Griechen die Verkündung von allem, was an sich und durch sich in Namen wie *logos*,

Since we cannot go into all the details of these theses, it seems to us of crucial importance that we deal with the central one of these 11 theses, i. H. deal with the second thesis.

"The question of whether human thinking has objective truth is not a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice man must know the truth, i. e. prove reality and power, this worldliness of his thinking. The argument about the reality or non-reality of thought - which is isolated from practice - is a purely scholastic question.'

In this concise formulation more than one theory of truth is given, which wants to see its source and its criterion in practice, in this concise formulation the horizon of the entire Marxian thought-work is marked out.

And as always happens when someone speaks from a horizon about what is in the same horizon - the horizon itself was not addressed. Throughout the extensive work of Marx and Engels, praxis as praxis or the nature of praxis was never raised as a question. On the contrary, it was just what they called it: self-confidence, self-understanding, understanding with oneself, seeing the light that illuminated the whole possibility of action and the whole possibility of thinking.

It is immediately striking that, unlike the traditional theories of truth, which tie truth to judgment relating to things in one way or another, which thus find the place of truth in presentation - that what is at issue here is a truth that is explained by an "is it" and is at the same time designated as reality and power, as the worldliness of thinking. Obviously we are dealing here with a "truth" that we are not used to seeing, since we start from variously oriented epistemologies, but for which there is also no precedent in any other philosophical discipline or in the pre-reflexive understanding, if we not to take this true and true as a metaphor for something else, such as e.g. B. "real" money for real money. With Marx, however, it is not a metaphor. It is that which enables both theoretical thinking and practical action in the narrower sense, and which gives both - theory and practice in the narrower sense - reality, power and this world. Obviously we are talking about something on which everything we know in the world articulated in one way or another is already dependent from the outset. Obviously we are talking about that third, which makes both of which precede it possible in the first place. Above all, this third is not in itself a property of things, nor is it a character of judgment, statement, or assertion. Marx calls this third "practice."

The "practice" is found in the structure of his thinking exactly where the guarantor for the adaequatio rei et intellectus was in the Middle Ages: the verocitas dei, the truthfulness of God. Exactly at this point stands the practice in which the Greeks found the proclamation of everything that is in and through itself in names like logos, 16

physis und *kosmos* befand, bevor die Praxis nur auf das Praktische im Sinne des Politischen, Ökonomischen und Ethischen, und die Wahrheit auf eine Eigenschaft der Aussage beschränkt wurde, die sich über die homoiosis, über die Übereinstimmung mit ta pragmata konstituiert.

So finden wir am Ende der Metaphysik in dieser Formel der zweiten, lapidar formulierten These die Erneuerung des ganzen Beginns des Metaphysizierens, und zwar im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Philosophierens, welches eindeutig dadurch bestimmt ist, daß es alles, was ist, sogar das Ist dieses Ist von dem Subjekt her versteht; oder in Hegels klassischer Formel – von der Subjekt-Substanz her.

Was ist eigentlich diese *Praxis?* Die Praxis ist der aus der Tradition des deutschen Idealismus und aus der Leibnitztradition entstandene und sie zugleich bereichernde, gedachte appetitus, der Wille, das dynamische Moment von allem Werden, demzufolge nichts beständig ist und alles wert ist, überwunden zu werden, und alles sich nur auf diese Weise erhält, daß es sich schon in der Setzung selbst überwindet. Aber appetitus, Wille wozu? Die Praxis erscheint bei Marx im Rahmen des genannten Dokuments, in der dritten These, mit einem charakteristischen Attribut, nämlich als »revolutionäre« Praxis. Was er unter »Revolution« versteht, ist aus der elften These ersichtlich, in der von der »Veränderung der Welt« die Rede ist.

»Revolution« ist nicht eine Rückkehr zu etwas; »Revulotion« ist eine endlose, durch nichts aufzuhaltende Transformation von allem, was ist, auf Ziele zu, die – wir wollen für den Augenblick diese Frage im Neutralen belassen – der Transformation selbst entweder immanent oder transzendent sein können. Also die »revolutionär« und durch die »Veränderung« aufgefaßte Praxis zeigt, von welcher Praxis die Rede ist. Als Transformation im pragmatischen Sinne gilt sie nicht nur für die klassische politische Ökonomie sondern gleicherart auch für das Ende des klassischen Idealismus und seine Vollendung, die Tätigkeit, die Tat, die näher bestimmt wird als Arbeit: jene unerhörte, ungeheuere Macht des Negativen, die im Rahmen der Totalität wirkt, diese Totalität herstellend und zugleich jedes von ihren Momenten als Übergang und als vergängliches Moment vernichtend, diese Negativität ist bei Hegel als Arbeit des Begriffs bezeichnet.

»Der Begriff« stellt sich selbst arbeitend in der Totalität und damit in seiner Wahrheit her, denn die Wahrheit ist das Ganze. Die Rede ist also von der Praxis, von der Praxis der Arbeit, und zwar im Sinne des genitivus subiectivus und des genitivus obiectivus, von der Praxis, die bewirkt, daß die Arbeit geschieht, die sozusagen energeia ist, das Realisieren und Aktualisieren der Arbeit, und zugleich von der Arbeit, die praktiziert, die Subjekt dieser Praxis ist und die weit davon entfernt ist, nur auf eine äußere actualitas und energeia angewiesen zu sein, die ihre eigene energeia, ihre actualitas – das Arbeiten und das Erarbeiten der Arbeit ist.

Diese Zweifachheit, ausgedrückt durch den genitivus subiectivus und den genitivus obiectivus, zeigt die innere Spannung aller Selbstveränderungen, aller Selbstwandlungen der Arbeit. Dadurch ist der dynamische Charakter aller Arbeit erhalten. Die Arbeit, nun meta-

physis and kosmos before practice was limited to the practical in the sense of the political, economic and ethical, and truth was limited to a property of the statement that is constituted by homoiosis, by agreement with ta

pragmata.

Thus, at the end of metaphysics, in this formula of the second, succinctly formulated thesis, we find the renewal of the whole beginning of metaphysicization, namely within the framework of modern philosophizing, which is clearly determined by the fact that everything that is, even the 1st of this 1st understands from the subject; or in Hegel's classic formula - from the subject-substance.

What exactly is this practice? Practice is the imagined appetitus that has emerged from the tradition of German idealism and from the Leibniz tradition and at the same time enriches it, the will, the dynamic moment of all becoming, according to which nothing is permanent and everything is worth overcoming, and everything only itself in this way you get that it already overcomes itself in the positing.

But appetite, will for what? In Marx, in the context of the document mentioned, in the third thesis, praxis appears with a characteristic attribute, namely as "revolutionary" praxis. What he means by "revolution" can be seen from the eleventh thesis, which speaks of "changing the world."

"Revolution" is not a return to something; "Revulotion" is an endless, unstoppable transformation of everything that is, towards goals which—let's leave this question neutral for the moment—may be either immanent or transcendent to the transformation itself. So the practice understood as "revolutionary" and through the "change" shows what kind of practice we are talking about. As a transformation in the pragmatic sense, it applies not only to classical political economy, but also in the same way to the end of classical idealism and its completion, activity, the deed that is more closely defined as work: that outrageous, tremendous power of the negative, which in The framework of the totality works, producing this totality and at the same time destroying each of its moments as a transition and as a transitory moment. This negativity is designated by Hegel as the work of the concept.

"The concept" produces itself working in the totality and thus in its truth, because the truth is the whole. We are therefore talking about practice, about the practice of work, namely in the sense of the genitivus subiectivus and the genitivus obiectivus, about the practice that causes work to happen, which is energeia, so to speak, the realization and actualization of work, and at the same time from the work that practices, that is the subject of this practice and that is far from being dependent only on an external actualitas and energeia, which is its own energeia, its actualitas - the working and the working out of the work.

This duality, expressed by the genitivus subiectivus and the genitivus obiectivus, shows the inner tension of all self-changes, all self-transformations of work. This preserves the dynamic character of all work. The work, now meta-2 PRACTICE

physisch und nicht im Sinne einer speziellen Ergologie oder vielleicht einer Soziologie der Arbeit oder Psychologie der Arbeit u. ä. aufgefaßt – ist dasselbe wie die Macht. In dem theta Buchvon Aristotels' Metaphysik, in dem von den Schlüsselbegriffen alles Philosophierens die Rede ist – von der dynamis, der energia, der enteleheia – werden die Beispiele, mit denen diese Begriffe illustriert werden, aus dem Bereich der Arbeit genommen. Das Wort selbst weist schon darauf hin, denn en-ergeia, ergon usw. sind »Arbeit«. Anderseits zielt die bekannte historisch-philosophische Klassifizierung der Aristotelischen Anschauung als einer »organologischen« (z. B. K. Schilling) auf nichts Biologisches, denn »organon« im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes ist auch nichts Biologisches, sondern Werkzeug, und zwar ein Werkzeug, mit dem eine entsprechende Arbeitsleistung erzielt wird.

Die gesamte Aristotelische Metaphysik bleibt trotz der strengen, auf keinen Fall zufälligen Trennung der theoria, poiesis und praxis, doch im Rahmen des fundamentalen weltlichen Projekts der Arbeit, welches Projekt sich über die Hegelsche *Philosophie* der Arbeit, durch eine Umkehrung zur Diesseitigkeit in der Marxschen *allgemeinen Ergologie* oder *Technologie* der Arbeit »realisiert«.

»Macht«, das heißt erstens: die Möglichkeit, die ermöglicht, d. h. zur Arbeit und zum Arbeiten intensiv sammelt und vorbereitet (dynamis), zweitens, das Arbeiten als Äußerung der Arbeit selbst – die Arbeit am Werk (en-ergeia) und drittens die Erarbeitung als das Bei-sich-sein und die Abgerundetheit des Arbeitens der Arbeit in sich und somit die Vervollkommnung in dem Endzweck (enteleheia).

Die Umkehrung der Tradition bei Marx, dieser ganze Prozeß, den er »Verwirklichung der Philosophie« und »Aufhebung der Philosophie« genannt hat, besteht darin, daß durch die Praxis der Arbeit die Unterscheidung der »wesentlichen Welt« von der »Erscheinungswelt« aufgehoben wird. Jene metaphysische Welt, die in »Gott« verkörpert ist, ist tot, so daß Nietzsches Formel »Gott ist tot« eine entsprechende Formulierung in der vierten These des genannten Dokuments findet, wo die Rede davon ist, daß dieses »himmlische Reich« destruiert wird – und Feuerbach hat schon gezeigt, daß es auf das »diesseitige Reich« zurückzuführen ist, aber – Marx zufolge – besteht Feuerbachs Unzulänglichkeit darin, daß er in der Diesseitigkeit nicht die entscheidenden Prinzipien der Widersprüche gefunden hat, aus denen heraus sie theoretisch und auch praktisch vernichtet werden könnten: Engels eufemisiert das in seiner Redaktion des genannten Dokuments, indem er sagt, die Rede wäre nur von einer Veränderung, während es im Originaltext »vernichten« und nicht »verändern« heißt.

Es wird also die Unterscheidung der »wesentlichen Welt« von der »Erscheinungswelt« abgeschafft, desjenigen, was wahrhaft ist, was in sich selbst seinen eigenen Bestand und Bestehen hat, und dessen, was nur zu sein scheint, was ein ewiges Werden, eine ewige Veränderung ist, me on – und zwar dadurch, daß die wesentliche Welt in die Erscheinungswelt eingeführt wird, und diese – indem sie nicht bloß eine körperlich sinnliche wie bei Feuerbach bleibt, eine bloß veränderliche Welt, die einfach hier zur Wahrnehmung gegeben ist –

physically and not in the sense of a special ergology or maybe a sociology of work or psychology of work etc. understood

- is the same as the power. In the theta book of Aristotle's metaphysics,

which speaks of the key concepts of all philosophizing - the dynamis, the energia, the enteleheia - the examples used to illustrate these concepts are taken from the realm of work. The word itself indicates this, for en-ergeia, ergon etc. are "work". On the other hand, the well-known historical-philosophical classification of the Aristotelian view as an "organological" (e.g. K. Schilling) does not aim at anything biological, because "organon" in the proper sense of the word is also not biological, but a tool, and indeed a tool with which appropriate work performance is achieved.

The whole of Aristotelian metaphysics, despite the strict, by no means accidental, separation of theoria, poiesis and praxis, remains within the framework of the fundamental secular project of work, which project extends beyond the Hegelian philosophy of work, through a reversal to this worldliness in Marx's general Ergology or technology of work »realizes«.

"M eight" means firstly: the possibility that enables, i. H.

intensively collected and prepared (dynamis) for the work and for the work, secondly, the work as an exposure of the work itself - the work on the work (en-ergeia) and thirdly, the development as the being-with-oneself and the roundedness of the work of the work in itself and thus perfection in the end (enteleheia).

The reversal of tradition in Marx, this whole process that he called the "realization of philosophy" and the "abolition of philosophy," consists in the fact that through the practice of work the distinction of the "essential world" from the "world of appearances" will be annulled. That metaphysical world that is embodied in "G ott" is dead, so that Nietzsche's formula "Gott ist dead" finds a corresponding formulation in the fourth thesis of the document mentioned, where it is said that this "heavenly kingdom «

is destroyed - and Feuerbach has already shown that this is due to

"This-worldly realm" can be traced back, but - according to Marx - Feuerbach's inadequacy consists in the fact that he did not find in this worldliness the decisive principles of the contradictions from which they could theoretically and practically be destroyed: Engels eufemized this in his redaction of said document, saying that there is only talk of a change, while in the original text it is "destroyed" and not "changed"

heifit.

The distinction between the "essential world" and the

"world of appearances" abolished, that which is true, that which in itself

has its own existence and persistence, and that which only seems to be, which is an eternal becoming, an eternal change, me on - namely because the essential world is introduced into the world of appearances, and this - in that it does not merely remain a physically sensual world as in Feuerbach, a merely variable world which is simply given here for perception -

unterzieht sich selbst der Veränderung nach Kriterien, die aus dieser »wahren Welt« gewonnen sind, d. h. indem diese Welt hier gemessen wird, kritisch beurteilt wird nach dem Wesen, das die Metaphysik entdeckt hat, aber nun auf die Art, daß in dieser kritischen Tätigkeit nur die metaphysische Theorie und nur die sinnlich-körperliche, in dem Erscheinenden und Veränderlichen wirkende Praxis abgeschafft wird, so daß sich beides in die eigentliche Praxis verwandelt, die sich jenseits des Unterschiedes zwischen Theorie und Praxis befindet und beiden vorangeht.

Alle Theorie ist schon immer praktisch, alle Praxis ist schon immer theoretisch, Diese Behauptungen reichen nicht aus, um zu sehen, wer das »Subjekt« des ganzen Verhältnisses ist, weil sie in der Relation der Wechselwirkung bleiben. Dasjenige, was wahrhaft ist, was sowohl das eine als auch das andere, sowohl die Theorie im engeren Sinne als auch die Praxis im engeren Sinne ermöglicht, ist die Praxis selbst, deren Eigentümlickeit es ist, daß sie sowohl die theoria als auch die poiesis in sich aufgenommen hat.

Indem die metaphysiche Welt so auf die sinnliche reduziert, und die sinnliche praktisch revolutioniert wird, *verwirklicht* sich die Metaphysik, sie hört auf, eine Beschäftigung mit etwas Jenseitigem zu sein und wird zur diesseitigen Praxis. Das ist diejenige Diesseitigkeit dieses Gedankens, der dem Rang nach der Wirklichkeit und der Macht gleichgesetzt ist.

Die Praxis der Arbeit ist das Wesen von allem, der grundlegende Charakter des Seienden, d. h. der Arbeitsprodukte im Ganzen der arbeitenden Welt, die Macht, welche allem ermöglicht hat, das zu sein, was es ist, und in der Vollständigkeit seines Wesens so zu sein, wie es schon immer ist. Was ist aber das Wesen der Praxis? Diese Frage hat sich Marx nicht gestellt. Das höchste, was er von der Praxis weiß, steht in einem Kontext der Grundrisse . . . etc., und das ist, daß die Praxis ein »freies Spiel der menschlichen Kräfte« ist. Und das hat er geäußert, der sich sonst, Fourier gegenüber, so energisch dagegen verwahrt hat, die Arbeit als Spiel aufzufassen. Das hier gebrauchte Wort »Spiel« hat seine strenge Bedeutung. Die Rede ist nähmlich davon, daß die Praxis, die alles begründet, so daß man nicht fragen kann, beziehungsweise nicht einmal die Frage stellen kann: Wozu die Praxis? daß also diese Praxis selbst ohne Wesen ist, sie selbst ist ohne Grund, falls sie solch ein Wesen und solch einem Grund nicht wieder auf etwas Praktisches reduzieren vermag: Die Frage nach dem *Ursprung* der Praxis kann nicht gestellt werden. Und gerade auf diesen Ursprung, auf das Wesen der Praxis ist die Frage nach der Macht und der Menschlichkeit, wie wir sie hier gestellt haben, gerichtet. Aber als Praxis der Arbeit, wäre der allgemeine Charakter eines jeden Seienden der ständigen Änderung und Transformation ausgesetzt, ohne in sich seine Beständigkeit und Ständigkeit zu haben, ohne in sich seine realisierte philosophische Dimension zu haben.

Marx weiß das ganz genau. Indem er in dem Horizont der Praxis der Arbeit bleibt, stellt er nicht mehr die Frage: Was ist die Praxis? oder gar: Wozu die Praxis?, sondern: *Wie sich die Praxis,* einmal in ihrer Reinheit und ihrer Fülle hergestellt, und das ist die geschicht-

undergoes itself the change according to criteria resulting from this

"true world" are won, i. H. in that this world is measured here, critically judged according to the essence that metaphysics has discovered, but now

in such a way that in this critical activity only metaphysical theory and only sensual-corporeal practice, effective in what appears and changes, are abolished so that both are transformed into actual practice, which is beyond the difference between theory and practice and precedes both.

All theory is always practical, all practice is always theoretical. These assertions do not suffice to see who is the "subject" of the whole relation, because they remain in the relation of interaction. What truly is, what makes both the one and the other possible, both theory in the narrower sense and practice in the narrower sense, is practice itself, the peculiarity of which is that it includes both theoria and poiesis in has taken up.

By thus reducing the metaphysical world to the sensuous, and practically revolutionizing the sensuous, metaphysics materializes, ceases to be a preoccupation with something otherworldly, and becomes a practice of this world. This is the worldliness of this thought, which is ranked equal to reality and power.

The practice of work is the essence of everything, the fundamental character of being, i. H. of the products of labor throughout the working world, the power that has enabled everything to be what it is and to be in the wholeness of its essence as it always is. But what is the essence of practice? Marx did not ask himself this question. The highest that he knows of practice stands in the context of the floor plans. . . etc., and that is that the practice is a "free play of human powers." And that's what he came up with, who otherwise, to Fourier, so energetically protested against seeing work as a game. The word "game" used here has its strict meaning. We are talking about the fact that the practice that justifies everything, so that one cannot ask, or even pose the question: What is the practice for? that this practice itself is without essence, it itself is without reason, if it is not able to reduce such a essence and such a reason to something practical again: The question of the origin of the practice cannot be asked. And it is precisely to this origin, to the essence of practice, that the question of power and humanity, as we have asked it here, is directed.

But as a practice of work, the general character of each being would be subject to constant change and transformation, without having in itself its permanence and permanence, without having in itself its realized philosophical dimension.

Marx knows this very well. Staying within the horizon of the practice of work, he no longer poses the question: what is practice?

or even: Why the practice?, but: How the practice, once established in its purity and its fullness, and that is the history-19

liche Tat der »kommunistischen Revolution«, *entwickelt, entfaltet, entpuppt,* da sie ständig im Werden begriffen ist, d. h. sich selbst ständig überwindet und sich dennoch in diesem Überwinden *ununterbrochen, unbedingt, absolut* setzend.

Die Vollendung der Metaphysik, die Realisierung der Metaphysik, besteht also nicht nur darin, daß das »wahre Reich« reduktiv auf die »Diesseitigkeit«, auf die »Wirklichkeit«, kurz auf die Macht der Praxis, auf die Praxis der Arbeit zurückgeführt wird, sondern daß auch die Praxis der Arbeit so aufgefaßt wird, daß sie eigentlich die *Sicherung der Ständigkeit,* der *Persistenz* ist von allem, was in der Welt des Werdens ist, und daß ihre Tendenz ist, als Praxis so lange zu funktionieren und sich selbst zu überwinden, bis das Letzte nicht erreicht ist, daß nämlich, in den Arbeitsprodukten die Arbeit selbst am Werk ist, d. h. daß die Praxis absolut gesetzt ist. Den Prozeß dieser absoluten Setzung der Praxis der Arbeit oder der Produktion faßt Marx in seiner historischen Konzeption der Revolution als Frage des Übergangs von der »bisherigen Geschichte« zur *wahren* Geschichte auf.

Wenn die gesamte bisherige Geschichte durch die zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen auf der Grundlage der Entwicklungsstufe der Produktivkräfte bestimmt war, welche zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen sich wie selbständige Mächte verhielten – mit der Aufhebung, der radikalen Aufhebung der Sphäre des Ökonomischen, d. h. der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen in dem Produktionsprozess, die den Anschein von Sachen und von etwas dem Menschen fremden hatten – dann kommt es darauf aus, daß die Praxis der Arbeit aus sich heraus ihre Ziele setzt, und daß sie in jedem Moment darauf bedacht ist, daß sich diesem Ziel nichts entzieht, daß nichts aus dem Rahmen ihres Bereiches, ihrer Tatigkeit verschwindet.

Die Stabilität in der Veränderung, in der Umwandlung, in der Transformation, die die Praxis der Arbeit mit sich bringt, ist durch den *wissenschaftlichen* Charakter der Geschichte gewährleistet. Das ist nicht eine Geschichte, die – unter anderem – in ihrem Schoß auch so etwas wie die Wissenschaft hätte, sondern das ist eine aus der Wissenschaft hervorgehende Geschichte. Nur als »geplante« Geschichte im strengsten Sinne des Wortes, nicht im engeren Sinne des Planens, wie es im Rahmen der ökonomistischen oder soziologistischen Reflexionen aufgezeigte Möglichkeit jedes aktuellen Praktizierens, die die *Beständigkeit* in der Veränderung gewährleistet. Diese Beständigkeit in der Veränderung hat aber ihrerseits die Tendenz, die Veränderung überflüssig zu machen. Der Dynamismus von jenem *appetitus,* von dem *Willen,* der in der Praxis der Arbeit arbeitet, stellt sich selbst dadurch in Frage, daß als Quelle der Beständigkeit, der Sicherung dessen was ist, die Wissenschaft gesetzt wird.

Die wissenschaftliche Geschichte ist das Analogon zu Nietzsches ewiger Wiederkehr des Gleichen, genauso wie die Praxis der Arbeit das Analogon zu Nietzsches Willen zur Macht ist.

Außerhalb ihrer Teilung ist die Arbeit also eine Macht, die allem übergeordnet ist; ihr ist alles untergeordnet, und sie ist die Ordnung selbst, ordo der Dinge, die herrschend, das Verhalten von allem und

deed of the 'communist revolution', developed, unfolded, unveiled, since it is constantly in the process of becoming, i. H. constantly overcoming itself and yet uninterruptedly, unconditionally, absolutely positing itself in this

overcoming.

The completion of metaphysics, the realization of metaphysics, consists not only in the fact that the "true realm" is reductive to the

"This-worldliness," to "reality," in short, to the power of practice, to the practice of work, but also that the practice of work is understood in such a way that it actually secures the stability, the persistence, of everything what is in the world of becoming, and that its tendency is to function as practice and to overcome itself until the ultimate is not reached, namely that the work itself is at work in the products of work, i. H. that practice is absolutely posited. In his historical conception of revolution, Marx conceives of the process of this absolute positing of the practice of work or of production as a question of the transition from "history up to now" to true history.

If all previous history was determined by interpersonal relations on the basis of the level of development of the productive forces, which interpersonal relations behaved like independent powers - with the abolition, the radical abolition of the sphere of the economic, i. H. of the interpersonal relationships in the production process, which had the appearance of things and of something alien to man - then what matters is that the practice of work sets its own goals and that it is careful at every moment to ensure that nothing detracts from this goal, so that nothing disappears from the framework of its area, its activity.

The stability in the change, in the transformation, in the transformation that the practice of work brings with it is guaranteed by the scientific character of history. This is not a story that - among other things - also had something like science in its bosom, but it is a story that emerges from science. Only as "planned" history in the strictest sense of the word, not in the narrower sense of planning, as shown in the context of economistic or sociological reflections of any current practice that guarantees permanence in change. However, this persistence in change tends to make change superfluous. The dynamism of that appetitus, of the will that works in the practice of work, questions itself by positing science as the source of stability, of securing what is.

Scientific history is the analogue of Nietzsche's eternal return of the same, just as the practice of work is the analogue of Nietzsche's will to power.

Outside of its division, then, labor is a power superior to all; everything is subordinate to it, and it is the order itself, ordo of things that rule, the behavior of everything and 20

allen bestimmt. Das ist der Grund, warum Marx in seinen Vorarbeiten zum Kapital, in den bekannten Grundrissen . . . etc. Fourier entgegenhält, daß die Arbeit nie zum Spiel werden kann, allerdings das Spiel als etwas Unernstes verstehend, das im Gegensatz zum äußersten Ernst der Arbeit als Macht steht. Das Spiel der Macht, die alles begründet, selbst jedoch ohne Grund bleibend, ist also nicht gleichbedeutend mit jenem Spiel, dem gegenüber sich Marx in seinen Grundrissen negativ äußert. Das Spiel der Macht ist, unter dem Aspekt des Wesens des Menschen, ein »freies Spiel der menschlichen Kräfte«, menschliche Praxis, die der Offenheit des Seins, der Praxis selbst als wesentlichem Spiel entspricht. Aber auch dieser ambivalente Gebrauch des Terminus, – Spiel als bloßes Spiel, nur als Spiel, und Spiel zugleich als Bestimmung des Wesens von allem, was ist, – diese Zweiheit, wie auch die Marxsche Zweiheit des Humanen und des Praktischen, die sich ständig überspielen, weil das Humane durch die Praxis und die Praxis durch das Humane ist, zeugt von jener bestimmten metaphysischen Individuation, der er selbst angehört, nämlich dem Übergang von der Philosophie in die Postphilosophie, – von der Philosophie in die »realisierte« Philosophie. Dieser Prozeß kann sich seinerseits nur philosophisch abspielen. Der philosophische Ausdruck für diesen Übergang ist das Residuum der spekulativen Subjektivität, genannt »Humanismus«. Deshalb wird die innere Grenze derjenigen wesentlichen Marxschen Einsicht, nämlich der *Produktion als solchen und um ihrer selbst willen*, jener Technologie und Ergologie, durch einen »Humanismus« und durch das Primat der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen als einem besonderen Marxschen Thema verdeckt und ersetzt.

An der entsprechenden Stelle in den Grundrissen . . . etc. sagt Marx: Die Freizeit, die sowohl Zeit für die Muße als auch für eine höhere Tätigkeit ist – hat ihren Besitzer natürlich in ein anderes Subjekt verwandelt, so daß er dann als ein verwandeltes Subjekt in den Prozeß der unmittelbaren Produktion eintritt. Dieser ist zugleich Disziplin, im Hinblick auf den werdenden Menschen betrachtet, als auch Betätigung und Ausübung, experimentelle Wissenschaft, eine materiell schaffende und sich selbst vergegenständlichende Wissenschaft, im Hinblick auf den gewordenen Menschen betrachtet.

Der Bereich der letzgenannten Disziplin für den Menschen, der so im Rahmen der Praxis der Arbeit aufgefaßt ist, ist die sgn. »höhere Tätigkeit«, diejenige Tätigkeit, die im Rahmen der »Freizeit« ausgeübt wird, oder wie es an einer anderen Stelle im Kapital III heißt: »Tätigkeit im Reich der Freiheit«.

Aus ihr geht eine »Disziplin« hervor, die jedesmal bestimmt, als was und wie er in seinen sozialen, politischen, organisatorischen und was und ie er in seinen sozialen, politischen, organisatorischen und anderen Relationen auftreten wird.

Diese Marxsche Unterscheidung zwischen dem unmittelbaren Produktionsprozeß einerseits und der höheren Tätigkeit anderseits, der Arbeitszeit einerseits, und der Freizeit andererseits, des Reiches der Notwendigkeit und des Reiches der Freiheit, weist zweifachen Charakter auf – des Seins als Macht, aufgefaßt als Praxis der Arbeit in

alien destined. That is the reason why Marx, in his preparatory work on Capital, in the well-known Grundrisse . . . etc. Fourier counters that work can never become play, but understands play as something irresponsible

that stands in contrast to the utmost seriousness of work as power. The game of power, which justifies everything but itself remains without a reason, is therefore not synonymous with that game which Marx portrays himself negatively in his Grundrisse. From the point of view of human nature, the game of power is a "free game of human forces," human practice that corresponds to the openness of being, to practice itself as an essential game. But also this ambivalent use of the term - game as mere game, only as game, and game at the same time as a determination of the essence of everything that is - this duality, as well as the Marxian duality of the human and the practical, which constantly overlap , because the human is through practice and practice through the human, bears witness to that specific metaphysical individuation to which he himself belongs, namely the transition from philosophy to post-philosophy—from philosophy to "realized" philosophy. For its part, this process can only take place philosophically. The philosophical term for this transition is the residue of speculative subjectivity called "humanism." Therefore the inner limit of that essential Marxian insight, namely production as such and for its own sake, that technology and ergology, is obscured and replaced by a "humanism" and by the primacy of interpersonal relationships as a special Marxian theme.

At the appropriate place in the floor plans .. . etc. says Marx: Leisure time, which is both time for leisure and for a higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into another subject, so that he then enters the process of immediate production as a transformed subject. This is at the same time discipline, viewed with regard to the developing human being, as well as activity and practice, experimental science, a materially creating and self-objectifying science, viewed with regard to the developing human being.

The area of the latter discipline for man, which is so understood in the context of the practice of work, is the so-called. "higher activity", that activity which is carried out in the context of "free time", or as it is called elsewhere in Chapter III:

»Activity in the realm of freedom«.

A "discipline" emerges from it, which always determines what and how he will appear in his social, political, organizational and what and how he will appear in his social, political, organizational and other relations.

This Marxian distinction between the immediate process of production on the one hand and higher activity on the other hand, labor time on the one hand, and leisure time on the other, the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, has a dual character - being as power, understood as the practice

der geschichtlichen Wissenschaft. Die höhere Tätigkeit ist paradigmatisch in der sgn. wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit enthalten. Die materielle Tätigkeit ist auch nichts anderes als eine experimentelle Wissenschaft, ein Terminus, der schon in den Pariser Manuskripten (1844) vorkommt, wo von dem Experimentieren und der Industrie als dem wahren Forschungsfeld des Wesens des Menschen – der Anthropologie – die Rede ist; das »Geheimnis« der Psychologie, der Anthropologie usw. ist die Industrie und das Experiment.

Der ständige Prozeß des sich überwindenden Produzierens, der *Produktion wegen der Produktion,* wie es in dem zweiten Band der Mehrwerttheorie heißt, wird stabil gehalten mit Hilfe der »höheren Tätigkeit«. Die Wechselwirkung der »höheren Tätigkeit« und der »materiellen Produktion« hält die Welt der Arbeit als Macht aufrecht. Das ist die Macht in bedeutend fundamentalerem Sinn als es Gewalt, Zwang und alle ihre Derivate sind, mit denen sich die alltägliche, vorwissenschaftliche Erfahrung und die Wissenschaft selbst befassen, jedesmal irgendwie damit rechnend, daß Macht und ihre Menschlichkeit unproblematisch vorausgesetzt sind, wenn von diesem oder jenem menschlichen Phänomen gesprochen wird, oder wenn von den verschiedenen Formen der faktischen Macht die Rede ist. Das, was hier jedesmal vorausgesetzt wird, ist dasselbe, was Marx sonst im Geschehen der Produktionsweise, die nach der Vorgeschichte erfolgen wird, vorwegnimmt, der Prähistorie, die an die »antagonistischen« zwischenmenschlichen Verhältnisse gebunden ist, die ihrerseits auf der fundamentalen Arbeitsteilung fußen und insofern eine Grenze für die volle Etablierung des »Wesens« von allem in der »Realität« darstellen.

Um das Wesentliche aus den Marxschen Gedanken herauslesen zu können, muß erklärt werden, in welchem Ausmaß der humanistisch-anthropologische Horizont aller seiner Ausführungen es erschwert, das zu sehen, wovon im Grunde die Rede ist: ihm ist eigentlich an der *ungestörten, vollen Entfaltung der Produktivkräfte* gelegen, die einmal auf sich selbst gestellt, immer mehr den Charakter der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit, einer arbeitenden Wissenschaft erhalten. Die Möglichkeit einer solchen Arbeit erahnte er schon in den Jahren 1857/58, als er die Automatisation voraussah und für den Menschen die Rolle des Aufsehers und Kontrolleurs des verselbständigten Arbeitsprozesses prophezeihte.

Wenn die Rede von der Arbeit im metaphysischen Sinne des Wortes ist, ist diese Arbeit der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit im Rahmen einer absoluten Systematik des Hegelschen Typus viel näher als der manuellen Arbeit. Aber die wahre Formel ist nicht einmal in der Analogie mit der Hegelschen Metaphysik. Die wissenschaftliche Arbeit ist viel mehr als dasjenige, was wir gewohnheitsgemäß als Wissenschaft ansehen. Das ist nicht mehr eine Theorie, die der Praxis ihretwegen vorangeht, sondern das ist eine Praxis, die unmittelbar von der Theorie durchdrungen ist; die Theorie hat sich dabei aber wesentlich modifiziert. Von der Kontemplation und dem Denken an etwas anderes, als sie selbst ist, wurde sie zur Verfassungsform der Praxis selbst, zur Organisation der Praxis selbst, zu ihrem organi-

of historical science. The higher activity is paradigmatic in the so-called. contain scientific activity. Material activity is also nothing other than an

experimental science, a term that appears as early as the Paris Manuscripts (1844), where experimentation and industry are spoken of as the true research field of human nature - anthropology; the "secret" of psychology, anthropology, etc., is industry and experiment.

The constant process of overcoming production, production because of production, as it is called in the second volume of the Theory of Surplus Value, is kept stable with the help of "higher activity." The interaction of "higher activity" and dcr

»material production« keeps the world of work upright as power. This is power in a much more fundamental sense than violence, coercion and all their derivatives, with which everyday, pre-scientific experience and science itself deal, always somehow reckoning with the fact that power and its humanity are unproblematically presupposed when when talking about this or that human phenomenon, or when talking about the various forms of factual power. What is always presupposed here is what Marx otherwise anticipates in what happens in the mode of production that will take place after prehistory, in prehistory, which reminds of the "antagonistic"

interpersonal relationships, which in turn are based on the fundamental division of labor and in this respect represent a limit for the full establishment of the "essence" of everything in "reality".

In order to be able to read the essentials from Marx's thoughts, it must be explained to what extent the humanistic-anthropological horizon of all his statements makes it difficult to see what is basically being said: he is actually concerned with the undisturbed, full development of productive forces which, once left to their own devices, increasingly acquire the character of scientific work, of a working science. He sensed the possibility of such work as early as 1857/58, when he foresaw automation and prophesied that people would play the role of supervisor and controller of the independent work process.

If we are talking about work in the metaphysical sense of the word, this work is much closer to scientific work within the framework of an absolute system of the Hegelian type than to manual work. But the real formula is not even in the analogy with Hegelian metaphysics. The scientific work is much more than what we are accustomed to think of as science. This is no longer a theory that precedes practice for its own sake, but a practice that is directly permeated by theory; however, the theory has changed significantly. From contemplating and thinking of something other than itself, it became the constitutional form of practice itself, the organization of practice itself, its organi-22

sierten, guten und rationalen Funktionieren, d. h. am Ende zum Rechnen, und zwar zum Rechnen nach dem strengen Schema des Kalküls und nicht mehr der Reflexion, des Abwägens, Messens, des intuitiven Moments und der emotionalen »Stellungnahme«. Das Subjekt dieses Denkens ist jedoch – und das ist die entscheidende Frage – *nicht* der Mensch selbst. Obwohl Marx fest davon überzeugt war, daß die menschliche Historie in der Tat die Historie des Menschen selbst mit Hilfe seiner Arbeit sei, hat Engels das radikaler formuliert, indem er sagte, die Arbeit habe den Menschen *geschaffen*, und zwar in einer Schrift, die auf den ersten Blick natürlich gar keine metaphysische Prätentionen hat. In der Tat, im strengsten Sinne, ist die Arbeit dasjenige, das den Menschen geschaffen hat, denn die Arbeit ist kein Attribut des Menschen, der auch ohne die Arbeit irgendwie existieren würde; der *Mensch ist das, was er ist, durch die Arbeit.* So erscheint die Arbeit, im Sinne der Praxis der Arbeit und der geschichtlichen Wissenschaft, als Substanz-Subjekt des postmetaphysischen Zeitalters. Mit anderen Worten, der ungehemmten Untwicklung der *Produktion wegen der Produktion* kann sich keine interproduktive oder innerweltliche Macht entgegensetzen. Eine ganz andere Revolution, als diejenige, die die zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen zu ändern sucht, ist nötig, um so etwas überhaupt durchzudenken. Diese Revolution kann aber nur von dem ausgehen, was sich für Marx in dem genannten ursprünglichen Dokument erschlossen hat, nämlich von der Dimension der Praxis selbst, jedoch unter der Voraussetzung, daß man nicht mehr fragt, wie die Praxis funktioniert, sondern: *Was ist das überhaupt die Praxis?* Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Praxis überwindet die Philosophie und ihre Realisierung. Erst durch diese Fragestellung wird klar ersichtlich, daß die Praxis nicht der Ursprung der Geschichte ist, sondern daß sie selbst nur *eine* der geschichtlichen Bewirkungen ist, *eine* geschichtliche Entscheidung, und daß es einen solchen Typus des geschichtlichen Mit-Verhaltens von allem, was ist, nicht immer gegeben hat und es nicht immer geben wird, ein Mit-Verhalten, das bislang den Charakter des Absoluts sowie den Charakter des Kosmos, den Charakter des Menschen und den Charakter des Denkens eindeutig bestimmt hatte.

Die Metaphysik der Arbeit in der Realisierung ist *keine* Entdeckung eines neuen Ereignisses im Werk, sondern das Zu-Ende-Gehen eines alten Weges, der uns unbedingt, zwangsläufig vor die Frage stellen wird, ob es nicht möglich wäre, auch noch *anders* zu leben als in der Weise der Praxis der Arbeit als wissenschaftlichen Geschichte?

ed, good and rational functioning, i. H. in the end to arithmetic, namely to arithmetic according to the strict scheme of calculation and no longer to reflection, weighing up, measuring, the intuitive moment and the emotional

»opinion«. However, the subject of this thinking is - and this is the crucial question

- not man himself. Although Marx was firmly convinced that human history is indeed the historic of man himself through his labour, Engels put it more radically, saying that labor created man, and did so in a writing that, at first glance, naturally has no metaphysical intentions at all. In fact, in the strictest sense, work is what created man, because work is not an attribute of man, who would somehow exist without work; man is what he is through work. Thus labor, in terms of the practice of labor and historical science, appears as the substance-subject of the post-metaphysical age.

In other words, the unchecked development of production for the sake of production cannot be opposed by any interproductive or intra-mundane power. A completely different revolution than the one that seeks interpersonal relationships with others is necessary to think through something like this at all. However, this revolution can only start from what Marx found in the original document mentioned, namely from the dimension of practice itself, provided, however, that one no longer asks how practice works, but rather: What is that? the practice at all? The question of the essence of practice overcomes philosophy and its realization. Only by asking this question does it become clear that practice is not the origin of history, but that it itself is only one of the historical effects, a historical decision, and that there is such a type of historical co-behaviour of everything is, has not always existed and will not always exist, a co-behaviour that up until now had clearly determined the character of the absolute as well as the character of the cosmos, the character of man and the character of thinking.

The metaphysics of work in the realization is not the discovery of a new event in the work, but the coming to an end of an old path, which will necessarily, inevitably confront us with the question of whether it would not be possible to live differently in the way of practice work as scientific history?

POUVOIR ET HUMANISME

Lucien Goldmann

Paris

En dehors de son importance propre, le thème choisi par le colloque de cette année me paraît hautement intéressant parce qu'il permet de poser les problèmes essentiels de nos sociétés et surtout d'aborder un certain nombre de questions théoriques fondamentales.

Dans les discussions d'hier et d'avant-hier, j'ai eu l'occasion de rappeler que la pensée marxiste ne se situe jamais sur un plan purement spéculatif et ne s'intéresse à la philosophie que dans la stricte mesure où celle-ci est indispensable pour comprendre la situation de l'homme dans le monde, c'est-à-dire pour répondre aux problèmes théoriques et pratiques que soulève l'étude *positive* de la vie historique et sociale.

Vous m'excuserez donc si, dans la première partie de cet exposé, j'insiste sur quelques concepts théoriques à partir desquels j'aborderai la discussion du sujet proprement dit.

Ce qui me paraît constituer le principal caractère spécifique de la pensée marxiste, c'est le concept de *sujet collectif*, l'affirmation que, dans la dimension historique, ce ne sont jamais les individus isolés mais les groupes sociaux qui agissent et que c'est seulement par rapport à eux que nous pouvons comprendre les événements, les comportements et les institutions.

Encore faut-il, pour éviter tout malentendu, ajouter que même sur le plan historique ce concept de sujet collectif n'est pas exhaustif et que celui de sujet individuel garde son importance. Ce dernier se situe d'ailleurs à deux niveaux qui ont un statut scientifique tout à fait différent.

Il y a d'abord le sujet des pulsions libidinales mis en lumière par Freud, le *Ça,* dont une grande partie se situe dans l'inconscient. Il a incontestablement un caractère *individuel* et Freud nous a montré à quel point tout un ensemble de comportements, délires, rêves et lapsus deviennent, à partir de lui, hautement intelligibles.

Mais si on peut sans difficulté admettre le caractère purement individuel du *Ça,* les choses ne vont plus de même pour le *Moi.* Freud y voit le résultat de la lutte entre le *Ça* et le *Surmoi* qu'il considérait toujours comme une *unité.* En réalité ce *Surmoi* dont le conflit avec le *Ça*

PO U VO IR E T H U M A N ISM E

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Paris

Apart from its own importance, the theme chosen by this year's symposium seems to me highly interesting because it makes it possible to pose the essential problems of our societies and above all to address a certain number of fundamental theoretical questions.

In the discussions yesterday and the day before yesterday, I had the opportunity to recall that Marxist thought is never situated on a purely speculative level and is only interested in philosophy to the strict extent this is essential for understanding the situation of man in the world, that is to say, for responding to the theoretical and practical problems raised by the positive study of historical and social life.

You will therefore excuse me if, in the first part of this exposition, I insist on a few theoretical concepts on the basis of which I will approach the discussion of the subject itself.

What seems to me to constitute the main specific characteristic of Marxist thought is the concept of the collective subject, the affirmation that, in the historical dimension, it is never isolated individuals but social groups who act and that it is It is only in relation to them that we can understand events, behaviors and institutions.

It is still necessary, to avoid any misunderstanding, to add that even on the historical level this concept of collective subject is not exhaustive and that that of individual subject retains its importance. The latter is situated at two levels which have a completely different scientific status.

First there is the subject of the libidinal drives highlighted by Freud, the Qa, a large part of which is located in the unconscious. He undeniably has an individual character and Freud showed us to what extent a whole set of behaviors, delusions, dreams and lapsus become, from him, highly intelligible.

But if we can admit without difficulty the purely individual character of Qa, things are no longer the same for the Ego. Freud sees in it the result of the struggle between the Qa and the Superego, which he always considered as a unit. In reality this Superego whose conflict with the Qa 24

contribue à la constitution du *Moi* est un *mélange* de structurations différentes dues au fait que chaque individu appartient à un grand nombre de groupes: nations, classes sociales, familles, cercles d'amis, groupes professionnels, classes scolaires, etc. En aucun d'entre nous on ne trouve exactement une appartenance de même type aux mêmes groupes et cette différence est constitutive de notre personnalité.

Seulement – et c'est là une idée familière à tous les chercheurs – la science ne peut étudier les mélanges mais seulement leurs éléments constitutifs. Cela signifie, ici, que *la science* ne saurait étudier ni les *Moi* ni les *Surmoi* individuels mais, au niveau psychologique, uniquement le *Ça*, la partie instinctive, libidinale du comportement humain et, au niveau sociologique et historique, les sujets collectifs, dont le mélange, chaque fois différent, constitue ces *Moi* et ces *Surmoi*.

Si cependant du *Ça*, du *Moi* et du *Surmoi* individuels nous passons aux faits *historiques* – et cela vaut non seulement pour les Croisades, la Révolution française ou les événements de mai 1968, mais aussi pour le théâtre de Racine, la philosophie de Kant ou les œuvres de Victor Hugo, bref pour tout ce qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, se situe au niveau de l'Histoire – il n'est plus possible de saisir de manière scientifique et positive ni la nature, ni la genèse, ni la signification des faits si ce n'est par rapport aux sujets transindividuels, collectifs, que les ont créés et qui continuent à les transformer.

Parmi les faits mentionnés, il en est un dont le caractère collectif peut sembler moins évident que celui des autres: une création littéraire, le théâtre de Racine par exemple. Une fois mis en lumière les liens de ce théâtre avec la théologie et l'histoire du Jansénisme, il devient cependant évident que si le jeune Racine avait été élevé – ce qui n'était nullement inconcevable – non dans un milieu janséniste mais, disons, chez les Jésuites, il n'aurait certainement pas écrit *les mêmes pièces*, mais sans doute des pièces différentes impliquant une autre vision de l'homme et du monde. On voit que, sur le plan biographique de la relation au sujet *individuel*, le théâtre de Racine apparaît lié à un accident: l'éducation port-royaliste de l'auteur; ni sa structure ni sa genèse ne présentent donc un caractère nécessaire.

Nous référant en revanche au groupe social qui, en France, au XVII[e] siècle, a élaboré la vision tragique, à savoir à la Noblesse de Robe et au mouvement janséniste, il va de soi que si les tragédies de Racine pouvaient ne pas voir le jour faute d'un écrivain de génie capable de donner une expression littéraire à la conscience possible du groupe, il était toutefois inconcevable que ce groupe aboutisse, en tant que sujet transindividuel, à une expression littéraire disons épicurienne ou mystique. En ce sens, le lien qui rattache les tragédies de Racine au Jansénisme et à la Noblesse de Robe a un caractère *nécessaire* que ne possède pas celui qui les rattache à l'écrivain lui-même.

Et ce lien entre sujets transindividuels et développement historique est beaucoup plus visible lorsqu'il s'agit de mouvements sociaux et de processus globaux.

Une objection pourrait cependant être soulevée. Si les individus sont différents les uns des autres, comment un groupe peut-il constituer un sujet historique? Elle ne me paraît pas valable car, à l'intérieur d'un groupe, les différences individuelles s'annulent mutuellement, renfor-

contributes to the constitution of the Ego is a mixture of different structures due to the fact that each individual belongs to a large number of groups: nations, social classes, families, circles of friends, professional groups,

school classes, etc. In none of us is there exactly the same type of belonging to the same groups and this difference is constitutive of our personality.

Only - and this is an idea familiar to all researchers -

science cannot study mixtures but only their constituent elements. This means, here, that science cannot study either the individual Egos or the Superegos but, at the psychological level, only the (7a), the instinctive, libidinal part of human behavior and, at the sociological and historical level, the collective subjects, whose mixture, each time different, constitutes these Egos and these Superegos.

If, however, from (7a, from the individual ego and superego, we move on to historical facts - and this applies not only to the Crusades, the French Revolution or the events of May 1968, but also to the theater of Racine, the philosophy of Kant or the works of Victor Hugo, in short for everything that, in one way or another, is at the level of History - it is no longer possible to grasp in a scientific and positive way either nature, neither the genesis nor the meaning of the facts except in relation to the transindividual, collective subjects that created them and who continue to transform them.

Among the facts mentioned, there is one whose collective character may seem less obvious than that of the others: a literary creation, Racine's theater for example. Once the links of this theater with the theology and history of Jansenism have been clarified, however, it becomes clear that if the young Racine had been brought up - which was by no means inconceivable - not in a Jansenist environment but, let's say, among the Jesuits, he would certainly not have written the same plays, but undoubtedly different plays implying another vision of man and of the world. We see that, on the biographical plane of the relationship to the individual subject, Racine's theater appears to be linked to an accident: the port-royalist education of the author; neither its structure nor its genesis therefore presents a necessary character.

Referring on the other hand to the social group which, in France, in the 15th century, elaborated the tragic vision, namely the Noblesse de Robe and the Jansenist movement, it goes without saying that if the tragedies of Racine could not see the For lack of a writer of genius capable of giving literary expression to the possible consciousness of the group, it was nevertheless inconceivable that this group would end up, as a transindividual subject, in a literary expression, let us say epicurean or mystical. In this sense, the link that connects Racine's tragedies to Jansenism and the Nobility of the Robe has a necessary character that the one who connects them to the writer himself does not possess.

And this link between transindividual issues and historical development is much more visible when it comes to social movements and global processes.

An objection could, however, be raised. If individuals are different from each other, how can a group constitute a historical subject? It does not seem valid to me because, within a group, individual differences cancel each other out, reinforce each other.

çant précisément les tendances et les aspirations communes. Déjà, à un niveau purement statistique qui fait abstraction de toute structuration, s'il est impossible de savoir si Pierre se mariera ou aura un accident d'automobile l'année prochaine, étant donné la multiplicité des facteurs dont l'interférence pourrait provoquer ou empêcher ces événements, il est en revanche facile de prévoir, avec une marge d'erreur relativement faible, le nombre de mariages ou d'accidents d'automobile qui se produiront en France dans la première semaine de l'année prochaine. Et ce même statut de la connaissance joue, bien entendu, de manière renforcée bien que différente lorsqu'il s'agit de processus dynamiques et structurés.

Enfin, parmi les sujets transindividuels qui seuls permettent de comprendre les processus historiques, il faut souligner l'existence d'une catégorie privilégiée: il s'agit des classes sociales dont la praxis – et à partir de là la conscience et l'affectivité – est orientée vers l'organisation globale de la société, vers la structuration de l'ensemble des rapports interhumains et des rapports entre les hommes et la nature.

On comprend que cette catégorie de sujets transindividuels joue un rôle prépondérant dans l'évolution historique et constitue le sujet des grandes créations culturelles (littéraires, philosophiques et artistiques).

Il me semble que ce concept de sujet collectif ou, plus précisément, transindividuel sépare nettement la pensée marxiste de toutes les autres philosophies. Car de Descartes à Sartre, en passant par Locke, Hume, la pensée des Lumières, Kant et Husserl, pour ne citer que quelques noms, nous trouvons jusqu'à aujourd'hui l'idée du sujet *individuel* au centre de tout un secteur de la pensée philosophique. D'autre part, dans les philosophies mécanistes on implique – et notamment dans l'engouement contemporain pour le structuralisme on proclame même – la négation du sujet. Il reste – il est vrai – Hegel, chez qui nous trouvons un sujet transhistorique: »la substance comme sujet«. Mais, malgré certaines analyses partielles remarquables, cette substance, l'Esprit, demeure une notion spéculative très générale et, comme telle, dépourvue de précision. Ce n'est que dans la pensée de Marx que le sujet historique deviendra une réalité empirique qu'il faut dans chaque cas particulier dégager et étudier de manière positive. Ajoutons que pour chaque processus ou fait historique le sujet transindividuel n'est pas donné de manière immédiate et qu'il faut toujours une recherche assez longue et assez difficile pour le mettre en lumière.

Deuxième point important, étroitement lié d'ailleurs à l'idée de sujet collectif: le marxisme est une philosophie moniste qui refuse toutes les fausses alternatives caractérisant aussi bien l'idéalisme que le mécanisme, à savoir: sujet-objet, déterminisme-liberté, continuité-discontinuité, matière-conscience, etc. Nous aurons l'occasion d'y revenir; contentons-nous de dire que, d'un point de vue marxiste, le thème dont nous traitons aujourd'hui ne saurait constituer une alternative. »Pouvoir et humanisme« ne peut signifier ni l'affirmation de leur identité, ni celle de leur opposition radicale et irrémédiable, impliquant une prise de position de principe pour l'humanisme contre le pouvoir ou pour le pouvoir contre l'humanisme; comme dans toutes les autres alternatives, il s'agit d'éléments qui ont une indépendance relative mais se trouvent néanmoins toujours liés à l'intérieur de certaines structures

Precisely tracking common trends and aspirations. Already, at a purely statistical level which disregards any structuring, if it is impossible to know whether Pierre will marry or have an automobile accident next year, given

the multiplicity of factors whose interference could cause or prevent these events, it is on the other hand easy to predict, with a relatively small margin of error, the number of marriages or automobile accidents which will occur in France in the first week of next year. And this same status of knowledge plays, of course, in a reinforced although different way when it comes to dynamic and structured processes.

Finally, among the transindividual subjects who alone allow us to understand historical processes, it is necessary to emphasize the existence of a privileged category: these are the social classes whose praxis - and starting from consciousness and affectivity - is oriented towards the global organization of society, towards the structuring of all interhuman relations and the relations between men and nature.

We understand that this category of transindividual subjects plays a preponderant role in the historical revolution and constitutes the subject of great cultural creations (literary, philosophical and artistic).

It seems to me that this concept of the collective or, more precisely, transindividual subject clearly separates Marxist thought from all other philosophies. C ar from Descartes to Sartre, passing through Locke, Hume, the thought of the Enlightenment, Kant and Husserl, to name but a few names, we find until today the idea of the individual subject at the center of an entire sector of philosophical thought. On the other hand, in mechanistic philosophies one implies - and notably in the contemporary infatuation with structuralism one even proclaims - the negation of the subject. There remains - it is true - Hegel, in whom we find a transhistorical subject: »substance as subject«.

But, despite certain remarkable partial analyses, this substance, the Spirit, remains a very general speculative notion and, as such, devoid of precision. It is only in Marx's thought that the historical subject will become an empirical reality that must be identified and studied in a positive way in each particular case. Let us add that for each process or historical fact the transindividual subject is not immediately given and that it always takes a fairly long and difficult search to bring it to light.

Second important point, closely linked moreover to the idea of the collective subject: Marxism is a monistic philosophy which refuses all the false alternatives characterizing both idealism and mechanism, namely: subject-object, determinism-freedom, continuity-discontinuity, matter-consciousness, etc. We shall have occasion to return to it; let us content ourselves with saying that, from a Marxist point of view, the theme we are dealing with today cannot constitute an alternative. »Power and humanism« cannot signify either the affirmation of their identity, nor that

of their radical and irremediable opposition, implying a position of principle for humanism against power or for power against humanism; as in all the other alternatives, these are elements that have a relative independence but are nevertheless always linked within certain structures
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concrètes. La tâche du théoricien est précisément d'analyser cette relation dans chaque cas et de faire, dans la mesure du possible, une théorie générale qui délimite le cadre des variations virtuelles de cette relation. J'ajouterai encore que ces alternatives caractérisent toute perspective du sujet individuel. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, pour les deux problèmes fondamentaux en sciences humaines: la relation entre les jugements de fait et les jugements de valeur; la relation entre le sujet et l'objet.

Si je me situe dans une perspective individuelle, je me trouve en face de cette maison que je n'ai pas construite, qui est pour moi une donnée objective et extérieure, et que je peux tout au plus d'une part décrire et d'autre part juger sous un angle moral, esthétique ou pratique, y apportant éventuellement certaines modifications de type technique.

La situation en revanche est très différente dans la perspective du sujet transindividuel. Des groupes humains ont *réellement* construit cette maison, comme toutes les autres maisons de la ville, et les modifient constamment par le simple fait d'y vivre et de les intégrer dans leur existence. La structure urbaine de Korčula est un processus permanent dans lequel on ne saurait arbitrairement séparer les maisons d'une part, les comportements humains de l'autre. La manière de voir et de comprendre cette structure est étroitement liée aux besoins des hommes qui y vivent, à leurs aspirations, et ces aspirations sont elles-mêmes, dans une certaine mesure, le résultat de la structure urbaine et du statut économique et social de ses habitants. Les jugements de fait se fondent sur les jugements de valeur et inversement.

Dans les processus sociaux, les chodses sont encore plus évidentes. Si l'on suppose que *le Capital* est une œuvre individuelle, on a d'une part son auteur et d'autre part la société capitaliste qu'il a étudiée. On aboutit alors aux innombrables interprétations qui séparent chez Marx science et morale, ou science et politique, et lui reprochent d'avoir mélangé la constatation de ce qui est à l'affirmation de ce qui doit être.

Plaçons-nous au contraire dans la perspective d'un sujet collectif et admettons pour l'instant l'hypothèse – qui ne me paraît pas évidente – selon laquelle cette œuvre est une expression de la conscience prolétarielle de l'époque: la situation devient entièrement différente. Car, d'une part, en étudiant la société capitaliste et en élaborant son statut historique, le prolétariat s'étudie aussi lui-même en tant que partie importante de cette société; il devient alors impossible de séparer radicalement la science de la conscience. Et d'autre part, par le simple fait de prendre conscience de son statut, le prolétariat se transforme en dehors de toute action technique et cette transformation modifie à un degré plus ou moins important la société capitaliste. Il y a ainsi non pas dualité radicale, mais identité partielle du sujet et de l'objet de la recherche.

De même, dans cette hypothèse, les analyses théoriques de Marx sont étroitement liées aux tendances et aux aspirations de la classe prolétarienne; ces valeurs agissent profondément sur la structure catégoriale des analyses marxiennes, déterminant et leurs limites et les problèmes qu'elles peuvent mieux cerner que toutes les analyses antérieures. Inversement, les aspirations du prolétariat dépendent avant

concrete. The task of the theoretician is precisely to analyze this relation in each case and to make, as far as possible, a general theory which delimits the framework of the virtual variations of this relation. I would add that

these alternatives characterize any perspective of the individual subject. This is the case, for example, with the two fundamental problems in the human sciences: the relationship between judgments of fact and judgments of value; the relationship between the subject and the object.

If I place myself in an individual perspective, I find myself face to face with this house that I did not build, which for me is an objective and external given, and which I can at most on the one hand describe and on the other hand to judge from a moral, aesthetic or practical angle, possibly making certain modifications of a technical type.

The situation, on the other hand, is very different from the perspective of the transindividual subject. Human groups have actually built this house, like all the other houses in the city, and are constantly modifying them by the simple fact of living there and integrating them into their existence. T he urban structure of Korčula is a permanent process in which one cannot arbitrarily separate the houses on the one hand, the human behaviors on the other. The way of seeing and understanding this structure is closely linked to the needs of the people who live there, to their aspirations, and these aspirations are themselves, to a certain extent, the result of the urban structure and the economic and social status of its inhabitants. Judgments of fact are based on judgments of value and vice versa.

In social processes, the chodses are even more evident. If we suppose that Capital is an individual work, we have on the one hand its author and on the other hand the capitalist society which he studied. We then end up with the innumerable interpretations that separate Marx's science and morality, or science and politics, and reproach him for having mixed the observation of what is with the affirmation of what must be.

On the contrary, let us place ourselves in the perspective of a collective subject and accept for the moment the hypothesis - which does not seem obvious to me -

that this work is an expression of the proletarian consciousness of the time: the situation becomes completely different. For, on the one hand, in studying capitalist society and elaborating its historical status, the proletariat also studies itself as an important part of this society: it then becomes impossible to radically separate science from consciousness. And on the other hand, by the simple fact of becoming aware of its status, the proletariat is transformed outside of any technical action and this transformation modifies capitalist society to a greater or lesser degree. There is thus not a radical duality, but a partial identity of the subject and the object of research.

Likewise, in this hypothesis, Marx's theoretical analyzes are closely linked to the tendencies and aspirations of the proletarian class; these values act profoundly on the categorial structure of Marxian analyses, determining both their limits and the problems they can better grasp than any previous analyses. Conversely, the aspirations of the proletariat depend before 27

tout de son statut réel à l'intérieur de la société capitaliste, c'est-à-dire d'une réalité *de fait.* Ici non plus il n'y a pas dualité radicale entre les jugements de fait et les jugements de valeur qui se fondent les uns sur les autres dans une relation qui n'est pas constante et dont il convient d'étudier dans chaque cas le statut particulier. Les faits et la manière de les percevoir sont fondées sur les valeurs, et ces valeurs ne seront comprises que si on se demande qui les a élaborées et dans quelle situation; c'est dire que les valeurs sont fondées sur les faits.

De même encore, dans la perspective du sujet collectif, une distinction fondamentale de la philosophie moderne, celle du sujet empirique et du sujet transcendental, apparaît dénuée de toute signification. Le concept de sujet transcendental est né du besoin de concilier l'affirmation que c'est l'homme qui construit le monde et surtout les catégories qui structurent la perception et la pensée scientifique, avec le fait que le moi empirique n'a de toute évidence construit ni le monde qu'il a en face de lui ni les catégories scientifiques et perceptives par lesquelles il l'appréhende. On aboutit ainsi à ce monstre, qui est supposé créer les structures de la connaissance à l'aide desquelles le sujet empirique appréhende un monde qui lui reste étranger et opposé. Si nous remplaçons au contraire le sujet empirique par les sujets collectifs, cette construction devient inutile: ce sont en effet les groupes humains empiriques qui ont effectivement construit les maisons, tracé les routes, développé l'industrie et en même temps créé les institutions sociales, l'Etat et les catégories mentales à l'aide desquelles les membres de ces groupes perçoivent ces réalités et en élaborent la théorie.

S'il s'agissait ici d'une série de conférences, je pourrais analyser une à une les alternatives mentionnées tout à l'heure pour montrer qu'elles ont le même statut épistémologique: celui de distinctions à justification partielle qui ont, tant qu'on reste conscient de leur caractère relatif, une valeur opératoire dans la recherche, mais qui deviennent fausses et voilent la réalité dès qu'on en fait des oppositions radicales et qu'on transforme l'étude de leurs relations en alternatives. Qu'il s'agisse de faits et de valeurs, de continuité et de discontinuité, de langue et de pensée, de théorie et de praxis, etc. il faudra chaque fois se demander comment se présente la relation dialectique entre ces éléments de la totalité.

Or parmi ces alternatives, il en est une – celle des relations entre Pouvoir et Humanisme – qui constitue l'objet de notre colloque. Sur ce point comme sur d'autres, il importe – je viens de le dire – d'être conscient du fait qu'il s'agit de deux éléments distinct d'une structure globale, éléments qu'il ne faut en aucun cas séparer de manière radicale mais dont il faut rechercher la relation aujourd'hui, dans notre situation actuelle, tout en sachant parfaitement qu'elle sera différente à d'autres époques.

Troisième idée méthodologiquement important – et qui constitue d'ailleurs le refus d'une autre alternative: celle du déterminisme et de la liberté –: les sujets collectifs ne sont ni des réalités mécaniquement déterminées par les conditions sociales et économiques, ni des sujets entièrement libres, limités seulement de l'extérieur par les obstacles qu'ils rencontrent. En fait, comme nous l'a dit Marx dans la Troisième

everything from its real status within capitalist society, that is to say from a factual reality. Here again there is no radical duality between judgments of fact and judgments of value which are based on each other in a

relationship which is not constant and whose status should be studied in each case. particular. Facts and the way of perceiving them are based on values, and these values will only be understood if one asks who made them and in what situation; that is, values are based on facts.

Likewise, from the perspective of the collective subject, a fundamental distinction of modern philosophy, that of the empirical subject and the transcendental subject, appears devoid of all meaning. The concept of transcendental subject is born from the need to reconcile the affirmation that it is man who constructs the world and above all the categories that structure perception and scientific thought, with the fact that the empirical self has no evidence builds neither the world he has in front of him nor the scientific and perceptual categories by which he apprehends it. We thus end up with this monster, which is supposed to create the structures of knowledge by means of which the empirical subject apprehends a world which remains foreign and opposed to him. If, on the contrary, we replace the empirical subject with collective subjects, this construction becomes useless: it is indeed the empirical human groups who have effectively built the houses, traced the roads, developed industry and at the same time created the social institutions. the state and the mental categories with the help of which the members of these groups perceive these realities and elaborate their theory.

If it were a question here of a series of lectures, I could analyze one by one the alternatives mentioned earlier to show that they have the same epistemological status: that of distinctions with partial justification which have, as long as we remain aware of their relative character, an operational value in research, but which become false and veil the reality as soon as we make radical oppositions of them and transform the study of their relations into alternatives. Whether facts and values, continuity and discontinuity of language and thought, theory and praxis, etc. it will be necessary each time to ask how the dialectical relationship between these elements of the totality presents itself.

Yet among these alternatives, there is one - that of the relationship between Power and Humanism - which constitutes the subject of our colloquium. On this point as on others, it is important - as I have just said - to be aware of the fact that these are two distinct elements of a global structure, elements which must in no case be separated. in a radical way, but the relationship of which must be sought today, in our current situation, knowing perfectly well that it will be different at other times.

Third methodologically important idea - and which moreover constitutes the refusal of another alternative: that of determinism and freedom -: collective subjects are neither realities mechanically determined by social

Thèse sur Feuerbach,[1] les hommes vivent dans des cadres sociaux et psychiques élaborés par les sujets collectif antérieurs mais qu'ils transforment en créant des cadres sociaux nouveaux pour les générations à venir. Sans constituer un déterminisme rigoureux, les conditions qui ont engendré aussi bien la réalité sociale globale que leur propre forme de pensée créent les limites de leur action actuelle, limites que les transformations qu'ils opèrent dans la réalité rendront plus larges ou plus étroites, augmentant ou réduisant ainsi la liberté des générations futures. Et lorsqu'on se propose d'étudier la praxis historique, l'action des hommes en train d'accomplir ces transformations, Marx nous a montré qu'il faut utiliser deux concepts fondamentaux pour répondre à la question: dans des conditions données, que peuvent faire les hommes et que feront-ils probablement? Ces concepts sont celui du *maximum de conscience et de praxis possible* et celui de *conscience et de praxis réelles.*

Je voudrais terminer cette partie introductive en posant le problème d'un dernier couple de concepts qui constitue la clef de voûte de notre sujet: c'est la thèse – qui occupe une si grande place dans la littérature marxiste – du caractère fondamental de la relation qui lie l'histoire des moyens de production à l'histoire des rapports de production. Que signifie cette affirmation? Elle n'a certainement jamais eu dans l'esprit de Marx et elle ne peut avoir pour aucun sociologue sérieux un caractère mécaniste. Elle signifie notamment que les groupes humains tendent à aménager leurs rapports mutuels (rapports de production signifiant toutes les formes de relations entre les groupes sociaux et, à partir de là, entre les individus dans une structure sociale donnée) afin de leur donner un caractère fonctionnellement optimal par rapport aux tâches à accomplir et à la manière de les accomplir étant donné la technique existante. Je me permettrai de donner un exemple qui ne colle pas très bien parce qu'il s'agit d'un comportement individuel mais qui peut néanmoins aider à la compréhension du processus: si je devais donner des coups de marteau sur cette table et si, pour ce faire, j'étais étendu par terre, ce serait une situation pour le moins incommode; et on pourrait prévoir que, dans la mesure où cela est possible, je finirais par me lever et par adopter une position plus favorable à l'action à accomplir.

Entre la praxis des hommes qui dépend de la technique et des moyens de production dont ils disposent et les conditions sociales dans lesquelles ils accomplissent leurs tâches, il y a une relation fonctionnelle étroite et, implicitement, une tendance à l'équilibration. Si la transformation de l'un de ces facteurs – notamment des moyens de production – crée une situation de déséquilibre et de tension dans les rapports sociaux existants, il est probable, il est même certain que les classes sociales les plus défavorisées par ce déséquilibre aspireront à,

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[1] »La doctrine matérialiste concernant le changement des circonstances et l'éducation oublie que les circonstances doivent être changées par les hommes et que l'éducateur doit être lui-même éduqué. Elle doit donc diviser la société en deux parties dont l'une est au-dessus de la société.

»La coïncidence du changement des circonstances et de l'activité humaine ou de l'autochangement ne peut être considérée et comprise rationnellement qu'en tant que *pratique révolutionnaire.*«

Thesis on Feuerbach,1 men live in social and psychic frameworks elaborated by previous collective subjects but which they transform by creating new social frameworks for future generations. Without constituting a rigorous determinism, the conditions which have engendered both the global social reality and their own form of thought create the limits of their current action, limits which the transformations they operate in reality will make wider or narrower, increasing or thereby reducing the freedom of future generations. And when we set out to study historical praxis, the action of men in the process of accomplishing these transformations, Marx showed us that we must use two fundamental concepts to answer the question: under given conditions, what can men and what are they likely to do? These concepts are that of the maximum possible consciousness and praxis and that of real consciousness and praxis.

I would like to end this introductory part by posing the problem of a last couple of concepts which constitutes the keystone of our subject: it is the thesis - which occupies such a large place in Marxist literature - of the fundamental character of the relation which links the history of the means of production to the history of the relations of production. What does this statement mean? It certainly never had in Marx's mind and it cannot have for any serious sociologist a mechanistic character. It means in particular that human groups tend to adjust their mutual relations (relations of production meaning all forms of relations between social groups and, from there, between individuals in a given social structure) in order to give them a functionally functional character. optimal in relation to the tasks to be accomplished and the manner of accomplishing them given the existing technique. I will allow myself to give an example which does not fit very well because it is an individual behavior but which can nevertheless help to understand the process: if I had to strike this table with a hammer and if, to do this, I was lying on the ground, it would be an inconvenient situation to say the least; and it could be foreseen that, insofar as this is possible, I would end up getting up and adopting a position more favorable to the action to be accomplished.

Between the praxis of men, which depends on the technique and the means of production at their disposal, and the social conditions in which they carry out their tasks, there is a close functional relationship and, implicitly, a tendency towards equilibration. If the transformation of one of these factors - in particular the means of production - creates a situation of imbalance and tension in the existing social relations, it is probable, it is even certain that the social classes most disadvantaged by this imbalance will aspire a, 1 “The materialistic doctrine concerning the change of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances must be changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. It must therefore divide society into two parts, one of which is above society.

“The coincidence of changing circumstances and human activity or self-change can only be considered and rationally understood as a revolutionary practice.

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et orienteront leur action vers, une transformation qui rétablirait l'accord fonctionnel entre praxis productive et structure des relations sociales. Au fond, il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler dans un langage scientifique un processus de régulation dynamique.

Je mentionnerai brièvement que c'est le passage d'une structure à une autre à partir de tendances nées dans la première qui a été désigné dans la littérature dialectique comme passage de la quantité à la qualité.

Partant de ces concepts préalables, il devient évident qu'on ne peut jamais poser à un niveau abstrait des questions du genre: qu'est-ce que le socialisme? le capitalisme? l'aliénation? l'humanisme? le pouvoir? Ces concepts ne deviennent opératoires que si on les met chaque fois en relation avec les éléments constitutifs des structures concrètes dont on veut mettre la nature en lumière, et en tout premier lieu avec la praxis des hommes à l'intérieur de ces structures et les conditions dans lesquelles elle s'exerce.

Il n'y a pas de socialisme abstrait et universel, ni de critère particulier qui autorise à dire *toujours et partout* que telle ou telle société est socialiste ou ne l'est pas. Ni l'étatisation des moyens de production ni les professions de foi de tel ou tel gouvernement ne suffisent à l'affirmer de manière fondée. Le socialisme suppose avant tout des rapports sociaux qui permettent aux hommes de vivre de la manière la plus conforme possible à leurs aspirations, dans un accord optimal entre les rapports de production et les conditions dans lesquelles s'exerce la praxis de la grande majorité des membres de la société. Dans cette perspective, il faut ajouter – et Marx l'a suffisamment souligné lui-même – que cet accord est d'autant plus facile à réaliser que la société est plus riche, de sorte qu'il est difficile d'imaginer une société réellement socialiste sans un très grand développement des forces productives.

Pour les mêmes raisons je ne saurais être d'accord avec ceux qui nous ont dit hier qu'il est inutile de parler de capitalisme d'organisation ou de société capitaliste technocratique puisqu'il s'agit toujours de sociétés capitalistes.

La question ne se pose pas au nom d'un jugement moral; il ne s'agit pas d'avoir plus ou moins d'antipathie ou de sympathie pour l'une ou l'autre de ces formes sociales, mais d'élaborer des concepts opératoires qui permettent de comprendre la nature de la réalité sociale et d'en élaborer la théorie. Marx pouvait parler de *Capitalisme* sans spécification particulière car il n'avait en face de lui qu'une seule structure capitaliste fondamentale avec, bien entendu, des modalités diverses dans chaque pays: le capitalisme libéral et concurrentiel. Mais dès le début du siècle, face à une structure fondamentale où les mécanismes de régulation du marché étaient transformés par le développement du capital financier, des monopoles et des trusts, les penseurs marxistes Hilferding, Lénine et Trotsky ont été obligés de créer un concept opératoire nouveau: celui d'impérialisme; et bien entendu aucun de ces théoriciens ne perdit jamais de vue que le capital financier était une forme de capital et l'impérialisme une forme de capitalisme. Mais ce

and will orient their action towards a transformation that would restore the functional agreement between productive praxis and the structure of social relations. Basically, it is about what we could call in scientific language a

process of dynamic regulation.

I will briefly mention that it is the passage from one structure to another starting from tendencies born in the first which has been designated in the dialectical literature as the passage from quantity to quality.

Starting from these preliminary concepts, it becomes obvious that one can never pose at an abstract level questions of the kind: what is socialism? capitalism? alienation? humanism? the power? These concepts only become operative if they are put each time in relation with the constituent Elements of the concrete structures whose nature we want to highlight, and in the very first place with the praxis of men inside these structures and the conditions in which it operates.

There is no abstract and universal socialism, nor any particular criterion which authorizes us to say always and everywhere that such and such a society is or is not socialist. Neither the nationalization of the means of production nor the professions of faith of this or that government are sufficient to affirm this in a well-founded manner. Socialism presupposes above all social relations which allow men to live in the manner most consistent with their aspirations, in an optimal agreement between the relations of production and the conditions in which the praxis of the great majority of members is exercised. of the society. In this perspective, it must be added - and M arx has sufficiently underlined this himself - that this agreement is all the easier to achieve as the society is richer, so that it is difficult to imagine a society truly socialist without a very great development of the productive forces.

For the same reasons, I cannot agree with those who told us yesterday that it is useless to speak of organizational capitalism or of a technocratic capitalist society since it is always a question of capitalist societies.

The question does not arise in the name of a moral judgment; it is not a question of having more or less antipathy or sympathy for one or the other of these social forms, but of elaborating operational concepts which make it possible to understand the nature of social reality and to develop the theory. M arx could speak of Capitalism without any particular specification because he had in front of him only one fundamental capitalist structure with, of course, various modalities in each country: liberal and competitive capitalism. But from the beginning of the century, faced with a fundamental structure in which the mechanisms of market regulation were transformed by the development of finance capital, monopolies and trusts, the Marxist thinkers Hilferding, Lenin and Trotsky were obliged to create a concept new operative: that of imperialism; and of course none of these theorists ever lost sight of the fact that finance capital

was a form of capital and imperialism a form of capitalism. But this 30

concept général ne suffisait plus à un moment où on connaissait déjà deux formes fondamentales de la structure capitaliste, formes qu'il fallait distinguer.

Cinquante ou soixante ans plus tard, nous nous trouvons devant un nouvel ensemble de transformations de la société capitaliste qui nous oblige, à côté des concepts de capitalisme libéral et d'impérialisme, à en créer un troisième: celui de capitalisme d'organisation ou de société technocratique (la terminologie n'est pas encore consacrée); et cela sans oublier, bien entendu, qu'il s'agit toujours de sociétés capitalistes où les concepts fondamentaux d'exploitation, d'aliénation, de plus-value continuent à être valables. Cette introduction d'un concept nouveau n'en reste pas moins nécessaire pour comprendre la nature *concrète* et les fonctions *actuelles* de l'exploitation, de l'aliénation, de la plus-value et de toute une série de phénomènes contemporains.

Revenons à l'idée que les hommes, c'est-à-dire les groupes sociaux, tendent à établir une adéquation aussi forte que possible entre les forces productives et les rapports de production. Cela signifie que le problème des relations entre ces deux aspects de la vie sociale se pose encore, et se posera longtemps, non seulement dans le monde capitaliste mais aussi dans les sociétés qui se désignent elles-mêmes comme socialistes. Et comme toute tension entre les conditions techniques du travail et les relations sociales existantes à un moment donné a abouti dans le passé à la création de groupes sociaux orientés vers une réorganisation de ces rapports – c'est-à-dire à la formation de classes sociales – le problème continuera à se poser de manière analogue dans les sociétés d'aujourd'hui. La tâche urgente est de saisir concrètement les formes spécifiques de ces phénomènes.

Quant au problème des relations entre le pouvoir politique et l'humanisme, il ne saurait être ni celui de chercher une identification totale et définitive des deux éléments, le moyen d'établir un pouvoir politique réellement et durablement humaniste, ni celui d'admettre leur opposition radicale en affirmant que le pouvoir est toujours inhumain et l'humanisme une attitude morale dépourvue de réalisme politique. Il faut bien plutôt se demander quelle est la nature des moments où, dans l'histoires effective des hommes, pouvoir et humanisme se rapprochent le plus, et inversement ceux où ils entrent résolument en conflit. C'est au fond, me semble-t-il, la seule approche positive et scientifique du problème de l'aliénation.

Or la réponse à la première de ces questions dépend de deux paramètres: les premier étant le maximum de développement *possible* des forces productives au moment de l'analyse; le second étant la relation entre le niveau réel de développement des forces productives et les rapports de production existants.

Si nous prenons nos exemples dans les sociétés du passé, sur lesquelles l'accord sera plus facile à établir entre chercheurs marxistes ou proches du marxisme, je pense que nous serons tous d'accord pour dire que pendant une très longue période de l'histoire de l'humanité la division en classes était nécessaire: d'une part, pour maîtriser au maximum la nature et assurer le progrès de cette maîtrise; d'autre part pour assurer aux hommes la possibilité de vivre de mieux en mieux à l'intérieur de la société. Mais, une fois faite cette constation extrême-

general concept was no longer sufficient at a time when we already knew two fundamental forms of the capitalist structure, forms which had to be

distinguished.

Fifty or sixty years later, we find ourselves faced with a new set of transformations of capitalist society which forces us, alongside the concepts of liberal capitalism and imperialism, to create a third: that of organizational capitalism or technocratic society (the terminology is not yet established); and this without forgetting, of course, that we are still dealing with capitalist societies where the fundamental concepts of exploitation, alienation, surplus value continue to be valid. This introduction of a new concept is nonetheless necessary for understanding the concrete nature and the current functions of exploitation, alienation, surplus value and a whole series of contemporary phenomena.

Let us return to the idea that men, that is to say social groups, tend to establish as close an adequation as possible between the productive forces and the relations of production. This means that the problem of the relations between these two aspects of social life still arises, and will arise for a long time, not only in the capitalist world but also in societies which call themselves socialist. And since any tension between the technical conditions of work and the social relations existing at a given time has led in the past to the creation of social groups oriented towards a reorganization of these relations - that is to say, to the formation of classes social - the problem will continue to arise in a similar way in today's societies. The urgent task is to concretely grasp the specific forms of these phenomena.

As for the problem of the relations between political power and humanism, it cannot be either that of seeking a total and definitive identification of the two elements, the means of establishing a truly and lastingly humanist political power, nor that of admitting their radical opposition by asserting that power is always inhuman and humanism a moral attitude devoid of political realism. We must rather ask ourselves what is the nature of the moments when, in the actual history of men, power and humanism come closest together, and conversely those when they come into resolute conflict. It is basically, it seems to me, the only positive and scientific approach to the problem of alienation.

Now the answer to the first of these questions depends on two parameters: the first being the maximum possible development of the productive forces at the moment of the analysis; the second being the relation between the real level of development of the productive forces and the existing relations of production.

If we take our examples from the societies of the past, on which agreement will be easier to establish between Marxist researchers or those close to

Marxism, I think that we will all agree that for a very long period of history of humanity the division into classes was necessary: on the one hand, to master nature as much as possible and to ensure the progress of this mastery; on the other hand to ensure that men have the possibility of living better and better within society. But, once made this observation extreme-31

ment générale, il reste à se demander, dans chaque cas, si la forme concrète de la division en classes correspond à un maximum possible de la maîtrise de la nature ou si ellé est déjà devenue oppressive, dans la mesure où des groupes privilégiés défendent des structures qui ne correspondent plus à l'optimum des relations interhumaines et du développement des forces productives. Dans le premier cas, il n'y a sans doute pas une situation idéale conforme à un moralisme spiritualiste et abstrait, mais une situation optimale dans les relations entre le pouvoir politique et ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'humanisme; c'est, dans l'étude historique, le seul sens possible du concept de non-aliénation. Dans le second cas, le pouvoir devient nécessairement répressif, engendrant l'aliénation, et l'humanisme bascule du côté des forces d'opposition orientées vers le renversement du pouvoir et la transformation de l'ordre social.

Je prendrai deux exemples pour illustrer cette analyse: ceux de la société féodale et de la société bourgeoise.

Bien qu'on puisse faire un schéma théorique plus ou moins rigoreux du féodalisme, il n'en resterait pas moins insuffisant. Il n'y a pas de féodalisme en soi, mais des sociétés féodales concrètes nées de sociétés antérieures et se transformant elles-mêmes jusqu'à leur disparition. Il va de soi aussi qu'aucune société féodale n'a jamais été égalitaire et que le féodalisme a toujours été fondé sur l'oppression et l'exploitation des serfs. Cela dit, tant que les seigneurs féodaux, tout en exploitant leurs serfs, remplissaient néanmoins une fonction sociale utile à ces derniers; tant que, pour pouvoir les exploiter, ils les protégeaient contre les pillards éventuels et surtout contre les autres seigneurs féodaux du voisinage; tant que, enfin, les exigences des seigneurs et le taux d'exploitation étaient limités par l'économie naturelle (le château ne pouvait consommer qu'une quantité limitée de denrées), l'organisation féodale a représenté dans toute une partie de l'Europe et certainement en France un équilibre plus ou moins proche de l'optimum entre les forces de production et les rapports de production et, à partir de là, entre le pouvoir social et politique et le développement de l'humanisme.

Par la suite, les villes et l'économie marchande se développent. Les seigneurs féodaux, libres désormais de vendre leurs produits, commencent à augmenter considérablement leurs exigences et accentuent l'exploitation des serfs. Mais, dans le même temps, trois processus concomittants viennent s'opposer à cette exploitation; l'affaiblissement militaire des seigneurs que le besoin d'argent conduit à réduire leurs suites; le développement des villes qui constituent des foyers de résistance aux seigneurs et offrent aux paysans le moyen de s'enfuir et d'échapper au servage; le pouvoir central qui, appuyé sur la bourgeoisie des villes, commence à lutter contre la féodalité. Du fait de cette situation contradictoire, la structure féodale devient réactionnaire, oppressive et aliénante.

Le conflit entre le pouvoir social et politique des seigneurs et l'humanisme bourgeois ira croissant.

Le problème se pose de manière analogue lorsque nous étudions l'histoire du capitalisme. Nous savons tous à quel point la création de l'industrie par la bourgeoisie s'est accompagnée d'une exploitation

Generally speaking, it remains to be asked, in each case, whether the concrete form of the division into classes corresponds to a maximum possible mastery of nature or whether it has already become oppressive,

insofar as privileged groups defend structures that no longer correspond to the optimum of interhuman relations and the development of the productive forces. In the first case, there is no doubt not an ideal situation conforming to a spiritualistic and abstract moralism, but an optimal situation in the relations between political power and what one might call humanism; it is, in historical study, the only possible meaning of the concept of non-alienation. In the second case, power necessarily becomes repressive, engendering alienation, and humanism tips over to the side of opposition forces oriented towards the overthrow of power and the transformation of the social order.

I will take two examples to illustrate this analysis: those of feudal society and bourgeois society.

Although one could make a more or less rigorous theoretical schema of feudalism, it would still be insufficient. There is no feudalism in itself, but concrete feudal societies born of earlier societies and transforming themselves until their disappearance. It also goes without saying that no feudal society has ever been egalitarian and that feudalism has always been based on the oppression and exploitation of serfs. That said, as long as the feudal lords, while exploiting their serfs, nevertheless fulfilled a social function useful to them; as long as, in order to be able to exploit them, they protected them against possible looters and especially against other feudal lords in the vicinity; as long as, finally, the demands of the lords and the rate of exploitation were limited by the natural economy (the castle could only consume a limited quantity of foodstuffs), the feudal organization represented in a whole part of the Europe and certainly in France a balance more or less close to the optimum between the forces of production and the relations of production and, from there, between social and political power and the development of humanism.

Subsequently, cities and the market economy develop. The feudal lords, now free to sell their products, began to considerably increase their demands and accentuated the exploitation of serfs. But, at the same time, three concomitant processes come to oppose this exploitation; the military weakening of the lords that the need for money leads to reduce their consequences; the development of cities which constitute centers of resistance to the lords and offer the peasants the means of fleeing and escaping serfdom; the central power which, supported by the bourgeoisie of the cities, began to fight against feudalism. Because of this contradictory situation, the feudal structure becomes reactionary, oppressive and alienating.

The conflict between the social and political power of the lords and bourgeois humanism will grow.

The problem arises in an analogous way when we study the history of capitalism. We all know to what extent the creation of industry by the bourgeoisie was accompanied by exploitation 32

odieuse et d'une extraordinaire misère de la classe ouvrière.[2] Et aussi que, dans une perspective globale, ce progrès de la bourgeoisie était, malgré l'affreuse misère qui l'accompagnait, une manière efficace – peut-être la plus efficace – de développer la production et d'assurer aux sociétés européennes les conditions d'une libération ultérieure.

Mais au fur et à mesure où l'industrie s'est développée et où les sociétés occidentales sont sorties de la première révolution industrielle – je ne reprendrai pas ici toute l'analyse du développement des monopoles et de l'impérialisme élaborée par les classiques du marxisme – le pouvoir de la bourgeoisie est devenu de plus en plus oppressif; la rupture s'accentua entre la culture et les valeurs humanistes d'une part et d'autre part le pouvoir des classes dominantes et de l'Etat. Ce phénomène s'accentuera encore – Marcuse, Adorno et l'Ecole de Francfort l'ont montré de manière particulièrement nette – avec le développement contemporain de la société technocratique.

Des phénomènes analogues apparaissent, bien entendu, dans les pays socialistes. Ce n'est que par l'analyse concrète des relations entre d'une part la structure des rapports sociaux et du pouvoir politique fondé sur eux et, d'autre part, les conditions de vie et de travail des hommes, ce n'est que par l'étude de la fonctionnalité de ces relations et de leurs possibilités d'assurer l'optimum de développement des individus, qu'on pourra décider du caractère socialiste et non-aliénant, ou au contraire oppressif et aliénant d'une société et du rapprochement ou de l'opposition entre le pouvoir politique – qu'il se dise ou non socialiste – et la culture humaniste.

Connaissant peu – en tout cas trop peu – les sociétés à caractère socialiste, je me contenterai dans la dernière partie de mon exposé d'analyser concrètement le problème tel qu'il se pose aujourd'hui dans les sociétés industrielles occidentales. Ce sont, je l'ai déjà dit, des sociétés capitalistes et, plus précisément, des sociétés qui entrent dans la troisième phase de l'histoire du capitalisme: celle que nous avons appelé le capitalisme d'organisation ou capitalisme technocratique. Ce dernier succède, après la période du capitalisme libéral, à la seconde phase que les classiques du marxisme ont appelée phase impérialiste et que je préfère appeler phase du capitalisme en crise. Il me faut justifier rapidement ce changement de terminologie, qui porte moins sur le contenu même de l'analyse théorique que sur les traits spécifiques de l'objet étudié. Lorsque Lénine caractérisait par le terme d'*imperialisme* la seconde phase historique du capitalisme, il mettait l'accent, entre autres, sur le caractère expansionniste et agressif à l'extérieur des frontières qui apparaissait comme un des traits spécifiques de cette période *par rapport au capitalisme libéral*. Mais, précisément, ce trait n'est plus spécifique si nous envisageons cette période *par rapport au capitalisme technocratique*, qui n'est ni moins expansionniste, ni moins agressif dans sa politique étrangère que ne l'étaient précédemment les grands Etats. Aussi le concept d'impéralisme risque-t-il d'effacer les différences pourtant essentielles entre la

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[2] Les U. S. A., qui avaient besoin de main-d'oeuvre immigrée à laquelle il fallait assurer des revenus plus élevés, et qui ont construit leur industrie à l'aide de capitaux empruntés à l'Europe, constituent la seule exception.

odious and extraordinary misery of the working class.2 And also that, in a global perspective, this progress of the bourgeoisie was, despite the terrible misery that accompanied it, an effective way -

perhaps the most effective - to develop production and provide European societies with the conditions for later liberation.

But as industry developed and Western societies emerged from the first industrial revolution

- I will not repeat here all the analysis of the development of monopolies and imperialism elaborated by the classics of Marxism - the power of the bourgeoisie has become more and more oppressive; the rupture was accentuated between culture and humanist values on the one hand and on the other hand the power of the dominant classes and the State. This phenomenon will be further accentuated - Marcuse, Adorno and the Frankfurt School have shown it in a particularly clear manner - with the contemporary development of technocratic society.

Similar phenomena appear, of course, in the socialist countries. It is only through the concrete analysis of the relations between, on the one hand, the structure of social relations and of the political power based on them and, on the other, the living and working conditions of men, that it is not that by studying the functionality of these relationships and their possibilities of ensuring the optimum development of individuals, it will be possible to decide whether a society is socialist and non-alienating or, on the contrary, oppressive and alienating. the rapprochement or opposition between political power - whether or not it calls itself socialist - and humanist culture.

Knowing little - in any case too little - of societies of a socialist character, I will content myself in the last part of my presentation with a concrete analysis of the problem as it arises today in Western industrial societies. These are, as I have already said, capitalist societies and, more precisely, societies which are entering the third phase of the history of capitalism: that which we have called organizational capitalism or technocratic capitalism. The latter succeeds, after the period of liberal capitalism, to the second phase which the classics of Marxism have called the imperialist phase and which I prefer to call the phase of capitalism in crisis. I must quickly justify this change in terminology, which bears less on the very content of the theoretical analysis than on the specific features of the object studied. When Lenin used the term imperialism to characterize the second historical phase of capitalism, he was emphasizing, among other things, the expansionist and aggressive character outside the frontiers which appeared to be one of the specific features of this period in relation to the liberal

capitalism. But, precisely, this trait is no longer specific if we consider this period in relation to technocratic capitalism, which is neither less expansionist nor less aggressive in its foreign policy than the large states were previously. Also, the concept of imperialism runs the risk of erasing the differences, however essential, between the

** The U.S.A., which needed immigrant labor for which higher incomes had to be guaranteed, and which built its industry with the help of capital borrowed from Europe, is the only exception.*

seconde et la troisième phase du capitalisme, dans la mesure où il peut s'appliquer aussi bien à l'une qu'à l'autre. C'est pourquoi je préfere le terme de capitalisme en crise car il permet de distinguer la période 1910–1950, aussi bien par rapport au siècle précédent que par rapport aux vingt dernières années.

Cette période a été, en effet, caractérisée par l'impossibilité de réaliser un équilibre économique, social et politique, même de courte durée, et cela par suite du développement des monopoles et des trusts qui ont compromis la régulation libérale par le marché sans encore trouver le moyen de créer les nouveaux mécanismes d'auto-régulation qui ne seront mis en place qu'après la seconde guerre mondiale. C'est pourquoi, après une longue période de développement relativement stable, troublée seulement par des crises cycliques et quelques guerres relativement localisées (entre 1848 – ou même 1815 – et 1914), nous voyons se succéder dans le monde occidental, à un rythme extrêmement rapide: la première guerre mondiale, la crise politique et sociale des années 1921–1923, l'extraordinaire crise économique de 1929–1933, le fascisme allemand et enfin la seconde guerre mondiale.

Ajoutons que cette période a été caractérisée aussi par le développement d'une philosophie spécifique: l'existentialisme, centré sur l'angoisse, la condition précaire de l'homme, ses limites, et la limite par excellence, la mort.

Ce n'est qu'après la seconde guerre mondiale, et au moins en partie sous la pression du développement interrompu des forces productives en U. R. S. S., que le capitalisme occidental est parvenu à mettre sur pied des mécanismes d'autorégulation interventionnistes en créant – ce qu'aucun classique du marxisme n'aurait imaginé – d'importants éléments de la planification dans le capitalisme.

Il va de soi que je ne saurais faire ici une analyse exhaustive de cette troisième étape, mais je voudrais au moins insister sur quelques-uns de ses processus spécifiques.

Tout d'abord la disparition non pas des couches moyennes en tant que telles mais des couches moyennes *indépendantes*, constituées dans la période libérale, et même dans la période de crise du capitalisme, par les *notables*. Les couches moyennes, qui se développent actuellement dans les sociétés industrielles occidentales diffèrent sur un point essentiel de celles qui caractérisaient les sociétés antérieures: ce ne sont plus des couches moyennes économiquement *indépendantes* mais des couches moyennes *salariées*, c'est-à-dire des gens qui gagnent autant et même plus peut-être que les notables traditionnels mais qui sont des administrateurs, des chercheurs, des cadres, des techniciens. Or cette disparition des notables indépendants constitue une modification, de la navigation spatiale est factice? Il ne faut pas se payer de la structure même des sociétés capitalistes.

D'autre part, le capitalisme d'organisation assure un développement considérable de la technique, c'est-à-dire des forces productives. On a dit, au cours de la discussion, que ce développement est »factice«. Je ne comprends pas ce que cela peut vouloir dire. Est-ce que la découverte de l'énergie atomique, des matières plastiques, de l'automation, de la navigation spatiale est factice? Il ne faut pas se payer de mots au nom de je ne sais quelle orthodoxie. Les sociétés capitalistes

second and third phase of capitalism, insofar as it can apply equally well to one as to the other. This is why I prefer the term capitalism in crisis because it makes it possible to distinguish the period 1910-1950, both from

the previous century and from the last twenty years.

This period was, in fact, characterized by the impossibility of achieving an economic, social and political balance, even for a short time, and this as a result of the development of monopolies and trusts which compromised the liberal regulation by the market without yet find a way to create the new self-regulation mechanisms that will only be put in place after the Second World War. This is why, after a long period of relatively stable development, disturbed only by cyclical crises and a few relatively localized wars (between 1848 - or even 1815 - and 1914), we see a succession in the Western world, at an extremely rapid: the First World War, the political and social crisis of the years 1921-1923, the extraordinary economic crisis of 1929-1933, German fascism and finally the Second World War.

Let us add that this period was also characterized by the development of a specific philosophy: existentialism, centered on anguish, the precarious condition of man, his limits, and the limit par excellence, death.

It was only after the Second World War, and at least partly under the pressure of the interrupted development of the productive forces in the U.S.S.R., that Western capitalism succeeded in setting up mechanisms of interventionist self-regulation by creating -

what no classic Marxist would have imagined - important elements of planning in capitalism.

It goes without saying that I cannot make here an exhaustive analysis of this third stage, but I would like at least to insist on some of its specific processes.

First of all the disappearance not of the middle layers as such but of the independent middle layers, constituted in the liberal period, and even in the period of crisis of capitalism, by the notables. The middle strata, which are currently developing in Western industrial societies, differ on an essential point from those which characterized earlier societies: they are no longer economically independent middle strata but salaried middle strata, that is to say people who earn as much and perhaps even more than the traditional notables but who are administrators, researchers, executives, technicians.

But this disappearance of independent notables constitutes a modification, of space navigation is factitious? We must not pay for the very structure of capitalist societies.

On the other hand, organizational capitalism ensures a considerable

development of technique, that is to say of the productive forces. It has been said, during the discussion, that this development is »fictitious«.

I don't understand what that could mean. Is the discovery of atomic energy, plastic maturities, automation, space navigation artificial? We must not pay ourselves with words in the name of I don't know what orthodoxy. Capitalist Societies 34

sont en mesure d'assurer aujourd'hui un extraordinaire développement réel des forces productives: il s'agit de ce qu'on a appelé, à juste titre je pense, la seconde révolution industrielle.

Or cette seconde révolution industrielle entraîne encore un autre changement important dans la structure sociale. Si d'un côté elle fait disparaître les notables, elle entraîne aussi une diminution en poids relatif, et même parfois en nombre absolu, du prolétariat traditionnel, des ouvriers non-qualifiés travaillant à la chaîne qui caractérisaient la grande industrie au cours de la période précédente, développant ce qu'on peut appeler »la nouvelle classe ouvrière« ou – comme je le préfère – »les couches moyennes salariées« (selon que l'on met l'accent sur le niveau des revenus ou le caractère salarial). Il naît ainsi une couche croissante de spécialistes, et cela signifie – nous verrons tout de suite l'importance concrète de cette constation – que des forces humaines productives, des travailleurs qui ont un lien très proche avec la production vont de plus en plus passer par les universités, modifiant ainsi le caractère de ces dernières et même la société globale.

En troisième lieu, la naissance du capitalisme d'organisation et les mécanismes de régulation économique sur lesquels il se fonde entraînent une réduction considérable – qui pourrait devenir totale – des crises économiques de *surproduction;* ce qui ne signifie pas bien entendu – et je ne veux pas qu'on me le fasse dire – la suppression des crises sociales et politiques, bien que dans une situation nouvelle celles-ci aussi changent de nature.[3] Cette modification de la structure économique entraîne, entre autres, une augmentation très relative mais néanmoins réelle des revenus et aussi du temps libre, bref, une augmentation du standard de vie pour l'ensemble des couches salariées, et en tout premier lieu pour les couches moyennes salariées, c'est-à-dire pour le groupe social dont le poids va croissant.

Or l'analyse traditionnelle de Marx, que nous connaissons tous, était fondée sur le concept de paupérisation. On peut discuter à perte de vue pour savoir si Marx imaginait une paupérisation absolue ou une paupérisation relative. Ce qui me paraît certain, c'est que son analyse implique l'idée que le développement du capitalisme rendrait progressivement la vie insupportable à une couche de plus en plus large d'ouvriers; qu'à partir de là, quel que soit l'état réel de la conscience de classe ouvrière, l'évolution économique et sociale – c'était la théorie géniale de la conscience possible – rendrait le prolétariat de plus en plus mécontent et de plus en plus révolutionnaire dans la mesure où il n'avait aucune chance d'occuper des positions économiques dominantes de contrôle à l'intérieur de la société capitaliste.

La perspective d'avenir se présentait comme une alternative: ou bien une révolution politique préalable à toute prise de contrôle éco-

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[3] En revanche, nous venons de voir qu'il existe encore des crises monétaires; celles-ci me paraissent cependant dues à l'imperfection des mécanismes d'auto-régulation et, en tant que telles, évitables dans un avenir plus ou moins proche. Bref, je ne crois pas qu'elles soient liées à la nature du capitalisme d'organisation, comme l'étaient les crises de surproduction au capitalisme libéral ou au capitalisme en crise. Mais c'est là un point dont on pourrait discuter et qu'il ne saurait être question de trancher ici.

are in a position today to ensure an extraordinary real development of the productive forces: this is what has been called, rightly I think, the second industrial revolution.

But this second industrial revolution brought about yet another important change in the social structure. If on the one hand it makes the notables disappear, it also causes a reduction in relative weight, and even sometimes in absolute number, of the traditional proletariat, of the unskilled workers working on the assembly line which characterized large industry during the period. previous one, developing what can be called »the new working class« or - as I prefer - »the salaried middle strata« (depending on whether the emphasis is on the level of income or the wage character). A growing layer of specialists is thus born, and this means - we will immediately see the concrete importance of this observation - that productive human forces, workers who have a very close link with production will increasingly pass through the universities, thus changing the character of the latter and even society as a whole.

Thirdly, the birth of organizational capitalism and the mechanisms of economic regulation on which it is based lead to a considerable reduction - which could become total - of the economic crises of overproduction; which of course does not mean - and I do not want anyone to make me say this - the suppression of social and political crises, although in a new situation these too change in nature.3 This modification of the economic structure leads, among other things, to a very relative but nevertheless real increase in income and also in free time, in short, an increase in the standard of living for all the salaried strata, and in the first place for the middle salaried strata, it is that is to say for the social group whose weight is increasing.

But the traditional analysis of Marx, which we all know, was based on the concept of pauperization. One can argue as far as the eye can see whether Marx imagined an absolute pauperization or a relative pauperization. What seems certain to me is that his analysis implies the idea that the development of capitalism would gradually make life unbearable for an increasingly large layer of workers; that from there, whatever the real state of working class consciousness, economic and social revolution - this was the brilliant theory of consciousness possible - would make the proletariat more and more discontented and more and more revolutionary insofar as it had no chance of occupying dominant economic positions of control within capitalist society.

The prospect for the future presented itself as an alternative: either a political revolution prior to any takeover of eco-

** On the other hand, we have just seen that there are still monetary crises; however, these seem to me to be due to the imperfection of the mechanisms of self-regulation and, as such, avoidable in the more or less near future. In short, I do not believe that they are linked to the nature of organizational*

capitalism, as were the crises of overproduction to liberal capitalism or to capitalism in creation-But this is a point that could be discussed. and that there can be no question of deciding here.

nomique et social et suivie d'un profond bouleversement sur ces deux plans, ou bien la barbarie et l'aliénation totale; alternative où la première éventualité, la révolution prolétarienne, était de loin la plus probable.

Aujourd'hui, un siècle après la parution du *Capital,* nous nous trouvons tout d'abord devant une classe ouvrière qui a, lentement sans doute mais néanmoins réellement, augmenté progressivement son standard de vie, ce qui a empêché le développement en Europe occidentale (excepté pour de très brèves périodes) de puissantes organisations politiques révolutionnaires. Si Lénine expliquait le réformisme par l'existence d'une aristocratie ouvrière, il faut se rendre compte que c'est non pas une minorité mais la grande majorité de la classe ouvrière en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en France, et aux U. S. A. qui a constitué cette aristocratie par rapport au reste du monde. C'est un des facteurs les plus importants qui explique le caractère essentiellement réformiste aussi bien de la social-démocratie allemande d'avant-guerre que des partis communistes allemand et français depuis au moins 1924 ou 1925: et cela malgré une idéologie révolutionnaire de surface devenue de plus en plus scolastique. Ce réformisme, lié entre autres à l'organisation de la classe ouvrière et aux conquêtes syndicales, était – et est encore – un *réformisme intégré* à la société capitaliste, qui se proposait d'y introduire un certain nombre de modifications, importantes sans doute mais néanmoins secondaires, qui ne menaçait – et ne menace – en rien le capitalisme en tant que tel, et dont l'acttion *réelle* ne s'orientait nullement vers un changement profond de l'ordre social. En bref, les organisations politiques et syndicales de la classe ouvrière ne posaient qu'en paroles et nullement dans leur action réelle le problème du dépassement du capitalisme.

Or, ce qu'on a appelé la nouvelle classe ouvrière, ou encore les nouvelles couches moyennes salariées, se trouvent dans une situation essentiellement différente. Sans doute le problème du standard de vie est-il complètement renversée; son amélioration devient évidente et, pour ces couches, une paupérisation pourrait être difficilement défendue, même par les doctrinaires les plus dogmatiques. A partir de là le problème de l'aliénation se modifie lui aussi de fond en comble. L'Ecole de Francfort, Adorno et surtout Marcuse, nous ont montré dans des ouvrages remarquables l'abêtissement, le rétrécissement de l'horizon intellectuel, la disparition de toute dimension critique et créatri de la conscience, qui menacent ces couches dans la mesure où elles accepteraient passivement les avantages que leur propose le capitalisme d'organisation. Une société hautement administrée, et qui étend l'administration jusqu'à la culture au point de l'étouffer et de la faire disparaître – car rien n'est plus contraire à la culture que l'administration –; le consommateurs absolu et passif, gagnant sa vie comme simple exécutant pour s'offrir des gadgets; le Club Méditerranée de la pensée: voilà la grande menace qui se profile à l'horizon. A la contrainte extérieure du fascisme et des camps de concentration se substitue quelque chose de plus subtil et de plus dangereux: l'abêtissement, le lavage de cerveau, corruption par le revenu, les vacances, l'action des mass-media et de la publicité.

economic and social and followed by a profound upheaval on these two planes, or else barbarism and total alienation; alternative where the first eventuality, the proletarian revolution, was by far the most probable.

Today, a century after the publication of Le C apital, we find ourselves first of all faced with a working class which has, slowly no doubt but nevertheless really, gradually raised its standard of living, which has prevented development in Western Europe. (except for very brief periods) powerful revolutionary political organizations. If Lenin explained reformism by the existence of a labor aristocracy, we must realize that it is not a minority but the great majority of the working class in England, Germany, France, and the U.S.A. a constitutes this aristocracy in relation to the rest of the world. This is one of the most important factors which explains the essentially reformist character both of pre-war German social democracy and of the German and French communist parties since at least 1924 or 1925: and this in spite of a revolutionary ideology surface became more and more scholastic. This reformism, linked among other things to the organization of the working class and to trade union conquests, was - and still is - a reformism integrated into capitalist society, which proposed to introduce a certain number of modifications into it, important but nevertheless secondary, which in no way threatened - and does not threaten - capitalism as such, and whose real action was in no way directed towards a profound change in the social order. In short, the political organizations and trade unions of the working class posed only in words and not in their real action the problem of overcoming capitalism.

Now, what has been called the new working class, or even the new salaried middle strata, find themselves in an essentially different situation. No doubt the problem of the standard of living is completely reversed; its improvement becomes evident and, for these layers, an impoverishment could hardly be defended, even by the most dogmatic doctrinaires. From there, the problem of alienation also changes from top to bottom.

The Frankfurt School, Adorno and above all Marcuse, have shown us in remarkable works the dumbing down, the narrowing of the intellectual horizon, the disappearance of any critical and creative dimension of consciousness, which threaten these strata insofar as they would passively accept the advantages that organizational capitalism offers them. A society that is highly administered, and which extends the administration to the point of suffocating the culture and making it disappear - for nothing is more contrary to the culture than the administration

the absolute and passive consumer, earning his living as a simple executant to afford gadgets; the Mediterranean Club of Thought: this is the great threat looming on the horizon.

The external constraint of fascism and the concentration camps is replaced by something more subtle and more dangerous: dumbing down, brainwashing, corruption by income, holidays, the action of the mass

Il faut reconnaître que, pendant toute une période qui s'étend à peu près de 1950 à 1968, ce processus d'intégration a semblé effectivement réussir. C'est pendant cette période que ce sont développées des théories sociologiques qui, radicalement opposées les unes aux autres dans leurs jugements de valeur, affirmaient néanmoins la même chose et transformaient une situation transitoire en période historique. Enchantés de la naissance d'une pensée »positive« (et cela voulait dire intégrée), Raymond Aron et Daniel Bell chantaient l'hymne de la fin des idéologies; avec la conscience mélancolique que la culture était en train d'agoniser, David Riesmann annonçait la fin du radar intérieur; avec la conscience apocalyptique du prophète qui voit arriver la fin du monde, Herbert Marcuse clamait l'avènement de ce monstre qu'est l'homme unidimensionnel. En même temps d'ailleurs, en France, une théorie qui se présentait comme scientifique alors qu'elle était en réalité hautement idéologique, et qui, avec Althusser, pénétrait même la pensée marxiste, annonçait la disparition du sujet, de l'homme et de l'Histoire, l'avènement d'un »savoir« réservé à une élite, complètement séparée des masses par la »coupure épistémologique« entre d'une part l'»idéologie«, la »pensée sauvage« et d'autre part la »Science«.

Quelles étaient, sur le plan économique et social, les caractéristiques de la société technocratique en voie de se constituer dans le monde occidental qui avaient engendré ces idéologies?

Tout d'abord – je l'ai déjà dit – constitution progressive de mécanismes d'auto-régulation et de planification économique. A partir de là, diminution considérable des notables et diminution progressive du poids social des ouvriers non-qualifiés, des anciens travailleurs à la chaîne; augmentation d'une couche nouvelle de spécialistes relativement bien payés, à revenu croissant, ayant de plus en plus une importance décisive dans le processus de production; mais aussi, phénomène capital, concentration progressive des décisions entre les mains d'un groupe relativement restreint d'individus, notamment de planificateurs (je les appellerai des »technocrates«, en ne liant pas particulièrement ce mot à l'idée de technique mais plutôt à celle de décision, et en l'opposant au mot »technicien«; il y a ainsi des technocrates de l'économie, de la politique, de l'enseignement, de la publicité, des loisirs, etc.); enfin, contre-partie du développement de la technocratie, réduction des techniciens spécialistes, des nouvelles couches moyennes salariées au niveau de simples exécutants. Je n'insisterai pas – Marcuse et l'Ecole de Francfort l'ont fait de manière suffisamment brillante – sur le rétrécissement intellectuel et la suppression de la dimension critique qu'a entraîné cette transformation.

Faut-il, à partir de là, accepter les conclusions, catastrophiques pour l'homme et la culture, des apologistes du capitalisme, des prophètes de l'apocalypse ou des théologiens de la scolastique anti-humaine? Faut-il donner raison à Raymond Aron, à Daniel Bell, à Herbert Marcuse, à Claude Lévi-Strauss ou à Roland Barthes? Je ne le crois pas. La réalité sociale est beaucoup plus complexe qu'elle n'apparaît à tous ces théoriciens qui confondent une période de transition relativement brève avec une période historique ou un statut fondamental et »a-historique« de l'humanité.

It must be recognized that, during a whole period extending approximately from 1950 to 1968, this process of integration did indeed appear to be successful. It was during this period that sociological theories were developed which, radically opposed to each other in their value judgments, nevertheless affirmed the same thing and transformed a transitory situation into a historical period. Enchanted by the birth of "positive" (and that meant integrated) thought, Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell sang the hymn of the end of ideologies; with the melancholic awareness that culture was dying, David Riesmann announced the end of the inner radar; with the apocalyptic consciousness of the prophet who sees the end of the world coming, Herbert Marcuse proclaimed the advent of this monster that is the one-dimensional man. At the same time, moreover, in France, a theory which presented itself as scientific when in reality it was highly ideological, and which, with Althusser, even penetrated Marxist thought, heralded the disappearance of the subject, of man and of History, the advent of a »knowledge« reserved for an elite, completely separated from the masses by the »epistemological break« between on the one hand »ideology«, »wild thought« and on the other Science".

What were the economic and social characteristics of the emerging technocratic society in the Western world which gave rise to these ideologies?

First of all - as I have already said - the progressive constitution of mechanisms for self-regulation and economic planning. From there, considerable reduction in notables and gradual reduction in the social weight of unskilled workers, former assembly line workers; the rise of a new layer of relatively well-paid specialists, with growing incomes, having more and more decisive importance in the production process; but also, capital phenomenon, progressive concentration of the decisions between the hands of a relatively restricted group of individuals, in particular of planners (I will call them "technocrats", by not linking this word particularly to the idea of technical but rather to that of decision, and by opposing it to the word "technician"; there are thus technocrats of the economy, politics, education, advertising, leisure, etc.); finally, counterpart of the development of the technocratic, reduction of the specialized technicians, of the new middle layers salaried at the level of simple executants. I will not insist - Marcuse and the Frankfurt School have done it brilliantly enough - on the intellectual narrowing and the suppression of the critical dimension that this transformation entailed.

Should we, from there, accept the conclusions, catastrophic for man and culture, of the apologists of capitalism, the prophets of the apocalypse or the theologians of anti-human scholasticism? Should we agree with Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Herbert Marcuse, Claude Levi-Strauss or

Roland Barthes? I do not believe that. Social reality is much more complex than it appears to all those theoreticians who confuse a relatively brief period of transition with a historical period or a fundamental and "a-historical" status of humanity.

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Tout d'abord, s'il est vrai que la première réaction à l'augmentation du niveau de vie d'une génération qui avait encore connu – directement ou par l'intermédiaire de ses parents – l'incertitude et l'angoisse des années 1929 à 1945 a été l'enthousiasme pour la sécurité et le bien-être offerts par la nouvelle société technocratique, les choses devaient et doivent se modifier avec la poursuite de cette évolution. La securité, le revenu permettant de vivre à un niveau décent, deviennent des choses naturelles et qui vont de soi.

Phénomène plus notable encore: à chaque augmentation du revenu, l'augmentation suivante doit perdre de sa valeur pour la conscience. Une seconde voiture a moins d'importance que la première, une troisième beaucoup moins que la seconde. La différence entre la possession d'un ou deux costumes est énorme, elle diminue considérablement entre six et sept, etc. Il y a donc beaucoup de chances – et cela constitue une possibilité réelle pour l'action socialiste – pour que l'augmentation du standard de vie perde son poids de facteur d'intégration et pour que, parallèlement, à l'exclusion de toute participation aux décisions, le statut de simple exécutant deviennent une frustration de plus en plus difficile à supporter; et cela d'autant plus qu'il y a là une contradiction virtuelle – et qui doit aller en s'accentuant – entre la culture universitaire, l'accroissement des connaissances qu'exige la spécialisation, et le rétrécissement d'horizon intellectuel, l'absence de tout intérêt non seulement social et politique mais même organisationnel pour la politique d'investissements de l'entreprise qu'implique l'adaptation à la société technocratique. Le produit le plus important qui était à la base de l'image du capitalisme d'organisation intégré – ce que j'ai appelé un jour le spécialiste et l'universitaire analphabètes – contient une contradiction interne qui risque fort d'éclater au corps de l'évolution historique. Dans la mesure cependant où la conscience des couches moyennes salariées s'orientera très probablement de plus en plus vers des revendications non pas quantitatives mais qualitatives, vers une exigence de participation aux décisions et, à la limite, vers une gestion entièrement démocratique de l'entreprise, la perspective d'une évolution des sociétés industrielles vers le socialisme se trouve à la fois réactualisée et profondément modifiée.

Or cette couche tend à devenir à la fois la couche numériquement la plus importante de la société nouvelle, et un groupe social dont les individus, difficilement remplaçables étant donné leur qualification, se trouvent situés au point névralgique de toute l'organisation sociale: son orientation a donc toute chance de devenir décisive pour l'évolution de la société. Lancée d'abord par les socialistes yougoslaves et née du besoin de donner une infrastructure à leur attitude critique à l'égard du socialisme centraliste et bureaucratique de l'U. R. S. S., l'idée d'autogestion qui était – et est encore – très difficile à réaliser dans un pays en voie d'industrialisation – vous connaissez toutes les difficultés auxquelles elle se heurte du fait, entre autres, du caractère arriéré des couches paysannes et de certaines couches ouvrières qui viennent seulement de quitter la paysannerie – s'est répandue comme une flamme en Occident en mai 1968. Elle est aujourd'hui sinon acceptée – la résistance farouche du P. C. F. et de la C. G. T. suffirait à rendre cette acceptation impossible – tout au moins discutée par des dizaines de

First of all, if it is true that the first reaction to the increase in the standard of living of a generation which had still known - directly or through the intermediary of its parents - uncertainty and anguish From the years 1929

to 1945 was the enthusiasm for the security and well-being offered by the new technocratic society, things were and must change with the continuation of this evolution. Security, the income to live at a decent level, become natural and self-evident things.

Even more notable is that with each increase in income, the next increase must lose value for consciousness.

A second car is less important than the first, a third much less than the second. The difference between owning one or two costumes is huge, it decreases considerably between six and seven, etc. There is therefore a good chance - and this constitutes a real possibility for socialist action - that the increase in the standard of living will lose its weight as a factor of integration and that, at the same time, the exclusion of any participation in decisions, the status of simple executor become a frustration increasingly difficult to bear; and this all the more so since there is a virtual contradiction - and which must go on becoming more accentuated - between the university culture, the increase in knowledge required by specialization, and the narrowing of the intellectual horizon, the the absence of any interest, not only social and political, but even organizational, for the company's investment policy, which adaptation to a technocratic society implies. The most important product which was the basis of the image of integrated organizational capitalism - what I once called the illiterate specialist and academic - contains an internal contradiction which is very likely to explode in the body of historical revolution. To the extent, however, that the awareness of the salaried middle strata will most likely be oriented more and more towards demands that are not quantitative but qualitative, towards a demand for participation in decision-making and, ultimately, towards an entirely democratic management of the enterprise, the perspective of an evolution of industrial societies towards socialism is both updated and profoundly modified.

Now, this stratum tends to become both the numerically most important stratum of the new society, and a social group whose individuals, difficult to replace given their qualifications, find themselves situated at the nerve center of the whole social organization: its guidance therefore has every chance of becoming decisive for the revolution of society. Launched first by the Yugoslav socialists and born out of the need to give an infrastructure to their critical attitude towards the centralist and bureaucratic socialism of the U. R. S. S., the idea of self-management which was - and still is - very difficult to achieve in a country in the process of industrialization - you know all the difficulties it comes up against due, among other things, to the backward character of the peasant strata and of certain layers of workers who have only just left the peasantry - spread like a flame in the West in

milliers de jeunes gens et d'ouvriers qui n'en avaient jamais entendu parler, et elle devient, dans cette perspective, la principale et peut-être l'unique forme concrète que peut prendre une orientation socialiste dans les sociétés industrielles avancées.

Le schéma marxiste traditionnel d'un prolétariat qui, n'ayant aucune possibilité de conquérir des positions sociales et économiques importantes à l'intérieur de la société capitaliste, ne saurait arriver au socialisme que par une révolution politique, une conquête de l'Etat préalable à toute réforme fondamentale de la structure économique, se trouve profondément modifié. Des conquêtes qualitatives orientées vers le contrôle de la production et l'autogestion ne supposent plus nécessairement une conquête préalable de la machine étatique, et la marche vers le socialisme prendra probablement un chemin analogue au développement de la bourgeoisie à l'intérieur de la société féodale, à savoir: celui d'une conquête graduelle – bien que jalonnée de conflits parfois très aigus – du pouvoir économique et social, suivie d'une conquête révolutionnaire (Angleterre – France) ou réformiste (Italie – Allemagne) du pouvoir politique.

Il s'agit sans doute d'une orientation réformiste, mais essentiellement différente du réformisme qui a caractérisé la période antérieure dans l'histoire du capitalisme. Ce dernier s'orientait vers des aménagements de la structure sociale existante; cette fois, il s'agit – comme dans le cas de la lutte en dernière instance réformiste, elle aussi, de la bourgeoisie contre la société féodale – d'un réformisme orienté vers un changement radical des structures, c'est-à-dire d'un réformisme révolutionnaire.

A ce sujet, je voudrais dire quelques mots sur l'opposition entre la nature et la fonction de l'université dans le capitalisme libéral et dans le capitalisme d'organisation. Une des raisons du mouvement étudiant dans les pays capitalistes avancés me paraît d'ailleurs être le renversement radical de cette nature et de cette fonction.

La société libérale traditionnelle était en effet composée de deux secteurs à structure différente: l'un, autoritaire, embrassant la production et, sur son modèle, l'armée et surtout la famille; l'autre, égalitaire et démocratique, réservé aux notables, embrassant surtout le marché (sauf le marché de la main-d'œuvre) et la vie culturelle, sociale et politique dans la mesure – et dans la mesure seulement – où les notables y participaient. Ce dualisme posait le problème du passage du jeune enfant éduqué dans une famille autoritaire – à l'intérieur de laquelle il occupait une position subordonnée – au statut de notable indépendant, ayant un jugement suffisamment critique pour prendre des décisions importantes et exercer à son tour l'autorité dans le secteur hiérarchisé. L'université et, dans une certaine mesure, les dernières classes de l'école secondaire avaient précisément pour fonction d'assurer ce passage; ce qui explique le caractère libéral et critique d'une université qui avait pour mission de créer des esprits indépendents même lorsqu'elle leur transmettait des idées conservatrices et réactionnaires.

Or cette situation s'est renversée du tout au tout avec le remplacement des notables par les couches moyennes salariées. Simples exécutants dans la plus grande partie de leur activité, ayant relativement

thousands of young people and workers who had never heard of it, and it becomes, in this perspective, the main and perhaps the only concrete form that a socialist orientation can take in advanced industrial societies.

The traditional Marxist schema of a proletariat which, having no possibility of conquering important social and economic positions within capitalist society, could only arrive at socialism through a political revolution, a conquest of the prior state to any fundamental reform of the economic structure, is profoundly modified. Qualitative conquests oriented towards the control of production and self-management no longer necessarily presuppose a prior conquest of the state machine, and the march towards socialism will probably take a path analogous to the development of the bourgeoisie within feudal society. , namely: that of a gradual conquest - although punctuated by sometimes very acute conflicts - of economic and social power, followed by a revolutionary (England - France) or reformist (Italy - Germany) conquest of political power.

It is undoubtedly a reformist orientation, but essentially different from the reformism that characterized the earlier period in the history of capitalism. The latter was oriented towards adjustments to the existing social structure; this time, it is a question - as in the case of the reformist struggle in the last instance, also of the bourgeoisie against feudal society - of a reformism oriented towards a radical change of structures, that is to say of revolutionary reformism.

On this subject, I would like to say a few words about the opposition between the nature and the function of the university in liberal capitalism and in organizational capitalism. One of the reasons for the student movement in the advanced capitalist countries seems to me to be the radical reversal of this nature and this function.

The traditional liberal society was in fact composed of two sectors with a different structure: one, authoritarian, embracing production and, on its model, the army and above all the family; the other, egalitarian and democratic, reserved for notables, embracing above all the market (except the labor market) and cultural, social and political life to the extent - and only to the extent - that the notables attended. This dualism posed the problem of the transition from the young child educated in an authoritarian family - within which he occupied a subordinate position - to the status of independent notable, having a sufficiently critical judgment to make important decisions and exercise in turn authority in the hierarchical sector. The university and, to some extent, the last grades of secondary school had precisely the function of providing this transition; which explains the liberal and critical character of a university whose mission was to create independent minds even when it transmitted to them conservative and reactionary ideas.

However, this situation was completely reversed with the replacement of the notables by the salaried middle strata. Simple performers in most of their activity, having relatively 39

peu de décisions importantes à prendre par eux-mêmes, les membres de ces couches – comme les anciens notables – ont transporté dans une très grande mesure leur comportement du bureau à la maison, du lieu de production à la famille, provoquant ainsi une libéralisation de la vie familiale et une importante diminution de l'autorité paternelle.

Vous voyez facilement la double conséquence de ce changement. L'université, qui reçoit une masse de plus en plus grande d'étudiants n'est plus réservée aux notables et devient un élément constitutif de la production, a maintenant pour mission de transformer des enfants éduqués de manière relativement libérale et peu habitués à obéir en exécutants disciplinés. On comprend que sa structure critique traditionnelle a tendu à faire progressivement place à une structure autoritaire et mandarinale qui existe même lorsque les idées transmises sont progressistes et libérales.

Malheureusement, cette structure autoritaire entre en conflit non seulement avec les tendances libérales qui commencent à se développer dans les nouvelles couches moyennes et particulièrement dans la jeune génération, qui n'a connu ni la crise ni la guerre et n'est pas encore intégrée à la structure hiérarchique de l'appareil de production, mais encore avec le statut même du savoir scientifique dont la progression rapide fait que très souvent de jeunes assistants de trente à quarante ans sont plus au courant de l'état actuel de la pensée scientifique que les professeurs auxquels ils sont hiérarchiquement subordonnés.

J'ajoute que cette situation contradictoire – qui devait mener à la crise – est d'autant plus importante pour la société globale que l'université n'est pas une entreprise quelconque mais un noyau à partir duquel les novelles couches de spécialistes sont diffusées dans l'ensemble de la production.

Ainsi, devant les événements de ces toutes dernières années et, notamment, depuis les événements de mai 1968 en France – qui ont suivi une longue période de stabilisation relative – le problème le plus important est celui de savoir s'il s'agit d'une crise de même type que celles qui ont jalonné le XIX^{e} et le XX^{e} siècles, ou si au contraire nous sommes devant les premières manifestations de nouvelles forces sociales, nées de la seconde révolution industrielle et orientées vers une nouvelle perspective.

Au niveau purement empirique, il faut avouer qu'il serait difficile de trancher et que les deux thèses peuvent être défendues. C'est à l'intérieur de l'analyse théorique globale que je viens de développer que j'opte pour la deuxième. Il est probable que les événements à venir, l'évolution ultérieure permettront de répondre à cette question. Ce qui me paraît certain, en tout cas, c'est que, même s'il s'agit des premières manifestations de forces nouvelles, celles-ci n'ont pas encore atteint un niveau de conscience historique et théorique suffisamment développé et que la plupart des étudiants et des ouvriers qui ont participé au mouvement de mai parlaient et parlent encore le langage de la période des structures autoritaires tant des forces dominantes que des forces de contestation. Quel que soit le jugement que l'on porte sur la pensée de Marcuse – et j'ai eu l'occasion plusieurs fois de discuter avec lui ici à Korčula et de dire ce qui nous sépare – il a eu le mérite de poser tout au moins les problèmes qui correspondent à la génération nouvelle et

few important decisions to be taken by themselves, the members of these strata - like the former notables - transported their behavior to a very large extent from the office to the home, from the place of production to the

family, thus provoking a liberalization of family life and a significant reduction in paternal authority.

You can easily see the double consequence of this change.

The university, which is attracting an increasingly large mass of students, is no longer reserved for the notables and is becoming a constituent element of production, now has the task of transforming children educated in a relatively liberal manner and little accustomed to obeying in executing disciplines. We understand that its traditional critical structure has tended to gradually give way to an authoritarian and mandarin structure that exists even when the ideas transmitted are progressive and liberal.

Unfortunately, this authoritarian structure comes into conflict not only with the liberal tendencies which are beginning to develop in the new middle strata and particularly in the young generation, which has experienced neither the crisis nor the war and is not yet integrated into the hierarchical structure of the apparatus of production, but still with the very status of scientific knowledge, the rapid progress of which very often means that young assistants aged thirty to forty are more aware of the current state of scientific thought than the teachers to whom they are hierarchically subordinate.

I would add that this contradictory situation - which was to lead to the crisis - is all the more important for global society since the university is not just any enterprise but a nucleus from which the new layers of specialists are disseminated in the whole production.

Thus, faced with the events of the last few years and, in particular, since the events of May 1968 in France - which followed a long period of relative stabilization - the most important problem is that of knowing whether it is a question of a crisis of the same type as those that marked the 19th and 20th centuries, or whether, on the contrary, we are faced with the first manifestations of new social forces, born of the second industrial revolution and oriented towards a new perspective.

At the purely empirical level, it must be admitted that it would be difficult to decide and that both theses can be defended. It is within the overall theoretical analysis that I have just developed that I opt for the second. It is probable that future events and subsequent developments will make it possible to answer this question. What seems certain to me, in any case, is that, even if these are the first manifestations of new forces, they have not yet reached a sufficiently developed level of historical and theoretical consciousness and that the Most of the students and workers who took part in the May movement spoke and still speak the language of the period of

*authoritarian structures, both of the dominant forces and of the forces of protest. Whatever judgment one passes on the thought of Marcuse _ e**

had the opportunity several times to discuss with him here in Korčula and to say what separates us - he had the merit of at least posing the problems which correspond to the new generation and 40

au monde où elle a grandi, alors que la plupart des théoriciens marxistes continuent à parler le langage de la paupérisation, de la révolution politique prolétarienne préalable à toute transformation sociale et économique, et de la dictature du prolétariat.

Malgré l'admiration que j'ai pour Lénine et pour Trotsky – et je vous assure qu'elle est énorme – il importe de savoir que le monde a changé et que nous devons éviter à tout prix de devenir scolastiques et dogmatiques en continuant à parler le même langage et à répondre aux mêmes problèmes. Un metteur en scène de la jeune génération a donné à un de ses films un titre caractéristique: *la Chine est proche*. Les gens de mon âge font partie d'une génération pour laquelle aucune information sur les progrès de la technique, sur les possibilités d'arriver en deux jours à Pékin et en quelques jours sur la lune ne changera rien au fait que la Chine est lointaine et reste un monde tout à fait différent. Un exemple très limité permet d'illustrer le phénomène: lorsque les premières nouvelles de la Révolution Culturelle ont paru dans la presse occidentale, elles montraient le désarroi et la désorientation totale des correspondants; ceux-ci avaient leur schéma sur le monde communiste, sur son caractère strictement discipliné et organisé et, devant le flot d'affiches qui couvraient les murs des villes, se demandaient - après se les être fait traduire - de qui elles émanaient, quel était l'organisme qui les avait fait coller sur les murs. Les jeunes qui ont vu tout cela à la télévision ont eu au contraire une réaction toute différente: ils y ont vu un moyen spontané d'expression, et il a suffi de deux jours d'occupation de la Sorbonne pour que nous comprenions tous que, dans un moment de révolte populaire, une affiche collée sur un mur signifiait simplement qu'un homme avait quelque chose à dire et qu'il s'adressait à tous les passants. Le mur comme moyen d'expression à la place du livre et du journal était difficilement concevable pour les gens de quarante ans; il était tout naturel pour les filles et les garçons de vingt. La Chine est proche, et les jeunes qui le savent et le vivent ont raison contre l'érudition de tous les sinologues et géographes de la génération précédente.

Cela dit, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que ces jeunes gens qui découvrent de manière intuitive qu'un mur est un moyen d'expression et que la Révolution Culturelle les concerne, n'ont pour la plupart aucune conscience claire et surtout aucune conscience théorique des phénomènes contemporains et de leur propre comportement. C'est là que la carence des théoriciens de la génération précédente, de notre génération, apparaît la plus dangereuse. N'ayant reçu aucun moyen sérieux de comprendre la société contemporaine ni de se comprendre lui-même, le mouvement tout entier souffre d'une ambiguïté fondamentale. Il parlait, et parle encore, le langage des socialistes et des révolutionnaires du début du siècle ou des pays en voie de développement, le langage de Trotsky, Lénine, Rosa Loxemburg, Guévara ou Mao, pour dire la contestation dans les pays industriels de la seconde moitié du XX^{e} siècle; or la distance entre ces deux périodes est beaucoup plus grande qu'elle n'était, par exemple, entre 1850 et 1940. Ces discordances entre, d'une part, la conscience et le langage, et, d'autre part, le comportement et les problèmes réels auxquels il doit répondre

to the world where she grew up, while most Marxist theoreticians continue to speak the language of pauperization, of the proletarian political revolution prior to any social and economic transformation, and of the

dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite the admiration I have for Lenin and for Trotsky - and I assure you it is enormous - it is important to know that the world has changed and that we must avoid at all costs becoming scholastic and dogmatic by continuing to speak the same language and to respond to the same problems. A director of the young generation gave one of his films a characteristic title: China is near. People my age are part of a generation for whom no information on the progress of technology, on the possibilities of arriving in two days in Beijing and in a few days on the moon will not change the fact that China is far away. and remains a completely different world. A very limited example illustrates the phenomenon: when the first news of the Cultural Revolution appeared in the Western press, it showed the disarray and the total disorientation of the correspondents; these had their schema on the communist world, on its strictly disciplined and organized character and, faced with the flood of posters which covered the walls of the cities, wondered - after having had them translated - from whom they emanated, what was the organization that had them stuck to the walls. The young people who saw all this on television had, on the contrary, a completely different reaction: they saw in it a spontaneous means of expression, and it only took two days of occupation of the Sorbonne for us all to understand that, in a moment of popular revolt, a poster stuck on a wall simply meant that a man had something to say and that he was addressing all passers-by. The wall as a means of expression instead of the book and the newspaper was hardly conceivable for people of forty; it was quite natural for girls and boys of twenty. China is near, and the young people who know it and live it are right against the erudition of all the sinologists and geographers of the previous generation.

Having said that, it is nonetheless true that these young people who intuitively discover that a wall is a means of expression and that the Cultural Revolution concerns them, for the most part have no clear conscience and above all no theoretical awareness of contemporary phenomena and their own behavior. This is where the lack of theoreticians of the previous generation, of our generation, appears most dangerous. Having received no serious means of understanding contemporary society or of understanding itself, the whole movement suffers from a fundamental ambiguity. He spoke, and still speaks, the language of the socialists and revolutionaries of the beginning of the century or of the developing countries, the language of Trotsky, Lenin, Rosa Loxemburg, Guevara or Mao, to express the protest in the industrial countries of the second half of the X X th century; now the distance between these two periods is much greater than it was, for example, between 1850 and 1940. and the real problems to which it must respond 41

engendrent bien entendu une ambiguïté parfois favorable à l'apparition de la conscience nouvelle, mais fatale souvent à la structuration de l'action.

Et, pour terminer sur le dilemme Pouvoir et Humanisme: dans l'ancienne problématique du mouvement ouvrier et de la pensée marxiste, la hiérarchie et la discipline des classes dominantes, qui organisaient et perpétuaient l'exploitation, exigeaient une défense des classes opprimées et des valeurs humaines organisée, centralisée et hiérarchisée sur le même modèle. Si vous voulez, il s'agissait de la lutte entre deux camps qui prenaient tous deux des structures organisationnelles se raprochant de la structure militaire des armées traditionnelles formées avant tout de troupes d'infanterie. Deux choses m'ont cependant frappé dans le mouvement de mai 1968, et notamment dans le mouvement étudiant: c'est le refus radical de toute organisation et de toute discipline, et l'exigence profonde de liberté et de spontanéité; un refus et une exigence qui allaient jusqu'au pathologique lorsque des Comités d'action refusaient de maintenir le même secrétaire le matin et l'après-midi, ce qui supprimait toute continuité et ne permettait même pas de conserver les procès-verbaux. Tout cela était bien entendu absurde et condamné à l'inefficacité. L'important est néanmoins de savoir si nous étions en face d'une mentalité enfantine ou, au contraire, d'une réaction encore confuse mais essentiellement justifiée contre la discipline et le caractère hiérarchique d'organisations ne correspondant plus à la société nouvelle en train de se constituer. La réponse dépend de l'existence de forces nouvelles en voie de développement, orientées à la fois vers la liberté, la démocratie et la transformation socialiste de la société. L'espoir de démocratisation du mouvement ouvrier ne saurait être réellement fondé que sur le fait qu'il se trouve maintenant dans un monde nouveau et face à une problématique nouvelle.

La discipline et l'organisation ne sauraient en effet être les mêmes dans un corps d'infanterie et dans un avion ou tout autre corps techniquement avancé. N'importe quel sous-officier connaît le maniement du fusil et peut l'expliquer aux soldats en leur disant ce qu'ils doivent faire et en leur donnant des directives générales. En revanche, même un officier supérieur se trouverait incompétent devant un simple soldat spécialiste en train de manier une mécanique ultramoderne. Peu à peu, le progrès technique exige un remplacement de la hiérarchie par la coopération, de l'autorité par la camaraderie. Et permettez-moi, en tant que sociologue, de dire aux camarades trotskystes qui ont parlé hier et avant-hier qu'il y a une certaine naïveté à affirmer que les partis sociaux-démocrates et communistes se sont bureaucratisés mais qu'ils parviendront, eux, à créer un véritable parti hiérarchique, centralisé et révolutionnaire. Il est probable et même certain qu'à l'origine les socialistes allemands ou les bolcheviks russes étaient animés pour le moins d'intentions aussi bonnes et d'un esprit socialiste aussi sincère que le sont ces camarades aujourd'hui. La bureaucratisation et l'intégration à la société existante ne sont pas le simple résultat d'une trahison ou d'une mauvaise volonté – bien que celles-ci aient souvent existé – mais bien plutôt d'un processus structural auquel le parti trotskyste n'échapperait certainement pas lui-même s'il devenait un parti de masse et se trouvait dans une situation analogue.

of course generate an ambiguity sometimes favorable to the appearance of the new consciousness, but often fatal to the structuring of the action.

And, to end on the dilemma of Power and Humanism: in the old

problematic of the labor movement and Marxist thought, the hierarchy and the discipline of the dominant classes, which organized and perpetuated exploitation, demanded a defense of the oppressed classes and organized, centralized and hierarchical human values on the same model. If you like, it was about the fight between two camps which both took on organizational structures approaching the military structure of traditional armies formed primarily of infantry troops. However, two things struck me in the movement of May 1968, and in particular in the student movement: it is the radical refusal of any organization and any discipline, and the profound demand for freedom and spontaneity; a refusal and a demand that went as far as pathological when Action Committees refused to keep the same secretary in the morning and afternoon, which eliminated all continuity and did not even allow the minutes to be kept. All this was of course absurd and doomed to ineffectiveness. The important thing is nevertheless to know whether we were faced with a childish mentality or, on the contrary, a still confused but essentially justified reaction against discipline and the hierarchical character of organizations no longer corresponding to the new society in the process of to constitute itself. The answer depends on the existence of new forces on the way to development, oriented simultaneously towards freedom, democracy and the socialist transformation of society. The hope of democratization of the labor movement can only really be based on the fact that it now finds itself in a new world and faced with a new problem.

Discipline and organization cannot in fact be the same in an infantry corps and in an airplane or any other technically advanced corps. Any non-commissioned officer knows the handling of the rifle and can explain it to the soldiers, telling them what to do and giving them general instructions. On the other hand, even a superior officer would find himself incompetent in front of a simple specialist soldier trying to handle an ultramodern mechanism. Little by little, technical progress demands a replacement of hierarchy by cooperation, of authority by camaraderie. And allow me, as a sociologist, to say to the Trotskyist comrades who spoke yesterday and the day before yesterday that there is a certain naivety in asserting that the social-democratic and communist parties have become bureaucratic but that they will succeed, them, to create a truly hierarchical, centralized and revolutionary party. It is probable and even certain that originally the German Socialists or the Russian Bolsheviks were animated at least with as good intentions and as sincere a socialist spirit as are these comrades today. Bureaucratization and integration into existing society are not the simple result of betrayal or bad will - although these often existed - but rather of a structural process to which the Trotskyist party would certainly not escape itself if it became a mass party and found itself in a similar situation.

Cela dit, reste pour l'instant le problème le plus fondamental et sans doute le plus difficile: celui des formes d'organisation d'un mouvement réellement socialiste dans les sociétés industrielles contemporaines.

Il est évident pour nous tous que, sur ce plan, aucun programme réaliste et valable n'a surgi en Occident au cours des dernières années et que cela constitue la faiblesse la plus importante de la gauche européenne. Au fond si, entre 1916 et 1925, Lénine, Lukács et Gramsci redécouvrent indépendamment l'un de l'autre la pensée dialectique et la nécessité de fonder la compréhension de la société et l'action socialiste sur des forces internes aux sociétés qu'ils combattent, leur analyse reste au niveau philosophique; si, après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, les socialistes yougoslaves, Trentin et Foa en Italie et, plus tard, Serge Mallet en France découvrent cette force sociale interne, en train de naître avec la seconde révolution industrielle, dans la nouvelle classe ouvrière et son programme dans le concept d'autogestion, tout ce qu'ils peuvent affirmer sur le plan organisationnel c'est la probabilité – qui ne cesse de se confirmer – de l'augmentation de la fonction politique des syndicats et des organes d'autogestion par rapport à celle des partis. Reste toujours dans les sociétés capitalistes avancées le problème des formes nouvelles d'organisation capables d'unir la démocratie et la liberté internes avec l'efficacité dans la lutte contre les classes dominantes.

Vous pensez bien que je n'ai sur ce point aucune recette à vous présenter. Néanmoins je voudrais mentionner que j'ai lu un jour dans un ouvrage de Trotsky une remarque qui m'a paru hautement intéressante: l'auteur se demandait pourquoi le prolétariat avait besoin dans sa lutte d'organisations centralisées et disciplinées alors que la bourgeoisie avait réussi sa Révolution en France avec l'organisation beaucoup plus lâche et décentralisée des Clubs et des Sections; et il répondait – à juste titre, me semble-t-il – que la bourgeoisie ayant déjà le pouvoir économique et social avait acquis les cadres mentaux, la conscience de classe qui orientaient spontanément son action dans un sens révolutionnaire. Il y a en effet, entre spontanéité et discipline, une relation dialectique qui rend la seconde d'autant moins nécessaire que la première est plus développée.

A la base des positions des anciens marxistes, de Kautsky à Lénine et de Bebel à Staline, il y avait l'intuition – et souvent la conviction – de l'absence de toute spontanéité révolutionnaire de la classe ouvrière, absence à laquelle devait suppléer précisément l'organisation hiérarchique et disciplinée. Mais si – comme je viens de le dire – la nouvelle classe ouvrière arrive, par son action, à conquérir des positions de contrôle de la production à l'intérieur même de la société capitaliste, elle se trouvera dans une situation analogue à celle de la bourgeoisie d'avant 1789. L'exercice de ces fonctions économiques et sociales entraînera une formation psychique et intellectuelle suffisante pour permettre d'augmenter considérablement la spontanéité et la démocratie dans les organisations à venir, que les théoriciens devront découvrir à partir de l'expérience historique future comme leurs prédécesseurs ont découvert jadis les syndicats en Occident ou les soviets en Russie.

Having said this, the most fundamental and doubtless the most difficult problem remains for the moment: that of the forms of organization of a

truly socialist movement in contemporary industrial societies.

It is obvious to all of us that, on this level, no realistic and valid program. has arisen in the West in recent years and that this constitutes the most important weakness of the European left. Basically, if between 1916 and 1925 Lenin, Lukacs and Gramsci independently rediscovered dialectical thought and the need to base the understanding of society and socialist action on forces internal to the societies they fight, their analysis remains at the philosophical level; if, after the Second World War, the Yugoslav socialists, Trentino and Foa in Italy and, later, Serge Mallet in France discovered this internal social force, being born with the second industrial revolution, in the new working class and its program in the concentration of self-management, all they can affirm on the organizational level is the probability - which continues to be confirmed - of the increase in the political function of the trade unions and the organs of self-management in relation to that of the parties. There always remains in advanced capitalist societies the problem of new forms of organization capable of uniting internal democracy and freedom with efficiency in the struggle against the dominant classes.

You can well imagine that I have no recipe to present to you on this point. Nevertheless, I would like to mention that I once read in a work by Trotsky a remark which seemed to me highly interesting: the author wondered why the proletariat needed centralized and disciplined organizations in its struggle when the bourgeoisie had succeeded in its Revolution in France with the much looser and more decentralized organization of Clubs and Sections; and he replied - rightly, it seems to me - that the bourgeoisie, already having economic and social power, had acquired the mental frameworks, the class consciousness which spontaneously oriented its action in a revolutionary direction. There is indeed, between spontaneity and discipline, a dialectical relationship which makes the second all the less necessary as the first is more developed.

At the base of the positions of the old Marxists, from Kautsky to Lenin and from Bebel to Stalin, there was the intuition - and often the conviction -

from the absence of any revolutionary spontaneity of the working class, an absence to which precisely the hierarchical and disciplined organization had to compensate. But if - as I have just said - the new working class succeeds, through its action, in conquering positions of control of production within capitalist society itself, it will find itself in a situation analogous to that of the bourgeoisie before 1789. The exercise of these economic and social functions will lead to a sufficient psychic and intellectual formation to allow a considerable increase in spontaneity and democracy in the organizations to come, which the theorists will have to

discover from future historical experience as their predecessors once discovered the trade unions in the West or the soviets in Russia.

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Les formes futures d'organisation devront sans doute – pour être fonctionnelles et efficaces – se débarrasser de tout ce que l'enthousiasme et le radicalisme des étudiants de 1968 avaient d'intempestif, d'irresponsable et d'exagéré. Il n'en reste pas moins que leur refus de la hiérarchie et de la discipline bureaucratique – ces deux caractéristiques du mouvement ouvrier des dernières décennies –, leur exigence profonde de liberté et de démocratie contenaient en germe, et sous une forme sans doute anticipatrice, une profonde et puissante intuition du monde moderne en train de naître et des formes que prendront probablement les valeurs humanistes, l'organisation de la lutte pour le socialisme et les structures du pouvoir et que, par cela même, les étudiants de mai 1968 étaient en avance sur la conscience bureaucratique des défenseurs des structures antérieures, devenues oppressives et en train d'être dépassées par l'Histoire.

Future forms of organization will undoubtedly have to - in order to be functional and effective - get rid of all that the enthusiasm and radicalism of the students of 1968 had that was untimely, irresponsible and

exaggerated. The fact remains that their rejection of hierarchy and bureaucratic discipline - these two characteristics of the labor movement of the last decades

of freedom and democracy contained in germ, and in a doubtless anticipatory form, a profound and powerful intuition of the modern world in the process of being born and of the forms which humanist values, the organization of the struggle for socialism and the structures of power and that, for that very reason, the students of May 1968 were ahead of the bureaucratic consciousness of the defenders of the earlier structures, which had become oppressive and were being overtaken by history.

MACHT, GEWALT UND HUMANITÄT

Gajo Petrović

Zagreb

Sind Macht und Gewalt wesentliche Merkmale der Menschlichkeit, oder vielmehr Formen eines entfremdeten Seins des Menschen? Oder sind sie vielleicht ein Drittes, im Verhältnis zur Menschlichkeit Neutrales und Instrumentales, dessen Menschlichkeit oder Unmenschlichkeit von den Zwecken abhängt, zu welchen wir Macht und Gewalt gebrauchen?

Die so gefaßten Fragen können wohl zu einfach erscheinen. Die Antwort scheint sich von selbst zu ergeben. Ist es nicht ganz klar und unbestreitbar, daß Macht und Gewalt etwas Negatives, Unmenschliches darstellen? In den gegenwärtigen Diskussionen über Macht und Gewalt wird wirklich sehr oft von einer solchen Voraussetzung ausgegangen, ohne irgendwelche gedankliche Anstrengungen zu machen, sie kritisch zu prüfen, sie zu durchdenken und zu begründen. In diesen Diskussionen wird aber auch sehr oft unkritisch die entgegengesetzte Voraussetzung angenommen, daß die Macht oder der Wille zur Macht die wesentliche Bestimmung des Menschen ausmacht, so daß die Menschlichkeit des Menschen am Grad seiner Macht gemessen werden kann. Diese beiden entgegengesetzten Auffassungen führen oft eine friedliche Koexistenz, wobei sie in keinen Dialog treten und so die Frage offen lassen.

Müssen wir uns denn für eine der beiden entgegengesetzten Auffassungen entscheiden? Und ist die einzige »dritte Möglichkeit«, die Macht und die Gewalt zu etwas Äusserlichen und Neutralen im Verhältnis zu Humanität zu erklären? Sollte man nicht zunächst den Begriff der Macht durchdenken? Könnte die Differenzierung im Begriff Macht nicht als Ausgangspunkt für eine angemessenere Lösung dienen? Steht die Sache vielleicht nicht so, daß einige Formen der Macht dieVerneinung der Menschlichkeit, die anderen ihre volle Behauptung darstellen?[1]

[1] Der Gedanke, daß eine Differenzierung im Begriff Macht durchgeführt werden sollte, wurde in Korčula im Vortrag von V. Korać ausgesprochen, wenn er am Ende seiner Ausfürungen die Forderung aufstellte, die *Macht* soll *ohnmächtig* und die Humanität *allmächtig* werden. In der so formulierten Forderung, in der die Macht einmal gesondert und zweimal in Zusammensetzungen erwähnt wird, han-

POWER, VIOLENCE AND HUM ANITY

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Are power and violence essential characteristics of humanity, or rather forms of an alienated human being? Or are they perhaps a third, neutral and instrumental in relation to humanity, whose humanity or inhumanity depends on the purposes for which we use power and violence?

The questions posed in this way may well seem too simple. The answer seems to be self-explanatory. Isn't it quite clear and undeniable that power and violence represent something negative, inhuman? Indeed, in contemporary discussions of power and violence, such a premise is very often assumed without making any mental effort to critically examine, think through, and justify it. In these discussions, however, the opposite assumption is very often uncritically accepted, that power or the will to power constitutes the essential determination of man, so that man's humanity can be measured by the degree of his power. These two opposing views often coexist peacefully without entering into a dialogue, leaving the question open.

Do we have to decide for one of the two opposing views? And is the only "third possibility" to explain power and violence as something extraneous and neutral in relation to humanity? Shouldn't one first think through the concept of power? Couldn't the differentiation in the concept of power serve as a starting point for a more appropriate solution? Is it perhaps not the case that some forms of power represent humanity's opinion and others its full assertion?

1 The idea that a differentiation should be made in the concept of power was expressed in Korčula in the lecture by V. Korać when, at the end of his explanations, he made the demand that power should become impotent and humanity omnipotent. In the demand thus formulated, in which power is mentioned once separately and twice in compounds, han-45

Die Frage ob jede Macht etwas Menschliches, bzw. Unmenschliches ist, oder ob vielleicht Formen der menschlichen, wie auch der unmenschlichen Macht bestehen, kann einem abstrakt erscheinen, in keiner Beziehung mit den »konkreten« Fragen des Lebens. Im Zusammenhang mit einem solchen möglichen Einwand soll aber erwähnt werden, daß diese »abstrakte« Frage bedeutende theoretisch-praktische Konsequenzen hat, weil von ihr viele andere Fragen abhängen, die wir im weiteren stellen und theoretisch oder praktisch zu lösen versuchen werden. Wenn wir nämlich den Standpunkt einnehmen, daß die Macht und die Gewalt Merkmale der Menschlichkeit darstellen, so stehen wir vor der Aufgabe ihrer Weiterentwicklung und Stärkung; wenn wir uns aber für die These entscheiden, daß Macht und Gewalt Formen der Entfremdung des Menschen darstellen, so sehen wir uns dem Problem ihrer Eliminierung oder wenigstens »Zähmung« (Russell) gegenübergestellt; und wenn wir die Auffassung von der neutralen, instrumentalen Natur der Macht und Gewalt annehmen, werden wir die Ziele zu bestimmen haben, denen sie untergeordnet werden sollen.

Der Frage, ob Macht und Gewalt in einer inneren (wesentlichen) oder nur äußerlichen (instrumentalen) Beziehung zur Humanität stehen, könnte auch eingewendet werden, daß sie akademisch »neutral« oder »ohne Standpunkt« ausgedrückt ist, weil sie verschiedene Möglichkeiten erwähnt, als ob sie gleichberechtigt und gleich wahrscheinlich wären. Die Frage wäre aber keine Frage, wenn sie im voraus nur eine Antwort gestattete. Ist eine Frage offen, bedeutet das keineswegs so etwas wie »désengagement«. Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Macht und Gewalt zur Humanität ist schon als Frage »engagiert«, weil sie vor allem die herrschende inhumane Macht trifft, die in ihrer Besessenheit nach der unaufhörlichen Selbstvermehrung jede kritische Frage über sich selbst als unerwünscht abweist.

Da die Macht und die Gewalt nicht dasselbe sind, werden wir zunächst die Beziehung zwischen Macht und Humanität betrachten, und zwar so, daß wir die Gewalt vorläufig beiseite lassen – bis sie sich von selbst meldet.

Die Frage über das Verhältnis zwischen Macht und Humanität ist eine der großen Fragen der europäischen Philosophie, so daß wir uns über sie bei vielen bedeutenden Denkern (man denke nur z. B. an Hobbes oder Hegel) belehren könnten. In unserer Betrachtung dieses Verhältnisses werden wir von Friedrich Nietzsche ausgehen. Es ist nicht mein Vorhaben, Nietzsche zu degradieren oder zu rehabilitieren, sogar nicht »objektiv« zu interpretieren oder zu rekonstruieren. Ich möchte nur gewisse Möglichkeiten für die Differenzierungen im Begriff Macht aufweisen, Möglichkeiten, die bei Nietzsche angezeigt, obwohl vielleicht nicht auf diese Weise durchgeführt sind.

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delt es sich offensichtlich nicht immer um die Macht in demselben Sinn. Die Notwendigkeit der Differenzierung des Begriffes Macht wurde auch von R. Muminović hervorgehoben, als er sagte, daß es sich wirklich nicht um das Verhältnis zwischen Macht und Humanität handelt, sondern um das Verhältnis der Macht zur edlen Macht.

The question of whether all power is something human or inhuman, or whether forms of human as well as inhuman power exist, can seem abstract, unrelated to the "concrete" questions of life. In connection with

such a possible objection, however, it should be mentioned that this "abstract" question has important theoretical and practical consequences, because many other questions depend on it, which we will pose later and try to solve theoretically or practically. If we take the position that power and violence are characteristics of humanity, we are faced with the task of developing and strengthening them; but if we decide to accept the thesis that power and violence represent forms of human alienation, we are faced with the problem of their elimination, or at least "taming" (Russell); and if we accept the view of the neutral, instrumental nature of power and violence, we shall have to determine the ends to which they are to be subordinated.

The question of whether power and violence stand in an inner (essential) or only outer (instrumental) relationship to humanity could also be objected to, that they are academic

"neutral" or "without a point of view" because it mentions different possibilities as if they were equal and equally probable. But the question would not be a question if it allowed only one answer in advance. If a question is open, it does not mean anything like »disengagement«. The question of the relation of power and violence to humanity is already a question

"Committed" because above all it affects the ruling inhuman power which, in its obsession with incessant self-reproduction, rejects any critical question about itself as undesirable.

Since power and violence are not the same, we shall first consider the relationship between power and humanity, leaving violence aside for the time being - until it makes itself known.

The question of the relationship between power and humanity is one of the great questions of European philosophy, so that we could learn about it from many important thinkers (just think of Hobbes or Hegel, for example). In our consideration of this relationship we will start with Friedrich Nietzsche. It is not my intention to degrade or rehabilitate Nietzsche, nor even to interpret or reconstruct it "objectively." I would just like to point out certain possibilities for the differentiations in the concept of power, possibilities indicated in Nietzsche, although perhaps not carried out in this way.

obviously it is not always about power in the same sense. The need to differentiate the concept of power was also emphasized by R. Muminović, when he said that it is really not a question of the relation between power and humanity, but of the relation of power to noble power.

Vor allem möchte ich auf eine der Hauptthesen Nietzsches verweisen, diejenige, derzufolge das Leben als »die uns bekannteste Form des Seins« spezifisch »ein Wille zur Akkumulation der Kraft« ist.[2] Nietzsche zufolge haben alle Prozesse des Lebens hier ihren Hebel: »nichts will sich erhalten, alles soll summiert und akkumuliert werden.« (467) Der Wille zur Macht ist aber nicht nur das Prinzip des Lebens als eines gesellschaftlichen Phänomens, weil der Wille zur Akkumulation der Kraft nicht nur für das Phänomen des Lebens, für Ernährung, Zeugung, Vererbung spezifisch ist, sondern auch »für Gesellschaft, Staat, Sitte, Autorität« (466). »Sollten wir – fragt Nietzsche – diesen Willen nicht als bewegende Ursache auch in der Chemie annehmen dürfen? – und in der kosmischen Ordnung?« (466) So zeigt sich der Wille zur Macht als ein nicht nur biologisches Prinzip, und das ist nicht erstaunlich, weil wir, wie es auch Nietzsche sagt, vom Sein keine andere Vorstellung als »leben« haben. »Wie kann also etwas Totes 'sein'?« (396)

Indem Nietzsche den Willen zur Macht zum universalen Prinzip erklärt, macht er uns auch auf verschiedene Illusionen und illusorische Annahmen aufmerksam, wie diejenige, daß der Mensch nur die Lust sucht. Das Streben nach Lust ist wirklich nur eine Folge und was dahinter steckt ist das Streben nach einem »Plus von Macht« (473). Nietzsche behauptet auch, daß die Macht, wo sie machtlos ist, sich der Hypokrisie und Klugheit bedient, so daß sie sich als Gehorsam, Ergebung, Hingebung, Liebe, Idealisierung, Vergötterung, Fatalismus, Resignation, »Objektivität«, Selbsttyrannisierung, Stoizismus, Askese, Kritik, Pessimismus usw. ausgibt. (487) Zum Begriff des Lebendigen gehört es »daß es wachsen muß, – daß es seine Macht erweitern und folglich fremde Kräfte in sich hineinnehmen muß.« (489) Man redet von einem »Recht des Individuums sich zu *verteidigen*,« man sollte aber »auch von seinem Rechte *anzugreifen* reden«, weil beides, der aggressive und der defensive Egoismus »die *Fatalität* des Lebens selbst« sind. (489) »Die Erschöpften wollen Ruhe, Gliederausstrecken, Frieden, Stille, – es ist das Glück der nihilistischen Religionen und Philosophien; die Reichen und Lebendigen wollen Sieg, überwundene Gegner. Überströmen des Machtgefühls über weitere Bereiche als bisher. Alle gesunde Funktionen des Organismus haben dies Bedürfnis. . .« (475)

Wenn wir die angeführten, wie auch einige andere Texte von Nietzsche sorgfältig studieren, so sehen wir daß der Begriff der Macht, der hier als ein universales Prinzip erscheint, gewisse Differenzierungen in sich enthält, und daß auch bei Nietzsche der Grund zur Unterscheidung der drei Hauptformen der Macht zu finden ist.

Die erste Grundform der Macht wäre die Macht als bloße, im Bezug auf das Menschliche neutrale Macht oder Kraft, die Macht die nichts spezifisch Menschliches, sondern dem Menschen, dem Tier, der Maschine, der Natur Gemeinsames ist. Das ist die Macht des Verweilens und des Erhaltens, die Macht der Bewegung und des Zusammenstoßes. Daß auch bei Nietzsche eine solche Auffassung erscheint, ersieht man daraus, daß er oft die Worte »Macht« und »Kraft« pro-

[2] F. Nietzsche, *Der Wille zur Macht*, Alfred Kröner Verlag, Leipzig 1930, S. 467.

Above all, I would like to refer to one of Nietzsche's main theses, the one according to which life as "the form of being best known to us" is

specifically "a will to the accumulation of strength".2

According to Nietzsche, all processes of life have their heart here:

"Nothing wants to be preserved, everything should be summed up and accumulated." (467) But the will to power is not only the principle of life as a social phenomenon, because the will to accumulate power not only for the phenomenon of life, for Nutrition, procreation, heredity is specific, but also "for society, state, custom, authority" (466). "Shouldn't we - asks Nietzsche - also be allowed to accept this will as a moving cause in chemistry? - and in the cosmic order?" (466) Thus the will to power shows itself to be not just a biological principle, and that is not surprising because, as Nietzsche also says, we have no other idea of being than "living." . "So how can something dead 'be'?" (396)

By declaring the will to power to be a universal principle, Nietzsche also draws our attention to various illusions and illusory assumptions, such as that man only seeks pleasure. The striving for pleasure is really just a consequence and what is behind it is the striving for a "plus of power" (473).

Nietzsche also asserts that power, where powerless, makes use of hypocrisy and prudence, so that it presents itself as obedience, devotion, devotion, love, idealization, deification, fatalism, resignation, "objectivity", self-tyrannization, stoicism, asceticism , criticism, pessimism etc. (487) The concept of the living includes "that it must grow - that it must expand its power and consequently absorb foreign powers." (489) One speaks of a "right of the individual to defend himself."

but one should "also talk about attacking one's right" because both aggressive and defensive egoism are "the fatality of life itself." (489) 'The exhausted want rest, stretch out their limbs, peace, quiet - it is the happiness of nihilistic religions and philosophies; the rich and alive want victory, vanquished opponents. Overflow of the feeling of power over more areas than before. All healthy functions of the organism have this need. . ." (475)

If we carefully study the cited texts, as well as some other texts by Nietzsche, we will see that the concept of power, which appears here as a universal principle, contains certain differentiations, and that in Nietzsche too the reason for distinguishing between three main forms of power can be found.

The first basic form of power would be power as mere power or force that is neutral in relation to the human, power that is not specifically human

but is common to humans, animals, machines, and nature. This is the power of abiding and maintaining, the power of appraisal and clash. That such a conception also appears in Nietzsche can be seen from the fact that he often used the words "might" and "force"

** F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Alfred Kroner Verlag, Leipzig 1930, p. 467.*

miscue gebraucht, daß sieht man auch an vielen Stellen, wie diejenige, an der er sagt: »Ich lehre das Nein zu allem, was schwach macht, – was erschöpft. Ich lehre das Ja zu allem, was stärkt, was Kraft aufspeichert, was das Gefühl der Kraft rechtfertigt.« (41)

Die zweite Konzeption, die wir auch bei Nietzsche finden, wäre die Auffassung von Macht als mehr Macht oder mehr Kraft, als Übermacht. Das ist Macht als die Macht des Verwaltens und des Herrschens, die Macht des Befehlens, der Unterdrückung und der Ausbeutung, die Macht des Aneignens und Nehmens. Diese Macht klang in einigen Zitaten an, die ich schon angeführt habe, und klingt auch sonst oft in Nietzsche an, so daß sie den Ausgangspunkt für viele Kritiken seiner Philosophie darstellt.

Ich glaube aber, daß bei Nietzsche auch eine dritte Konzeption oder Form der Macht vorkommt. Sehr klar kommt sie zum Ausdruck, wenn Nietzsche den sogenannten »guten Menschen« der Kritik unterwirft: »Bescheiden, fleißig, wohlwollend, mäßig: so wollt ihr den Menschen? den *guten Menschen?* Aber mich dünkt das nur der ideale Sklave, der Sklave der Zukunft.« (247) Und weiter: »Fleiß, Bescheidenheit, Wohlwollen, Mäßigkeit sind ebenso viele *Verhinderungen* der *souveränen Gesinnung*, der großen *Erfindsamkeit*, der heroischen Zielsetzung, des vornehmen Für-sich-seins.« (247) Auch so: »Der Arme an Leben, der Schwache, verarmt noch das Leben: der Reiche an Leben, der Starke, bereichert es. Der erste ist dessen Parasit: der zweite ein Hinzu-Schenkender . . .« (37)

Auf diese Weise neben der Konzeption der Macht als bloßer Kraft und der Konzeption der Macht als Übermacht, Herrschaft, haben wir auch die Konzeption der Macht als Vermögen und Befähigung, als die Fähigkeit des Lebens und Erlebens, des Liebens und des Staunens, die Fähigkeit des Entdeckens und Ins - Leben - Rufens des Neuen, als die Fähigkeit des Schaffens und des Schenkens. Wir sollten, also, drei wesentlich verschiedene Formen der Macht unterscheiden: die Macht als bloße Macht oder Kraft, die Macht als Übermacht und die Macht als Schöpferkraft und Schaffen.[3]

Wenn man jetzt die Frage nach dem Verhältnis der verschiedenen Formen der Macht zur Menschlichkeit stellt, lautet die Antwort nicht immer gleich. Die Macht als bloße Kraft ist etwas Vor-menschliches, etwas noch-nicht-Menschliches. Die Macht als Übermacht, als Domination, ist eine Form des uneigentlichen, entfremdeten menschlichen Seins. Die Macht als Schaffen und Schenken ist die Form des wirklich menschlichen Seins. Die Macht als Übermacht und die

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[3] Die angeführten Unterscheidungen, die mit Hilfe von Nietzsches Texte erklärt wurden, sind selbstverständlich für Nietzsche selbst keineswegs verbindlich. Doch möchte ich erwähnen, daß auch bei Nietzsche Stellen zu finden sind, wo er die Begriffe Macht und Wille zur Macht differenziert, wobei er gewissermaßen ähnliche Unterscheidungen macht. So sagt er in einem Fragment, wo er über den »Machiavellismus« der Macht spricht, daß die Macht in drei Formen vorkommt: a) bei den Unterdrückten, bei Sklaven jeder Art als Wille zur »Freiheit«, b) bei jenen Stärkeren und zur Macht heranwachsenden als Wille zur Übermacht, der, wenn erfolglos, sich auf den Willen zum gleichen Maß der Macht, zur »Gerechtigkeit« einschränkt, und c) bei den Stärksten, Reichsten, Unabhängigsten, Mutigsten als »Liebe zur Menschheit«, zum »Volk«, zum Evangelium, zur Wahrheit, Gott, als Mitleid, Selbstopferung etc. (516–517).

Miscue used, you can see that in many passages, like the one in which he says: "I teach the no to everything that makes you weak -

what exhausted. I teach yes to everything that strengthens, that stores up

power, that justifies the feeling of power.« (41) The second conception, which we also find in Nietzsche, would be the conception of power as more power or more power as supremacy. This is power as the power to administer and rule, the power to command, oppress and exploit, the power to appropriate and take. This power was echoed in some of the quotations I have already quoted, and is often echoed in Nietzsche, so that it forms the starting point for many critiques of his philosophy.

But I believe that a third conception or form of power also occurs in Nietzsche. It is expressed very clearly when Nietzsche subjects the so-called 'good people' to criticism: 'Modest, diligent, benevolent, moderate: is that how you want people? the good people? But that only seems to me the ideal slave, the slave of the future." (247) And further: "Diligence, modesty, benevolence, moderation are just as many hindrances to the sovereign attitude, to great inventiveness, to heroic goals, to the noble cause - himself.« (247) Also like this: »The poor in life, the weak, impoverishes life: the rich in life, the strong, enriches it. The first is its parasite: the second an add-on. . ." (37)

In this way, in addition to the conception of power as mere force and the conception of power as supremacy, domination, we also have the conception of power as ability and ability, as the ability to live and experience, to love and marvel, the ability of Discovering and bringing to life the new, as the ability to create and give. We should, therefore, distinguish three essentially different forms of power: power as mere power or force, power as supreme power, and power as creative power and creation.3

If one now asks the question of the relationship between the various forms of power and humanity, the answer is not always the same. Power as mere force is something pre-human, something not yet human. Power as supremacy, as domination, is a form of inauthentic, alienated human existence. Power as creating and giving is the form of truly human existence. 3 The distinctions made, which were explained with the help of Nietzsche's texts, are of course by no means binding on Nietzsche himself. But I would like to mention that there are also passages in Nietzsche where he differentiates the concepts of power and will to power, making similar distinctions to a certain extent. Thus, in a fragment where he speaks about the "M a-chiavcllism" of power, he says that power occurs in three forms: a) among the oppressed, among slaves of all kinds as the will to "freedom", b) at those stronger and growing to power as will to supremacy, which, if unsuccessful, resorts to the will to the same power of power, to "justice"

cinlimited, and c) in the strongest, richest, most independent, most courageous as

'Love of humanity', of the 'people', of the gospel, of truth, of God, as compassion, self-sacrifice, etc. (516-517).

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Macht als Schaffen und Bereicherung der Menschlichkeit befinden sich in einem unversöhnlichen Widerspruch. Diese beiden Formen der Macht setzen aber die Macht als Kraft voraus. Auch das Schöpfertum kann nicht ohnmächtig sein!

Wenn behauptet wird, daß die Macht als Schöpfertum Verneinung der Macht als Übermacht darstellt und wenn im Namen der Humanität die Forderung aufgestellt wird, die Macht als Herrschaft durch die Macht als Schöpfertum zu überwinden, kann sehr leicht der Zweifel entstehen, ob wir doch nicht »übertreiben«. Vielleicht ist nicht die Macht selbst als Übermacht und Herrschaft etwas Unmenschliches, sondern nur derjenige »Mißbrauch« von Übermacht, den wir »Gewalt« nennen? Vielleicht sollte die Forderung nach der Überwindung der Macht als Übermacht und Herrschaft durch die Forderung nach der Überwindung der Herrschaft als *Gewalt* ersetzt werden?

Ebenso wie man das achtzehnte Jahrhundert »das Jahrhundert der Aufklärung« nannte, so glauben manche, daß man das unsere »das Jahrhundert der Gewalt« nennen sollte. Wie auch dieser Name »einseitig« und »unangemessen« zur Charakterisierung unserer Zeit in ihrer Vielfalt sei, so ist es auch schwer zu bestreiten, daß uns in der gegenwärtigen Welt auf Schritt und Tritt die Tatsache des physischen oder der psychischen Gewalt in verschiedenartigsten Formen begegnet, ausgehend von der Gewalt, die die Individuuen gegeneinander ausüben, über diejenigen die verschiedene Gruppen den Individuen antun, bis zu denjenigen die zwischen den Klassen, Staaten und anderen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und Organisationen ausgeübt wird. Eben diese Allgegenwart und Unerträglichkeit der Gewalt erklärt wahrscheinlich die Tatsache, daß viele gegenwärtige Denker über die Möglichkeit der Überwindung der Gewalt zu denken beginnen, wie auch die Tatsache, daß man dabei die anscheinend »abstrakte« und in Wahrheit unausweichliche und notwendige Frage über das Wesen der Gewalt oft überspringt.

Erinnern wir uns nur an einige Diskussionen und Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die Wege zu Überwindung der Gewalt!

Viele gegenwärtige fortschrittliche Theoretiker, deren Ideal eine freie, sozialistische Gesellschaft ist, glauben, daß die Gewalt, die ein Merkmal der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft ist, nicht anders als durch eine Gegengewalt überwunden werden kann. Dieser Standpunkt wird von manchen Marxisten vertreten, wie auch von vielen Theoretikern und Führern der progressiven antikolonialen und antiimperialistischen Bewegung. Eines der deutlichsten Beispiele stellt vielleicht Frantz Fanon dar, der einerseits betont, daß die Dekolonisation, für die er sich einsetzt, eine wahrhafte »Erschaffung der neuen Menschen« darstellen soll, und andererseits behauptet, daß die Dekolonisation ohne »blutige Messer« nicht verwirklicht werden kann, weil »wenn die Letzten zum Ersten werden sollen, kann das nur als Folge eines entscheidenden und tödlichen Zusammenstoßes zwischen zwei Gegnern geschehen.« Dieser Wille zur Absetzung aller Herrscher und Unterdrücker kann nur durch den Gebrauch aller Mittel einschließlich Gewalt durchgeführt werden. Man kann nicht eine Gesellschaft desorganisieren, sei sie noch so primitiv, wenn wir nicht

Power as creation and enrichment of humanity are in irreconcilable contradiction. But these two forms of power presuppose power as force. Even creativity cannot be powerless!

When it is asserted that power as creatorship represents the negation of power as supreme power, and when the demand is made in the name of humanity that power as rulership be overcome by power as creatorship, doubts can very easily arise as to whether we are not " exaggerate". Perhaps power itself as supreme power and domination is not something inhuman, but only that "abuse" of supreme power that we call "violence"? Perhaps the demand for overcoming power as supremacy and domination should be replaced by the demand for overcoming domination as violence?

Just as the eighteenth century has been called "the century of enlightenment," so some believe that ours should be called "the century of violence." Just as this name is "one-sided" and "inadequate" to characterize our age in all its diversity, it is also difficult to deny that in the modern world we encounter the fact of physical or psychological violence in the most varied forms at every turn , starting from the violence that individuals use against each other, through that which different groups do to individuals, to that which is used between classes, states and other social groups and organizations. It is precisely this omnipresence and intolerability of violence that probably explains the fact that many contemporary thinkers are beginning to think about the possibility of overcoming violence, as well as the fact that in doing so they raise the apparently "abstract" and in fact inescapable and necessary question about the nature who often skips violence.

Let's just remember some discussions and disagreements about the ways to overcome violence!

Many contemporary progressive theorists, whose ideal is a free, socialist society, believe that the violence that is a feature of contemporary society cannot be overcome other than by counter-violence. This point of view is held by some Marxists, as well as by many theorists and leaders of the progressive anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement. Perhaps one of the clearest examples is that of Frantz Fanon, who on the one hand emphasizes that the decolonization he advocates should represent a genuine "creation of the new man" and on the other hand claims that decolonization cannot be achieved without "bloody knives". can, because

"if the last are to become first, it can only happen as a result of a decisive and deadly clash between two adversaries." This will to depose all rulers and oppressors can only be accomplished through the use of any means, including violence. You cannot disorganize a society, no matter how primitive, unless we 4 PRACTICE

von Anfang an bereit sind »alle Hindernisse zu brechen, denen wir auf dem Weg begegnen werden«. Der Kolonisierte, der die Entscheidung getroffen hat, dieses Programm zu verwirklichen und dessen treibende Kraft es ist, ist »zu jeder Zeit zur Gewalt bereit«, und nicht nur zu einer begranzten, sondern zur »absoluten Gewalt«.[4]

Gegen eine solche Auffassung vertreten Manche die These, daß die Gewalt durch Gewalt nicht überwunden werden kann. Der Meinung der amerikanischen Hippies zufolge, heißt z. B. die gewaltsame Reaktion auf Gewalt befürworten, für eine neue Form der gewaltsamen Gesellschaft auftreten, d. h. für ein wesentliches Verharren in den Grenzen der alten Gesellschaft. Die neue Gesellschaft kann nur so geschaffen werden, daß man auf die Gewalt und Obskurantismus mit Liebe und Wahrheit reagiert. Doch wird die Gewaltlosigkeit nicht nur von den »unwissenschaftlichen« und progressiven Hippies gepredigt. Im Sammelband über die Gewalt in der gegenwärtigen Welt, der unlängst von den (überwiegend konservativen) Mitarbeitern des Zentrums für Forschung der gegenwärtigen Zivilisation, an der Universität in Nizza, veröffentlicht wurde, waren fast alle Beiträge von der Idee durchdrungen, daß Gegengewalt keine Antwort auf Gewalt sein darf, daß auf Gewalt durch Liebe Verständnis, Verdeutlichung des Irrtums geantwortet werden soll.[5]

Einige progressive Denker, indem sie bedeutende Schwierigkeiten, die in der Meinung, daß die Gewalt nur durch Gewalt überwunden werden kann, wie auch in der Meinung, daß jeder Gebrauch der Gewalt unzulässig ist, eingesehen haben, sind zum Schluß gekommen, daß eine annehmbare Lösung für diese Schwierigkeiten nur so gefunden werden kann, daß man verschiedene Arten von Gewalt unterscheidet, wie z. B. revolutionäre und gegenrevolutionäre Gewalt, progressive und reaktionäre Gewalt, repressive und befreiende Gewalt, agressive und defensive Gewalt, usw. Indem er dieses Problem zu lösen versuchte, behauptete Marcuse (in der Diskussion mit Berliner Studenten), unter Anderem, das Folgende: »Ich habe in meinem Vortrag betont, daß es sehr verschiedene Arten von Gewalten sind, die angewandt werden in der Verteidigung und in der Aggression. Beispiel: Die Gewalt des Polizisten, die darin besteht, einen Mörder zu überwältigen, ist nicht nur äußerlich, sondern in ihrer Triebstruktur, in ihrer Substanz, sehr verschieden von der Gewalt eines Polizisten, der einen Demonstranten niederknüppelt. Beide sind Gewalttaten, beide haben eine völlig verschiedene Funktion.«[6]

Nachdem er auf diese Weise zwischen defensiver und aggressiver Gewalt im individuellen Maßstab einen Unterschied gemacht hat, behauptet Marcuse, daß diese Unterscheidung auch im überindivi-

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[4] Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre*, François Maspero, Paris 1968, S. 6–7.

[5] S. M. Amiot, J. Dupuy, J. Ellul, L. Gallo, M. Gallo, J. A. Gili, F. Jeanson, J. W. Lapierre, M. Marache, L. Mugnier-Pollet, A. Nouschi, J. Onimus, M. Oriol, Ph. Séjourné, L. del Vasto, *La violence dans le monde actuel*, Centre d'études de la civilisation contemporaine, Desclée De Brouwer 1968. Im Unterschied zu anderen Autoren vertritt im genannten Sammelband Francis Jeanson die These von der Notwendigkeit der revolutionären, befreienden Gewalt.

[6] Herbert Marcuse, *Das Ende der Utopie*, Verlag v. Maikowski, Berlin 1969, S. 69.

ready from the start »to break down all the obstacles that we will encounter on the way«. The colonized, who have made the decision to carry out this program and whose driving force it is, is "ready at all times for violence",

and not only for limited violence, but for "absolute violence".

Against such a view, some advocate the thesis that violence cannot be overcome by violence. According to the opinion of the American hippies, e.g. B. advocating the violent response to violence, advocating for a new form of violent society, d. H. for an essential persistence within the limits of the old society. The new society can only be created by responding to violence and obscurantism with love and truth. But nonviolence is not only preached by the "unscientific" and progressive hippies. In the anthology on violence in the contemporary world, recently published by the (mostly conservative) collaborators of the Center for Research in Contemporary Civilization, at the University of Nice, almost all the contributions were imbued with the idea that counter-violence is not an answer to Violence may be, that violence should be answered through love, understanding, clarification of the error.5

Some progressive thinkers, seeing significant difficulties inherent in the belief that violence can only be overcome by violence, as well as in the belief that any use of violence is inadmissible, have concluded that an acceptable solution to these difficulties can only be found by distinguishing between different types of violence, such as B. revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, progressive and reactionary violence, repressive and liberating violence, aggressive and defensive violence, etc. Trying to solve this problem, Marcuse claimed (in discussion with Berlin students), among other things, the following: "In my lecture I emphasized that there are very different types of force used in defense and in aggression. Example: The violence of the policeman, which consists in overpowering a murderer, is not only external, but in its drive structure, in its substance, very different from the violence of a policeman who bludgeons a demonstrator. Both are acts of violence, both have a completely different function.«6

Having thus distinguished between defensive and aggressive violence on an individual scale, Marcuse claims that this distinction also applies in the individual scale.

** S. M. Amiot, J . Dupuy, J. Ellul, L. Gallo, M. Gallo, J . A. Gili, F. Jeanson, J" W ., Lapierre, M. Marache, L. Mugnier-Pollet, A. Nouschi, J . Onimus, M. Oriol, Ph. Sejourne, L. del Vasto, L a violence dans le monde actuel, Center d'ćtudes de la civilization contemporaine, Desclee De Brouwer 1968. In contrast to other authors, in the above-mentioned collection Francis Jeanson represents the thesis of the necessity of revolutionary, liberating violence.*

S 69HCrbCrt MarCUSC' The end of UtoPie' Verlag v. Maikowski, Berlin 1969, 50

duellen, gesellschaftlichen oder geschichtlichen Maßstab gebraucht werden kann, wo man zwischen der Gewalt des revolutionären Terrors und der Gewalt des weißen Terrors unterscheiden muß, weil »der revolutionäre Terror eben als Terror seine eigene Transzendierung zu einer freien Gesellschaft impliziert, während das der weiße Teror nicht tut. Der Terror, der in der Verteidigung von Nordvietnam angewandt wird, ist wesentlich different von dem Terror, der in der Aggression angewandt wird.« (69–70) Indem er fordert diese Unterscheidung durchzuführen, sieht Marcuse daß es in der Praxis nicht leicht ist, da eine Grenze zu ziehen, wo der eine beginnt und der andere endet. Er weiß, daß es nicht einfach ist zu verhindern, daß der revolutionäre Terror in Grausamkeit und Brutalität ausartet. Er meint aber, daß es »in einer wirklichen Revolution immer Mittel und Wege gibt, das Ausarten des Terrors zu verhindern.« (70) Welche Mittel und Wege es sind, – das sagt er leider nicht.

Im Zusammenhang mit den Versuchen, das Problem der Möglichkeit der Überwindung der Gewalt durch Gegengewalt mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Arten der Gewalt zu lösen, meldet sich die Frage, ob diese Unterscheidung[7] berechtigt ist oder ob wir vielleicht, bevor wir sie annehmen, nicht den Begriff der Gewalt selbst durchdenken sollten. Es scheint, daß diese Unterscheidung die Frage nicht löst, so daß diejenigen, die den Standpunkt über die revolutionäre Gewalt verteidigen, in Schwierigkeiten geraten. Die revolutionäre Gewalt ist doch auch Gewalt, und es ist eine sehr schwere Frage, wie man erreichen kann, daß es nicht zur Erhaltung und Perpetuierung der Gewalt kommt. Wäre der Ausgang nicht darin, daß wir den Begriff der Gewalt nochmals durchdenken, daß wir ihn gegen den Begriff Kraftanwendung abgrenzen? Sollten wir nicht eine Unterscheidung »anwenden« oder, richtiger, umkehren, die seinerzeits Georges Sorel machte?

In seinen »Gedanken über die Gewalt« behauptete Sorel, daß man zwischen der »bürgerlichen Kraft« (la force bourgeoise) und der »proletarischen Gewalt« (la violence prolétarienne) unterscheiden sollte. Seiner Meinung nach »wünscht die Kraft (force) die Organisation einer gewissen Gesellschaftsordnung, wo die Minderheit herrscht, aufzudrängen, während die Gewalt zur Zerstörung dieser Ordnung strebt.«[8] Die Bourgeoisie gebraucht Kraft (force), um eine oppressive Ordnung zu erhalten, und das Proletariat bedient sich der revolutionären Gewalt (violence), um diese Ordnung aufzuheben. Diese Gewalt ist die befreiende, und ihre wirksamste Form, Sorel zufolge, der Generalstreik.

Die Unterscheidung von Sorel führe ich an, nicht weil ich mit ihr einverstanden wäre, sondern weil ich sie als terminologisch interessant im umgekehrten Sinne betrachte, weil ich nämlich die Unter-

[7] Wir sprechen über die Unterscheidung im Singular, weil, obwohl es sich hier um verschiedene Unterscheidungen handelt, die nicht denselben Sinn haben; sie sind parallel. So z. B. die Unterscheidung zwischen der oppressiven und der befreienden Gewalt ist nicht mit derjenigen zwischen der aggressiven und der defensiven identisch, und doch sind es Paare, die einen gewissen Parallelismus aufweisen.

[8] G. Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*, 8. Aufl., Paris 1930, S. 263.

duel, social or historical scale where one has to distinguish between the violence of revolutionary terror and the violence of white terror, because

"revolutionary terror, precisely as terror, implies its own transcendence to a

free society, while white terror does not. The terror used in the defense of North Vietnam is essentially different from the terror used in aggression.« (69-70) In demanding that this distinction be made, Marcuse sees that in practice it is not easy to draw a line where one begins and the other ends. He knows that it is not easy to prevent revolutionary terror from degenerating into cruelty and brutality. However, he thinks that "in a real revolution there are always ways and means to prevent the terror from escalating." (70) Which ways and means are there - unfortunately he doesn't say that.

In connection with the attempts to solve the problem of the possibility of overcoming violence through counter-violence with the help of the distinction between two types of violence, the question arises whether this distinction7 is justified or whether we perhaps, before accepting it, do not should think through the concept of violence themselves. It seems that this distinction does not solve the question, so that those who defend the point of view of revolutionary violence get into trouble. Revolutionary violence is also violence, and it is a very difficult question how to ensure that violence does not endure and perpetuate itself. Wouldn't the outcome be that we rethink the concept of violence, that we distinguish it from the concept of the use of force? Shouldn't we "apply," or rather reverse, a distinction made by Georges Sorel?

In his Thoughts on Violence, Sorel claimed that one should distinguish between 'bourgeois force' (la force bourgeoise) and 'proletarian violence' (la violence proletarienne).

In his opinion, "force wishes to impose the organization of a certain social order where the minority rules, while force tends to destroy that order."8 The bourgeoisie uses force to maintain an oppressive order, and the proletariat uses revolutionary violence (violence) to overthrow this order. This violence is the liberating, and according to Sorel, its most effective form, the general strike.

I bring up Sorel's distinction not because I agree with it, but because I consider it terminologically interesting in the opposite sense, namely because I have the sub-7 We are talking about the distinction in the singular because, although it is about different distinctions that do not have the same meaning; they are parallel. such as B. The distinction between oppressive and liberating violence is not identical to that between aggressive and defensive, and yet they are pairs that show a certain parallelism.

8 G. Sorel, Reflections on violence, 8. Aufl., Paris 1930, S. 263.

scheidung (welche die serbokroatische Umgangssprache ziemlich deutlich macht) zwischen der (manchmal auch proletarischen) Kraftanwendung *(sila)* und der (sehr oft bürgerlichen, nicht proletarischen) Gewalt *(nasilje)* durchfüren möchte.

Die Kraftanwendung *(sila)* ist wesentlich mit Macht als Kraft verbunden, während die Gewalt *(nasilje)* eine Form der Macht als Übermacht, Herrschaft und Unterdrückung darstellt. Ebenso wie die Macht als Kraft noch nicht Übermacht darstellt, ist auch nicht die Kraftanwendung als solche schon Gewalt. Jedenfalls ist es nicht Gewalt, wenn jemand, der in der Finsternis angegriffen ist, sich mit aller Kraft, die ihm zur Verfügung steht, verteidigt, wie es auch keine Gewalt ist, wenn ein Land sich von der Militäragression mit Waffen verteidigt, also durch Kraftanwendung. Die Gewalt ist nur eine solche Kraftanwendung, die auf die Destruktion des Menschen ziehlt, auf die Begrenzung seiner Freiheit, auf die Vereitlung seines Schöpfertums, auf die Vernichtung oder Verkrüppelung seiner Persönlichkeit. Sie kann auf die physische Vernichtung des Menschen, durch die Antun der körperlichen Verletzungen oder durch die Aufbürdung der physischen Anstrengungen abzielen, sie kann sich aber auch »nur« auf die psychische Vernichtung durch den psychischen Druck, Beängstigung und Betrug »begrenzen«. Jedenfalls glaube ich, daß es sich um Gewalt nur dort handelt, wo die Kraft zur Zerstörung der Menschlichkeit angewandt wird, zum Auslöschen der menschlichen Fähigkeiten, zur Lahmlegung des menschlichen schöpferischen Tuns.

Wenn wir die Gewalt so auffassen, so ist die Gewalt offensichtlich mit der zweiten Form der Macht wesentlich verbunden, d. h. mit der Macht als Übermacht. Nur dort, wo Übermacht besteht, ist auch die Gewalt möglich, und sie kann nur durch den Stärkeren dem Schwächeren gegenüber ausgeübt werden. In einer unlängst geführten Diskussion über die Studentenbewegung, hat einer der Teilnehmer, indem er indirekt auf die Anklage der Vertreter der Macht beantwortete, die Studenten bedienten sich der Gewalt, gut gesagt, daß der Hase dem Jäger keine Gewalt antun kann.[9] Die Gewalttat kann nur der Stärkere gegenüber dem Schwächeren ausüben.

Indem sie auf der Voraussetzung der Macht als Übermacht wächst, ist die Gewalt nicht ein von ihrer Voraussetzung wesentlich verschiedenes Auswächs. Die Macht als Übermacht enthält schon im Keime die Gewalt und geht in die Gewalt, als der ihrem Wesen angemessenen Form des Seins über. Mit anderen Worten, die Gewalt ist nur das ausgedrückte und entwickelte Wesen der Macht als Übermacht.

Die Frage über das Verhältnis von Macht und Gewalt zur Humanität, was das Hauptthema dieser Betrachtungen ausmachte, kann also so beantwortet werden, daß die Gewalt, als die entwickelte Form der Macht als Übermacht, Ausbeutung und Herrschaft, etwas wesentlich Unmenschliches darstellt, was nicht als Mittel zur Erreichung

[9] N. Popov, *Gledišta*, No. 6–7/1960, S. 925.

distinction (which Serbo-Croatian slang makes quite clear) between the (sometimes proletarian) use of force (sila) and (very often bourgeois, non-proletarian) violence (nasilje).

The use of force (sila) is essentially associated with power as force, while violence (nasilje) represents a form of power as dominance, domination and oppression. Just as power as force does not yet represent superior power, neither is the use of force as such already violence. In any case, it is not violence when someone who is attacked in the darkness defends himself with all the strength at his disposal, just as it is not violence when a country defends itself from military aggression with weapons, i.e. by using force. Violence is only such an application of force that aims at the destruction of man, at the limitation of his freedom, at the thwarting of his creativity, at the annihilation or crippling of his personality. It can aim at the physical annihilation of man, by inflicting bodily harm or by imposing physical exertion, but it can also be "limited" to psychic annihilation through psychological pressure, fear and deception. In any case, I believe that violence is only involved where the force is used to destroy humanity, to efface human abilities, to paralyze human creative activity.

If we understand violence in this way, then obviously violence is essentially connected with the second form of power, viz. H. with power as supremacy. Violence is only possible where there is superior power, and it can only be exercised by the stronger against the weaker. In a recent discussion on the student movement, one of the participants, indirectly responding to the accusation of the representatives of power that the students use violence, said well that the hare cannot do violence to the hunter.9 The act of violence can only be used by the stronger against the weaker.

Because it grows on the presupposition of power as superior power, violence is not an outgrowth that is essentially different from its presupposition. Power as superior power contains violence in the bud and passes into violence as the form of being appropriate to its nature. In other words, violence is only the expressed and developed essence of power as superior power.

The question of the relationship between power and violence and humanity, which constitutes the main theme of these considerations, can thus be answered in such a way that violence, as the developed form of power as supremacy, exploitation and domination, represents something essentially inhuman, which is not as a means of achieving 9 N. Popov, Gledišta, no. 6-7/1960, p. 925.

der humanen Ziele dienen kann. Das heißt keineswegs, daß wir uns der Gewalt nicht durch Kraftanwendung widersetzen dürfen, weil, wie es auch gesagt wurde, das Erdulden der Gewalt weder Toleranz noch Humanität ist, sodern eine sklavenhafte, unmenschliche Aussöhnung mit der Unmenschlichkeit.[10] Wenn wir wirklich auf das Menschliche, das Humane gerichtet sind, verlangt das die Negation der Macht als Übermacht und Gewalt, ihre Überwindung durch die Macht als menschliche schöpferische Tätigkeit.

[10] Vgl. A. Hodžić, *Gledišta* No. 6–7/1969, S. 966.

that can serve humane goals. This in no way means that we must not resist violence through the use of force, because, as has also been said, tolerating violence is neither tolerance nor humanity, but a slave-like, inhuman

reconciliation with inhumanity.10 If we really focus on the human , which are humane, demands the negation of power as supremacy and violence, their overcoming through power as human creative activity.

'• See A. Hodžić, Glediita No. 6-7/1969, S. 966.

LA NON-VIOLENCE CONSIDEREE COMME MODE DE VIE HUMAIN

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La »volonté de puissance«, la »volonté d'accumulation de la puissance«, et les différentes définitions que Nietzsche a donnés de l'impulsion première et du sens final de la vie, peuvent s'appuyer sur d'innombrables faits empruntés à toute l'histoire jusqu'à nos jours. Une question cependant reste ouverte: reconnaissant cet état de fait, faut-il en même temps accepter l'interprétation qu'en donne Nietzsche, notamment en ce qui concerne les interprétations de son œuvre qui sont pratiquement entrées en conflit avec l'histoire, sous forme de pogromes massifs?

Si, dans les événements historiques, l'emploi de la force est si important qu'elle s'impose à la connaissance comme trait constitutif de l'histoire, faut-il partager la conviction de Nietzsche concernant l'»optimisme absurde des socialistes« qui »rêvent naïvement de bonté, de beauté, de vérité et d'égalité«, et la conviction contraire revient-elle à une chute dans les illusions du christianisme? Et d'ailleurs, le principe chrétien de la non-violence peut-il être interprété d'une façon qui lui accorde certaines valeurs historiques progressistes?

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La force est avant tout, originellement, une catégorie *physique*, servant à saisir des phénomènes *naturels*. Par exemple, dans l'ontologique de Hegel, la force est étudiée au moment où l'auteur passe de l'explication mécanique à l'explication dynamique du monde. Là la force est conçue comme une qualité de la *chose*, de la *matière*, qualité dont la nature est d'agir, qualité agissante. Mais pour agir, cette force doit subir une impulsion, être suscitée par d'autres forces. La force pré-suppose donc la force, elle est causée par la force, ou, pour reprendre les mots de Hegel, »l'agissement de la force est conditionnée par elle-même comme par quelque autre chose en rapport avec elle-même«, et »la force montre que son extérieur est identique à son intérieur«. Agissant sur la seule pression d'une impulsion extérieure, la

L A N O N -V IO LEN C E C O N SID E R EE COM M E MODE

D E V IE H U M A IN

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The "will to power", the "will to accumulate power", and the different definitions that Nietzsche gave of the first impulse and the final meaning of life, can be based on innumerable facts borrowed has the whole story up to the present day. One question, however, remains open: recognizing this state of affairs, should we at the same time accept the interpretation that Nietzsche gives of it, in particular with regard to the interpretations of his work which have practically come into conflict with history, in the form of massive pogroms?

If, in historical events, the use of force is so important that it imposes itself on knowledge as a constitutive feature of history, must we share Nietzsche's conviction concerning the "absurd optimism of socialists" who "naively dream of goodness, beauty, truth and equality", and does the opposite conviction amount to a fall into the illusions of Christianity? And indeed, can the Christian principle of nonviolence be interpreted in a way that gives it certain progressive historical values?

Force is above all, originally, a physical category, serving to grasp natural phenomena. For example, in Hegel's onto-logic, force is studied at the moment when the author passes from the mechanical explanation to the dynamic explanation of the world. There force is confused as a quality of the thing, of matter, a quality whose nature is to act, acting quality. But in order to act, this force must undergo an impulse, be aroused by other forces. Force therefore presupposes force, it is caused by force, or, to use Hegel's words, "the action of force is conditioned by itself as by something else in relation to itself«, and »the force shows that its exterior is identical to its interior«. Acting on the sole pressure of an external impulse, the 54

force n'est pas libre, elle ne se détermine pas par elle-même, elle n'agit pas avec un but, elle est *aveugle*. Il s'ensuit, selon Hegel, qu'il ne peut exister de force première telle par exemple que le dieu de Herder.

Lorsqu'il est question de la force dans *l'histoire*, on pense de nouveau avant tout à la force *physique*, à la qualité de l'homme considéré comme être *naturel*. Ici, la force physique se trouve dans la fonction directe de l'instinct naturel de reproduction. Plus le mode de vie de l'homme est primitif, proche de la nature, plus l'emploi et le prix de la force physique sont importants. D'où la »volonté d'accumulation de la force« innée à l'homme, l'aspiration naturelle de l'être humain à s'approprier la force physique la plus efficace possible, à se comporter vis-à-vis de son entourage comme une force physique, afin de se mesurer à lui, et, partant, de s'affirmer. Quand la jeunesse grandit assez sous la force protectrice de la famille et des institutions sociales, elle aspire fortement à échapper à cette protection et s'affirme par l'opposition aux parents et aux autres maîtres et par le refus de leur autorité, parfois avec des actes de violence pour la violence, si cette sorte d'auto-affirmation n'est pas remplacée par une mise en évidence de la force dans le sport, dans une aventure ou dans quelque chose du même genre. Ce besoin naturel de manifester la force accumulée est à noter aussi comme une composante de non-conformismes sociaux et politiques chez les jeunes. Et je n'avance ici rien d'original si je dis qu'en *partie* l'explication des activités déployées par les étudiants et les jeunes en général pour la destruction de la société contemporaine répressive est à chercher dans les impulsions naturelles dont je parlais plus haut, et dans leur sublimation. Quant à la raison essentielle de ces activités, c'est une autre question.

Dans la vie sociale des hommes, la violence est l'emploi de la force physique d'un ou de quelques-uns contre les autres, mais tout emploi de la force n'est pas considéré comme violence. Habituellement, on considère comme violence l'emploi illégal ou illégitime de la force. La défense du droit et de la légalité par la force – par exemple, la défense de l'indépendance nationale contre l'aggresseur ou même le meurtre de l'assaillant en cas de légitime défense, ne constituent pas une violence. Cependant, dans la pratique juridique, il n'est pas toujours si simple de distinguer la violence d'un juste (ou justifié) emploi de la force, et dans les conflits internationaux, on s'accorde parfois difficilement sur la question de savoir qui est l'aggresseur et qui est l'aggressé (rappelons les difficultés rencontrées dans ce domaine par l'O. N. U.) . D'habitude, chaque partie en guerre se réfère à un droit pour justifier son recours à la force, apportant la preuve de la *provocation* dont elle a fait l'objet de la part de l'autre force, la preuve, par conséquent, de la qualité d'aggresseur de l'autre partie, même dans les cas de recours à la force préventive.

Du point de vue du droit positif, est illégitime chaque changement violent du système des institutions et normes existantes. On justifie (ou légitime) par là le recours à la force pour empêcher les changements, autrement dit pour empêcher la violence, ce que des lois particulières codifient en général. Cependant, pour les partisans de l'ancien régime cet emploi légitime de la force équivaut à une violence, à un refoule-

force is not free, it does not determine itself, it does not act with a purpose, it is blind. It follows, according to Hegel, that there cannot exist a primary force such as, for example, the god of Herder.

When we talk about force in history, we think again above all of physical force, of the quality of man considered to be natural. Here, physical strength is found in the direct function of the natural reproductive instinct. The more primitive the way of life of man, close to nature, the greater the use and price of physical force. Hence the "willingness to accumulate force" innate to man, the natural aspiration of human beings to appropriate the most effective physical force possible, to behave towards their entourage as a physical force, in order to measure oneself against it, and, therefore, to assert oneself. When youth grows sufficiently under the protective force of the family and social institutions, it strongly aspires to escape this protection and asserts itself by opposing parents and other teachers and by refusing their authority, sometimes with acts of violence for violence's sake, if this kind of self-affirmation is not replaced by a demonstration of strength in sport, in an adventure or in the like. This natural need to manifest accumulated strength is also to be noted as a component of social and political non-conformism among young people. And I am not advancing anything original here if I say that part of the explanation for the activities deployed by students and young people in general for the destruction of contemporary repressive society is to be sought in the natural impulses of which I spoke earlier. high, and in their sublimation. As to the essential reason for these activities, that is another question.

In the social life of men, violence is the use of physical force by one or a few against others, but not all use of force is considered violence. Usually, violence is considered the illegal or illegitimate use of force.

The defense of law and legality by force - for example, the defense of national independence against the aggressor or even the murder of the assailant in the case of self-defence, does not constitute violence. However, in legal practice it is not always so simple to distinguish violence from the just (or justified) use of force, and in international conflicts there is sometimes little agreement on the question of who is the aggressor and who is the aggressor (remember the difficulties encountered in this area by the U.N.) . Usually, each warring party refers to a right to justify its use of force, providing proof of the provocation to which it has been subjected by the other force, proof, therefore, of the status of aggressor of the other party, even in the case of recourse to preventive force.

From the point of view of positive law, any violent change in the system of existing institutions and norms is illegitimate. One justifies (or legitimizes) by the recourse to force to prevent the changes, in other words to prevent the violence, which particular laws codify in general. However, for supporters of the old regime, this legitimate use of force is tantamount to violence, to repression55

ment violent de la »bonne vieille justice«. Il arrive parfois que les »vieilles justices« servent aussi de principe de base à l'emploi de la force, pour la rectification et même pour l'abolition de l'ordre existant, sans être pour autant pour le retour à l'ordre ancien. Dans les deux derniers cas, la force légale équivaut à la violence et la résistance à l'ordre légal est le plus juste emploi de la force qu'il puisse inspirer. Dans tous les cas, ce qui est en jeu ici, c'est l'*emploi de la force,* et la question qui se pose est celle de savoir s'il est possible de déraciner définitivement la violence, tant que la force sera employée dans les rapports humains. Quant au droit, à la légalité considérée comme angle de différenciation, il s'agit ici d'une légalité en tant que critère humain universel. En d'autres termes, le point de vue de l'être humain en tant que tel est-il réellement possible dans la résolution définitive de la question de l'emploi de la force naturelle de l'homme?

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Un aspect historique du point de vue de l'homme en tant que tel – devenu un comportement pratique de masse *à côté* de la réalité du bas-empire esclavagiste – est représenté par le christianisme originel, le christianisme biblique. Celui-ci est apparu comme une voix de salut pour tous ceux qui souffraient de la force de ce monde. La passion du Christ est l'image dramatique et symbolique de la vie tombée au pouvoir de forces inhumaines, sans résistance à la force extérieure. La résistance à la force par la force est rejetée comme un comportement non-humain par lequel le monde ne saurait être sauvé de l'emprise de la force et de la violence. Par le sacrifice docile du *juste,* on fait appel à l'*humanité* des hommes, comme un moyen de lutte contre la force et la violence. »Ecce Homo«, dit Pilate en montrant l'Homme (le Christ) dans les tourments de la mort. C'était en appeler à la pitié des hommes pour la soufrance *humaine* due à la violence, et à la solidarité humaine dans la non-violence. La résurrection du sacrifié symbolise la possibilité de la victoire de l'humanité sur les forces de ce monde. Pour l'homme, il n'est d'autre issue que l'humanité, car on ne peut arracher la force par la force. »Qui frappe par l'épée périra par l'épée«: voilà l'expression figurative de la certitude que la force ne peut qu'engendrer la force. »Qui te frappe avec une pierre, donne-lui du pain«, appelle également à l'élimination de la force parmi les hommes. Pour s'arracher à l'emprise de la force matérielle, il est une seule voie de salut, c'est le retour à la nature générique de l'homme, de manière à opposer à la force et à la violence, l'amour envers l'homme pour la seule raison qu'il est un être humain.

Le triomphe de l'humanité à l'époque du haut christianisme n'était pas historiquement possible; il a persisté, en tant qu'idéal sur-historique transcendant, sous la forme de l'homme déifié, ou du dieu considéré l'homme idéal. Le genre humain réalisé, ou harmonieux en soi, était l'idéal-but final ou du moins très éloigné, qui a pris, du fait même de cet éloignement, la forme d'un dieu, aliénation humaine. C'est ce qui permet d'interpréter l'assertion biblique sur la toute-puissance de Dieu comme une représentation aliénée de l'origine *humaine* du pou-

violent ment of »good old justice«. It sometimes happens that the

»old justices« also serve as a basic principle for the use of force, for the rectification and even for the abolition of the existing order, without being

for all that for the return to the old order. In the last two cases, legal force is equivalent to violence, and resistance to the legal order is the fairest use of force it can inspire.

In any case, what is at stake here is the use of force, and the question that arises is whether it is possible to uproot violence definitively, as long as force is used in relations humans. As for law, for legality considered as an angle of differentiation, it is a question here of legality as a universal human criterion. In other words, is the point of view of the human being as such really possible in the definitive resolution of the question of the employment of the natural force of man?

A historical aspect from the point of view of man as such -

become a practical mass behavior alongside the reality of the lower slave empire - is represented by original Christianity, biblical Christianity. This appeared as a voice of salvation for all who suffered from the strength of this world. The passion of Christ is the dramatic and symbolic image of life fallen into the power of inhuman forces, without resistance to external force. Resistance to force by force is rejected as non-human behavior by which the world cannot be saved from the grip of force and violence. By the docile sacrifice of the just, one appeals to the humanity of men, as a means of struggle against force and violence. »Ecce Homo«, says Pilate pointing to the Man (Christ) in the torments of death. It was an appeal to the pity of men for human suffering due to violence, and to human solidarity in non-violence. The resurrection of the sacrifice symbolizes the possibility of the victory of humanity over the forces of this world.

For man, there is no other way out than humanity, because force cannot be taken away by force. »He who strikes with the sword will perish by the sword«:ˆ here is the figurative expression of the certainty that force can only beget force. »Who strikes you with a stone, give him bread«, also calls for the elimination of strength among men. To tear oneself away from the grip of material force, there is only one way of salvation, it is the return to the generic nature of man, so as to oppose force and violence, the love towards man for the sole reason that he is a human being.

The triumph of humanity in the era of High Christianity was not historically possible; it has persisted, as a transcendent super-historical ideal, in the form of the deified man, or of the god considered the ideal man. The realized human race, or harmonious in itself, was the final or at least very distant ideal-goal, which took, by the very fact of this remoteness, the form of a god, human alienation. This is what makes it possible to interpret the biblical assertion on the omnipotence of God as an alienated representation of the human origin of the louse.

voir. Bien entendu, il n'est pas question de contester par-là le syncrétisme éthique de la haute chrétienté. Mais on est orienté vers ces impulsions humanistes fondamentales que je sous-entends quand je parle du »christianisme biblique«.

Le christianisme, fondé sur l'amour de l'homme, c'est dans sa racine rationnelle l'humanité elle-même, qui est la valeur spontanément acceptée de chacun pour tous, tout en étant soulignée, du fait de son irréalité historique, comme le commandement suprême venant de l'extérieur (au-delà, transcendant, divin). Le chrétien, c'est l'Homme-Adam, renouvelé, nouveau-né, converti, ressuscité, réconcilié avec Dieu, autrement dit avec sa nature générique, après des millénaires de souffrances sous le joug des forces matérielles. Se réconcilier, c'est retrouver l'identité originelle de l'individu avec le genre. Cette identité prend de la forme de l'amour, de même que dans la communauté familiale (la gens), elle prend la forme du dévouement mutuel. En entrant dans la communauté chrétienne, l'homme abandonne l'état empirique des forces ennemies (le royaume du péché) pour s'égaliser à l'autre en tant qu'homme (frère dans le Christ). que cet autre soit esclave ou maître, Romain ou Juif. Les différences raciales, nationales et sociales (et l'opposition par la force) perdent leur importance à l'intérieur de cette communauté, qui se conçoit elle-même comme le prototype de la communauté humaine universelle. Le »Nouveau Testament« devait être conçu avant tout comme la représentation exemplaire du principe de l'amour-salut grâce auquel est abolie (dépassée) la loi de l'»Ancien Testament«, l'amour régnant parmi les hommes, c'est-à-dire à l'intérieur du genre humain devenu harmonieux, rendant superflus le Décalogue et autres commandements divins.

Les premiers chrétiens furent persécutés et suppliciés en masse, et l'histoire du Christ est en fait l'image-doctrine de la vie chrétienne primitive. Cette image biblique nous enseigne que la non-violence chrétienne ne pouvait pas être vaincue par la force de l'empire romain, qu'au contraire, propagée par le martyre, elle a gagné tout l'empire et vaincu sa force matérielle. Bien entendu, ce n'est pas parce qu'elle était une religion que la nouvelle doctrine a été victorieuse. Le complément religieux traditionnel de la force impériale en décadence a reculé devant le christianisme, et l'inspiration chrétienne découlait du besoin empirique de vie humaine qui possède chaque homme. Le christianisme a apporté l'espoir de la débâcle de l'empire de la force, du réel et de tout le possible, affirmant qu'à la fin tous les hommes deviendraient chrétiens, c'est-à-dire renonceraient à l'emploi de la force matérielle de l'homme contre l'homme. Ce serait alors l'empire de l'amour, la réalisation de l'unité du genre humain, c'est-à-dire l'»empire divin«, édifié sur les ruines de l'»empire du péché« païen, de l'»empire du diable«.

Le christianisme pour finir a bien gagné l'empire, il est bien devenu une force de l'empire, mais ce faisant il s'est vaincu lui-même. Le christianisme biblique a reculé devant l'idéologie et la pratique d'une puissante Eglise d'état, laquelle a fait de l'épée le nouveau moyen de propagation de la foi.

see. Of course, there is no question of contesting the ethical syncretism of high Christianity. But one is oriented towards those fundamental humanistic impulses that I imply when I speak of »Biblical Christianity«.

Christianity, founded on the love of man, is at its rational root humanity itself, which is the spontaneously accepted value of each for all, while being underlined, because of its historical unreality, as the supreme command coming from without (beyond, transcendent, divine). The Christian is the Man-Adam, renewed, newborn, converted, resuscitated, reconciled with God, in other words with his generic nature, after millennia of suffering under the yoke of material forces. To reconcile is to rediscover the original identity of the individual with the gender. This identity takes the form of love, just as in the family community (the gens) it takes the form of mutual devotion. By entering the Christian community, man abandons the empirical state of enemy forces (the kingdom of sin) to equalize himself with the other as man (brother in Christ), whether this other is a slave or master, Roman or Jew. Racial, national and social differences (and opposition by force) lose their importance within this community, which conceives itself as the prototype of the universal human community. The »New Testament« was to be confused above all as the exemplary representation of the principle of love-salvation by which is abolished (surpassed) the law of the »Old Testament«, love reigning among men, c that is to say, within the human race which has become harmonic, making the Decalogue and other divine commandments superfluous.

The early Christians were persecuted and supoliced en masse, and the story of Christ is in fact the image-doctrine of early Christian life. This biblical image teaches us that Christian non-violence could not be overcome by the force of the Roman Empire, that on the contrary, propagated by martyrdom, it gained all the worst and defeated its material force. Of course, it is not because it was a religion that the new doctrine was victorious. The traditional religious complement of imperial force to decadence receded before Christianity, and Christian inspiration flowed from the empirical need for human life which possesses every man. Christianity brought the hope of the debacle of the empire of force, of the real and of everything possible, affirming that in the end all men would become Christians, that is to say, would renounce the the use of material force of man against man. It would then be the empire of love, the realization of the unity of the human race, that is to say the »divine empire«, built on the ruins of the pagan »empire of sin«, of the »devil's empire«.

Christianity finally won the empire, it did become a force of the empire, but in doing so it defeated itself. Biblical Christianity recoiled from the ideology and practice of a powerful state church, which made the sword the new means of spreading the faith.

Mais le christianisme biblique vaincu n'a jamais disparu, car il est impossible d'arracher du cœur de l'homme son aspiration humaine à une vie plus humaine, aspiration qui ne disparaît que lorsqu'elle est satisfaite. Sur les ruines de la force d'un monde, le christianisme a semé des idées d'humanité qui ont envahi les fondements mêmes de ce que l'on appelle la culture chrétienne occidentale. C'est pourquoi, à côté des interprétations chrétiennes officielles de la Bible, l'esprit biblique a connu une perpétuelle renaissance en tant qu'opposition à l'intérieur de l'église, et en dehors de l'église en tant que contestation de la force de la hiérarchie laïque et ecclésiastique existantes. Ces idées d'humanité – sous leur forme mystique ou théorique sécularisée – représentaient l'exigence indéracinable de l'humanité contrainte pour la *transcendance de l'empire des forces matérielles.* La raison humaine a toujours été préoccupée par l'idée d'instaurer l'harmonie entre le bien individuel et le bien commun, par l'idée de soumettre la force matérielle aveugle à la force de la raison humaine. Chaque fois que survenait un grand changement historique, ces idées ont été des sources d'inspiration, et sous une forme qui faisait croire qu'il s'agissait de leur réalisation directe et finale. Rappelons-nous l'époque de l'humanisme de la Renaissance, l'époque de Münzer, l'époque de la Révolution française, etc.

L'apparition du marxisme ne se situe pas en dehors de ces traditions de l'esprit occidental. Le marxisme est *sorti* de lui. Cette *sorti* était composée chez Marx de la synthèse des forces opposées de l'esprit et de la matière dans *l'unité de la nature rationnelle,* unité qui est l'homme-même.

Si l'on part de l'homme pour l'homme, on doit rester humain, c'est-à-dire éviter de se perdre soit dans la matérialité pure du monde, où agissent aveuglément les forces matérielles (l'homme en tant que composante pure et simple de la nature, l'homme-machine, etc.), soit dans l'empire des idées à l'état pur, réalité en soi et pour soi (Dieu-créateur du monde, code de morale abstraite, etc.). Dans les deux cas, l'homme total et véritable se perd et s'aliène, et il n'y a pas de véritable histoire humaine.

Du point de vue de l'homme en tant que nature rationnelle, on doit prendre en considération le fait que le propre de l'être humain est justement la volonté d'accumulation de la force physique. Les hommes maintenant se rendent maîtres des forces de la nature à leur profit, ils exercent une violence sur la virginité de la nature, créant un monde sur-naturel, ou monde humain, et eux-mêmes en tant qu'hommes. C'est vraiment l'impulsion fondamentale de la vie humaine, la dimension de base de l'histoire. En même temps, on doit reconnaître que dans l'histoire entière l'humanité n'a pas employé les forces matérielles accumulées en tant que forces de l'humanité. L'humanité en tant que telle (»pour soi«) n'existe pas, les forces des uns sont utilisées pour la contrainte des autres. Ainsi la violence générale faite à la nature par les hommes s'accompagne d'une violence faite aux hommes, comme si les hommes n'étaient autres que des choses de la nature, purement et simplement. La force de la contrainte engendre la force de la résistance, de sorte que l'histoire jusqu'à nos jours s'est toujours déroulée selon la loi naturelle du parallélogramme des forces aveu-

But conquered biblical Christianity has never disappeared, for it is impossible to tear from the heart of man his human aspiration for a more human life, an aspiration which only disappears when it is satisfied. On the

ruins of the strength of a world, Christianity sowed ideas of humanity which invaded the very foundations of what is called Western Christian culture. Therefore, alongside official Christian interpretations of the Bible, the biblical spirit has experienced a perpetual revival as opposition within the church, and outside the church as a challenge to the strength of the existing secular and ecclesiastical hierarchy. These ideas of humanity - in their mystical or secularized theoretical form - represented the ineradicable demand of constrained humanity for the transcendence of the empire of material forces. Human reason has always been preoccupied with the idea of establishing harmony between the individual good and the common good, with the idea of subjecting blind material force to the force of human reason. Whenever a great historical change occurred, these ideas were sources of inspiration, and in a form which made believe that it was about their direct and final realization. Let us remember the epoch of Renaissance humanism, the epoch of Miinzer, the epoch of the French Revolution, etc.

The appearance of Marxism is not situated outside these traditions of the Western mind. Marxism came out of him. This outcome was composed in Marx of the synthesis of the opposing forces of spirit and matter in the unity of rational nature, a unity which is man himself.

If we start from man for man, we must remain human, that is to say, avoid getting lost either in the pure materiality of the world, where the material forces act blindly (man as a component pure and simple of nature, man-machine, etc.), or in the empire of ideas in their pure state, reality in itself and for itself (God-creator of the world, code of abstract morality, etc.). In both cases, the total and true man is lost and alienated, and there is no true human history.

From the point of view of man as a rational nature, we must take into consideration the fact that the characteristic of the human being is precisely the will to accumulate physical force. Men now make themselves masters of the forces of nature for their benefit, they exert violence on the virginity of nature, creating a supernatural world, or human world, and themselves as men. It is truly the fundamental impulse of human life, the basic dimension of history. At the same time, it must be recognized that throughout history mankind has not used the accumulated material forces as the forces of humanity. Humanity as such ("for itself") does not exist, the strengths of some are used to constrain others. Thus the general violence done to nature by men is accompanied by a violence done to men, as if men were nothing other than things of nature, purely and simply. T he force of constraint engenders the force of resistance, so that history up to the present day has always unfolded according to the natural law of the parallelogram of forces admitted-58

gles. C'est pourquoi, selon le mot de Marx, ce n'est pas là une véritable histoire humaine, et pour la représentation chrétienne, cet empire du péché et de l'enfer doit être aboli par l'empire divin. Aujourd'hui, nous avons sous les yeux le bond fait par l'homme dans le cosmos. Cette démonstration d'une force matérielle qui auparavant n'était reconnue qu'aux dieux, ne pourrait se concevoir sans l'histoire antérieure de la science et de la technique dans le monde entier. C'est donc »en soi« la puissance du genre humain, quoiqu'il en soit autrement empiriquement. Qui ne sait que le monopole de ces vols appartient exclusivement à deux super-puissances, et qu'ils sont motivés par des buts militaires et politiques et par la rivalité dans l'aspiration à la domination sur le monde? Restant conséquents sur le plan humain, nous devons souligner que la puissance matérielle et technique des hommes n'est pas un caractère acquis une fois pour toutes par l'évolution naturelle pure et simple, pas plus que donné par la volonté de la raison surhumaine. La spécificité humaine de cette puissance est son progrès historique, qui ne peut être conçu sans le progrès de l'esprit humain, dont il ne peut être distingué. C'est justement dans la »reproduction matérielle élargie«, dans l'accumulation historique de la force matérielle que l'homme a acquis et accumulé la force spirituelle, la puissance d'abstraction de l'existant, la projection du but futur, la négation idéale de l'état de choses ou la transcendance (y compris la forme religieuse de la négation ou de la transcendance de la vie empirique).

La transcendance est une force motrice spirituelle, mais elle se distingue, comme force humaine de l'histoire, de la force surhumaine qui pénètre de l'extérieur dans l'histoire pour y introduire à sa suite le progrès humain. Bien que la transcendance dans les deux cas naisse de l'insatisfaction humaine face à la vie empirique, cette transcendance correspond d'une part à l'aspiration révolutionnaire du monde réel, et de l'autre à la fuite de la réalité pécheresse ou non-rationnelle dans l'empire de l'esprit abstrait, cet-à-dire dans le néant. Cependant, le progrès humain ne peut pas se réaliser par la néantisation de la réalité, mais par la néantisation de sa positivité en tant qu'état humain non complet, ou non véritable. La nature générique de l'homme n'est pas caractérisée par l'instinct de la mort, comme un salut face à une vie non-générique, mais par l'instinct de »reproduction élargie« du genre. L'amour sexuel et familial est la base naturelle et l'affirmation de cette impulsion vitale. L'immortalité dans le genre est acquise par l'individu qui contribue exceptionnellement à cette »reproduction élargie«. C'est la raison pour laquelle, par exemple, le célibat clérical, qui représente une façon de dominer la force naturelle, équivaudrait au suicide véritable de l'humanité (et en même temps, à la mort de Dieu, compensation idéale du genre humain), s'il se généralisait. Il n'y a donc pas de solution à la séparation et à l'opposition de la force matérielle et de la force spirituelle, mais il y a une issue tout de même dans la force humaine de la nature, dans la jouissance de la réalité en tant que libre création matérialo-spirituelle.

La transcendance créatrice et révolutionnaire, c'est la puissance ***humaine*** de l'esprit avec laquelle la nature (en même temps que la nature de l'homme) s'entraîne dans un progrès matérialo-spirituel qui n'a pas de fin. Elle n'est pas projet simple, elle n'est pas du tout pro-

rules. This is why, according to Marx, this is not a true human history, and for the Christian representation, this empire of sin and hell must be abolished by the divine empire. Today we have before our eyes the leap

made by man into the cosmos.

This demonstration of a material force which previously was recognized only by the gods, could not be conceived without the previous history of science and technology throughout the world. It is done

»in itself« the power of mankind, though empirically otherwise Who does not know that the monopoly of these thefts belongs exclusively to two super-powers, and that they are motivated by military and political aims and by rivalry? in Inspiration to world domination? Remaining consistent on the human level, we must emphasize that the material and technical power of men is not a character acquired once and for all by pure and simple natural revolution, any more than it is given by the will of superhuman reason. The human specificity of this power is its historical progress, which cannot be confused without the progress of the human spirit, from which it cannot be distinguished. It is precisely in the »enlarged material reproduction«, in the historical accumulation of material force that man has acquired and accumulates spiritual force, the power of abstraction from the existing, the projection of the future goal, the ideal negation of the state of affairs or transcendence (including the religious form of the negation or transcendence of empirical life).

Transcendence is a spiritual driving force, but it is distinguished, as the human force of history, from the superhuman force which penetrates history from without in order to introduce human progress in its wake. Although transcendence in both cases arises from human dissatisfaction with empirical life, this transcendence corresponds on the one hand to the revolutionary aspiration of the real world, and on the other to flight from reality, whether sinful or not. -rational in the empire of the abstract mind, that is to say in nothingness. However, human progress cannot be achieved by the nihilation of reality, but by the nihilation of its positivity as an incomplete or non-true human state. The generic nature of man is not characterized by the instinct of death, as a salvation from a non-generic life, but by the instinct of "enlarged reproduction" of gender.

Sexual and family love is the natural basis and affirmation of this vital impulse. Immortality in the genus is acquired by the individual who contributes exceptionally to this "enlarged reproduction". This is the reason why, for example, clerical celibacy, which represents a way of dominating the natural force, would amount to the true suicide of humanity (and at the same time, to the death of God, the ideal compensation of the human race).), if it generalized. There is therefore no solution to the separation and opposition of material force and spiritual force, but there is a way out all the same in the human force of nature, in the enjoyment of reality. as free material-spiritual creation.

Creative and revolutionary transcendence is the human power of the spirit with which nature (at the same time as the nature of man) involves itself in a material-spiritual progress which has no end. It is not a simple project, it is not at all pro

jet, aussi scientifiquement que soit fondé un projet d'avenir. Chaque projet est le pro-jet du présent, le futur du présent, la réparation de l'état de choses. Projet signifie aussi état final positif, après l'état actuel. La transcendance est toujours »au-delà« de toute fin, elle n'est jamais fin, elle est toujours début, ouverture du progrès, force qui entraîne constamment en avant. Aussi la réalité transcendante ne saurait-elle être décrite en définitions positives comparables à la notion de Dieu pour Bouddha. (Quand on l'interrogea sur Dieu, Bouddha répondit en mettant le doigt sur la bouche.) De même, pour Marx le communisme n'était pas un projet (décrit en détail dans les œuvres sur ce que l'on appelle le communisme utopique), mais le *mouvement réel de la négation de la société de classes.* Voilà pour maintenant. Et demain – le mouvement de la négation de l'état final de demain. C'est pourquoi il signifie la liberté, la libération de l'homme, *l'ouverture finale* de l'histoire en tant qu'œuvre humaine libre, et non quelque liberté délimitée et la fin de l'histoire.

Comment est conçue l'emploi de la force ou de la »violence révolutionnaire« dans ce mouvement?

Les chrétiens reprochent surtout aux communistes de ne pas distinguer révolution et destruction violente de l'ordre bourgeois, quoique ces derniers temps, certains théologiens chrétiens autorisent (et même pratiquent) les méthodes de la »violence révolutionnaire«. Certains marxistes sont contre la force en tant que moyen du socialisme, et en particulier contre le soulèvement armé des révolutionnaires. Pour certains communistes et autres révolutionnaires, la révolution est violente (soulèvement armé) ou n'est pas la révolution veritable. Aujourd'hui, la majorité appartient à ceux qui sont contre l'emploi de la violence à tout prix, qui considèrent que la force doit être utilisée en dernier recours, et que le prolétariat révolutionnaire ne doit avoir recours aux armes que lorsque l'intolérable violence de la classe dirigeante ne lui laisse pas d'autre choix. Cependant, quand on parle de la force et de la révolution, il ne s'agit pas seulement de soulèvement armé ou d'»exportation de la révolution par les armes«.

Comme les chrétiens d'autrefois, les communistes sont en masse persécutés, torturés, massacrés dans le monde entier, sous différents régimes, y compris des régimes qui se considèrent comme communistes. Mais par ailleurs, loin d'être exterminés, ils ont étendu leur influence au monde entier et dans plusieurs pays, conquis depuis longtemps déjà la force d'état pour eux-mêmes, devenant des partis politiques dirigeants. L'analogie avec les christianisme ne s'en tient pas là. De mouvement des exploités et oppressés contre *toute* oppression et exploitation des hommes, le communisme se transforme en force d'oppression, qui est seule capable de le vaincre, et qui le fait. Autrefois, la hiérarchie de l'église était beaucoup plus sévère contre les hérétiques chrétiens qui aspiraient au retour au christianisme biblique, que contre les hétérodoxes. Tout à fait comparable est le comportement du communisme officiel et d'état envers les communistes restés fidèles au communisme original, révolutionnaire et humaniste. La terreur stalinienne frappait essentiellement les communistes révolutionnaires, et le marxisme dogmatisé des bureaucrates s'élève toujours violemment contre l'esprit de liberté du communisme de Marx.

jet, no matter how scientifically based a project for the future. Each project is the project of the present, the future of the present, the repair of the state of things. Project also means positive final state, after 1 current state.

Transcendence is always »beyond« any end, it is never an end, it is always a beginning, the opening of progress, a force which constantly drives us forward. Also the transcendent reality cannot be described in positive definitions comparable to the notion of God for Buddha. (When asked about God, Buddha replied by putting his finger to his mouth.) Likewise, for M arx communism was not a project (described in detail in the works on what is called utopian communism) , but the real movement of the negation of class society. That's it for now. And tomorrow — the movement of the negation of the final state of tomorrow. This is why it signifies freedom, the liberation of man, the final opening of history as a free human work, and not some limited freedom and the end of history.

How confused is the use of force or "revolutionary violence" in this movement?

Christians mainly reproach communists for not distinguishing between revolution and violent destruction of the bourgeois order, although in recent times some Christian theologians have authorized (and even practiced) the methods of "revolutionary violence". Some Marxists are against force as a means of socialism, and in particular against the armed uprising of revolutionaries. For some communists and other revolutionaries, the revolution is violent (armed uprising) or is not the real revolution. Today, the majority belongs to those who are against the use of violence at all costs, who consider that force should be used as a last resort, and that the revolutionary proletariat should have recourse to arms only when the he intolerable violence of the ruling class leaves him no other choice. However, when we talk about force and revolution, we are not only talking about armed uprising or "exporting the revolution by arms".

ˆ Like Christians of old, Communists are being persecuted, tortured, and massacred en masse all over the world, under various regimes, including regimes that consider themselves Communists.

But on the other hand, far from being exterminated, they have extended their influence entirely and in several countries, conquered for a long time already the force of the state for themselves, becoming leading political parties. The analogy with Christianity does not stop there. From a movement of the exploited and oppressed against all oppression and exploitation of men, communism is transformed into a force of oppression, which alone is capable of defeating it, and which does so. Formerly, the hierarchy of the Church was much more severe against the Christian heretics who aspired to the return to biblical Christianity, than against the heterodox. Quite comparable is the behavior of official and state communism towards communists who remained loyal to the original, revolutionary and humanist communism. The Stalinist terror struck mainly

the revolutionary communists, and the dogmatized Marxism of the bureaucrats always rises violently against the spirit of freedom of the communism of Marx.

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Cependant, le communisme, né de l'indestructible aspiration de l'homme à l'humanisation du monde, ne peut pas disparaître avant d'avoir été réalisé. Il apparaît et apparaîtra aussi longtemps que la contrainte matérielle existera dans le monde, sans égard au terme formel et au symbole traditionnel du communisme. Ses chances sont d'autant plus grandes qu'il a une connaissance critique du danger couru par les organes de sa propre force, qu'il crée contre les forces du monde existant. L'expérience qu'il a déjà de cette force montre que le mouvement communiste doit se libérer de ses propres forces de contrainte dès qu'il a subjugué la force de l'adversaire, s'il veut rester ce qu'il est: le *mouvement* communiste. Mais s'il est déjà contraint à la contrainte (à la violence), il est contraint en même temps de s'en servir de manière à n'en pas être la victime, veiller à ne pas trahir par les moyens son but, c'est-à-dire sa propre nature. Il ne saurait y avoir autrement de véritable commencement d'une transformation de l'histoire de la force matérielle en véritable histoire humaine. Le communisme authentique ne peut pas se maintenir par la force, pas plus que la santé ne peut coexister avec la maladie, ou la liberté avec l'esclavage. Aucune force ne le détruira lorsque son empirique coïncidera avec sa notion, c'est-à-dire quand il sera l'abolition (opposition) de toutes les sources de violence dirigées contre les hommes, y compris la violence de source communiste. Aussi le communisme en tant que tel s'affirme-t-il constamment par l'auto-critique (auto-négation), écartant l'une après l'autre toutes ses formes empiriques de l'existence, qui en constituent la limite. Il est donc toujours le »néant-de-l'existant«, l'u-topie, et pas seulement la négation ou la critique d'une seule (capitaliste) positivité. Dans ce sens, le communisme s'identifie à la véritable nature de l'histoire, à la vie consciente de la dialectique, au processus d'humanisation déchaîné, que nul ne peut arrêter.

L'esprit est la transcendance historique de la matière et non la transcendance métaphysique (pré-historique ou sur-historique). Dans le communisme, la force matérielle aveugle fait place à la force de l'esprit *humain libre*, à une raison qui dirige le développement de la force matérielle. L'esprit historique est une force que chacun reconnaît librement sur la seule base de sa propre foi dans le sens humain de la vie. Plus cet esprit reçoit de soin, plus il porte de fruits (rappelons sa floraison dans la démocratie antique, et sa décadence sous la machinerie bureaucratique de l'empire romain. Et de nos jours, la grisaille du communisme d'état dogmatique). Cet esprit n'est pas obligatoirement l'esprit de la majorité, mais seule la liberté de la rivalité de l'esprit permet à la majorité de s'élever jusqu'à l'esprit historique.

Transcendance métaphysique, l'esprit est la solution cachée de l'énigme historique de l'homme, il donne à l'homme l'illusion qu'il se libère de la nécessité matérielle. Le communisme est une solution réelle, non parce qu'il nie l'esprit par la matière, mais parce qu'il permet à l'esprit libre et créateur de l'homme de transcender ou de nier sans cesse la réalité par le »non-réel«, réalisant par là son progrès, ou histoire. D'autres espèces organiques survivent en gardant plus ou moins le même mode de vie. Pour l'homme, le sens de la vie est dans le changement et le progrès. L'arrêt du progrès, l'immobilité, ne sont pas des modes de vie humains, et le communisme abolit justement

However, communism, born of the indestructible aspiration of man to humanize the world, cannot disappear until it has been realized. It appears and will appear as long as material constraint exists in the world,

regardless of the formal term and traditional symbol of communism. His chances are all the greater because he has a critical knowledge of the danger to the organs of his own strength, which he creates against the forces of the existing world. The experience it already has of this force shows that the communist movement must free itself from its own forces of constraint as soon as it has subjugated the force of the adversary, if it wants to remain what it is: the communist movement. But if he is already constrained to force (to violence), he is constrained at the same time to use it in such a way as not to be its victim, to take care not to betray his goal by the means, that is, its own nature. Otherwise there could be no real beginning of a transformation of the history of material force into real human history. Genuine communism cannot be maintained by force, any more than health can coexist with disease, or freedom with slavery. No force will destroy it when its empiricism coincides with its notion, that is to say when it is the abolition (opposition) of all sources of violence directed against men, including communist source violence. Also communism as such constantly affirms itself through self-criticism (self-negation), discarding one after another all its empirical forms of existence, which constitute its limit. It is therefore always the "nothingness-of-the-existent", the u-topia, and not only the negation or the critique of a single (capitalist) positivity. In this sense, communism is identified with the true nature of history, with the conscious life of dialectics, with the process of unbridled humanization that no one can stop.

Spirit is the historical transcendence of matter and not metaphysical transcendence (pre-historic or super-historic). In communism, blind material force gives way to the force of the free human spirit, to a reason which directs the development of material force. The historical spirit is a force that everyone freely recognizes on the sole basis of their own faith in the human meaning of life. The more care this spirit receives, the more fruit it bears (recall its flowering in ancient democracy, and its decline under the bureaucratic machinery of the Roman Empire. And nowadays, the dullness of dogmatic state communism). This spirit is not necessarily the spirit of the majority, but only the freedom of the rivalry of spirit allows the majority to rise to the historical spirit.

Metaphysical transcendence, the spirit is the hidden solution to the historical enigma of man, it gives man the illusion that he is freeing himself from material necessity. Communism is a real solution, not because it negates the spirit through matter, but because it allows the free and creative spirit of man to transcend or ceaselessly deny reality by "no". -real", realizing by its progress, or history. Other organic species survive by keeping more or less the same way of life. For man, the meaning of life is in change and progress. Stoppage of progress, immobility, are not human ways of life, and communism precisely abolishes 61

toute forme de conservation de l'existant. C'est pourquoi le communisme ne peut être qu'un mouvement d'hommes à l'esprit libre, de révolutionnaires insatisfaits, un mouvement qui fabrique pour lui-même de tels promoteurs.

Le mouvement historico-humaniste, ou communisme, est une communauté d'hommes organisés, mais cette communauté, ou organisation, n'est pas une collectivité-masse rassemblée et formée dans le but d'être dirigée et manipulée de l'extérieur. Ce collectivisme qui s'impose aujourd'hui sous les drapeaux du communisme comme sous ceux de l'anti-communisme dégrade la personnalité humaine, la rabaisse au rang de simple particule numérique dans la collectivité-masse (organisation politique, militaire, professionnelle ou autre). La collectivité-masse est une force au-dessus des hommes, un sujet aliéné d'eux sous la forme d'une institution d'état, de parti, d'église, de travail, d'armée, etc. L'individu dépersonnalisé, face à cette collectivité-sujet, est évalué comme quantum de force de travail, de force militaire, comme »brebis du troupeau divin«, numéro de vote, puissance de consommation dans ce qu'on appelle la société de consommation, unité de statisque, modèle standard, etc. La personnalité ainsi conçue n'est pas appréciée en fonction de l'originalité de ses qualités créatrices, mais suivant un fanatisme ou une fidélité aveugles aux collectivités-sujets, en fonction de la »discipline civique«, de l'adaptivité automatique à l'influence extérieure, de la soumission, de l'auto-contestation ou auto-critique, de l'humilité, du dressage de la raison, de la capacité d'accepter un rythme imposé de l'extérieur, de la souplesse aux manipulations. En un mot, cette personnalité est une personnalité de masochiste.

Le masochisme s'accompagne de sadisme, comme les deux faces d'une même médaille. Les faibles ont un seul refuge, la foule, et les foules de faibles fanatisés sont responsables des violences les plus sanglantes au cours de l'histoire. On comprend alors le mépris de Nietzsche pour les masses, son désir de voir l'»Homme« se libérer par la force de l'état de la moyenne massive et de la force de nivellation. La collectivité puissante des faibles se soumet d'ordinaire à la volonté d'une élite étroite ou d'une unique personnalité plus forte qui inspire une foi aveugle et un dévouement fidèle, parce qu'elle représente l'incarnation de la collectivité-masse. La puissance collective devient sa puissance et s'organise fonctionnellement comme la hiérarchie de ses fonctions. La personnalité du chef est au-dessus de toute critique, de même que le pâtre est au-dessus du troupeau, bien que l'activité des guides soit en fait au-dessous de toute critique. Cette personnalité commence donc à perdre tout critère propre, à jouir d'un pouvoir arbitraire sur l'organisation de la masse, qu'elle considère comme son organisme, et à s'affirmer comme personnalité par un comportement original (non collectif). Pour les soumis, il est dangereux de critiquer le chef, et profitable de chanter ses louanges.

Le pouvoir arbitraire d'un individu sur les autres est une violence faite à leur individualité humaine, un égoïsme. L'homme violent viole la femme faible, en dépit du dégoût que lui inspire cet acte, dans le seul but de s'affirmer comme force. L'amour est refusé à l'égoïste, qui ne rencontre que résistance. A l'égoïsme du possédant revient la

any form of conservation of the existing. That is why communism can only be a movement of free-spirited men, of dissatisfied revolutionaries, a movement which manufactures such promoters for itself.

The historico-humanist movement, or communism, is a community of organized men, but this community, or organization, is not a mass collectivity gathered and formed for the purpose of being directed and manipulated from without. This collectivism which imposes itself today under the flags of communism as under those of anti-communism degrades the human personality, lowers it to the rank of a simple digital particle in the collective mass (political, military, professional or other organization).). The mass collectivity is a force above men, a subject alien to them in the form of an institution of state, party, church, work, army, etc. The depersonalized individual, faced with this collectivity-subject, is evaluated as a quantum of labor power, of military force, as "sheep of the divine flock", vote number, power of consumption in what is called the consumer society. , statistical unit, standard model, etc. The personality thus conceived is not appreciated according to the originality of its creative qualities, but according to a blind fanaticism or fidelity to the collectivities-subjects, according to »civic discipline«, automatic -ticity to outside influence, submission, self-contestation or self-criticism, humility, the training of reason, the ability to accept a rhythm imposed from outside, flexibility in handling. In a word, this personality is a masochistic personality.

With masochism comes sadism, like two sides of the same coin. The weak have only one refuge, the mob, and mobs of weak fanatics are responsible for the bloodiest violence in history. We then understand Nietzsche's contempt for the masses, his desire to see "Man" liberate himself by force from the state of the mass mean and the force of leveling.

The powerful collective of the weak usually submits to the will of a narrow elite or a single stronger personality who inspires blind faith and faithful devotion, because it represents the embodiment of the mass collective. Collective power becomes its power and is organized functionally like the hierarchy of its functions. The personality of the chief is above all criticism, just as the shepherd is above the flock, although the activity of the guides is in fact below all criticism. This personality therefore begins to lose all criteria of its own, to enjoy an arbitrary power over the organization of the mass, which it considers as its organism, and to affirm itself as a personality through an original (non-collective) behavior. For submissives, it is dangerous to criticize the leader, and beneficial to sing his praises.

The arbitrary power of an individual over others is a violence done to their human individuality, an egoism. The violent man rapes the weak woman, despite the disgust this act inspires in him, with the sole aim of asserting himself as strength. Love is refused to the egoist, who meets only resistance. At 1 egoism of the owner returns the 62

manipulation libre de la force de travail, dont les autres se sont débarrassés en tant que force humaine. D'où le besoin, et sa satisfaction, de se débarasser de l'expropriateur. Mais l'égoïsme engendre l'égoïsme, et le moi-autobut devient inéluctablement le moyen d'un autre moi. Ainsi le royaume de l'égoïsme ne peut être rien d'autre que le royaume animal existant non-historiquement, c'est-à-dire d'après la force aveugle de l'élection naturelle. L'individualité humaine ne doit être la simple partie fonctionnelle de la collectivité-masse et l'être de l'instinct égoïste dans la société-enfer.

Le véritable mouvement communiste est caractérisé par la liberté de l'individu, condition de la liberté pour tous. Ici, l'individu humain est la source et le principe de la communauté (de l'organisation) et la communauté ne peut avoir d'autre sens que rendre possible le libre développement de l'individu. La conquête de la nature générique ou sociale pour l'*individu* ne peut pas se faire au prix de la perte de la personnalité dans une totalité abstraite du genre-personnalité (état, parti, etc.), mais précisément par le »retour« à l'irrépétabilité originelle, autrement dit à l'originalité de l'individu. L'originalité de l'espèce humaine, c'est justement l'originalité, ou irrépétabilité de chaque membre de l'espèce. C'est dans ce sens que l'on peut parler de l'instauration de l'identification de l'individu à la communauté, et du communisme en tant qu'existence humaine véritable (la vérité a sa forme logique d'identité du singulier et du général). Cette identification, ou vie humaine véritable, est un but éternellement transcendant qui peut se maintenir comme la force réelle du progrès historique s'il se réalise constamment.

L'individu a besoin des autres (de la communauté) pour affirmer son originalité, sans quoi celle-ci n'existe pas. C'est pourquoi la personnalité est sociale, les autres étant son but intime; en se cherchant elle-même, elle cherche les autres, et sans les autres, elle ne peut se satisfaire en tant qu'individu. En même temps, les autres s'intéressent aussi à toute personnalité originale, et la recherchent afin de jouir de sa présence. Les stéréotypes, les médiocres, sont ressentis comme ennuyeux. Bref, la personnalité est sociale en tant qu'individu complet, et la société humaine est une société d'individu libres (c'est-à-dire responsable), ou n'est pas une véritable société humaine mais un troupeau.

Le plaisir qu'un homme peut prendre avec un autre, leur attirance mutuelle, leur amour, tout cela est une question de temps libre, mais le temps libre n'est pas cette éternité transcendante de l'esprit qui s'est libéré en fuyant la temporalité du monde matériel, l'empire du péché ou du non-être. Le temps libre est une transcendance appartenant à la réalité historique du travail-peine, et il repose sur cette supposition matérielle, mais de telle manière qu'il lui applique la mesure de la liberté. Autrement dit, le mouvement communiste ne reconnaît pas pour temps libre le temps de travail, ni le fonctionnalisme technique de l'organisation du travail, force répressive fatalement dirigée contre les ouvriers. Sans oublier cette nécessité, supposition de la liberté, Marx a souligné que le travail doit s'organiser en partant de la dignité humaine de l'ouvrier. Le mouvement perd son but humain libérateur dès qu'il l'ajourne dans le futur, pour la génération à venir, dès que

free manipulation of labor power, which others have discarded as human power. Hence the need, and its satisfaction, to get rid of the expropriator. But egoism engenders egoism, and the self-goal inevitably becomes the

means of another self. Thus the kingdom of egoism can be nothing other than the animal kingdom existing non-historically, that is, according to the blind force of natural election. Human individuality should not be the mere functional part of the collective-mass and the being of egoistic instinct in the society-hell.

The true communist movement is characterized by the freedom of the individual, the condition of freedom for all. Here, the human individual is the source and the principle of the community (of the organization) and the community can have no other meaning than to make possible the free development of the individual. The conquest of generic or social nature for the individual cannot be achieved at the cost of the loss of personality in an abstract totality of gender-personality (state, party, etc.), but precisely by the "return" to the original irrepetability, in other words to the originality of the individual. The originality of the human species is precisely the originality, or irrepetability of each member of the species. It is in this sense that one can speak of the establishment of the identification of the individual with the community, and of communism as true human existence (the truth has its logical form of identity of the singular and general). This identification, or true human life, is an eternally transcendent goal which can be maintained as the real force of historical progress if it is constantly realized.

The individual needs others (in the community) to affirm his originality, otherwise it does not exist. This is why the personality is social, the others being its inner goal; in seeking itself, it seeks others, and without others, it cannot satisfy itself as an individual. At the same time, others are also interested in any original personality, and seek it out in order to enjoy its presence. The stereotypes, the mediocre ones, are felt to be boring. In short, the personality is social as a complete individual, and human society is a society of free (i.e. responsible) individuals, or is not a true human society but a herd.

The pleasure that one man can take with another, their mutual attraction, their love, all this is a question of free time, but free time is not this transcendent eternity of the spirit which has freed itself by fleeing the temporality of the material world, the empire of sin or non-being. Free time is a transcendence belonging to the historical reality of labor-pain, and it rests on this material supposition, but in such a way that it applies to it the measure of freedom. In other words, the communist movement does not recognize working time as free time, nor the technical functionalism of the organization of work, a repressive force fatally directed against the workers. Without forgetting this necessity, the supposition of freedom, Marx stressed that work must be organized on the basis of the human dignity of the worker. The movement loses its liberating human goal as

»pour le moment«, »pour un intérêt supérieur«, etc., il accepte l'absolutisme de l'organisation sur la personne de l'ouvrier, ou soumet son destin au jeu capricieux d'un élément (monnaie-marchandise, par exemple). Si la libération n'est pas *actuelle*, la liberté-autobut se transforme en fuite illusoire loin de la nécessité, en esprit spéculatif pur, ou en bonheur paradisiaque après la mort.

A notre époque, il est possible, par le travail des automates remplaçant les hommes automatisés (réifiés), d'assurer à tous, progressivement, la jouissance des libertés personnelles, à l'intérieur des communautés riches. Il est possible en même temps que d'autre part le monde périsse, victime des forces matérielles colossales de l'humanité divisée. C'est devant ce choix qu'est placé notre temps.

L'humanité ne choisirait pas sa ruine, si elle choisissait. Mais elle n'existe pas encore »pour soi«, elle ne forme pas un tout homogène vis-à-vis de la nature, et elle doit se choisir comme nature humaine si elle ne veut pas périr au seuil de sa véritable histoire. Le communisme, c'est justement ce choix possible de l'humanité, au moment où sa force matérielle et technique nécessite l'univers entier, pour le progrès futur. Ce choix salutaire de l'humanité ne peut pas être le monopole d'une partie du monde divisé, une affaire d'entente, par exemple, entre les grandes puissances, ni la ligne spécifique de ce que l'on appelle le monde communiste, ni l'affaire de ce que l'on appelle le monde libre anti-communiste. Il s'est déjà avéré empiriquement que tout choix fait »au nom« de la totalité du monde, constitue justement un danger pour le monde. Le communisme comme esprit historique transcendant de l'humanité moderne, se situe de même »au-delà« de tout sectarisme vis-à-vis de la totalité du monde. Cet esprit historique anime les hommes dans toutes les parties du monde, sous des formes les plus variées, nationales, raciales, religieuses, politiques, culturelles, sportives, etc. Le monde, si divers dans sa totalité est l'espace donné à son action consciente, laquelle doit être diverse dans sa forme, pour être action mondiale. Il est important que la richesse de l'humanité repose sur la variété formelle, qu'elle soit conçue sur cette base et pratiquée à partir de ce principe.

La première exigence de l'humanité est que la communication entre les hommes s'accomplisse sans contrainte matérielle, sans recours à l'argument de la force, c'est-à-dire exclusivement par la force de la parole humaine (négociations, conférences, accords). Peu importe que l'on *pénètre* dans cet empire du *logos* poussé par des motifs chrétiens (ou bouddhiques, etc. . . .) ou par des motifs olympiques des sportifs, par des raisons scientifiques ou par des idées marxistes. Dès que la force fait place au *dialogue* libre, considéré comme seule attitude humaine possible, les hommes sont sûrs de trouver à la fin une racine humaine qui leur soit commune, un intérêt humain transcendant le redoutable esclavage que la force matérielle absurde leur fait subir actuellement. Le mouvement communiste humanisé absorbe et pénètre tout l'humain du monde, tout ce qui, quelque part sur la terre, d'une façon ou d'une autre, prend part au progrès du monde. Cet humanisme *spontané* du monde aspirant à une vie humaine plus digne, représente une sorce potentielle énorme, et constitue l'espace mondial naturel du mouvement humaniste *conscient de lui-même*, du communisme.

of the organization on the person of the worker, or submits his destiny to the capricious play of an element (money-commodity, For example). If liberation is not present, self-freedom turns into illusory flight from necessity, into pure speculative spirit, or into heavenly happiness after death.

In our time, it is possible, through the work of automatons replacing automated (reified) men, to ensure to all, progressively, the enjoyment of personal freedoms, within wealthy communities. It is possible at the same time that on the other hand the world will perish, victim of the colossal material forces of a divided humanity.

It is before this choice that our time places itself.

Humanity would not choose its ruin, if it chose. But it does not yet exist "for itself", it does not form a homogeneous whole with respect to nature, and it must choose itself as human nature if it does not want to perish on the threshold of its true history. Communism is precisely this possible choice of humanity, at the moment when its material and technical force requires the entire universe, for future progress. This salutary choice of humanity cannot be the monopoly of a divided part of the world, a matter of agreement, for example, between the great powers, nor the specific line of what is called the communist world, nor the affair of what is called the anti-Communist free world. It has already been shown empirically that any choice made

"in the name" of the whole world, constitutes a danger for the world. Communism, as the transcendent historical spirit of modern humanity, is similarly situated "beyond" any sectarianism vis-a-vis the totality of the world. This historical spirit animates men in all parts of the world, in the most varied forms, national, racial, religious, political, cultural, sporting. etc. The world, so diverse in its totality, is the space given to its conscious action, which must be diverse in its form, in order to be global action. It is important that the richness of humanity rests on formal variety, that it is conceived on this basis and practiced from this principle.

T h e first requirement of humanity is that communication between men be accomplished without material constraint, without recourse to the argument of force, that is to say exclusively by the force of human speech (negotiations, conferences, agreements). It matters little whether one enters this empire of logos driven by Christian (or Buddhist, etc.)

) or by Olympic reasons of the sportsmen,

for scientific reasons or for Marxist ideas. As soon as force gives way to

free dialogue, considered as the only possible human attitude, men are sure to find in the end a human root which is common to them, a human interest transcending the dreadful escrow that absurd material force causes them. currently undergo. The humanized communist movement absorbs and penetrates every human in the world, everything that, somewhere on earth, in one way or another, takes part in the progress of the world. This spontaneous humanism of the world aspiring to a more dignified human life, represents an enormous potential source, and constitutes the natural world space of the humanist movement conscious of itself, of communism.

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MACHT, ELITEN, DEMOKRATIE

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I

Die Kategorie der Macht (potestas) stammt aus dem römischen Recht und dem römischen Familenleben, und sie trägt von Anfang an, als »patria potestas« ein despotisches Gepräge. Aufgrund der lebenslangen »Vatergewalt«, die das Famielienoberhaupt besaß, waren ihm nicht nur die Söhne, sondern auch deren Nachkommen untertan. Der »pater familias« hatte unbeschränkte Macht inne, da er souverän über Leben und Tod seiner untertanen »Hausgnossen« herrschte (ius vitae ac necis). In seiner Macht stand es nicht nur, jemanden als Sklaven zu verkaufen, sondern, kraft der »Lex duodecim tabularum«, auch jede Strafe zu verhängen, die Todesstrafe eingeschlossen. Diesen Status hat der pater familias bis zur klassischen Periode der Entwicklung des römischen Rechts beibehalten. Seiner Gewalt konnte sich auch der Erbe, der die höchsten Stellen in der römischen Hierarchie innehatte, nicht entziehen. Die paternalistische Macht erstreckte sich auch auf die Spitzen der römischen Gesellschaft, und sie fand in der Institution des obersten Glaubensführers, des pontifex maximus, ihre allgemeine »gesellschaftliche« Bestätigung. Man kann ganz allgemein sagen, daß der heimische Herd, der auf sentimentale Weise gefeiert wurde und hie und da noch als Zufluchtsort und Freiheit betrachtet wird, eigentlich Herd und Ausgangspunkt von Lebensnotwendigkeiten und jeder Form von Konservativismus und Unterdrückung war.

Und doch ist die Kategorie der Macht, wie wir sie heute kennen, in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften neueren Datums. Sie wurde, wie ja bekannt ist, von Thomas Hobbes in die politische Philosophie eingeführt.[1] Die Macht ist jedoch ein zweideutiger und amorpher Begriff.[2]

[1] Vgl. *De cive*, VIII und IX. Leo Strauß (Droit naturel et l'histoire, Plon, Paris 1954, Seite 208) weist darauf hin, daß in Hobbes' politischer Doktrin die Macht zum erstenmal *eo nomine* zum Hauptthema wird.

[2] Auch Strauß weist an derselben Stelle auf die Zweideutigkeit des Begriffes Macht bei Hobbes, und Max Weber (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1. Halbband, J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1956, S. 28) behauptet, daß Macht ein amorpher Begriff ist. Bertrand Russell meint in seinem *Power, a New Social Analysis*, New

POWER, ELITES, DEMOCRACY

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I

The category of power (potestas) stems from Roman law and Roman family life, and from the beginning it has had a despotic character as "patria potestas". Due to the lifelong "father's authority" possessed by the head of the family, not only the sons but also their descendants were subject to him. The

"pater familias" had unlimited power, since he had sovereign control over the life and death of his subjects "household gnomes" (ius vitae ac necis). In his power was not only to sell someone as a slave, but also, by virtue of the Lex duodecim tabularum, to impose any punishment, including the death penalty. This status the pater familias retained until the classical period of the development of Roman law. Even the heir, who held the highest positions in the Roman hierarchy, could not escape his power. Paternalistic power also extended to the heads of Roman society, and it found its general form in the institution of the supreme leader of the faith, the pontifex maximus

"social" affirmation. In general it can be said that the hearth of home, which was sentimentally celebrated and still seen here and there as a place of refuge and freedom, was actually the hearth and starting point of the necessities of life and every form of conservatism and oppression.

And yet the category of power as we know it today is more recent in the social sciences. As is well known, it was introduced into political philosophy by Thomas Hobbes.1 Power, however, is an ambiguous and amorphous concept.2

1 Cf. De cive, VIII and IX. Leo Straufi (Droit naturel et l'histoire, Plon, Paris 1954, p. 208) points out that in Hobbes's political doctrine power becomes the main theme for the first time eo nomine.

** In the same place, Straufi also points out the ambiguity of the term power in Hobbes, and Max Weber (Wirtsckaft und Gesellschaft, 1st half volume.*

J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen 195G, p. 28) claims that power is an amorphous concept. Bertrand Russell mcint in scinem Power, a New Social Analysis, New 5 PRAXIS

Sie ist gleichzeitig p o t e n t i a und p o t e s t a s, und das bedeutet soviel wie natürliche Kraft oder Macht und gesellschaftspolitische und juridische Gewalt. Hobbes hat den physischen Gesichtspunkt der Macht mit dem juridischen verbunden (mit dem gesellschaftspolitischen). Ihm zufolge ist die Macht sowohl originell als auch instrumental. Neben außerordentlichen natürlichen Fähigkeiten (ungewöhnliche Kraft, körperliche Verfassung, Weisheit, Gewohnheit, Beredsamkeit, Freigibigkeit, Freigeistigkeit, Großzügigkeit und Edelmut) zählt Hobbes zur instrumentalen Macht auch die, die man durch natürliche Anlagen oder »glückliche Umstände« (Reichtum, Respekt, Freunde und das geheimnisvolle Werk Gottes) erwirbt. Doch die höchste menschliche Macht ist *die Macht des Staates* oder die vereinte Macht einer größtmöglichen Anzahl von Menschen.[3] Hobbes hat in seiner politischen (gesellschaftlichen) Philosophie die Umwandlung klassischer in moderne Begriffe durchgeführt. Die Erforschung der Ziele über die b e s t e R e g i e r u n g ersetzte er nicht nur durch die Forschung, sondern auch durch die M e s s u n g der Macht im Sinne von Machiavellis »ragione di Stato«, d. h. durch die Erforschung der Aktivität nicht der besten, sondern der erfolgreichsten oder der f ä h i g s t e n R e g i e r u n g. Es ist also von der wirkungsvollsten Macht im Sinne einer g u t o r g a n i s i e r t e n oder, um es zeitgemäß zu sagen, von einer f u n k t i o n e l l e n s t a a t l i c h e n O r g a n i s a t i o n die Rede.

Der Kern dieser Macht liegt vor allem im Befehlen und im Willen, nicht auf klarem Denken und Vernunft. Dem körperlichen Zwang wird Vorschub geleistet vor dem Recht, denn das Recht beruht auf der Autorität und der Macht und nicht auf dem Grundsatz der Gerechtigkeit. Daher ist die Macht zum Mittelpunkt, zur bestimmenden Kategorie aller efficienten Politik-Theorie und der Gesellschaft geworden, und hat so, man könnte sagen, spirituelle Gewalt gewonnen, die in der modernen Welt herrscht. Bei Hobbes wird die staatliche Macht durch den Selbsterhaltungstrieb, durch die Angst vor einem gewaltsamen Tod gerechtfertigt. Diese vereinte menschliche Kraft soll das Aufflammen von Leidenschaften wie Agressivität und Haß, die in einem allgemeinen Krieg eines jeden gegen jeden mit allgemeiner Vernichtung drohen, verhindern.

Die »potestas« aber, weit davon entfernt, die Agressivität, den Haß und den K r i e g entfernt zu haben, hat als politische Macht im Gegenteil im Rahmen einer »gesellschaftlichen Situation« eine gesetzliche »natürliche Situation« geschaffen, eine Situation, in der nicht Frieden und Selbsterhaltung, sondern gewaltsamer Tod und Angst zur normalen Erscheinung wurden, die sich immer mehr verbreitet. Die Haeteronomie der Macht liegt nicht nur im offenen (ohne Zustim-

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York 1938, S. 12, daß Macht »ein grundlegender Begriff der Gesellschaftswissenschaften ist, sowie die Energie ein grundlegender Begriff in der Physik ist«. Bei den angelsächsischen Politologen wird die Macht sehr oft als Hauptbegriff der politischen Verhältnisse aufgefaßt, sei es, daß es sich um Diktaturen oder um Demokratie handelt. Manche Autoren, wie z. B. Hans Morgenthau *(Politics among Nations,* S. 16) bestimmen die politische Macht als psychologisches Verhältnis zwischen dem, der sie ausübt und dem, an dem sie ausgeübt wird, usw.

[3] Vgl. *Leviatan,* »Kultura« Beograd 1961, S. 72.

It is simultaneously p o t e n t i a and p o t e s t a s, and that means something like natural force or power and socio-political and juridical violence. Hobbes combined the physical aspect of power with the juridical

(with the socio-political). According to him, power is both original and instrumental. In addition to extraordinary natural abilities (unusual strength, physical condition, wisdom, habit, eloquence, generosity, free spirit, generosity, and nobility), Hobbes counts among instrumental power that which one can acquire through natural talents or "fortunate circumstances" (wealth, respect , friends and the mysterious work of God). But the supreme human power is the power of the state, or the combined power of the greatest possible number of people.3 In his political (social) philosophy, Hobbes carried out the transformation of classical into modern concepts. He replaced research into the goals of the best government not only with research, but also with the measurement of power in the sense of Machiavelli's "ragione di Stato", i. H. by researching the activity of not the best, but the most successful or the most capable governments. We are therefore talking about the most effective power in the sense of a well-o r g a n i s i a t i o n or, to put it in contemporary terms, of a functional s t a c t l i e o r g a n i s a t i o n.

The core of this power lies primarily in command and will, not in clear thinking and reason. Physical coercion is abetted before law, for law rests on authority and power and not on the principle of justice. Hence power has become the center, the defining category of all efficient political theory and society, and has thus acquired, one might say, spiritual power reigning in the modern world. In Hobbes, state power is justified by the instinct of self-preservation, by the fear of a violent death. This united human power soli the A ufflam -

to prevent passions such as aggressiveness and hate, which threaten general annihilation in a general war of everyone against everyone.

The "potestas", however, far from having removed aggressiveness, hate and war, as a political power has, on the contrary, created a legal "natural situation" within the framework of a "social situation", a situation in which no peace and self-preservation, but violent death and fear have become the norm and are becoming more prevalent. The heteronomy of power is not only open (without Zustim-York 1938, p. 12) that power "is a fundamental concept in the social sciences, just as energy is a fundamental concept in physics." understood as the main concept of political relations, be it dictatorships or democracy Some authors, such as Hans Morgenthau (Politics among Nations, p. 16) define political power as a psychological relationship between the one who wields it practiced and who it is practiced on, etc.

3 See Leviathan, "Culture" Belgrade 1961, S. 72.

mung) Aufzwingen des eigenen Willens anderen, sondern auch in der (scheinbaren) Zustimmung zur Unterwerfung und Unterordnung Die Macht hat sich als Fähigkeit der herrschenden Minderheit gezeigt, mit Hilfe des »Rechtes des Stärkeren«, den schweigenden Gehorsam der Mehrheit zu verursachen, d. h. jene Art von Gehorsam, die keinerlei Dialog oder Widerspruch duldet (»u mlađega pogovora nema« – bei den Jungen gibt es keinen Widerspruch). Das hätte sie erreichen können, indem sie sich die *Arbeit* in den Dienst stellte und zwar als »potentia«, d. h. als körperliche und geistige Kraft. So ist die Arbeit auch nicht zu der Macht geworden, der alles untergeordnet ist, sondern es hat sich die »potestas« als Gewalt der Minderheit die Arbeit als Instrumentalkraft untergeordnet und nur so ihr Ansehen und ihre Autorität gewonnen. In diesem Prozeß muß das Geheimnis der kapitalistischen Herrschaftsform gesucht werden.[4]

Die Ideologie der Macht ist nur die andere Seite der Ideologie der Arbeit, mit der man die dauernde Versklavung der Produzenten rechtfertigt. Sie beruht auf der ausgesprochenen oder verschwiegenen Voraussetzung, daß die *Herrschaft des Menschen über den Menschen* im Sinne von Übermacht des Stärkeren über den Schwächeren besteht, jener »oben« über die »unten«, der Erfolgreichen über die Erfolglosen und Mittelmäßigen, der Energischen über die Weichen und schließlich aber nicht endlich als Herrschaft der *Reichen über die Armen*, daß sie besteht als etwas Natürliches, Selbstverständliches, als etwas, das keiner neueren Untersuchung oder Begründung bedarf, als etwas, das in der »Natur der Dinge« liegt.

Das Endresultat dieser Ideologie liegt darin, daß zwischen dem politischen Leben, beziehungsweise Kampf, und dem Darwinistischen Kampf ums Dasein, in dem der Stärkere überlebt, kein grundlegender Unterschied gemacht wird.

Max Weber beschreibt seine Vision der gesellschaftspolitischen Wirklichkeit in trostlosen Worten:

»Für den Traum vom Frieden und Menschenglück steht über der Pforte der unbekannten Zukunft der Menschengeschichte: lasciate ogni speranza.«[5]

Auch Webers Soziologie der Macht ist zunächst in der Ideologie der Arbeit verankert, aus der in der Folge die politische Soziologie abgeleitet wird. Weber meint, daß es im wirtschaftlichen Lebenskampf keinen Frieden geben könne und gibt. Dann vollzieht Weber eine wichtige Verschiebung des Zusammenstoßes vom Boden des Klassenkampfes auf den Boden des nationalen Zusammenstoßes. In den wirtschaftlichen Zusammenstößen sind nicht die Klassenkämpfe entscheidend, sondern die nationalen Kämpfe, die Kämpfe um die nationale

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[4] Die Großindustrie hat, nach Marx, durch die allgemeine Konkurrenz »das einzelne Individuum gezwungen, seine Energie bis zum Äußersten anzustrengen.... Sie hat die Naturwissenschaften dem Kapital untergeordnet und der Arbeitsverteilung den letzten Schein von Natürlichkeit genommen... Die Großindustrie macht dem Arbeiter nicht nur das Verhältnis zum Kapitalisten, sondern auch zur Arbeit unerträglich«. (Vgl. Marx-Engels, Frühe Schriften, »Kultura«, Zagreb 1953, S. 327).

[5] Vgl. *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik in* »Gesammelte politische Schriften«, zweite erweiterte Auflage, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1958, S. 12.

mung) imposing one's own will on others, but also in the (apparent) consent to subjection and subordination. H. the kind of obedience that does not tolerate any dialogue or contradiction ("u mlađega pogovora nema" -

among the boys there is no contradiction). She had been able to achieve this by putting her work at her service, as a

»potentia«, i.e. H. as physical and mental strength. So work has not become the power to which everything is subordinated, but the "potestas" as the violence of the minority has subordinated work as an instrumental force and only in this way has it gained its reputation and authority. In this process the secret of the capitalist form of rule must be sought.4

The ideologic of power is just the other side of the ideologic of labor used to justify the perpetual enslavement of producers. It is based on the explicit or silent assumption that the rule of man over man exists in the sense of the superior power of the stronger over the weak, those "above" over the "below", the successful over the unsuccessful and mediocre, the energetic over the Finally, but not finally, as the domination of the rich over the poor, it exists as something natural, self-evident, as something that needs no recent investigation or justification, as something that lies in the "nature of things."

The end result of this ideologic is that no fundamental distinction is made between political life, or struggle, and the Darwinian struggle for existence in which the fittest survives.

Max Weber describes his vision of socio-political reality in bleak words:

"For the dream of peace and human happiness stands above the gate of the unknown future of human history: lasciate ogni speranza."5

Weber's sociology of power is also initially anchored in the ideology of the work, from which political sociology is subsequently derived. Weber believes that there cannot and is no peace in the economic struggle for life. Then Weber carries out an important shift in the clash from the field of class struggle to the field of national clash. In economic clashes, it is not the class struggles that are decisive, but the national struggles, the struggles for the national 4 Large-scale industry has, according to Marx, through general competition, 'forced the individual to exert his energy to the utmost. .

It has subordinated the natural sciences to capital and removed the last semblance of naturalness from the distribution of labor... Large-scale industry makes the worker's relationship not only with the capitalist but also with work unbearable'. (Cf. Marx-Engels, Early Writings, Kultura, Zagreb 1953, p. 327).

s Cf. The nation state and political economists i/i “Collected political writings”, second expanded edition, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),

Macht und das Ansehen: »*Macht*kämpfe in letzter Linie sind auch die ökonomischen Entwicklungsprozesse, die *Macht*interessen der Nation sind, wo sie in Frage gestellt sind, die letzten und entscheidenden Interessen, in deren Dienst ihre Wirtschaftspolitik sich zu stellen hat; die Wissenschaft von der Volkswirtschaftspolitik ist eine *politische* Wissenschaft. Sie ist Dienerin der Politik, nicht der Tagespolitik der jeweils herrschenden Machthaber und Klassen, sondern der dauernden machtpolitischen Interessen der Nation. Und der *Nationalstaat* ist uns nicht ein unbestimmtes Etwas . . . sondern die weltliche Machtorganisation der Nation, und in diesem Nationalstaat ist für uns der letzte Wertmaßstab auch der volkswirtschaftlichen Betrachtung die »*Staatsraison*«.[6]

So gelangt Webers amorpher Begriff der Macht zu seiner operationellen Bestimmung.

Die Sphäre der Macht wird in die Nation getragen, in die Nation und den Nationalstaat, und die»Staatsraison« des Nationalstaates wird zur höchsten Wertinstanz zur Beurteilung aller wirtschaftlichen Probleme, sogar der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Die politische Macht der Nation stellt so der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Imperative. Nicht nur der wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch der kulturellen, denn was stellt die Macht einer Nation ohne *kulturelles*, politisch relevantes Ansehen dar?

Im Kampf des »Menschen gegen den Menschen«, der Nation gegen die Nation, beziehungsweise des Staates gegen den Staat müssen alle Potenzen eingeschaltet werden, und so muß auch Webers »Gott« oder »Dämon« aktiv an dem Kampf teilnehmen, der der Nation die Chance zur Macht bietet, aber die Menschheit bleibt ohne Hoffnung, angenommen, Frieden und Glück seien Ziel dieser Hoffnung. Wenn Frieden und Glück tatsächlich illusorisch sind, stellt sich die Frage, was in diesem Kampf denn bestimmt ist. Die Antwort kann nur lauten: das ist *Krieg* als letzte Konsequenz unseres politischen Seins, also ein Zustand, in dem schon im Voraus bestimmt ist, daß die Regierung und der Stärkere, jener, der wirtschaftlich, politisch und kulturell besser auf den Krieg vorbereitet ist, gewinnt. In den Beziehungen zwischen den Nationen bedeutet das praktisch die Übermacht der Mächtigeren über die Schwächeren, denn im wirtschaftlichen Wettkampf und im kriegerischen Zusammentreffen haben die Schwächeren keine Überlebensaussichten. Der Krieg ist nicht nur das letzte Mittel der Entscheidung, sondern auch Hegels Praetor, der urteilt. In den inneren, »nationalen« Beziehungen liegen die Dinge nicht besser. Hier wieder erscheint der Staat als »Monopol der legitimen körperlichen Gewaltanwendung«[7] oder als Arbiter in den Zusammenstößen der konkurrierenden Gruppen, um die Macht. In einem solchen Zustand verliert die politische Wissenschaft ihre präskriptive und gewinnt ihre deskriptive

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[6] Ibid. S. 14.

[7] Ibid. S. 494 »Wer Politik treibt«, sagt Weber in der Fortsetzung, »erstrebt Macht: – Macht entweder als Mittel im Dienst anderer Ziele (ideeller oder egoistischer)" – oder Macht »um ihrer selbst willen«: um das Prestigegefühl, das sie gibt zu genießen«. Ibid., S. 495.

Power and reputation: "Afacfa struggles are ultimately also the economic development processes, which are afac/^ interests of the nation where they are questioned, the last and decisive interests in the service of which its economic policy has to place itself ; the science of economics is a political science. It is the servant of politics, not of the day-to-day politics of the rulers and classes, but of the nation's ongoing power-political interests. And the nation state is not an indefinite something for us .. . but the secular power organization of the nation, and in this nation-state the ultimate value standard for us, also from the economic point of view, is the "reason of state"?

This is how Weber's amorphous concept of power achieves its operational determination.

The sphere of power is carried into the nation, into the nation and into the nation-state, and the "raison d'etat" of the nation-state becomes the highest value authority for judging all economic problems, even economics. The political power of the nation thus provides imperatives for economic development. Not just economic, but cultural as well, for what is the power of a nation without cultural, politically relevant standing?

In the battle of "man against man," nation against nation, or state against state, all powers must be involved, and so must Weber's "God" or

"Damon" take an active part in the struggle that offers the nation the chance for power, but mankind remains hopeless, assuming that peace and happiness are the goal of that hope. If peace and happiness are indeed illusory, then what is destined in this struggle? The answer can only be: this is war as the ultimate consequence of our political being, i.e. a state in which it is already determined in advance that the government and the stronger one, the one who is better prepared for war economically, politically and culturally, wins. In the relations between the nations this means in practice the superiority of the more powerful over the weaker, because in economic competition and in military encounters the weaker have no prospects of survival. War is not only the last resort of decision, but also Hegel's praetor who judges. in the inner,

"National" relations are no better off. Here again the state appears as a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force"7 or as an arbiter in the clashes of competing groups for power. In such a state political science loses its prescriptive and gains its descriptive 8 Ibid. p. 14.

7 Ibid. P. 494 "Those who do politics," says Weber in the sequel, "aspire to power: - power either as a means in the service of other goals (ideal or egoistic)" - or power "for its own sake": for the feeling of prestige that she

Rolle: ihr einziges Ziel ist es, »sei es mit Machtanteil oder mit Einfluß auf die Machtverteilung zwischen Staaten oder auch zwischen Gruppen eines, diese Gruppen umfassenden Staates, das Streben« *zu beschreiben.* Im besten Fall bestimmen hier der politische status quo oder die politische Vorgeschichte der Menschheit hier fatal allen zukünftigen Stand.

II

In der modernen politischen Soziologie stellen die Kategorien der Macht und die Eliten eng verbundene Begriffe dar und nehmen wichtige Schlüsselpositionen ein. In der konservativen Theorie der Eliten – und das ist sie ihrem tiefsten und innersten Gehalt nach – erhält der Begriff Macht als Haeteronomie die Bedeutung der nackten, groben Macht. Die Theorie der Eliten ist entweder im ideologischen Kampf mit der Demokratie entstanden oder als Folge des Mißtrauens, das in die Demokratie gesetzt wurde, oder schließlich als Folge der objektiven Krisen des Parlamentarismus und des repräsentativen Herrschaftssystems.

Den Ursprung der modernen Theorie der Eliten müssen wir also in der antidemokratischen, traditionalistischen Doktrin der Theoretiker der französischen Konterrevolution suchen, vor allem in den Ideen de Bonalds und de Maistres. Die Basis dieser Lehre bildet eine eigenartige politische Pädagogie, deren wichtigste Instrumente: Prügel, Dunkelzelle, und der heimische Herd sind. Folgerichtig verwerfen die französischen Traditionalisten auch die Möglichkeit der Schaffung eines Staates auf der Basis der Vernunft, d. h. durch die gemeinsame Willenskraft der Bürger. Dem entgegen kommt alle Macht (Gewalt) von Gott, und ihre Ausführung hat er selbst einigen wenigen Auserwählten übertragen.[8]

Diesen wenigen stellen die französischen Traditionalisten, ähnlich den modernen Elitisten, die Masse, als gefährliche Anhäufung, die man durch Gewaltanwendung, Blendung, Glauben, Vorurteile, Gehorsam, Fanatismus unterwerfen kann, entgegen.

Indem er sich an das theologisch-christliche Dogma lehnt, daß der menschliche Instinkt nur dem *Schlechten* diene und daß dieses Schlechte gerade der »Volksmasse« eigen sei, die von Egoismus und niederen Leidenschaften besessen ist, sucht der Traditionalismus Wege zur Hemmung und kommt zu dem Schluß, daß dies nur durch Zwang und soziale Dressur zu erreichen ist. Für diese Aufgabe sind nur jene geeignet, die zum Herrschen bestimmt sind, aufgrund ihrer Geburt oder ihres Reichtums, die auf der einen Seite selbst die Dressur mitgemacht haben und einen besonderen, feinen Lebensstil pflegen und auf das Benehmen achten, und auf der anderen Seite stecken sie nicht in den unmittelbaren wirtschaftlichen Notwendigkeiten des Lebenskampfes.[9] Im gegenteiligen Fall droht die bösartige menschliche Natur in Chaos, Unordnung und Barbarei auszuarten.

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[8] Vgl. de Bonald, Oeuvres complètes, Paris 1864, Band I, S. 121, und de Maistre, Oeuvres complètes, Lyon 1891–92, S. 344.

[9] Vgl. de Maistre, siehe oben S. 354, 361.

Roller their only goal is "whether with power or with influence

to describe the striving for the distribution of power between states or also between groups of a state encompassing these groups. In the best case, the political status quo or the political prehistory of mankind fatally determine all future conditions here.

II

In modern political sociology, the categories of power and elites are closely related concepts and occupy important key positions. In the conservative theory of elites -

and that, in its deepest and innermost content, is the preservation of

Concept power as haeteronomy the meaning of naked, gross power. The theory of elites arose either in the ideological struggle with democracy, or as a result of mistrust placed in democracy, or finally as a result of the objective crises of parliamentarianism and the representative system of government.

We must therefore seek the origin of the modern theory of elites in the anti-democratic, traditionalist doctrine of the theorists of French counter-revolution, particularly in the ideas of de Bonald and de Maistre. The basis of this teaching is a unique political pedagogy, the most important instruments of which are the beating, the dark cell, and the home hearth. Consequently, the French traditionalists also reject the possibility of creating a state on the basis of reason, i. H. through the combined willpower of the citizens. To meet this, all power comes from God, and He himself has delegated its execution to a few chosen ones.8

The French traditionalists, like the modern elitists, contrast these few with the masses as a dangerous accumulation that can be subdued by the use of force, blindness, faith, prejudice, obedience, fanaticism.

Leaning on the theological-Christian dogma that the human instinct only serves the bad and that this badness is peculiar to the "popular masses" possessed by egoism and base passions, traditionalism seeks ways of inhibition and arrives at it Conclusion that this can only be achieved through coercion and social training. Only those who are destined to rule, because of their birth or their wealth, are suitable for this task, who on the one hand have undergone the training themselves and maintain a special, refined lifestyle and pay attention to behavior, and on the other hand are stuck they not in the immediate economic necessities of the struggle for life.9

Otherwise, vicious human nature threatens to degenerate into chaos, disorder, and barbarism.

6 vgl. de Bonald, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1864, Band I, S. 121, and de Maistre, Oeuvres completes, Lyons 1891-92, S. 344.

• *Cf. de Maistre, see above pp. 354, 361.*

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In diesem Sinn brandmarkt de Bonald die Demokratie als politischen Atheismus. »Die Demokratie verwirft im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes in der politischen Gesellschaft jede sichtbare und feste Einheit der Führung, und den Souverän sieht sie nur in Subjekten oder im Volk, so wie der Atheismus den einzigen und wahren Ursprung des Universums (Gott, Lj. T.) verwirft und ihn nur in seinen Folgen oder der Materie sieht. In diesem System (im Atheismus, Lj. T.) vollführt die Materie alles, in jenem System (in der Demokratie, Lj. T.) hat das Volk das Recht, alles zu tun, und so könnte man die Demokraten die Atheisten der Politik nennen, und Atheisten die Jakobiner der Religion.«[10]

De Bonalds ausdrücklicher Vergleich der Demokratie mit dem Atheismus und sein verschwiegener Vergleich der Machtausübung der Elite mit dem Glauben an Gott zeigt die intensive Gegenwart der Idee, daß die Unterwerfung und der Gehorsam einem vorgesetzten *Paternalismus* gegenüber auf einer dauernden Infantilität der Beherrschten aufgebaut ist, und daß dem folgend die Idee der Demokratie gottlos ist und sich illegitim dem ewigen Lauf der Dinge widersetzt.

Es sei nebenbei bemerkt, daß man diesen unhistorischen Zutritt zum Staat auch bei einem so repräsentativen historischen Denker wie Hegel findet. Es ist schon bekannt, daß Marx Hegel deshalb kritisiert hat, weil en in seiner Konzeption der Verfassungs-Monarchie unhistorisch vorgegangen ist, weil er nämlich den Begriff der *Verbundenheit* mit dem Staat auf der *Psyche* des Individuums, also auf natürlichem, nicht auf historischem Boden aufgebaut hat. So geschah es auch, daß Hegel Brauch und Staat im konservativen Familienleben verankerte, und so hat er, ähnlich den meisten der konservativen Soziologen, den Staat auf genetische Art aus der Familie entwickelt.[11]

Der neueren konservativen politischen Ideologie ist auf einer höheren Stufe dieser politische Paternalismus und Naturalismus eigen. Die Geschichte wird tacite oder expressis verbis aus den Betrachtungen als etwas Irrelevantes ausgeschlossen. Die politische Einheit, für die sich de Bonald einsetzte, wurde z. B. während des Nationalsozialismus zu einer *natürlichen Einheit der Nation* umgewandelt, und diese wurde ihrerseits durch die Wiederbelebung feudaler Grundsätze des Repräsentierens, im Führer personifiziert (Ein Volk – ein Führer). Die nationale Homogenität, begründet auf der »Blutgemeinschaft«, entwindet

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[10] Vgl. Oeuvres de Bonald, Paris 1849, Bd. X, S. 104 ff. De Maistre folgend haben wir Dogmen und nützliche Vorurteile »von unseren Vätern bekommen« und »der erste Mensch war der König seiner Kinder« (siehe oben S. 323). Seinerseits leitet de Bonald das Entstehen der »politischen Gesellschaft« von »Besitzerfamilien« ab. Edmund Burke *(Über die französische Revolution,* Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1967, S. 98) sieht den Grund für die Beständigkeit der englischen Familie im Besitz. Über den französischen Traditionalismus und Burkes konservative Kritik der französischen Revolution vgl. die außerordentliche Studie Herbert Marcuses, 1936 für die Horkheimer Sammlung »Autorität und Familie« geschrieben, neuerlich aber in »Idee zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft« veröffentlicht, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1969, S. 113 ff.

[11] Vgl. G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften,* hrsg. von Georg Lasson, Leipzig 1905, S. 442, und die entsprechenden Abschnitte der »Philosophie des Rechts« (§§ 142–360). Vgl. auch Marx »Kritik zur Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie«, und besonders Hegels Kritik am Naturalismus in der Erklärung der monarchistischen Macht.

In this sense, de Bonald brands democracy as political atheism. "Democracy in the truest sense of the word in political society rejects any visible and fixed unity of leadership, and sees the sovereign only in subjects

or in the people, just as atheism sees the only and true origin of the universe (God, Lj. T.) rejects and sees it only in its consequences or the matter. In this system (in atheism, LT) matter does everything, in that system (in democracy, LT) the people have the right to do everything, and so the democrats could be called the atheists of politics, and atheists call the Jacobins of religion.«10

De Bonald's explicit comparison of democracy with atheism and his tacit comparison of elite exercise of power with belief in God shows the intense presence of the idea that submission and obedience to a superior paternalism is built upon a perennial infantility of the ruled, and that consequently the idea of democracy is godless and illegitimately opposed to the eternal course of things.

It should be noted, by the way, that one finds this unhistorical approach to the state even in such a representative historical thinker as Hegel. It is already known that Marx criticized Hegel because his conception of the constitutional monarchy was unhistorical, because he based the concept of connectedness with the state on the psyche of the individual, i.e. on natural lichen, not on historical ground. This is how it happened that Hegel anchored custom and the state in conservative family life, and thus, like most conservative sociologists, he genetically developed the state out of the family.11

This political paternalism and naturalism is characteristic of the more recent conservative political ideology at a higher level. The story is tacite or expressis verbis excluded from consideration as something irrelevant. The political entity that de Bonald advocated was e.g. For example, during National Socialism it was transformed into a natural unity of the nation, and this in turn, through the revival of feudal principles of representation, was personified in the Fuhrer (One People - One Fuhrer). According to de Maistre, we have dogmas and useful prejudices "inherited from our fathers" and

"the first man was king to his children" (see above, p. 323). For his part, de Bonald directs the emergence of the "political society" of "owning families"

away. Edmund Burke (Vber die franzdsiscke Revolution, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1967, p. 98) sees the reason for the persistence of the English family in property.

On French traditionalism and Burke's conservative critique of the French Revolution, see Herbert Marcuse's extraordinary study, written in 1936 for the Horkheim collection "Authority and Family," but recently published in

"Idea for a Critical Theory of Society" published, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/ Main 1969, p. 113 ff.

11 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, ed.

by Georg Lasson, Leipzig 1905, p. 442, and the corresponding sections of

"Philosophy of Law" (§§ 142-360). See also Marx's Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, and especially Hegel's critique of naturalism in the explanation of monarchist power.

sich so allen Klassen- (gesellschaftlichen) Aufteilungen und bildet eine *biologische* Voraussetzung für die Politik. Der Gedanke des »Führers«, mit dem sich das »Volk« identifiziert, sollte das gesamte politische Leben vereinen, beherrschen und durchdringen. Der Führer ist der einzige, der diese hypostasierte nationale Einheit erklären kann, in der sich alles, was im wahrsten Sinn des Wortes *existentiell* ist, dem Normativen widersetzt, als einem, das schematisch und fiktiv ist, oder – es kommt auf dasselbe – die Biologie wurde zur einzigen normativen Instanz. Hier ist es Tatsache, daß *auctoritas* (im Sinne von potestas) *non veritas facit legem*, weil veritas als Fiktion angenommen wird, und auctoritas (potestas) als die einzige authentische Wirklichkeit.[12]

Dabei ist es wichtig anzuführen, daß die konservative Ideologie der Elite die bekannte Idee der antiken politischen Philosophie und der revolutionären natürlichen Rechte, über die *menschliche Größe* (die auf eine bestimmte Art auch Nietzsche eigen ist)[13] restlos den herrschenden Eliten, als ihre inhärente Eigenheit überläßt, dem Volk als »Masse« aber schreibt sie niedere Eigenschaften zu. Dieses Ideologisieren des Begriffes Volk durch den *psychologischen* Begriff Masse einerseits und andererseits die Umwandlung des Begriffes Demokratie in ein plebiszitäres Machtsystem (»Massendemokratie«), deren Charakteristikum gerade die *Manipulation* eines blinden Haufens ist, führt mit logischer Notwendigkeit zur Idee von der unausbleiblichen Herrschaft *charismatischer* Persönlichkeit und zur Verewigung der paternalistischen Vormundschaft, in der der Erzieher immer Erzieher und Bestimmender, der Erzogene aber immer der Erzogene und Untergebene bleibt. In seiner »Psychologie du socialisme« hat Le Bon bewiesen, daß sich die Massen immer einem Caesar zu bewegen. Die »Masse« dient also nur als pasive Kontrast-Kategorie, als begriffliches Komplement der Elite, als dunkler Hintergrund ihres mächtigen Glanzes.[14] Da man die Möglichkeit der Demokratie nur in der Form eines Repräsentanten-Systems sieht, besteht das *Volk* als *Substanz* der Demokratie nur in der Form der *Masse*, der Anhäufung. Während nämlich die Elite als privilegierte Gruppe, der besondere geistige Eigenschaften zustehen, betrachtet wird, selbst dann, wenn sie diese augenscheinlich nicht mehr hat, also Eigenschaften, die sich einer rationalen Überprüfung entziehen, wird die Masse – wie das schon gesagt wurde – als, im rein psychologischen Sinn, Haufen, bar jeder Selbstständigkeit, jeder Berechnungsfähigkeit und Verantwortung, angesehen. Ihre Eigenschaften sollten per definitionem: Einheitlichkeit, Anpassung, Nivellierung, ein niedriges Kulturniveau sein, also jene Eigenschaften, die notwendig ein manipulatives Führen verursachen, die sozusagen nach

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[12] Vgl. Mathias Schmitz: *Die Freund-Feind-Theorie Carl Schmitts*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1965, S. 160 ff.

[13] Vgl. Danko Grlić, *Ko je Nietzsche* (Wer ist Nietzsche) »Vuk Karadžić«, 1969, S. 57 ff.

[14] Vgl. Hans P. Dreitzel. *Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur*. Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart 1962, S. 132. Die Tendenz der »Masse« Urteilsunfähigkeit und moralische Gleichgültigkeit zuzuschreiben führt zur Gleichsetzung der Begriffe »vulgus« und »populus«, die aber Hegel streng unterschieden hat. Die Werke Hendrik de Mans sind charakteristisch für diese Denkrichtung (*Vermassung und Kulturverfall*), sowie die Werke von José Ortega y Gasset (*Der Aufstand der Massen*). Die angeführten Werke der französischen Traditionalisten sind voll solcher Beispiele.

thus avoids all class (social) divisions and forms a biological prerequisite for politics. The idea of the "Fuhrer" with which the "people" identified should unify, dominate and permeate all of political life. The Fuhrer is the

only one who can explain this hypostatized national unity in which everything that is literally existential defies the normative as one that is schematic and fictitious, or - it comes down to the same thing - biology became the sole normative authority. Here it is a fact that auctoritas (in the sense of potestas) non veritas facit legem, because veritas is accepted as fiction, and auctoritas (potestas) as the only authentic reality.12

It is important to note that the conservative ideology of the elite has left the well-known idea of ancient political philosophy and the revolutionary natural rights, about human greatness (which in a certain way is also peculiar to Nietzsche)13 to the ruling elites, as their inherent peculiarity iüberlafit, the people as

But "mass" ascribes lower qualities to them. This ideologising of the concept of the people through the psychological concept of the masses on the one hand and the transformation of the concept of democracy into a plebiscitary system of power ("mass democracy") on the other hand, which is characterized precisely by the manipulation of a blind crowd, leads with logical necessity to the idea of the inevitable rule of charismatic personality and perpetuating paternalistic tutelage, in which the educator always remains the educator and the one who decides, but the educator always remains the educator and subordinate. In his Psychologie du socialisme, Le Bon proved that the masses always move toward Caesar. The "mass" thus serves only as a passive contrast category, as a conceptual complement of the elite, as a dark background of its powerful splendor.14

Since one sees the possibility of democracy only in the form of a representative system, the people as the substance of democracy exists only in the form of the mass, the accumulation. While the elite is viewed as a privileged group that is entitled to special intellectual qualities, even if they apparently no longer have them, i.e. qualities that evade rational examination, the masses - as has already been said - as, in a purely psychological sense, a heap devoid of any independence, calculation ability and responsibility. By definition, their characteristics should be: uniformity, adaptation, leveling, a low level of culture, that is, those characteristics that necessarily cause manipulative leadership. the so to speak after

*** Cf. Mathias Schmitz: Die Frcund-Feind-7heoric Carl Schmitts, Westdeutscher Verlag, Koln and Opladen, 1965, p. 160 ff.*

IS See Danko Grlić, Who is Nietzsche (Wer ist Nietzsche) "Vuk Karadžić", 1969, S. 57 ff.

14 Cf. Hans P. Drcitzcl. Elite Concept and Social Structure, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart 1962, p. 132. The tendency to attribute incapacity

to judgment and moral indifference to the »mass« leads to the equation of the term »vulgus«

and "populus," which Hegel made a strict distinction between. The works of Hendrik de Mans are characteristic of this movement (Mutualization and Cultural Decay), as are the works of Jose Ortega y Gasset (The Uprising of the Masses). The works of the French traditionalists cited are full of such examples.

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einer Elite lechzen. Es ist geradezu eine Eigenheit der konservativen Soziologie, die Übermacht der Elite über die Masse durch die Organisationsfähigkeit, beziehungsweise durch die Neigung der Massen zur Desorganisation, zu rechtfertigen, oder wie bei Pareto durch einen Rakurs in die irrationale, residuale Sphäre.[15]

Diese Rechtfertigung der Macht der Elite und der Ohnmacht der Masse wird durch Umwandlung politischer in psychologische Kategorien, historischer und gesellschaftlicher Qualitäten in natürliche und körperliche Eigenschaften durchgeführt.

Von Bedeutung ist es auch zu sagen, daß Max Weber, wie auch die Schüler der konservativen Soziologie der Elite, ausgesprochen oder stillschweigend die Demokratie als gemeine *Demagogie* betrachten. Der Parlamentarismus ist als politisches System nichts anderes als eine Form der Übermacht der *Auserwählten* über die *Wähler*, eine Macht, in der die Abgeordneten die Wahlen benützen, um ihre eigene Souveränität auf Kosten der Volkssouveränität zu schaffen.[16] Derselbe Prozeß spielt sich in den großen politischen Parteien ab, in denen das Ansehen der Führer die großen demokratischen Grundsätze besiegt, ebenso wie deren engherziger und egoistischer Ehrgeiz. Diese Tendenz zur Usurpierung betrachten in unserer modernen Zeit die Theoretiker der Übermacht der Elite als inhärente Eigenschaft der Demokratie als solcher.[17]

Hier wird das Ignorieren der Demokratie auf die Demokratie projektiert, und so drängen sich die Herrschaft der Elite und das Vertrauen in die rohe Gewalt von selbst als natürlich und als unausbleibliche Lösung auf, ja noch mehr, sie erscheinen als eine Art natürlicher Notwendigkeit jedes möglichen politischen Lebens.

Wenn, Lockes Lehrsatz folgend, die Demokratie *die Herrschaft der Mehrheit* ist, so ist nach der der konservativen Theorie der Elite das einzige natürliche System das, in dem die *Minderheit* und zwar die Minderheit gewählter, mächtiger Leute, die durch rücksichtslosen Kampf bis an die Spitze der gesellschaftlichen Hierarchie gedrungen sind, herrscht.[18] Der Erfolg in diesem Kampf wird zum einzigen, wahren Kriterium, ohne Rücksicht darauf, mit welchen Mitteln er erreicht wurde oder auf welchen Lebensbereich er sich bezieht. Auch umgekehrt ist der *Masse* Erfolglosigkeit und Mittelmäßigkeit eigen. Das

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[15] Vgl. Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale*, Lausanne–Paris 1919, § 1439. Vgl. auch Vojin Milić, *Apologija iracionalnosti i sile. Paretovo mesto u sociologiji saznanja*. Zeitschrift »Sociologija«, Jgg. IX (1967). Nr. 1, S. 16 ff.

[16] Vgl. Robert Michels *Soziologie des Parteiwesens*, A. Kröner, Stuttgart 1957.

[17] Ibid., S. 354.

[18] Damit in Verbindung bemerkt Dreitzel ganz richtig, daß die konservative Theorie der Elite, obwohl andere Ziele verfolgend, zum Verteidiger der Macht wird. Alle diese Machiavellisten sind zu Apologeten der Macht geworden – wenn auch bei Mosca mit dem bedauernden Unterton des Liberalen, und bei Michels mit der Bitternis des vom Sozialismus Enttäuschten. Die positivistische »Wertfreiheit« ihres politischen Pessimismus enthüllt sich als die »Wertlosigkeit« ihrer Sozialphilosophie. Wo sie Geschichte und Gesellschaft nur noch aus dem Machtstreben verstanden wissen wollen, öffnet die Sinnentleerheit ihres kritischen Aspekts gerade jener Ideologiesierung die Tore, die sie als solche enthüllen wollten. Daß sie dann – mit oder gegen ihren Willen – zu den grossen Lehrmeistern des Faschismus wurden, lag in der Konsequenz ihrer Theorien. . .« (s. o., S. 124). Was für die konservative Theorie der Elite und der Macht gilt, gilt genauso für jede positivistische »reine« Theorie.

lust for an elite. It is almost a peculiarity of conservative sociology to justify the supremacy of the elite over the masses through the ability to organize, or through the tendency of the masses to disorganize, or, as with

Pareto, through a rush into the irrational, residual sphere.

This justification of the power of the elite and the impotence of the masses is carried out by transforming political into psychological categories, historical and social qualities into natural and physical characteristics.

e

It is also worth noting that Max Weber, like the students of elite conservative sociology, openly or tacitly regarded democracy as base demagogy.

Parliamentarism, as a political system, is nothing more than a form of supremacy of the elect over the payers, a power in which the deputies use the elections to establish their own sovereignty at the expense of popular sovereignty.16 The same process plays out in the big political ones Parties in which the prestige of the leaders defeat the great democratic principles, as well as their narrow and selfish ambitions. The theorists of the supremacy of the elite regard this tendency towards usurpation in our modern times as an inherent characteristic of democracy as such.17

Here, ignoring democracy is projected onto democracy, and so elite rule and reliance on brute force impose themselves as natural and inevitable solutions, even more so, they appear as a kind of natural necessity any political life.

If, according to Locke's tenet, democracy is the rule of the majority, then, according to the conservative theory of the elite, the only natural system is one in which the minority, and that is the minority of elected, powerful people, ruled by ruthless struggle to the Those who have reached the top of the social hierarchy prevail.18 Success in this struggle becomes the only true criterion, regardless of the means by which it was achieved or the area of life to which it relates. Conversely, the crowd is characterized by lack of success and mediocrity. 15 Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, Traiie de sociologie generale, Lausanne-Paris 1919,

§ 1439. See auch Vojin Milić, A pology of irrationality and force. Pareto's place in the sociology of knowledge. Zeitschrift »Sociologija«, Jg g . I X (1967). No. 1, S. 16 ff.

16 Cf. Robert Michel's sociology of the party system, A. Kroner, Stuttgart 1957.

17 Ibid., S. 354.

18 In connection with this, Dreitzel correctly observes that the conservative

theory of the elite, although pursuing different goals, becomes the defender of power. All these Machiavellians have become apologists for power - albeit with a regretful liberal undertone in Mosca and with the pleading of someone who has been disappointed by socialism in Michels. The positivistic "value-freedom" of their political pessimism reveals itself as the "worthlessness" of their social philosophy. Where they only want history and society to be understood in terms of the striving for power, the meaninglessness of their critical aspect opens the doors to ideology that they wanted to reveal as such. Then she -

with or against their will - became the great teachers of fascism, lay in the consistency of their theories....« (see above, p. 124). What is true of the conservative theory of the elite and of power is equally true of any positivist "pure"

Theory.

eigentliche Memento dieser Theorie lautet: sichere und bestimmte Macht der Elite und fatale Ohnmacht der Masse. Dies dient gleichzeitig und gleichwertig der Vergeblichkeit allen Kampfes um die Demokratie.

Der ideologisierten Soziologie der Macht und der Elite ist Formalismus und die sogen. Wertneutralität eigen. Dies ist hauptsächlich bei Weber und bei Pareto zu bemerken. Diese Haltung trägt den Standpunkt in sich, daß im Zusammenprall der Werte keine Lösung liegt. Wenn alle Werte gleichen Rang haben, so ist der *Nihilismus* eine unausbleibliche Folge. Eine *Diskussion*, auf der alle politische Tätigkeit in einer Demokratie beruht und die eine rationale Voraussetzung aller politischen Entscheidungen bildet, muß in Übereinstimmung mit den Prämissen der konservativen Soziologie ihren Platz der *Dezision* räumen, derzufolge Gewaltanwendung und Krieg der Schlußpunkt von Politik und Recht sind. Die Politik der Macht und die bellicistische Ethik füllen da die höchsten Stellen im politischen Leben. Die Lüge des Friedens und die Wahrheit des Krieges sind die einzige Wirklichkeit, nicht nur die gegenwärtige, auch die zukünftige.[19] Der Kampf um das nationale Interesse, der ewige Kampf um den »Lebensraum« der eigenen Nation, der Existenzkampf und die Bereitschaft nicht nur zu Opfern, auch zur Vernichtung und zum Tod sind der kategorische Imperativ der kriegerischen Politik und Ethik, und diese Bereitschaft ist gänzlich unabhängig von irgendeiner Begründung oder irgendwelchem Denken. Sollte man denn daran zweifeln, daß ein außerordentlicher oder Besatzungszustand zum normalen politischen Zustand wird und der normale Zustand des Friedens zur Ausnahme? Ist es ein Wunder, wenn man die politische Pathologie als normales System predigt, das politische Leben als Militärlager, und den Frieden als Utopie?[20] Das Militärlager und das Konzentrationslager, als sinnlich fühlbare und deutlich sichtbare Symbole der nackten Macht und des Kampfes des Menschen gegen den Menschen, müßten notwendig den höchsten Rang in der Hierarchie der Rechtsinstitutionen erhalten (wenn hier von Recht überhaupt die Rede sein kann).

III

Heute ist es schon bekannt, daß die konservative Theorie der Macht und der Elite einerseits gegen den bürgerlichen Liberalismus und andererseits gegen den Marxismus und Sozialismus gerichtet ist.[21] In ihrem Gehalt ist sie fatalistisch, weil sie nicht an den Fortschritt in der Geschichte glaubt.

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[19] Vgl. Strauß, s. o., S. 17 weiter.

[20] Vgl. Herbert Marcuse, *Friede als Utopie*, in »Neues Forum«, XV Jahr, Heft 179/180, Nov.–Dez. 1968, S. 705 ff. Und doch gehört nicht jeder Krieg in den Kontext der kritisierten Ideologie der Macht oder der »Realpolitik«. Man muß, wie das Marcuse tut, der marxistischen Tradition folgend, den gerechten (Verteidigungs-)Krieg vom rechtlosen (Angriffs-)Krieg unterscheiden. Das klassische, das neueste und roheste Beispiel eines auferzwungenen Krieges ist der in Vietnam, und die Verteidigung, die das vietnamesische Volk jahrelang gegen die modernste Angriffsarmee, die Welt je gesehen hat, leistet, beweist die Übermacht der »Utopie des Friedens« über die Eroberungs-, Kriegs-, »Realpolitik«.

[21] Vgl. Dreitzel s. o., S. 122.

The real memento of this theory is: secure and definite power of the elite and fatal impotence of the masses. This serves at the same time and equally to the futility of the struggle for democracy.

The ideologized sociology of power and the elite is formalism and the so-called. intrinsic value neutrality. This is particularly noticeable in Weber and Pareto. This attitude carries with it the position that there is no solution in the clash of values.

When all values have the same rank, nihilism is an inevitable consequence. A discussion on which all political activity in a democracy is based and which forms a rational prerequisite for all political decisions must, in accordance with the premises of conservative sociology, give way to the decision that the use of force and war are the final point of politics and law . The politics of power and bellicose ethics occupy the highest places in political life. The lie of peace and the truth of war are the only reality, not only the present but also the future.19 The fight for the national interest, the eternal fight for the "living space" of one's own nation, the struggle for existence and readiness not only To sacrifice, also to annihilation and death are the categorical imperative of warlike politics and ethics, and this willingness is completely independent of any justification or any thinking. Should there then be any doubt that an extraordinary or occupation state will become the normal political state and the normal state of peace the exception? Is it any wonder if one preaches political pathology as a normal system, political life as a military camp, and peace as a utopia?20

The military camp and the concentration camp, as tangible and clearly visible symbols of naked power and of the struggle of man against man, must necessarily be given the highest rank in the hierarchy of legal institutions (if there can be any question of law at all).

Ill

Today it is already known that the conservative theory of power and the elite is directed against bourgeois liberalism on the one hand and against Marxism and socialism on the other.21 It is fatalistic in content because it does not believe in the progress of history.

**• Cf. Straufi, see above, p. 17 further.*

20 Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Friede als Utopic, in »Neues Forum«, XV year, Hett 179/180, Nov.-Dec. 1968, p. 705 ff. And yet not every war belongs in the context of the criticized ideology of power or »realpolitik«. As Marcuse does, following the Marxist tradition, one distinguishes between just (defence) war and (aggressive) war without rights. The classic, the most recent, and the crudest example of an imposed war is that in Vietnam, and the years of defense put up by the Vietnamese people against the most modern invading army the world has ever seen demonstrates the superiority of the "utopia of peace" over the Conquest, war, »Realpolitik«.

« *Cf. Dreitzel see above, p. 122.*

Karl Mannheim hat, wie es bekannt ist, einen Versuch unternommen, diesen fatalistischen Vorgang in der politischen Soziologie zu korrigieren und die Theorie der Elite mit der Theorie der Demokratie zu versöhnen, und ihm folgt heute die neoliberalistische Strömung in der Soziologie, aber mit der Konzession an die Eliten-Theorie, daß der Begriff der Demokratie, der im XVIII. Jahrhundert entstanden ist, eigentlich veraltet ist.[22]

Der Neoliberalismus verwirft den klassischen Begriff der Demokratie als ideologischen Selbstbetrug und versucht, die Krise der Demokratie auf dem Boden der sogen. »Industrie-Gesellschaft« und innerhalb ihres Rahmens zu lösen. Sein Ideal beruht auf der Verbesserung der Wirkung eines politischen Systems durch Entpersönlichung der Funktionen und durch Formalisierung des Wahl-Kriteriums. Die Depolitisierung der Gesellschaft geht Hand in Hand mit der Erhöhung des Lebensstandards und der Stärkung der Repräsentation der Elite, womit man den sogen. »totalitaristischen« Tendenzen in der Gesellschaft ausweichen will. Diese Theorie beruht auf vier Prozessen, von denen man annimmt, daß sie sich in der »Massengesellschaft« abspielen, und die wir wie folgt zusammenfassen können:

1. Es gibt eine Konkurenz innerhalb der Elite-Gruppen, und schon damit allein kommt es zur Schwächung der Schlagkraft der Macht der Eliten. Gleichzeitig ist ein wirkungsvolles Führen der Gesellschaft auf alte Art nicht mehr möglich.

2. Es gibt einen Vernichtungsprozeß innerhalb der geschlossenen Elite-Gruppen;

3. Es ändert sich die Auswahl der Elite-Zusammenstellung in Richtung einer Wahl aufgrund der *Leistung* (des Beitrages) und

4. Es ändert sich die innere Zusammenstellung der Eliten und das führt zur Selektion der beweglichen Elemente im Verhältnis zu den früheren Elementen.[23]

Mannheim folgend sind die neuen Eliten, den alten gegenüber, farblos und substanzlos. Die Differenzierung innerhalb der neuen Gesellschaftsstruktur entsteht vor allem aufgrund der »Leistung« und des Verbrauchs, so daß anstelle der alten wirtschaftlich etablierten Klassenstruktur eine wachsende »Mittelklasse« entsteht und ein funktionales Verhältnis zwischen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer. Da die alten Klassenverhältnisse überlebt sind, ist auch die alte Idee der Demokratie überlebt. Nach diesem Schluß müßte das Wissen, das zur Leistung beiträgt und sie möglich macht, das Wahlkriterium der Elite sein. Der »neue« Elitebegriff käme, noch mehr, in der neuen (Industrie-)Gesellschaft in den Mittelpunkt, anstelle des alten Klassenbegriffes (in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft). Auf diese Weise würde die

[22] Vgl. Otto Stammer: *Politische Soziologie und Demokratieforschung*, Humboldt, Berlin 1966, S. 66.

[23] Vgl. Karl Mannheim, *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus*, Leiden 1935, S. 60/61, 63–72, 90/91.

As is well known, Karl Mannheim made an attempt to correct this fatalistic process in political sociology and to reconcile the theory of the elite with

the theory of democracy, and he is today followed by the neoliberal current in sociology, but with concessions to the elite theory that the concept of democracy, which was used in X V III. century is actually outdated.22

Neoliberalism rejects the classic concept of democracy as ideological self-deception and attempts to base the crisis of democracy on the so-called "Industrial society" and to be solved within its framework. His ideal is based on improving the effectiveness of a political system by depersonalizing the functions and formalizing the election criterion. The de-politicization of society goes hand in hand with raising the standard of living and strengthening the representation of the elite, thus creating the so-called »totalitarian« tendencies in society. This theory rests on four processes believed to take place in "mass society," which we can summarize as follows: 1. There is competition within elite groups, and that alone is where it comes from to weaken the clout of elite power. At the same time, it is no longer possible to run society effectively in the old way.

2. There is a process of annihilation within the closed elite groups;

3. The selection of the elite composition changes towards a choice based on merit (contribution); and 4. The inner composition of the elites changes and this leads to the selection of the mobile elements in relation to the former elements.23

According to Mannheim, the new elites are colorless and insubstantial compared to the old ones. The differentiation within the new social structure arises primarily on the basis of "performance" and consumption, so that instead of the old economically established class structure, a growing "middle class" emerges and a functional relationship between employer and employee. Since the old class relations have survived, the old idea of democracy has also survived. According to this conclusion, the knowledge that contributes to performance and makes it possible should be the selection criterion for the elite. The "new" notion of elite would come even more to the fore in the new (industrial) society, instead of the old notion of class (in bourgeois society). In this way the 6gammer: Political Sociology and Democracy Research, Humboldt, i'n m l :

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Industriegesellschaft gleichzeitig die Elite und die Demokratie retten, aber in einer »vernünftigen« Proportion, d. h. unter beiderseitigen Opfern. Dies würde – wieder in einer vernünftigen Proportion – den Aspirationen des Sozialismus und den Forderungen des Kapitalismus genügen, wobei man den autoritären Tendenzen, die in der konservativen Theorie der Elite enthalten sind, ausweicht.

Und doch wird die »Industriegesellschaft« gerade als Folge davon *ideologisch* begriffen. Vor allem bleibt die Frage nach dem Bestehen der »Industriegesellschaft« äußerst problematisch und offen. Denn die Veränderungen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft sind eher *quantitativ* als *qualitativ*. Trotz der kräftigen und unerhörten Entwicklung der Industrie und der Produktion im allgemeinen schützen gesellschaftliche Armut und gesellschaftlicher Reichtum ihr *Verhältnis* und zwar genau in dem Maß, in dem auch weiter *privilegierte* Schichten bestehen, die die gesellschaftliche Macht kontrollieren und regulieren. Der Neoliberalismus versucht dem ideologisierten Begriff der Industriegesellschaft dadurch Ansehen zu verschaffen, indem er ihm rational allgemein annehmbare Eigenschaften zuschreibt, aber Eigenschaften, die bei kritischer Betrachtung der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit auf verdächtigen Voraussetzungen beruhen. Denn gesellschaftliches Ansehen erreicht man nicht durch persönliche Fähigkeiten, es unterliegt vielmehr auch weiter entweder den Kriterien der *Eigenschaft* oder den Kriterien der *Staatsgründe*. Nüchterne Anhänger dieser Theorie können nicht umhin, zuzugeben, daß auch weiter: Nepotismus, Cliquentum, Patronage, Konformismus, Protektion, Biographien, über Verdienste, Beliebtheit aufgrund des Willfahrens dem Publikumsgeschmack u. s. w. gibt, anstelle der echten Kriterien, die man aufgrund persönlicher Fähigkeiten erreicht, aufgrund moralischen Ansehens und eines realen Beitrages für die Gesellschaft.[24]

Andererseits besteht die Klassenherrschaft auch weiterhin, aber verborgen bis zum Moment, da die Frage der öffentlichen, demokratischen Kontrolle bestimmt gestellt wird.

Die Popularität dieser Theorie unter den Soziologen ist keineswegs ein verläßliches Zeichen ihrer Wahrheit. Es ist eher möglich, daß sie technokratische Universallösungen für die Gegensätze der zeitgenössischen kapitalistischen und sozialistischen Gesellschaft bietet. Sie verengt den Raum für die Demokratie und ermöglicht eine Invasion der Eliten auf alle Gebiete des gesellschaftlichen Lebens (nicht nur des politischen), von der Wirtschaft zur Kunst und zum Sport. Die neoliberalistische Theorie der Elite versucht die verzweigte Arbeitsverteilung, die Begünstigungen der Delegierten auf dem Gebiet der Produktion und des Verbrauchs (Manager, Film-und Sportstars) und das Errichten einer Hierarchie innerhalb der parzellisierten Arbeit als das Schwinden der Klassengesellschaft und als ihre Ersetzung durch rationale Verwaltungsfunktionen zu erklären. In diesem Sinn erfüllt sie tatsächlich nur eine ideologische Funktion.

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[24] Vgl. Dreitzel, s. o., S. 106 und Stammer s. o., S. 180.

industrial society save the elite and democracy at the same time, but in a "reasonable" proportion, i. H. at mutual sacrifice. This would satisfy - again in reasonable proportion - the aspirations of socialism and the

demands of capitalism, while dodging the authoritarian tendencies implicit in the conservative theory of the elite.

And yet the "industrial society" is understood idcologically precisely as a result of this. Above all, the question of the existence of "industrial society" remains extremely problematic and open. For the changes in civil society are quantitative rather than qualitative. In spite of the vigorous and unprecedented development of industry and production in general, social poverty and social wealth protect their relationship, just to the extent that there also continue to be privileged strata who control and regulate social power.

Neoliberalism tries to give the ideologized concept of industrial society respect by attributing to it rationally generally acceptable properties, but properties which, when critically examining social reality, are based on suspicious assumptions. For social standing is not attained through personal abilities; rather, it continues to be subject either to the criteria of quality or to the criteria of state reasons. Sober adherents of this theory cannot help but admit that there are also further: nepotism, cliques, patronage, conformism, protection, biographies, on merit, popularity based on compliance, etc., to popular taste, instead of the real criteria that can be found on the basis of personal ability achieved, due to moral standing and a local contribution to society.24

On the other hand, class rule persists, but remains hidden until the moment when the question of public, democratic control is definitely raised.

The popularity of this theory among sociologists is by no means a reliable sign of its truth. It is more possible that

it offers technocratic one-size-fits-all solutions to the contradictions of contemporary capitalist and socialist society. It narrows the space for democracy and enables an invasion of elites into all areas of social life (not just political), from business to arts and sports. The neoliberal theory of the elite seeks the ramifications of the distribution of labor, the privileges of delegates in the fields of production and consumption (managers, film and sports stars), and the establishment of a hierarchy within parcelized labor as the disappearance of class society and its replacement to be explained by rational administrative functions. In this sense it actually fulfills only an ideological function.

u Cf. Dreitzel, see above, p. 106 and Stammer, see above, p. 180.

IV

Die Kritik der konservativen Soziologie der Macht und der Elite und der neoliberalistischen Soziologie der Elite ermöglicht es uns, uns mit den entscheidenden Fragen des Verhältnisses Macht, Eliten und Demokratie auseinanderzusetzen.

Der aufmerksame Leser wird leicht darauf schließen, daß die Kritik an der Ideologie der Macht und den Eliten das Verwerfen der Versuche bedeutet, die der unterdrückenden Macht und den Eliten außerhistorische und allgemeine Werte verschaffen wollen oder den Klassencharakter der zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft verdecken, indem sie die gesellschaftlichen Zusammenstöße in irrationale oder marginale Lebensgebiete verschieben.

Aber hier ist nicht von einer Beichte einer kontrastiven Ideologie der Ohnmacht als Ersatz für die Ideologie der Macht die Rede, sondern es ist gerade von der Rückkehr der entfremdeten »forces propres« als einer gesellschaftlichen Kraft die Rede, von einer Kraft, die einzig imstande ist, die Wege und Bedingungen einer klassenlosen Gesellschaft vorzubereiten. Deshalb muß die Kritik der Ideologie der Macht und der Eliten vor allem die Verteidigung der Demokratie bedeuten und die Verwerfung aller Versuche, die die Demokratie als veraltete Form des gesellschaftlichen und politischen Lebens abtun und an ihrer Stelle den Ersatz des Liberalismus bieten.

Die Herrschaft der Elite ist tatsächlich die Übermacht der Minderheit. Dies bedeutet aber nicht, daß jeder politisch relevante Einfluß der Minderheit auch bedingungslos die Herrschaft der Elite bedeutet, obwohl er das unter bestimmten geschichtlichen Bedingungen werden *kann*. Er kann zur Herrschaft der Elite nur unter solchen gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen werden, in denen die *Demokratie* schwindet. Die Herrschaft der Elite besteht immer und überall dann, wenn die *privilegierte* und vom Volk *nicht kontrollierte* Minderheit in ihren Händen öffentliche Funktionen hält, sei es, daß sie sie selbst ausführt oder daß sie sich an Bürokratie oder Technokratie lehnt. Die unterdrückende Macht kann also nicht nur in der kapitalistischen (obwohl sie dort in erster Reihe besteht),[25] sondern auch in despotischer Form des Sozialismus und Kommunismus bestehen. Um kein Mißverständnis aufkommen zu lassen, hier wird unter Demokratie die revolutionäre Kontrolle des *armen* oder *produktiven* Volkes über die Ausführung der öffentlichen Funktionen verstanden, oder wenn man so will: unter dem Begriff Demokratie wird hier ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung verstanden, also die, die ihr schon Aristoteles gegeben hat und die alle großen Revolutionen von der Französischen bis zur Oktoberrevolution praktiziert haben.

Demokratie ist aber nicht dasselbe wie Parlamentarismus und das repräsentative System, die von der konservativen Bourgeoisie geschaffen wurden, und die oft mit dem einzig möglichen Weg der Demokratie gleichgesetzt werden. So nennt diesen Weg Maurice Duverger mit Recht »die Demokratie ohne Volk«.

[25] Es ist selbstverständlich, daß im Feudalismus und in der absoluten Monarchie die *Aristokratie* den repräsentativen Begriff der Übermacht der Elite darstellt. Hier ist von den modernen Gesellschaftsformen die Rede.

IV

The critique of the conservative sociology of power and the elite and the neoliberal sociology of the elite enables us to grapple with the crucial

questions of the relationship between power, elites and democracy.

The careful reader will easily conclude that criticism of the ideology of power and elites means rejecting attempts to provide the oppressive power and elites with extrahistorical and general values, or to conceal the class character of contemporary society by shift social collisions into irrational or marginal areas of life.

But here we are not talking about a confession of a contrastive ideology of powerlessness as a substitute for the ideology of power, but rather about the return of the alienated "forces propres" as a social force, about a force that alone is capable of is to prepare the ways and conditions of a classless society. Therefore, the critique of the ideologic of power and elites must mean above all the defense of democracy and the rejection of all attempts to dismiss democracy as an antiquated form of social and political life and to offer in its place liberalism as a substitute.

The rule of the elite is in fact the supremacy of the minority. This does not mean, however, that every politically relevant influence

of the minority also means unconditionally the rule of the elite, although it can become so under certain historical conditions. It can only become the rule of the elite under such social conditions in which democracy is waning. The rule of the elite exists always, and liberally, when the privileged and uncontrolled minority holds public functions in their hands, whether by performing them themselves or by leaning on bureaucracy or technocracy. The oppressive power can exist not only in the capitalist form (although it is there in the first place)25 but also in the despotic form of socialism and communism. To avoid any misunderstanding, democracy is understood here as the revolutionary control of the poor or productive people over the execution of public functions, or if you will: the term democracy is understood here as its original meaning, i.e. that, that Aristotle gave it and practiced all the great revolutions from the French to the October Revolution.

But democracy is not the same as parliamentarism and the representative system created by the conservative bourgeoisie, which are often equated with the only possible path to democracy. Maurice Duverger rightly calls this path "democracy without a people."

25 It is self-evident that in feudalism and in absolute monarchy anthocracy represents the representative concept of the superior power of the elite. We are talking about modern forms of society here.

Die historische Schwäche des Parlamentarismus haben auch die Theoretiker der konservativen Macht und Elite erkannt, aber ihr Fehler liegt darin, daß sie sie der Demokratie als Demokratie zugeschrieben haben. Wenn man nämlich das parlamentäre System als einzig mögliche Form der Demokratie begreift, dann ist es tatsächlich schwer, sich dem Widerspruch der sogen. »Macchiavellisten« entgegenzusetzen, daß die demokratische Macht notwendig zur Macht der Elite wird. Räumt man die ideologischen Ablagerungen weg, so war die historische Funktion des Parlamentarismus doppelt: einerseits bedeutete sie, wie das unlängst Kurt Jürgen Huch[26] schön gesagt hat, die Umwandlung der gesellschaftlichen Opposition in eine parlamentarische, d. h. in eine integrierte Instanz des bürgerlichen Staates, und andererseits hatte sie zum Ziel, auf formell-demokratischem Wege die Disziplinierung und Integrierung der revolutionären Bestrebungen der Arbeiterklasse in das bürgerliche System der Herrschaft zu rechtfertigen. Diesen Zielen dienten die *politischen Parteien*, auf deren Kandidaten, Vertreter die gesamte Volkssouveränität übertragen wurde.

Die Parlamentarisierung des Klassenkampfes führte unbedingt zur demokratisch verschleierten Oligarchie – bürgerlichen oder proleterischen Uursprungs –, schon aus dem Grund, da die gewählten Vertreter nach den Wahlen praktisch während ihres ganzen Mandates nicht *abgesetzt* werden konnten. Der Wille des Volkes und seine Souveränität – wesentliche Elemente der revolutionären Demokratie – wurden zum Willen und zur Souveränität *Auserwählter*, also einer Minderheit, die sich immer selbstständiger machte, was das Interesse und die Bestrebungen des Volkes betraf, und wurde zur privilegierten Elite der Macht, durch den Titulus der Volkssouveränität gestärkt.

Diese unwirkliche Einheit der Auserwählten und der Wähler, die sehr häufig auf fiktivem und manipulierten *Vertrauen* beruht, dem Vertrauen der Wähler zum Gewählten, zu zerstören, bedeutete und bedeutet noch immer das Zerstören der autoritären Macht, die sich unter der demokratischen Decke birgt.

Die unmittelbare Demokratie ist die einzige Form, die für dieses scheinbare gesellschaftliche und politische Rätsel eine Lösung bietet. Das ist die Demokratie *von unten*, wobei ich mich wegen des Gebrauchs der Tautologie entschuldige. Sie ist nämlich als einzige imstande, einen Damm gegen die neue Aristokratie, die neue Oligarchie oder die neue konservative Elite zu errichten. Historische Beispiele für diese Form der Demokratie bieten uns die Pariser Commune von 1871 und die Sowietherrschaft nach dem Oktober. Die unmittelbare Demokratie herrscht also praktisch nur dort, wo es eine unaufhörliche *historische Initiative* der Bürger gibt, eine *freie Öffentlichkeit* oder – einfacher gesagt – wo die *Revolution* am Werk besteht.

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[26] Vgl. Kurt Jürgen Huch *Alle Macht den Räten*, »Neues Forum« Jahr XVI, Heft 186/187, Wien, Juni/Juli 1969, S. 427 weiter. Marx war der Ansicht, daß »es ohne Parteien keine Entwicklung, ohne Scheidung keinen Fortschritt gäbe« vgl. Werke Bd. 1, Dietz, Berlin 1958, S. 104. Aber Marx Auffassung über die Partei (»im großen historischen Sinn«) ist eine ganz andere als die der apparatgewordenen Parteien unserer Zeit.

The theorists of conservative power and elite have also recognized the historical weakness of parliamentarism, but their error lies in attributing it to democracy as democracy. If one understands the parliamentary system

as the only possible form of democracy, then it is actually difficult to accept the contradiction of the so-called To counter "Macchiavellists" by saying that democratic power necessarily becomes elite power. If one clears away the ideological deposits, then the historical function of parliamentarism was twofold: on the one hand, as Kurt Jurgen Huch26 said recently, it meant the transformation of social opposition into a parliamentary, i. H. into an integrated instance of the bourgeois state, and on the other hand it aimed to justify in a formal democratic way the disciplining and integration of the revolutionary aspirations of the working class into the bourgeois system of rule. These goals were served by the political parties, whose candidates, representatives, were given the entire sovereignty of the people.

The parliamentarization of the class struggle led inevitably to the democratically veiled oligarchy - of bourgeois or proletarian origin

if only because the elected representatives

after the elections they could not be dismissed for practically the whole of their mandate. The will of the people and their sovereignty - essential elements of revolutionary democracy - became the will and sovereignty of the elect, that is, a minority that became more and more independent in the interests and aspirations of the people, and became the privileged elite of power, strengthened by the titulus of popular sovereignty.

Destroying this unreal unity of the elect and the electors, very often based on fictitious and manipulated trust, the voters' trust in the elected, meant and still means destroying the authoritarian power that lies beneath the democratic blanket.

Direct democracy is the only form that offers a solution to this apparent social and political conundrum.

This is democracy from below, with my apologies for the use of tautology. It is the only one able to erect a dam against the new aristocracy, the new oligarchic or the new conservative elite. Historical examples of this form of democracy are the Paris Commune of 1871 and post-October Soviet rule. Direct democracy therefore prevails practically only where there is an incessant historical initiative of the citizens, a free public or -

more simply put - where the revolution is at work.

**• Cf. Kurt Jurgen Huch Allemacht den Rdten, "Neues Forum" Year XVI, Issue 186/187, Vienna, June/July 1969, p. Marx was of the opinion that "without parties there was no development, without divorce there was no progress" cf.*

Works, Vol. 1, Dietz, Berlin 1958, p. 104. But Marx's conception of the artei ('in the broader historical sense') is quite different from that of the parties of our time that have become apparatus.

Das repräsentative oder parlamentäre System nützt diese Idee aus, wenn es in sozialistischen Staaten angenommen ist, aber nur im Sinne einer ideologischen Verstümmelung, da die historische Initiative des Volkes und damit auf Gnade oder Ungnade die des *Partei-Apparates,* auf den das Volk keinerlei wesentlichen Einfluß hat, und der, dort, wo noch revolutionäre Impulse bestehen eine reine *Institutionalisierung der Revolution* ist, übertragen wird.

Das Partei-Mandat der Funktionäre im Parlament ist nicht das Mandat des Volkes, ist kein demokratisches Mandat, eher eine *hierarchische Investitur* mit plebiszitärer Zustimmung, also der Schein oder die Fiktion von Demokratie. Die unmittelbare oder wahre Demokratie aber kann man nicht ohne *imperatives Mandat* und die Möglichkeit einer *Abberufung* denken, oder ohne »permanente Verunsicherung« (Rudi Dutschke) derer, die öffentliche Funktionen ausüben.[27]

Die Bedingung der Demokratie beruht also nur im Klima eines permanenten *Mißtrauens* des Volkes gegen die Ausübenden öffentlicher Funktionen oder, was dasselbe bedeutet, in einer permanenten *Überprüfung* ihrer öffentlichen Tätigkeit. Deshalb verträgt die Demokratie auch keinerlei Form von paternalistischer Bevormundung, und sie fußt auf der *Mündigkeit* der Bürger im öffentlichen Leben.

»Alle Macht den Räten« war das Losungswort der historischen Wahrwerdung der Demokratie. Die Sowietmacht (Macht der Räte) war zur Zeit der Revolution nicht die *Macht* der Sowiets, sondern die Macht der *Sowiets.* In seiner Schrift »De republica« hat Cicero in der römischen »civitas« drei Begriffe unterschieden, auf denen der römische politische Aufbau beruhte: potestas, auctoritas und libertas. Die Träger der »potestas« waren im alten Rom die geschäftstüchtigen *Magistratsherren.* Zum Unterschied vom Magistrat hatte der *Senat* die »auctoritas« in Form der Aufsichtsvollmacht und des Rates inne, während die »libertas« dem *Volk* zukam.[28] Auch die Sowiets der revolutionären Periode waren keine politische Macht im Sinne von »potestas«, sondern eine politische Form, in der Freiheit und Autorität rational vereint waren, eine Form wie die der Pariser Commune sollte die *Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse* bewerkstelligen, sowie die Befreiung *alles armen Volkes* von jeder *Form* elitistischer Bevormundung, damit, mit einem Wort die Arbeit als *Eigenheit einer Klasse* abgeschafft werden sollte oder die »potentia« als *freies Spiel menschlicher* Kräfte sollte von der »potestas« gelöst werden. Das bedeutet nicht, daß die Demokratie ihre »gegenständliche Wahrheit« ohne Gewalt (Kraft) verwirklichen kann, sondern nur, daß sie sich von Anfang an gegen jede Form von *Unterdrückung* erhebt. »Im allgemeinen aber«, schreibt Marx, »können soziale Reformen nie *mittels der Freiheit des Starken* (unterstrichen Lj. T.) durchgeführt werden, sie müssen und sie werden mit Hilfe der *Stärke der Schwachen* (unterstrichen Lj. T.) durchgeführt«.[29] Revolution oder Demokratie ist ge-

[27] Vgl. mein Buch *Poredak i sloboda* (Gesellschaftsordnung und Freiheit) »Kultura«, Beograd 1967, Abschnitt »Socijalizam i ustavni poredak«.

[28] Vgl. Theodor Eschenburg: *Über Autorität,* Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1969, S. 14/15.

[29] Vgl. Marx-Engels, Werke, Bd. 4, Dietz, Berlin 1959, S. 298.

The representative or parliamentary system exploits this idea when it is adopted in socialist states, but only in the sense of an ideological mutilation, since the historical initiative of the people and thus, by mercy

or disgrace, that of the party apparatus, on which the people have no has a significant influence, and which, where there are still revolutionary impulses, there is a pure institutionalization of the revolution, is transferred.

The party mandate of the functionaries in parliament is not the mandate of the people, it is not a democratic mandate, but rather a hierarchical investiture with plebiscitary approval, i.e. the appearance or fiction of democracy. Direct or true democracy, however, cannot be imagined without an imperative mandate and the possibility of recall, or without the "permanent uncertainty" (Rudi Dutschke) of those who exercise public functions.27

The condition of democracy, then, rests only in the climate of a permanent distrust of the people towards the performers of public functions, or, what means the same thing, in a permanent scrutiny of their public activities. That is why democracy does not tolerate any form of paternalistic tutelage, and it is based on the citizenship of citizens in public life.

"All power to the rates" was the watchword of the historical realization of democracy. The soviet power (power of the council) at the time of the revolution was not the power of the soviet, but the power of the soviet. In his work De republica, Cicero distinguished three terms in the Roman civitas on which the Roman political structure was based: potestas, auctoritas and libertas. In ancient Rome, the bearers of the "potestas" were the enterprising magistrates. In contrast to the magistrate, the senate held the auctoritas in the form of supervisory powers and the council, while the people had libertas.28 The soviet of the revolutionary period was not a political power in the sense of potestas, but one political form in which liberty and authority were rationally combined, a form like that of the Paris Commune was supposed to bring about the liberation of the working class, as well as the liberation of all poor people from any form of elitist paternalism, in a word abolishing work as a class peculiarity will solite or the potentia as the free play of human powers should be solved by the potestas. This does not mean that democracy can realize its "objective truth" without violence (force), but only that it rises up against any form of oppression from the start. "But in general," Marx writes, "social reforms can never be carried out by means of the liberty of the strong (underlined Lj.T.); they must and they are carried out with the help of the strength of the weak (underlined Lj.T.). carried out«.29 Revolution or Democracy is done. 27 Cf. my book Poredak i sloboda (Social Order and Freedom) »K ultura«, Beograd 1967, section »Socijalizam i ustavni poredak«.

28 Cf. Theodor Eschenburg: Vber Autoritat, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1969, pp. 14/15.

29 Cf. Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol. 4, Dietz, Berlin 1959, p. 298.

rade diese »Stärke des Schwachen« oder es ist die praktische Energie, die der *befreiende* Charakter, wo der historische Stand zwischen »potestas« und »libertas« radikal geändert wird, besitzt. Hier muß noch ein, für die Demokratie wesentlicher Vorzug erwähnt werden. Dies ist die »iustitia« oder das Recht des (armen) Volkes. Über das Verhältnis der Gewalt und des Rechtes hat Blaise Pascal bildhaft geschrieben: »Recht ohne Gewalt ist machtlos. Gewalt ohne Recht ist tyrannisch. Deshalb müssen sich Recht und Gewalt vereinen, damit das was gerecht ist, gewaltig wird, und das, was gewaltig ist gerecht sei.«[30]

Der unaufhörliche Kampf darum, daß das Volk (das Proletariat) zur politisch entscheidenden *Kraft* wird, und nicht die Masse, auf die sich die Elite von Zeit zu Zeit beruft, um ihre Herrschaft zu rechtfertigen, bedeutete jeder Macht einen Dorn im Auge, nicht nur der offen diktatorischen, auch der parlamentären, nicht nur der bürgerlichen, auch der autoritär-sozialistischen, jeder also, in der die Machthaber ihre Privilegien bewahren wollen, wo das »Reich der Freiheit« der »Freiheit des Reiches« oder des Staates geopfert wird. Das vergangene und dieses Jahr geben uns lebendige Zeugnisse, wie einige »demokratische« oder sogar »revolutionäre« Parteien ihre politischen Funktionen vergessen und bei *Polizei*-Funktionen Zuflucht suchen, sobald sie das Annähern der Demokratie, der Kontrolle des Volkes fühlen.

Demokratie und Macht (potestas) der Elite sind unvereinbar, so wie es Revolution und Magistratsdienst, Freiheit und Unterdrückung, Gleichheit (Recht) und Exploatierung, Brüderlichkeit mit verderbtem, gierigem, brudermörderischen und nationalistischem Willen zur Macht ist.

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[30] Vgl. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, Fragm. 298, Ausgabe des Institut de France.

Precisely this 'strength of the weak' or it is the practical energy possessed by the liberating character where the historical stand between 'potestas' and 'libertas' is radically altered. Here one more advantage must be mentioned which is essential for democracy. This is the justitia or the law of the (poor) people. Blaise Pascal wrote vividly about the relationship between violence and law: »Law without violence is powerless. Violence without justice is tyrannical. Therefore, law and power must unite, so that what is just may be powerful, and what is powerful may be just.«30

The relentless struggle to have the people (the proletariat) become the politically decisive force, and not the masses, to which the elite invokes from time to time to justify their rule, has been a thorn in the side of every power, not only the openly dictatorial, also the parliamentary, not only the bourgeois, but also the authoritarian-socialist, each in which the rulers want to preserve their privileges, where the "realm of freedom"

sacrificed to the »freedom of the empire« or of the state. The past and this year give us living testimonies, like some

"democratic" or even "revolutionary" parties forget their political functions and resort to political functions as soon as they feel the approach of democracy, the control of the people.

Democracy and power (potestas) of the elite are incompatible, as are revolution and magistrate service, liberty and oppression, equality (law) and exploitation, fraternity with corrupt, greedy, fratricidal and nationalistic will to power.

**• Vgl. Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, Fragm. 298, Ausgabe des Instituts de France.*

DAS ETHOS DER DEMOKRATIE

(THUKYDIDES, DIE GRABREDE DES PERIKLES)

K. H. Volkmann-Schluck

Köln

Man hört immer wieder die Meinung – und sie ist inzwischen geläufig geworden –, daß die Demokratie nicht aus sich selbst, sondern nur durch ein Prinzip der Entgegensetzung, also nur negativ bestimmbar sei, so daß die heute unablässig erhobene Forderung nach »Demokratisierung« eine nichtsbesagende, leere Redensart sei. Daß es sich in Wahrheit anders verhält, daß die Demokratie durch ein eigenes und nur ihr eigenes Ethos ausgezeichnet ist, aus welchem sich das Verhältnis von Macht und Humanität erst bestimmt, zeigt bündig und klar der geschichtlich erste Wesensentwurf der Demokratie im Zeitalter der Machtpolitik, den wir dem größten griechischen Historiker und Geschichtsdenker, Thukydides, verdanken. In der berühmten Totenrede des Perikles, gehalten bei der Totenfeier für die Gefallenen des ersten Kriegsjahres 431, von Thukydides jedoch zugleich der gesamten Jugend Athens zugedacht, die in diesem Würgekrieg dahingeopfert wurde, entfaltet Thukydides dasjenige politische Ethos, aus dem die griechische Klassik hervorging und in dessen Dienst Perikles und seine Freunde die Machtpolitik als ein Instrument seiner Bewahrung gehandhabt hatten.

Die Darstellung des politischen Ethos erfolgt nach den drei Gesichtspunkten der staatlich-gesellschaftlichen Verfassung, der Grundrichtung des Strebens und der menschlichen Wesensart.

Die staatlich-gesellschaftliche Verfassung Athens ist durch folgende Grundzüge bestimmt: der Staat ist nicht die Sache weniger, deren Privileg die Lenkung der staatlichen Geschicke wäre, sondern er ist auf alle gestellt, die das Bürgerrecht haben. Die Gesetze sind das für alle Gemeinsame, und jeder ist mit jedem vor dem Gesetz gleich; jeder Bürger hat an dem staatlichen Leben den gleichen Anteil. Ansehen und Geltung des einzelnen hängen nicht von der Zugehörigkeit zu einem Geschlecht ab, also nicht von Herkunft und Abstammung oder von der Zugehörigkeit zu einem Stand, Verband oder einer Partei, sondern beruhen allein in der Tüchtigkeit und dem Verdienst für das Gemeinwesen.

DA S ETH O S D ER D EM O K R A TIE

(TH U KYD IDES, THE GRABR ED E D ES PER IK LES) K. fl. Volkmann-Schluck

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One hears the opinion again and again - and in the meantime it has become commonplace

that democracy cannot be determined by itself, but only by a principle of opposition, i.e. only negatively, so that the demand for "de-mocratization" that is constantly being raised today is a meaningless, empty figure of speech. That things are really different, that democracy is distinguished by its own and only its own ethos, from which the relationship between power and humanity is first determined, is shown concisely and clearly by the first historical draft of the essence of democracy in the age of power politics, which we owe to the great Greek historian and historical thinker, Thucydides. In the famous funeral oration of Pericles, held at the funeral ceremony for the fallen of the first year of the war in 431, but at the same time intended by Thucydides for the entire youth of Athens who were sacrificed in this war, Thucydides unfolds the political ethos from which the Greek Classicism emerged and in whose service Pericles and his friends had wielded power politics as an instrument of its preservation.

The political ethos is presented according to the three aspects of the state and social constitution, the basic direction of striving and human nature.

The state-social constitution of Athens is determined by the following principles: the state is not a matter for a few whose privilege it would be to direct state affairs, but is dependent on everyone who has the right to citizenship. The laws are common to all, and everyone is equal to everyone else before the law; every citizen has an equal share in the life of the state. The reputation and standing of the individual do not depend on membership of a gender, i.e. not on origin and descent or on membership of a class, association or party, but are based solely on ability and merit for the community.

In Athen ist das öffentliche sowohl wie das private Leben durch die Freiheit bestimmt. Das politische Ethos hat zu seinem Lebenselement einzig und allein die Freiheit, und zwar die Freiheit in einer Vielfalt von Dimensionen. Es gilt daher, die Freiheit in ihrer Mehrdimensionalität zu entfalten und sie dann auf den Wesensgrund ihrer Einheit zurückzubringen.

Athens Bürger leben in Staat und Gesellschaft ein freies Leben, d. h. mit Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten, die nicht durch Familien- und Gruppenzugehörigkeiten oder durch die ökonomische Lage behindert sind. Die ökonomischen Unterschiede bilden keine Herrschaftsformen. Das private Leben ist bestimmt durch die Freiheit des gegenseitigen Gelten- und Gewährenlassens. Es gibt hier keine gegenseitige Aufpasserei, keine im Anschein der Moral auftretende Entrüstung, keinen Ausschuß für den Kampf gegen »antiathenische Umtriebe«, keine gesellschaftliche Diffamierung und deshalb auch keinen gesellschaftlichen Konformismus. An dieser Stelle der Rede stoßen wir auf eine Struktur, die immer wiederkehrt: Jedesmal sieht es so aus, als habe ein Vorzug deshalb etwas Bedenkliches an sich, weil er etwas anderes, das auch notwendig ist, auszuschließen scheint. So bereits hier: Führt dieses freie Gewährenlassen nicht zur Anarchie, diesem Bürgerschreck aller Zeiten? Die Rede macht betont darauf aufmerksam, daß das freie Leben die Befolgung der Gesetze und die Achtung vor den Mitbürgern, denen durch Wahl die Leitung des Gemeinwesens anvertraut ist, einschließt, vor allem die strengste Befolgung der Gesetze, die vor Unrecht schützen. Die Rede spricht den Bezug von Freiheit und Recht aus, den später Kant ein für allemal dahin geklärt hat, daß der Rechtsstaat unmittelbar aus der Idee der Freiheit entspringt. Die gleiche Freiheit für alle kann nur als *gesetzliche* Freiheit Bestand haben, d. h. sie wird allein durch effektive Gesetze bewahrt, die, weil sie Freiheitsgesetze sind, die strengste Befolgung verlangen. Eine freie, ungebundene Lebensweise und die Strenge in der Befolgung der Freiheitsgesetze sind ein und dasselbe. Dazu gehört auch die Achtung vor den ungeschriebenen Gesetzen, die keine gesellschaftlichen Tabus sind, sondern die das Menschliche hüten.

Der Freiheit des politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lebens im Inneren entspricht die Freiheit nach außen, die Weltoffenheit Athens. Denn nicht nur, daß zufolge ihrer vielfältigen Handelsbeziehungen alle Güter aus aller Welt in die Stadt gelangen, Athen gewährt auch jedermann den freien Zutritt in die Stadt. Anders als andere Städte, wie das konservative Sparta z. B., das aus Mißtrauen und Angst von Zeit zu Zeit die Ausweisung von Fremden beschließt, bleibt Athen jedem geöffnet. Es gibt keine Überwachung der Fremden, es gibt keine Geheimbezirke, deren Betreten verboten wäre, sondern die Stadt liegt mit allem, was zu ihr gehört, jedem Betrachter frei und offen. Perikles erklärt: »Wir bauen nicht so sehr auf Rüstungen und deren Geheimhaltung, sondern mehr auf unseren eigenen entschlossenen Mut zur Tat«.

Dieser Wagemut der Athener, von den Zeitgenossen ebensosehr argwöhnisch bewundert wie gefürchtet und gehaßt, entspringt einer eigenen Sorglosigkeit, die nicht ängstlich besorgt unentwegt an kom-

In Athens, public as well as private life is governed by liberty. The vital element of the political ethos is freedom alone, namely freedom in a variety of dimensions. It is therefore important to develop freedom in its

multidimensionality and then to bring it back to the fundamental basis of its unity.

Athens citizens live a free life in state and society, i. H. with opportunities for advancement that are not hampered by family and group affiliations or by the economic situation. The economic differences do not constitute forms of rule.

Private life is determined by the freedom of mutual acceptance and acceptance. There is no mutual scrutiny here, no indignation that appears to be moral, no committee for the fight against "anti-Athenian activities", no social defamation and therefore also no social conformism. At this point in the discourse we encounter a structure that recurs over and over again: every time it seems that a preference has something dubious about it because it seems to exclude something else that is also necessary. So already here: Doesn't this freedom of choice lead to anarchy, that terror of the public of all times? The speech emphasizes that the free life involves observance of the law and respect for one's fellow citizens, to whom the government of the community has been entrusted by election, and above all the strictest observance of the laws that guard against injustice. The speech expresses the relationship between freedom and law, which Kant later clarified once and for all to the effect that the constitutional state springs directly from the idea of freedom. Equal liberty for all can only exist as legal liberty, i. H.

it is preserved only by effective laws, which, being laws of liberty, demand the strictest observance. A free, unattached way of life and strict adherence to the laws of liberty are one and the same. This also includes respect for the unwritten laws, which are not social taboos but rather protect what is human.

The freedom of internal political and social life corresponds to the freedom external, the cosmopolitanism of Athens.

For not only does Athens allow all goods from all over the world to enter the city due to its diverse trade relations, but also grants everyone free access to the city. Unlike other cities like conservative Sparta e.g. B., which from time to time decides to expel foreigners out of mistrust and fear, Athens remains open to everyone. There is no surveillance of strangers, there are no secret districts that are forbidden to enter, but the city, with everything that belongs to it, lies freely and openly to every observer. Pericles explains: »We don't rely so much on armor and its secrecy, but rather on our own determined courage to act«.

This daring of the Athenians, admired with suspicion as much as feared

and hated by their contemporaries, springs from their own carelessness, which is not constantly anxiously concerned about com- 6 PRAXIS

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mende Gefahren denkt, wohl aber im rechten Augenblick, wenn die Situation es verlangt, sich mit einem Schlag in die Energie der Tat verwandelt, einer Sorglosigkeit also, die in sich die verborgene Entschlossenheit zur Tat ist und die aus der Freiheit entspringt, welche das Unberechenbare an sich selbst ist. Aus diesem freien Wagemut gehen die höchsten Vollzüge des Lebens hervor. Er gewährt dem Menschen die Überlegenheit über sich selbst und macht ihn frei für ein ganz in die Gegenwart aufgehendes und erfülltes Dasein. Dieses Vermögen, ganz in der Gegenwart dasein zu können, ist die Liebe zur Schönheit und zum Wissen. »Wir lieben das Schöne und bleiben einfach; wir lieben das Wissen und werden nicht schlaff«. Diese Sätze sprechen den Ursprung der griechischen Klassik aus, den freien Wagemut.

Das Schöne ist das durch seine Anwesenheit dem in seinem Umkreis Weilenden die Erfüllung Gewährende, durch seine Anwesenheit selbst und allein und nicht durch irgendeine Form der Brauchbarkeit. Und bei dem Wissen, von dem hier die Rede ist, geht es allein um die in ihm sich ereignende Auflichtung der Welt, die dem Menschen ein durchsichtiges Weltverhältnis verbürgt. Wie Kant uns gelehrt hat, beruht das Verhältnis zum Schönen in einer gegenseitigen Gunst. Dem ganz dem Werk zugewandten Schaffenden und dem das Werk Beschauenden erweist das Schöne eine Gunst: Es läßt die Welt in ihrer Schönheit beim Menschen anwesend sein. Umgekehrt erweist der Mensch dem Schönen eine Gunst: Er läßt es inmitten des schon Vorhandenen als solches erscheinen. In diesem Verhältnis gibt es keine gegenseitig zu verrechnenden Ansprüche, sondern es waltet ein ganz und gar freier wechselseitiger Austausch. Aber diese Liebe zum Schönen ist wie alles Freie auf ihre Weise bedroht: durch den prunkvollen Aufwand der Mittel, durch den falschen Selbstgenuß eines sich selbst in Prachtenfaltung bespiegelnden Lebens, durch die geschmäcklerische Kennerschaft im Formalen, durch bloße Schau und Repräsentation. Im wahren Verhalten zum Schönen herrscht eine verborgene Strenge in der Bemessung und Begrenzung der für die Erstellung des Werks erforderlichen Mittel, die deshalb verborgen bleibt, weil sie ganz in das Scheinen des Schönen eingeht und selbst als solche nicht hervortritt.

»Wir lieben das Wissen und werden nicht schlaff«. Wenn das erstrebte Wissen den Blick ganz und gar auf sich zieht, kann die Liebe zu ihm den Ursprung vergessen, aus dem es stammt: den freien Wagemut, die Entschiedenheit zur Tat. Aber das Wissen ist nur solange wahres Wissen, als es die menschliche Verfassung im Blick behält, aus der es entsprungen ist. Indem das freie Welterkennen seinen eigenen Wesensgrund selbst ins Licht des Wissens hebt, bedürfen die nach Wissen Strebenden nicht erst der Mahnung an das politische Engagement, sondern das Wissen selbst wird ihnen zum Antrieb, die freien Lebensverhältnisse zu wahren und durch die Tat für sie einzutreten, überhaupt die Stätte des freien Lebens zu verteidigen, ohne daß eine in Wissen gegründete Welt nicht bestehen kann. Wenn die nach

imminent dangers, but at the right moment, when the situation demands it, is suddenly transformed into the energy of action, that is, a carelessness that is in itself the hidden determination to act and that springs from

freedom, which is the unpredictable in itself. Out of this free daring come the highest accomplishments of life. It grants man the superiority over himself and frees him for an existence that is completely immersed in the present and fulfilled. This ability to be fully in the present is the love of beauty and knowledge. »We love beauty and stay simple; we love knowledge and do not become slack«. These sentences express the origin of Greek classicism, free daring.

The beautiful is that which, through its presence, grants fulfillment to those who dwell in its vicinity, through its very presence and alone, and not through any form of usefulness. And with the knowledge that is being discussed here, it is all about the lightening of the world that is happening in it, which guarantees man a transparent relationship to the world. As Kant taught us, the relationship to sparing is based on mutual favour. The beautiful shows a favor to the creator who is completely devoted to the work and to the one who looks at the work: it allows the world to be present in its beauty with man. Conversely, man shows a favor to the beautiful: He lets it appear as such in the midst of what is already there. In this relationship there are no mutually offsetting claims, but a completely free mutual exchange prevails. But this love of beauty, like everything free, is threatened in its own way: by the ostentatious expenditure of means, by the false self-enjoyment of a life that reflects itself in splendor, by tasteful connoisseurship in the formal, by mere show and representation.

In the true relationship to the beautiful, there is a hidden rigor in the measurement and limitation of the means required for the creation of the work, which remains hidden because it enters completely into the appearance of the beautiful and does not emerge as such.

»We love knowledge and do not become slack«. If the desired knowledge draws the eye completely, love for it can forget the source from which it comes: free daring, determination to act. But knowledge is true knowledge only as long as it bears in mind the human condition from which it arose. Since the free knowledge of the world raises its own essential ground itself in the light of knowledge, those striving for knowledge do not first need a reminder to engage in political activities, but knowledge itself becomes their motivation to preserve free living conditions and through deeds for them to defend the place of free life in general, without which a world based on knowledge cannot exist. If after 82

Welterkenntnis Strebenden den im freien Dasein beruhenden Ursprung des Wisssens selbst ins Wissen heben, dann wird das Wissen niemals zur bloßen Theorie, die nur sich selbst nachgeht und deren Vertreter, um ungestört in ihr weilen zu können, am politischen Dasein nur, so weit Interesse nehmen, als ihnen Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung verbürgt wird, sondern das Wissen selbst stößt die Wissenden zurück in jene Grundhaltung, aus der es entspringt, in den freien Wagemut, der deshalb für die Welterkenntnis frei ist, weil er zur Tat entschieden ist.

Und schließlich gehört zur Bewahrung eines freien Gemeinwesens die ständige Bereitschaft und Fähigkeit der Bürger, von der Vielfalt der Beschäftigungen und Interessen, in die sie tagtäglich aufgehen, absehen zu können, um für die Besorgung der gemeinsamen Dinge offen zu bleiben. In Athen nannte man jemanden, der am politischen Geschehen nicht teilnahm, nicht einen unpolitischen, sondern einen unbrauchbaren Menschen, d. h. einen zum Dasein im Gemeinwesen nicht befähigten Menschen, weil er zu der Gemeinschaft nichts beiträgt, die ihm doch das freie Leben erst verbürgt, dessen er sich erfreut. Die politischen Entscheidungen werden durch öffentlich gemeinsames Bereden und Beraten gefällt. Denn im Privaten wie im Öffentlichen herrscht der wissende Mut, der die Möglichkeiten und Gefahren zuvor durchdacht und erwogen hat. Bei vielen besteht freilich bis heute die Meinung, das gemeinsame Bereden und Bedenken hemme das Tun, es ziehe ein Zaudern und Zögern nach sich. In Wahrheit redet diese Meinung dem verwegenen Draufgängertum und der Tollkünhnheit das Wort. Und es ist bekannt, daß die bloße Tollkühnheit, wenn das Vorhaben mißlingt, in ein ruinöses Umsich-schlagen übergeht. »Für die innerlich Stärksten wird man mit Recht diejenigen erkennen, die aus klarer Erkenntnis vor dem Schrecken und Freuden nicht zurückweichen«.

Überblick man dieses in der Rede entfaltete politische Ethos im Ganzen seiner Wesenszüge, so könnte man meinen, hier werde vielleicht zum erstenmal ein humanistisches Bildungsideal aufgestellt, das dem Menschen die allseitige Ausbildung seiner Vermögen und Kräfte zum Ziel setze. Sagt doch Perikles selbst: »Zusammenfassend behaupte ich, daß unsere Stadt eine Bildungsstätte für Griechenland ist«. Man könnte diese Bildungsidee dann noch näher dahin bestimmen, daß sie in einer die Gegensätze umgreifenden Synthese bestehe und so das volle Menschsein uneingeschränkt zur Darstellung bringe. In der Tat hat die deutsche Klassik vor allem das Athen des Perikleischen Zeitalters im Lichte dieses Ideals gesehen. Die Kritik an dieser Auffassung hat dann vor allem geltend gemacht, daß es doch eine Rede auf die Gefallenen sei, daß der politische Bezug dominiere und der Opfertod für die Stadt als höchste Tugend gefeiert werden. Der politische Humanismus der 20er Jahre in Deutschland hat die politische Seite der Rede gegenüber dem Ideal zeitlos gültigen Menschentums hervorgehoben. Aber es will uns scheinen, daß *diese* Betonung des Politischen, weil sie reaktiv auf klassisch humanistische Vorstellung bezogen bleibt, ebenfalls nicht den Grundgedanken der Rede zu entsprechen vermag.

If those striving for world knowledge raise the origin of knowledge, which is based in free existence, into knowledge, then knowledge will never become mere theory, which only pursues itself and its representatives, in order to be

able to remain undisturbed in it, in political existence only to the extent that it is of interest when peace, security and order are guaranteed to them, but the knowledge itself pushes those who know back into that basic attitude from which it springs, into free daring, which is free for world knowledge because it is decided to act.

And finally, the preservation of a free community requires the constant willingness and ability of the citizens to be able to disregard the variety of activities and interests in which they are absorbed every day, in order to remain open to taking care of things in common. In Athens, someone who did not take part in political events was not called apolitical, but a useless person, i. H. a person who is not qualified to exist in the community, because he contributes nothing to the community, which in the first place secures the free life that he enjoys. Political decisions are made through public, joint discussion and deliberation. For in private as well as in public there is the knowing courage that has previously thought through and considered the possibilities and dangers. Of course, to this day, many people are of the opinion that joint discussions and concerns inhibit action, that it leads to procrastination and hesitation. In truth, this opinion speaks in favor of daring bravado and foolhardiness. And it is well known that mere foolhardiness, if the project fails, turns into a ruinous thrashing around. "For the inwardly strongest one will rightly recognize those who, out of clear knowledge, do not shrink from terror and joy".

If one looks at the political ethos unfolded in the speech in its entirety, one might think that here, perhaps for the first time, a humanistic ideal of education is being set up, which aims at the all-round development of man's faculties and strengths. Pericles himself says: "To sum up, I say that our city is a place of learning for Greece." One could then define this educational idea even more closely in that it consists in a synthesis encompassing the opposites and thus brings the full humanity to an unrestricted representation.

In fact, the German classics saw the Athens of the Periclean age in the light of this ideal. Criticism of this view then primarily asserted that it was a speech about the fallen, that the political reference was dominant and that sacrificial death was celebrated as the highest virtue for the city.

The political humanism of the 1920s in Germany emphasized the political side of speech over the ideal of timelessly valid humanity. But it seems to us that this emphasis on the political, because it remains reactively related to classical humanistic ideas, is also unable to correspond to the basic ideas of the speech.

Halten wir uns streng an das, was die Rede zur Sprache bringt, dann zeigt sich, daß es hier nicht um die Verwirklichung einer allseitig entfalteten Menschennatur geht. Zwar erscheinen immer wieder paarweise entgegengesetzte Verhaltungen, die einander auszuschließen scheinen und die dennoch zusammengehen, aber nicht dadurch, daß sie in der umgreifenden Einheit einer allgemeinen Menschennatur vereinigt sind, und auch nicht und erst recht nicht durch die Milderung und Mäßigung von Extremen zu einer Harmonie. Im Lichte ihrer eigenen Gedanken stellt sich die wesentliche Intention der Rede so dar: Jeder Vorzug, jede Auszeichnung ist zugleich etwas Fragwürdiges, Bedrohliches, etwas den Menschen im öffentlichen und privaten Dasein Gefährdendes, weil er das Andere, das unumgänglich notwendig ist, auszuschließen scheint. Alles den Menschen Auszeichnende gefährdet ihn zugleich, wenn nicht das Eine mit seinem Gegenteil zusammengeht. Was aber ist das, was dieses Zusammengehen ermöglicht? Man mache die Probe auf die folgende These: Sie gehen zusammen, sofern sie freie Verhaltungen sind, d. g. sofern der Mensch sich zu ihnen *frei* verhält. Die Freiheit ist es, die den Menschen, indem er sich in ein Verhalten verlegt, zugleich offen sein läßt für das entgegengesetzte andere, wenn dieses zu vollbringen die Stunde verlangt. Nur wenn die entgegengesetzten Verhaltungen Dimensionen der Freiheit sind, vermag der Mensch sich in ihnen zu halten und die aus ihnen kommenden Gefährdungen je und je zu bestehen.

Machen wir zu Bestätigung dieser These selbst an den Hauptgegensatzpaaren die Probe: Würden die Bürger in die privaten Interessen und Verrichtungen aufgehen, ohne sich zugleich für das Gemeinsame offen zu halten, dann wäre es um die politische Freiheit bald geschehen. Würden sie ihre freie Lebensweise nicht streng an die Gesetze des Rechts binden, dann würde sich das Gemeinwesen in ein Gegen- und Durcheinander auflösen. Lebten die Bürger, von der Sorge um die Zukunft gefesselt, in der ständigen Bereitschaft, kommenden Gefahren zu begegnen, dann vermöchten sie nicht die Schönheit und wären nicht frei für das Welt-aufschließende Wissen. Wäre umgekehrt die Liebe zur Schönheit und zum Wissen nicht immer schon von einer Entschiedenheit zur Tat in Not und Gefahr getragen, dann würde die Stätte dieser freien Lebensvollzüge selbst in Verlust geraten. Es zeigt sich also, daß allein im Element der Freiheit sich die Wesensmöglichkeiten des Menschen gegenwendig entfalten können. Es ist die Freiheit im Verhalten zu ihnen, welche das, was sich auszuschließen scheint, in eine Einheit zusammengehen läßt. Das Eine jeweils sein im freien Verhältnis zu ihm und deshalb für das entgegengesetzte Andere zugleich geöffnet und frei bleiben, dieses also ebenfalls der Möglichkeit nach sein – aus dieser Seinsverfassung bestimmt sich die Art und Weise, gemäß welcher der Mensch das Dasein bestehen kann, das ihm entgegengesetzte Verhaltungen abverlangt. Alle Verhaltungen aber sind politisch bezogen, weil nicht schon der Bereich der Natur, sondern erst die eigens zu gründende politische Gemeinschaft die Stätte eines freiheitlichen Lebens sein kann. Und das politische Leben ist dann seinerseits durch Freiheit bestimmt, wenn die Staatsbürger im verantwortlichen Mitbeteiligtsein an ihm aus der

If we stick strictly to what the speech brings up, then it becomes clear that what is at stake here is not the realization of a fully developed human nature. It is true that there are always pairs of opposite behaviors that seem

to exclude each other and that nevertheless go together, but not because they are united in the all-encompassing unity of a general human nature, and also not, and certainly not because of the mitigation and moderation of extremes a harmony. In the light of her own thoughts, the main intention of the speech is as follows: every advantage, every award is at the same time something questionable, something threatening, something that endangers people in public and private existence, because it is the other thing that is absolutely necessary , seems to rule out. Everything that characterizes man endangers him at the same time if one thing does not go together with its opposite. But what is it that makes this cooperation possible? Put the following thesis to the test: They go together insofar as they are free behaviors, i. G. as long as man freely relates to them. It is freedom that allows man, in committing himself to one behavior, to be open to the other when the hour calls for it to be accomplished.

Only when the opposing attitudes are dimensions of freedom can a person remain within them and withstand the dangers that arise from them over and over again.

To confirm this thesis, let us put the main pairs of opposites to the test: If the citizens were absorbed in their private interests and activities without at the same time keeping themselves open to the common, then political freedom would soon be over. If they did not strictly bind their free way of life to the laws of the law, then the community would dissolve into a conflict and confusion. If the citizens lived, shackled by worries about the future, in constant readiness to meet coming dangers, then they were not capable of beauty and were not free for world-enlightening knowledge. Conversely, if the love of beauty and knowledge were not always borne by a determination to act in need and danger, then the place of these free life accomplishments would itself be lost. It is thus evident that only in the element of freedom can the essential possibilities of man unfold in opposite directions.

It is the freedom in dealing with them that allows what seems to be mutually exclusive to come together in a unity. The one being in a free relationship to it and therefore remaining open and free for the opposite other at the same time, therefore also being this as far as possible - this constitution of being determines the way in which man can exist, that requires him to behave in the opposite way. But all attitudes are related to politics, because not the realm of nature alone, but only the specifically to be founded political community can be the site of a free life. And political life in turn is determined by freedom when the citizens of the 84th

Zuwendung zum eigenen Glücks- und Erfolgsstreben jederzeit in die Sorge um ein nach innen und nach außen freies Gemeinwesen zurückkehren können.

Diesem Entwurf des politischen Ethos der Demokratie fügt Perikles den Satz hinzu: »Und daß dies nicht ein bloßer Prunk mit Worten für den feierlichen Augenblick ist, sondern die wahre Wirklichkeit, das zeigt die Macht unserer Stadt selbst, die wir uns durch diese Wesensart errungen haben.« Der Realitätsbeweis für das Dargelegte ist die politische Machtstellung Athens selbst. Denn was Athen zu dem gemacht hat, was es ist: diese starke Stadt an der Spitze des attischen Seebundes, ist eben das, was dargelegt wurde: das Vollbringen des Einen im Freibleiben für das Andere, die freie Existenz. Oder mit einem das Dasein der Griechen besiegelnden Wort Jacob Burckhardts: »Was sie taten und litten, das taten und litten sie *frei*«.

Bekanntlich war das Zeitalter des Perikles die Zeit eines offen ins Erscheinen hervorgetretenen machtpolitischen Geschichtsprozesses, und der Peloponnesische Krieg, den Thukydides dargestellt hat, war der erste europäische Krieg, der alle Wesenszüge eines politischen Krieges trug. Thukydides hat als erster das Problem der Macht allseitig durchdacht und einer Lösung entgegengeführt. Die Macht ist durch und durch selbstbezüglich, und sie erstrebt aus ihrem eigenen Wesen nur sich selbst, d. h. ihr Mehr und immer Mehr. Sie ist deshalb aus sich selbst nicht fähig, sich eine Grenze zu setzen, sondern sie bedarf eines Anderen, das sie bindet und begrenzt. Dieses die Macht Bindende und Begrenzende können nicht schon die moralischen Gesetze sein, die immer nur an den einzelnen als einzelnen ergehen und deshalb überfordert werden, wenn man von ihnen eine Begrenzung der Machtausübung erwartet, sondern allein das politische Ethos. Deshalb ist auch die Macht nicht als solche schon das Unmenschliche und Verderbliche, sondern sie wird es erst dann, wenn das politische Ethos zerfällt, im dessen Dienst sie gehandhabt wird, oder wenn es sich noch nicht ausgebildet hat. Das in der Perikles-Rede entworfene Ethos, Realität und Aufgabe zugleich, war es, was im Zeitalter der Machtpolitik der Machtausübung Grenze, Maß und Ziel anwies. Und es war der Zerfall dieses Ethos in der Zeit nach Perikles Tod, der Schritt für Schritt die sich selbst erstrebende Macht freisetzte, zuerst in der Form eines allein noch auf Machtsicherung bedachten politischen Denkens, das, weil es bloße Funktion der Machtsicherung geworden war, der Macht kein Ziel mehr zu setzen imstande war, und dann als imperialistische Machtentfaltung, die mit der entfesselten Selbstsucht des Einzelnen zusammengeht. Daß Athen nach der Katastrophe in Sizilien den bereits verlorenen Krieg noch solange durchstehen konnte, war einerseits seinem Improvisationstalent zu danken, andererseits der Langsamkeit und Schwerfälligkeit der peloponnesischen Alliierten.

Das Werk des Thukydides will den einzigen Nachweis erbringen, daß Athen den Krieg nicht verlor, weil sein größter Staatsmann sich geirrt und die Kräfte falsch eingeschätzt hätte oder weil die demokratische Verfassung Athens sich der oligarchischen Staatsform Spartas als unterlegen erwiesen hätte. Verloren ging der Krieg zufolge des

Being able to return at any time to caring for a community that is free both internally and externally.

Pericles adds the following sentence to this draft of the political ethos of

democracy: "And that this is not just a splendour, with words for the solemn moment, but rather the true reality, that shows the power of our city itself, which we ourselves through this being The proof of reality for what has been presented is the political power of Athens itself. For what has made Athens what it is: this strong city at the head of the Athenian naval alliance, is precisely what was presented: the accomplishment of the one in remaining free for the other, free existence. Or with a saying by Jacob Burckhardt that seals the existence of the Greeks:

"What they did and suffered, they did and suffered freely."

As is well known, the age of Pericles was the time of a power-political historical process that emerged openly, and the Peloponnesian War, which Thucydides described, was the first European war that bore all the essential traits of a political war. Thucydides was the first to think through all aspects of the problem of power and to come up with a solution. Power is self-referential through and through, and out of its own being it strives only for itself, i. H. you more and more and more. It is therefore not capable of setting itself a limit, but needs someone else who binds and limits it. What binds and limits power cannot already be the moral laws, which only apply to individuals as individuals and are therefore overtaxed if one expects them to limit the exercise of power, but solely the political ethos. That is why power as such is not already inhuman and perishable, but only becomes so when the political ethos in the service of which it is used disintegrates, or when it has not yet developed. It was the ethos outlined in the Pericles speech, reality and task at the same time, that in the age of power politics set limits, measures and goals for the exercise of power. And it was the disintegration of this ethos in the time after Pericles' death that gradually released the self-striving power, first in the form of a political thinking that was only concerned with securing power, which, because it had become a mere function of securing power, Power was no longer able to set a goal, and then as an imperialist display of power that goes hand in hand with the unleashed selfishness of the individual. The fact that Athens was able to survive the lost war after the catastrophe in Sicily was due on the one hand to its talent for improvisation and on the other hand to the slowness and clumsiness of the Peloponnesian allies.

The work of Thucydides seeks to furnish the only proof that Athens did not lose the war because its great statesman made a mistake and misjudged the forces, or because the democratic constitution of Athens proved to be inferior to the oligarchic form of government of Sparta. The war was lost according to the 85th

politisch-sittlichen Versagens der Nachfolger des Perikles und in ihrem Gefolge der athenischen Bürgerschaft überhaupt, also durch den Verlust des politischen Ethos. Das ist die einfache Lehre, die Thukydides, für seine Zeit ohne Hoffnung, den kommenden Geschlechtern hinterlassen wollte. Und es scheint, als seien seine Gedanken uns vor allem zugedacht, die wir im Zeitalter der Machtpolitik und der demokratischen Revolution leben, denen daher die Freiheit Sache höchster Anstrengung des Denkens und der Praxis zu sein hat, wenn wir in unserem Zeitalter nicht nur leben und überleben, sondern *menschlich* leben wollen.

political and moral failure of the successors of Pericles and in their entourage of the Athenian citizenry in general, i.e. through the loss of political ethos. T his is the simple lesson that Thucydides, for his time

without hope, wished to leave to the generations to come. And it seems as if his ideas were primarily intended for us who live in the age of power politics and democratic revolution, for whom freedom must therefore be a matter of the highest effort of thought and practice if we not only live in our age and survive, but want to live humanely.

INTERSOGGETTIVITA' DEL POTERE

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Cercherò in questa analisi di chiarire in rapporto al potere le caratteristiche e le strutture essenziali di un nuovo tipo di socialismo che da qualcuno è stato indicato come umanesimo socialista. Da molte fonti, ma soprattutto dai paesi socialisti e, in modo particolare, dalla Cecoslovacchia, dalla Romania e dalla Polonia, ricevo richieste di chiarificazioni su ciò che può significare un umanesimo socialista. Devo dire che io personalmente non ho creato la dizione »umanesimo socialista«: mio compito, che per molti aspetti coincide con quello dell'umanesimo socialista, è stato quello di compiere una analisi fenomenologica del marxismo e, correlativamente quello di compiere una analisi marxistica della fenomenologia. La prima espressione di tale compito e quindi la notorietà della sua impostazione, è dovuta ad una conferenza che ho tenuto a Praga, ricollegandomi in qualche modo alle ultime conferenze che Husserl stesso aveva tenuto in quella città, una conferenza del 1962 che aveva per titolo »Il significato dell'uomo in Husserl e in Marx.« Dopo quella conferenza i problemi di una caratteristica umanistica del marxismo si sono sviluppati in modo particolare e indipendentemente da me in Cecoslovacchia, in Polonia, in Jugoslavia, in Romania. Anche in altri paesi socialisti ci si è interessati del problema. Ma la via che l'umanesimo socialista deve percorrere è ancora lunga ed estremamente dura.

In primo luogo che cosa intendiamo noi per umanesimo socialista? Poiché il termine »umanesimo« è molto vago dobbiamo insistere sul fatto che l'umanesimo, che per noi è fenomenologico, è prima di tutto un ritorno al soggetto, al soggetto come autore di operazioni concrete, come produttore. In generale, si è insistito, a proposito del socialismo, che esso riguarda la massa, il popolo, ciò che è, in qualche modo, collettivo. Ora è proprio sul termine »collettività« che bisogna discutere. In Marx questo problema si presenta come un problema della classe proletaria la quale, nel modo che diremo, rappresenta se stessa, così come rappresenta le altre classi, e cioè tutto il popolo et tutta l'umanità. Per quali ragioni in Marx troviamo queste posizioni? Per la ragione che al proletariato vengono tolte tutte le caratteristiche che costituiscono un uomo in quanto uomo. Ora quando il proletariato combatte per

IN TERSO G G ETTIVE ITA D EL POTERE

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In this analysis I will try to clarify in relation to power the essential characteristics and structures of a new type of socialism which has been indicated by some as socialist humanism. From many sources, but above all from socialist countries and, in a particular way, from Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland, I receive requests for clarifications on what a socialist humanism can mean. I must say that I personally did not create the term »socialist humanism«: my task, which in many respects coincides with that of socialist humanism, was to carry out a phenomenological analysis of Marxism and, correlatively, to carry out a Marxist analysis of phenomenology. The first expression of this task and therefore the notoriety of his formulation, is due to a conference that I gave in Prague, in some way linking me to the last conferences that Husserl himself had held in that city, a conference of 1962 which was entitled " The meaning of man in Husserl and in Marx. « After that conference the problems of a humanistic characteristic of Marxism developed in a particular way and independently of me in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, in Yugoslavia, in Romania. Other socialist countries have also taken an interest in the problem. But the path that socialist humanism must travel is still long and extremely hard.

First, what do we mean by socialist humanism?

Since the term »humanism« is very vague, we must insist on the fact that humanism, which for us is phenomenological, is above all a return to the subject, to the subject as author of concrete operations, as producer. In general, it has been insisted, with regard to socialism, that it concerns the mass, the people, that which is, in some way, collective. Now it is precisely on the term "collectivity" that we need to discuss.

In Marx this problem presents itself as a problem of the proletarian class which, in the way we will say, represents itself, just as it represents the other classes, that is, all the people and all of humanity. For what reasons do we find these positions in Marx? For the reason that all the characteristics that constitute a man qua man are stripped from the proletariat. Now when the proletariat fights for 87

sé, il segno negativo di tutte le caratteristiche negategli, diventa un segno positivo. Poiché al proletariato viene negato tutto ciò che è umano, esso combatte per tutto ciò che è umano e per l'umanità stessa. E' proprio la negazione dell'umanesimo inerente al marxismo come dottrina e come prassi, che fà sì che il proletariato, in quanto combatte per sé, finisce per combattere a favore di tutti gli uomini, e cioè per la eliminazione di ogni divisione di classe. Si deve sottolineare che nella dialettica di questa situazione il proletariato, che è una parte, si presenta ed agisce, come una totalizzazione continua. Il proletariato, in quanto parte, ha in sè la totalità di ciò che e umano. Ci preme insistere sul fatto che la comprensione di ciò che è umanno avviene attraverso la negazione di quel fatto negativo che è lo sfruttamento dell'uomo. Il socialismo, quindi, come voleva Engels, per quanto in un senso diverso, si afferma come una negazione del negativo, e cioè come l'affermazione di una società umana nella quale ogni uomo deve avere il potere che gli spetta, in quanto il lavoro che compie è suo ed è di fatto e concretamente, e non secondo affermazioni astratte e non verificate né verificabili, collegato con il lavoro di un altro e di più uomini. Il socialismo nel passato ha parlato spesso di questo collegamento e si è trovato di fronte ai problemi della divisione del lavoro, della indentità ripetitiva di un lavoro della stessa specie, della potenza negativa che ha la ripetizione meccanicistica di ridurre l'uomo ad un semplice strumento, della meccanicizzazione generale necessaria alla produzione. Questo problema diventa sempre più grave quanto più si procede verso un sistema di produzione che si serve dei cervelli elettronici e dei giuochi strategici e cioè dell'applicazione della cibernetica al lavoro e alla economia, e della teoria strategica dei giuochi alla previsione della produzione, della concorrenza, della competizione. Morgenstern e Neuman hanno chiarito questa posizione nella famosa opera *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.*

Noi non abbiamo nessuna intenzione di negare le tecniche strategiche dell'economia e tanto meno l'importanza dei cervelli elettronici e degli automi. Noi abbiamo bisogno nel lavoro e nella pianificazione di vasti piani che agiscono su strutture non unidimensionali e che richiedono perciò previsioni sulle probabili reazioni del campo economico. Ciò nonostante, anche in questo caso, che è il caso più avanzato della produzione capitalistica, la produzione che si serve di ogni mezzo cibernetico ed automatico non può e non deve dimenticare il soggetto. Infatti è proprio questo che conta: non dimenticare il soggetto. Parlando di soggetto non intendiamo il soggetto in senso idealistico o grammaticale, ma il soggetto in carne ed ossa, *leibhaft*, come diceva Husserl. Il nostro umanesimo è quindi un ritorno al soggetto, e questo ritorno vale sia per le società a capitalismo avanzato, sia per i paesi socialisti. In ambedue i casi troviamo una alienazione che nel primo caso è dovuta al carattere borghese che permane nelle società socialiste o a un mancato sviluppo tecnico scientifico, nel secondo caso riguarda il fatto che anche nelle società nelle quali trionfa il massimo tecnicisimo e si ottengono i prodotti migliori e più numerosi – nei limiti di una società capitalistica – l'uomo è ridotto da soggetto a oggetto o, come dice Marcuse, a uomo unidimensionale. La posizione dell'uomo non migliora in una società ricca, in una *affluent Society*,

if, the negative sign of all the characteristics denied to him, becomes a positive sign. Since the proletariat is denied all that is human, it fights for all that is human and for humanity itself.

It is precisely the denial of humanism inherent in Marxism as a doctrine and as a practice which means that the proletariat, insofar as it fights for itself, ends up fighting in favor of all men, i.e. for the elimination of all class divisions. . It must be emphasized that in the dialectic of this situation the proletariat, which is a part, presents itself and acts as a continuous totalization. The proletariat, as a part, has within itself the totality of what is human. We would like to insist on the fact that the understanding of what is human takes place through the denial of that negative fact which is the exploitation of man. Socialism, therefore, as Engels wanted, albeit in a different sense, affirms itself as a negation of the negative, that is, as the affirmation of a human society in which every man must have the power due to him, as the the work he does is his and is in fact and concretely, and not according to abstract and unverified or verifiable affirmations, connected with the work of another or more men. Socialism in the past has often spoken of this connection and has found itself faced with the problems of the division of labour, of the repetitive identity of work of the same kind, of the negative power that the mechanistic repetition has of reducing man to a simple tool, of the general mechanization necessary for production. This problem becomes increasingly serious the more we move towards a production system that uses electronic brains and strategic games, i.e. the application of cybernetics to work and the economy, and the strategic theory of games to the forecasting of production, competition, of competition.

Morgenstern and Neuman have clarified this position in the famous work Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.

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We have no intention of denying the strategic techniques of the economy and even less the importance of electronic brains and automata. We need in the work and in the planning of vast plans which act on non-one-dimensional structures and which therefore require forecasts on the probable reactions of the economic field. Nonetheless, even in this case, which is the most advanced case of capitalist production, the production that makes use of every cybernetic and automatic means cannot and must not forget the subject. In fact, that's exactly what counts: don't forget the subject. Speaking of subject we do not mean the subject in an idealistic or grammatical sense, but the subject in flesh and blood, leibhaft, as Husserl said. Our humanism is therefore a return to the subject, and this return applies both to advanced capitalistic societies and to socialist countries. In both cases we find an alienation that in the first case is due to the bourgeois character that persists in socialist societies or to a lack of scientific technical development, in the second case it concerns the fact that

even in societies in which maximum technicality triumphs and the best products are obtained and more numerous

— within the limits of a capitalist society — man is reduced from a subject to an object or, as Marcuse puts it, to a one-dimensional man. Man's position does not improve in a rich society, in an affluent society,

come direbbe Galbraith, perché non migliora in quella organizzazione che Galbraith stesso chiama »tecnostruttura«. Anche ammettendo che la tecnostruttura non abbia più per scopo il profitto ma il miglioramento tecnico scientifico e sociale, rimane il fatto che l'uomo nella tecnostruttura si trasforma in un meccanismo del sistema e cioè si autonega come uomo. Lo stesso Galbraith sa che l'uomo della *affluent Society* non è un uomo completo, ma un uomo ridotto alla funzione che egli compie nella tecnostruttura. Galbraith stesso finisce per ammettere che una società tecnostrutturata ha bisogno, alla fine, di una guerra o della possibilità di essa, perché l'economia sia spinta al massimo di occupazione e di produzione. Non solo ma Galbraith osserva che una società tecnostrutturata deve e può essere trasformata da quegli elementi che come gli studenti, i professori, e gli uomini di cultura, non fanno parte ancora del sistema chiuso della *affluent Society*. Ciò che vuole l'umanesimo socialista non è, naturalmente, la tecnostruttura di Galbraith, ma una società che, pur servendosi dei cervelli elettronici e delle tecniche di produzione e di distribuzione più avanzate, non riduca l'uomo a un elemento passivo della tecnostruttura, ma lo riporti sul piano dell'autonomia, della possibilità di scelta, dell'*autorealizzazione di se stesso*, del *potere che egli deve avere per realizzarsi*. Lo scopo finale del socialismo e di dare all'uomo la possibilità di realizzare se stesso come uomo in una società di uomini che tutti sentano e vivano come realtà il proprio *potere* umano. In questa visione teleologica della società umana, umanità e potere tendono a identificarsi: è questa la via che deve essere seguita. E' la via che come parla dell'intersoggettività e quindi dell'intercomprensione e dell'interazione dell'uomo, così parla dell'intersoggettività, dell'interriconoscimento e dell'interazione del potere. Per essere chiaro: in una società socialista l'intersoggettività e di conseguenza ogni rapporto delle azioni tecniche guidate dall'uomo, deve essere tale che il rapporto tra i soggetti non sia mai già costituito, ma debba costituirsi e ricostituirsi ad ogni passo dell'associazione, della collaborazione, dell'interazione, della pianificazione che si rinnova nel momento stesso in cui pianifica, offrendo un piano che non deve seplicemente essere applicato, ma deve ricostituirsi, rinnovarsi e perfezionare continuamente la linea verso la quale si muove, la linea versi il quale è diretto, e tutto questo deve essere fatto senza rinunziare agli elementi sintetici del piano e all'organicità dell'insieme. Un piano non è l'applicazione concreta di un disegno fatto a tavolino, ma l'unione del disegno e dell'applicazione che organicamente confluiscono, rettificano, per così dire, la via, e quindi continuamente si autocorreggono e si autoperfezionano non in nome di una società astratta ma degli individui o dei soggetti concreti di cui in realtà una società è costituita. Ci interessa notare che la »società astratta« di cui qui si parla non è molto diversa dall'operaio astratto di cui si parla nel *Capitale*. Marx insiste sul fatto che l'essenza della dialettica è riconducibile all'opposizione tra l'astratto e il concreto. Il capitalista fa un piano o ordina ai suoi ingegneri di farlo. Questi considerano l'operaio e gli altri esecutori come punti o numeri o equazioni del piano. Ma operai ed esecutori sono uomini concreti. Se io li obbligo ad agire come il piano prevede essi diventano astratti e sono io che ho il potere di farli diventare

as Galbraith would say, why doesn't it improve in that organization that Galbraith himself calls »technostructure«. Even admitting that the technostructure no longer has profit as its purpose but technical, scientific

and social improvement, the fact remains that man in the technostructure is transformed into a mechanism of the system and that is, he denies himself as a man. Galbraith himself knows that the man of the affluent Society is not a complete man, but a man reduced to the function he performs in the technostructure. Galbraith himself ends up admitting that a techno-structured society needs, in the end, a war or the possibility of one, for the economy to be pushed to the maximum of employment and production. Not only that but Galbraith observes that a techno-structured society must and can be transformed by those elements who, like students, professors, and men of culture, are not yet part of the closed system of the affluent Society.

What socialist humanism wants is, of course, not Galbraith's technostructure, but a society which, while making use of electronic brains and the most advanced production and distribution techniques, does not reduce man to a passive element of society. technostructure, but you bring him back to the level of autonomy, of the possibility of choice, of the self-realization of himself, of the power he must have in order to realize himself. The ultimate goal of socialism is to give man the possibility

ability to realize himself as a man in a society of men who all feel and experience their human power as a reality. In this teleological vision of human society, humanity and power tend to identify with each other: this is the path that must be followed. It is the path which, just as it speaks of intersubjectivity and therefore of the intercomprehension and interaction of man, also speaks of intersubjectivity, inter-recognition and the interaction of power. To be clear: in a socialist society intersubjectivity and consequently every relationship of technical actions guided by man, must be such that the relationship between subjects is never already established, but must be established and reconstituted at each step of the association , of collaboration, of interaction, of planning that renews itself at the very moment in which it plans, offering a plan that must not simply be applied, but must reconstitute itself, renew itself and continuously perfect the line towards which it moves, the line verse which is directed, and all this must be done without renouncing the synthetic elements of the plan and the organicity of the whole. A plan is not the concrete application of a design drawn up on a drawing board, but the union of design and application which organically flow together, rectify, so to speak, the way, and therefore continuously self-correct and self-perfect not in name of an abstract company but of individuals or concrete subjects of which a company is actually constituted.

We are interested in noting that the »abstract society« referred to here is not very different from the abstract worker referred to in Capital. Marx insists on the fact that the essence of dialectics can be traced back to the opposition between the abstract and the concrete. The capitalist makes a plan or orders his engineers to plan it. These consider the worker and the other executors as points or numbers or equations of the plan. But workers and executors are concrete men. If I force them to act as planned, they become abstract and it is I who have the power to make them abstract.

tali. I pianificatori non fanno differenze tra i soggetti umani o le cose e gli oggetti. L'uomo diventa oggetto. Anche di questi dialettica ci parla Marx non solo nel 1844, ma anche nei *Grundrisse* e in altri manostritti vicinissimi al *Capitale*. Marx dice chiaramante che il capitalismo è l'assunzione dell'astratto come concreto e del concreto come astratto. Ed insiste osservando, alla fine, che il capitalismo si può definire come quel sistema nel quale il soggetto si capovolge in oggetto. Potremmo osservare che qualcosa di simile avviene nel potere. E' possibile identificare un potere astratto senza fondamento, che in realtà agisce come se fosse concreto, e può esistere un potere concreto che, per mancanza di consapevolezza delle proprie reali possibilità, indica mete irrealizzabili che annullano il risultato del lavoro umano.

L'avvenire del socialismo è possibile se la produzione e la società civile sono fondati. Intendiamo qui servirci del concetto fenomenologico di »fondazione«. Qualsiasi scienza, qualsiasi organizzazione produttiva, qualsiasi struttura sociale e politica non deve essere un sistema categoriale astratto. Come ogni scienza deve essere fondata sulla *Lebenswelt*, così anche la produzione deve essere fondata sui soggetti concreti, sulle operazioni concrete degli operai e dei produttori.

Come i soggetti della fenomenologia costituiscono l'intersoggettività, così gli operai, con i mezzi di produzione e i ritmi di lavoro, devono costituire una intersoggetività produttrice, dove i veri centri di produzione debbono essere continuamente in rapporto tra loro e reagire l'uno sull'altro in modo di dar luogo ad una risposta reale ai bisogni e ad una organizzazione elastica, mobile e coordinata.

L'organizzazione intersoggettiva prende il posto della pianificazione. In genere la pianificazione, disegnata in base a dati e categorie scientifiche non fondate sul precategoriale, si impone dall'esterno ai soggetti e ai gruppi produttivi. In tal modo non è la scienza che si adegua alla concreta intersoggettività precategoriale, ma è la produzione precategoriale che è costretta a seguire ritmi e fini per arrivare ad un prodotto di cui i soggetti produttori non hanno in realtà bisogno e che si impone all'operaio reso astratto e cioè che, pur essendo concreto viene fatto vivere, dice Marx, come se fossero davvero vivi i dati categoriali imposti alla produzione. Se si seguissero le indicazioni qui appena accennate, verrebe eliminata una pianificazione puramente esterna anche se i suoi conti tornano sul piano statistico e matematico. Alla pianificazione bisogna sostituire un'organizzazione che sorga dalle esigenze precategoriali e intersoggettive degli operai, degli operatori, esigenze di cui i gruppi di produzione e le tecniche di produzione devono tener conto e trasformarsi, se è il caso, secondo fini che sorgono non prima dell'organizzazione produttrice, ma soltanto quando quest'ultima è già in atto.

Per sostituire alla pianificazione astratta l'organicità della produzione intersoggettiva è necessaria una particolare preparazione dell'operaio, preparazione non solo specializzata, ma tale da arrivare, da parte degli operai, al massimo della sostituibilità de lavoro. In discussioni tenute questo inverno con gli operai dell'Alfa Romeo di Milano,

Such Planners do not differentiate between human subjects or things and objects. Man becomes object. Marx also speaks to us of these dialectics not only in 1844, but also in the Grundnsse and in other manuscripts very

close to the Cipitale. Marx clearly states that capitalism is the assumption of the abstract as concrete and of the concrete as abstract. And he insists by observing, in the end, that capitalism can be defined as that system in which the subject turns into an object.

We might observe that something similar happens in power. It is possible to identify an abstract power without foundation, which in reality acts as if it were concrete, and there can exist a concrete power which, due to lack of awareness of its real possibilities, indicates unattainable goals which cancel the result of human work.

The future of socialism is possible if production and civil society are founded. Here we intend to use the phenomenological concept of »foundation«. Any science, any pro-productive organization, any social and political structure must not be an abstract categorical system. Just as every science must be founded on the Lebenswelt, so too production must be founded on concrete subjects, on the concrete operations of workers and producers.

Just as the subjects of phenomenology constitute intersubjectivity, so the workers, with the means of production and the rhythms of work, must constitute a productive intersubjectivity, where the true centers of production must be continuously in relationship with each other and react on each other. other in order to give rise to a real response to needs and to an elastic, mobile and coordinated organization.

Intersubjective organization takes the place of planning. In general, planning, designed on the basis of scientific data and categories not based on the pre-categorical, is imposed from the outside on subjects and production groups. In this way it is not science that adapts to the concrete pre-categorical intersubjectivity, but it is pre-categorical production that is forced to follow rhythms and goals to arrive at a product that the producers do not really need and that imposes itself on the worker made abstract and that is, despite being concrete, it is brought to life, says Marx, as if the categorical data imposed on production were really alive. If the indications just mentioned here were followed, a purely external planning would be eliminated even if its accounts return to the statistical and mathematical level. Planning must be replaced by an organization that arises from the pre-categorical and intersubjective needs of workers, operators, needs which production groups and production techniques must take into account and transform themselves, if necessary, according to ends that do not arise before of the producer organization, but only when the latter is already in place.

To replace abstract planning with the organic nature of intersubjective

production, a particular preparation of the worker is necessary, a preparation that is not only specialized, but such as to arrive, on the part of the workers, at the maximum of labor substitutability. In discus-siom held this winter with the workers of Alfa Romeo in Milan, 90

si è arrivati alla conclusione che l'operaio, che all'inizio compie un solo movimento o agisce in un settore chiuso, vuol rendersi conto dei vari modi possibili per risparmiare tempo nei movimenti del suo lavoro specifico. Partendo di qui è però interessato al lavoro dei suoi compagni e di una stazione o scala di montaggio. Alla fine l'operaio aumenta la sua cultura e la sua produttività quando comincia a rendersi conto della varietà e della coordinazione delle macchine di tutta una fabbrica. In molti casi l'operaio critica il modo di funzionare di una catena di montaggio o di alcuni sistemi coordinati di produzione. L'operaio dice: »Dopo aver lavorato tre anni in una stazione e aver imparato come si deve agire non in un solo punto della catena ma in tutti i punti, sono arrivato alla conclusione che gli ingegneri hanno sbagliato costruendo le macchine in un dato modo, un modo che obbliga a compiere movimenti inutili e che spreca fatica e tempo.«

In altre parole ogni operaio è un centro, un soggetto, che alla fine può rendersi conto dell'insieme. Se potesse acquistare un certo tipo di cultura, non solo scientifica, ma anche umanistica, l'operaio sarebbe in grado di progettare un lavoro, o di suggerire uno schema basato non su un piano categoriale, ma sull'esperienza precategoriale quotidiana.

Le possibilità che un soggetto come l'operaio influisca sull'organizzazione della produzione dipende dal suo maggiore o minore potere. Ciò vale per la preparazione, l'allenamento, la capacità sintetica o, in generale, dalla possibilità di una cultura che, sia al livello universitario, sia al livello operaio, di natura enciclopedica. Il termine *enciclopedia* ha qui un significato vasto ma preciso: si vuol dire che nessuna scienza è indipendente dall'altra, perché tutte sono fondate sulla struttura precategoriale. Allo stesso modo l'educazione dell'operaio esige che anche nel caso che egli sappia compiere soltanto tre o quattro operazioni, si renda conto del senso di queste operazioni per l'insieme. Stranamente si osserva qui che è proprio la intersoggettività e quindi, alla fine, il riconoscimento della personalità dell'operaio che raggiunge più facilmente una visione totalizzante. *In base ad una educazione sintetica sempre in atto aumenta il potere operaio* che, anche quando gli operai, per ragioni di età, non appartengono più alla fabbrica, nel senso che non lavorano, fa sì che la loro esperienza venga comunicata e ereditata, anche se trasformata, dai giovani. Si noti che nel discorso che stiamo facendo si ritrovano due momenti: il primo è la *visione di insieme*, la preparazione totalizzante una enciclopedia concreta delle operazioni lavorative; il secondo è l'implicita ammissione che anche se si deve realizzare una precisa specializzazione di lavoro, questa specializzazione è tanto più redditizia e tanto più umana, quanto più in ogni parte è presente la totalità dell'insieme. I due punti accennati risultano dallo sviluppo dei problemi della fenomenologia. Le ragioni di fondo per cui per Husserl le scienze e le tecniche sono in crisi è che esse non sono fondate sulle operazioni intersoggettive della *Lebenswelt* precategoriale. La crisi delle scienze riguarda l'uomo stesso e l'uomo di tutte le nazioni. La soluzione è una enciclopedia fenomenologica che riguarda non solo la conoscenza, ma anche la prassi nella sua interezza. D'altra parte le linee fondamentali di una enciclopedia fenomenologica – noi stiamo scrivendo da vari anni una opera

the conclusion has been reached that the worker, who at the beginning makes only one movement or acts in a closed sector, wants to become aware of the various possible ways to save time in the movements of his

specific work. Starting from here, however, he is interested in the work of his companions and in an assembly station or ladder. Eventually the worker increases his learning and his productivity when he begins to appreciate the variety and coordination of the machines throughout a factory. In many cases the worker criticizes the way an assembly line or some coordinated systems of production work.

The worker says: »After working for three years in a station and having learned how to act not just at one point of the chain but at all points, I came to the conclusion that the engineers made a mistake by building the machines in a given way, a way that forces you to make useless movements and wastes effort and time.«

In other words, each worker is a centre, a subject, who in the end can become aware of the whole. If he could acquire a certain type of culture, not only scientific but also humanistic, the worker would be able to plan a job, or to suggest a scheme based not on a categorical level, but on daily pre-categorical experience.

The possibilities that a subject like the worker influences the organization of production depends on his greater or lesser power. This applies to preparation, training, synthetic ability or, in general, the possibility of a culture which, both at the university level and at the working-class level, is encyclopaedic in nature. The term encyclopaedia has a broad but precise meaning here: it means that no science is independent of the other, because all are based on the pre-categorical structure. In the same way, the education of the worker requires that even if he knows how to perform only three or four operations, he realizes the meaning of these operations for the whole.

Strangely, it is observed here that it is precisely intersubjectivity and therefore, in the end, the recognition of the personality of the worker which most easily achieves a totalizing vision. On the basis of a synthetic education that is always in place, the workers' power increases which, even when the workers, for reasons of age, no longer belong to the factory, in the sense that they do not work, ensures that their experience is communicated and inherited, even if transformed, by the young. It should be noted that in the discourse we are making we find two moments: the first is the vision of the whole, the all-encompassing preparation of a concrete encyclopaedia of working operations; the second is the implicit admission that even if a precise job specialization must be carried out, this specialization is all the more profitable and all the more human, the more the totality of the whole is present in each part. The two points mentioned result from the development of the problems of phenomenology. The basic reasons why, for Husserl, science and technology are in crisis and that they

are not based on the intersubjective operations of the pre-categorical Lebenswelt. The crisis of science concerns man himself and man of all nations. The solution is a phenomenological encyclopedia that concerns not only knowledge, but also practice in its entirety. On the other hand, the fundamental lines of a phenomenological encyclopaedia - we have been writing a work for several years 91

che avrà per titolo: *Idee per una enciclopedia fenomenologica* – debbono tener conto delle varie situazioni storiche, geografiche, ecologiche. Ma se si insiste sull'interesse di un certo paese, ciò non vuol dire che siano ignorati quelli degli altri. Quello che si è detto per l'intersoggettività vale qui per l'internazionalismo. Da una direzione di questo tipo nasce dunque *una nuova realtà internazionalistica che tende a diminuire le differenze di produzione e di potere tra paese e paese, e tra blocco e blocco.* E' solo una nuova organizzazione dei soggetti operai e di tutti i gruppi produttivi che può evitare un urto tra i paesi più avanzati, il che sarebbe la massima espressione della crisi delle scienze così come la intedeva Husserl. Nell'età atomica e missilistica la scienza non entra in crisi da un punto di vista meramente conoscitivo, ma diventa una forza che può distruggere l'umanità. Il problema è risolvibile se *il potere non è un mezzo esterno di coercizione ma viene costituito intersoggettivamente e internazionalmente.* Nel suo significato valido il potere è sempre intersoggettivo e internazionalistico. Il potere di produzione e di costruzione di armi termonucleari monopolizzato da una, due, o magari tre nazioni, se non si trasforma e se non ritorna al suo fondamento intersoggettivo precategoriale ed umano, si può volgere verso una direzione che trova alla sua conclusione l'autodistruzione di tutta l'umanità.

which will have the title: Ideas for a phenomenological encyclopaedia - must take into account the various historical, geographical, ecological situations. But if the interests of a certain country are insisted on, this does

not mean that those of others are ignored. What has been said for intersubjectivity applies here to internationalism. From a direction of this type, therefore, a new internationalist reality arises which tends to diminish the differences of production and power between country and country, and between block and block. It is only a new organization of the workers and of all the productive groups that can avoid a collision between the more advanced countries, which would be the maximum expression of the crisis of the sciences as Husserl understood it. In the atomic and missile age, science does not enter a crisis from a merely cognitive point of view, but becomes a force that can destroy humanity. The problem can be solved if power is not an external means of coercion but is constituted intersubjectively and internationally.

In its valid meaning, power is always intersubjective and internationalistic. The power of production and construction of thermo-nuclear weapons monopolized by one, two, or perhaps three nations, if it does not transform itself and if it does not return to its pre-categorical and human intersubjective foundation, can turn in a direction that finds at its conclusion the self-destruction of all mankind.

THE UNIQUENESS OF MAN AND THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY

John Lewis

London

When the Pope addressed the pilgrims assembled outside his summer house Castel Gandolfo on the occasion of the first landing of man on the moon he spoke of »the ecstasy of this prophetic day – a real triumph for man-made means, for the dominion of the universe«; but at the same time he confessed to a disturbing awareness that the creation of this power, of unimaginable dimensions, not only seems to find us indifferent to the hunger of the world, which it has failed to satisfy, but embodied in the machines, stands over against us its makers, menacing – becoming, in the words of the Pope, »every day greater and more dangerous.«

Quite unconscious of the real significance of his anxiety, the Pope was apprehending, in his own way, the paradox and dilemma of the capitalist world today:

The enormous potentiality confronting desperate human need, instead of being used to make an end of the poverty of two thirds of the human race, is set in motion to send a Sputnik to Mars, or to create the atom bomb – somehow *not able* to be harnessed for human welfare, however desperate the need.

The Pope did not, of course, go on to develop the truth he thus glimpsed – the age of power resources of coal, oil, electricity and nuclear fission, – the age of immense technological advance, of automation, the multiplication of man's power to produce tenthousandfold – and yet, a world unfinished, still poverty stricken, wretched in its hunger, malnutrition, disease, and dreadful slums, of appalling rural misery, in spite of all the progress that has been made.

The Pope thought we needed only to *care*. But that is *not* the real difficulty. The problem is more intractable – built into the very structure of the great capitalist order of society which has taken us so far, only to halt at the very threshold of a new and better world – paralysed and helpless, unable to release its abundant gifts.

Why? The answer is deeply perplexing.

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Why? The answer is deeply perplexing.

The wheels of industry will not revolve, and even the operations of agriculture cannot continue, otherwise than in conformity to the economic laws of the industrial and financial system. It needs to be said, again and again, that it is not a question of *caring*, of knowing the need, of wanting to do the right thing. It is a question of not being able to. Not being able to, that is to say, within the inescapable categories of the economic mechanism.

This seems to set limits to our productive capacity which cannot be overcome. They are very strange limits. Some things we *can* do – the limits seem suddenly to disappear. We can travel through Space. We can make armaments to an indefinite extent. We can build a paradise anywhere for the privileged. But what we cannot do, within the limits of the system, is to release the straining forces of production to meet insatiable and desperate human need.

The men who know why this is so are the economists, and they are very quick to tell us when we have reached the economic and financial limits of producing food and houses and other consumption goods for the people – not, let us remember, the limits set by our resources, our machines, or our man power – or when some other deviation has disturbed the delicate equilibrium of the system; and there are very many ways of *that* happening. One step too far, and economic chaos breaks out – a balance of trade deficit, inflation, falling profits, restriction of investment, curtailment of credit, closing of factories, redundancy, slowing down of housing projects, desastrous fall of agricultural prices, ruin to the farmer, to the small man, bankruptcy to the bigger man, collapse of the pound and the dollar. And the economist can tell you, or he thinks he can, just *why*, and just *what* you have done wrong. But none of these dreadful things happen if you want to spend a hundred million or a thousand million or ten thousand million dollars to get to the moon. Funny!

This is the menace of the economic mechanism, of the power »that every day becomes more dangerous«, of the law of the market, of the monetary regulator, of human power embodied in the external world and subordinating man to his own products.

It was Marx who first analysed the capitalist economic system to show just how its »tendencies work out with an iron necessity towards an inevitable end«; and since his day many other economists have contributed towards the understanding of the strange and menacing mystery of capitalist crisis, and the disastrous consequences of upsetting the equilibrium of economic law. Nor have they succeeded, as some people imagine, in overcoming these contradictions by monetary devices, international trading cartels, or government controls of industry, as the parlous condition of the British and Italian economies, the intractable mass of American poverty and slum ghettoes, and the dangerous monetary situation of the United States demonstrates pretty clearly. And above all these experts have wrestled and in vain with the great paradox of potential plenty in a hungry world; which necessarily arises, as Engels said, because »the extension of the market«, that is to say the ability to purchase and consume, »cannot keep pace with the extension of production« – unless you are producing armaments of course, or luxury flats.

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But if we are to solve the riddle thus presented to us, the first thing that we have to understand is that these laws are not, as they suppose, the unalterable decrees of nature, operative through all time, but the ways of working of the productive apparatus of one particular and passing stage of man's history. The economic model, the values and principles, of this moment in history, seem to nearly everybody to be eternal; but this is not so; and we escape from the dilemmas of the economic system not by finding some ingenious device for making it work in the opposite way to which it was constructed, but by transcending the system itself and passing to a different one in which the antagonism of owning and working classes is replaced by the free association of all in operating a common ownership of the productive powers.

This is not a utopian piece of wishful thinking, but strictly scientific anthropology. It is the essential nature of man to control natural forces socially to satisfy his needs. It is neither natural nor necessary for man to subject himself to the mechanical operation of the laws of the market, to be treated as a helpless object driven hither and thither by natural forces. This is total dehumanisation. It is to fall below his own unique capacity and destiny, to subject nature and its laws to human aims. Man is defined by his possibilities, by the necessity to enter into community with other men and to establish his mastery over the sources of natural power.

The difficulty lies in realising that the existing system is not that of nature, but *man made;* that its apparent independence of men is an illusion; that when we are considering the economic laws of modern capitalism and its disasters we are witnessing the domination over man of his own creation, his own handiwork turning against him. And that just as, less than 200 years ago, he jettisoned the pre-capitalist system to make this one, so he can, when conditions allow, when the time is ripe, scrap capitalism and make another and a better one.

Man makes and remakes his own economic systems, and with it his world, its institutions, its philosophy, its morals, its art, its values, *and his own nature.* But the creation of a new economic order is only possible when it becomes manifest that the existing system has exhausted its capacity for progressive development and the satisfaction of human needs.

But when a whole social system reaches the end of its usefulness and efficiency, and begins to give way to a new one, an intellectual crisis accompanies this change – a revolution in the mind and spirit of man.

We see much the same intellectual difficulty in the succession of scientific concepts – the Copernican system, the Newtonian, theories of motion, the nature of combustion, the concept of the ether, Maxwell's equations, relativity and quantum, creationism versus evolution. There is a very close connection between the demand for mental revolution, whether in the progress of science, or in social change. In both, the world and everything in it is not merely *interpreted,* subsequently to being objectively seen and described, it is *constituted* for us, as Kant saw, by the conceptual categories of the prevailing system. But just as the multiplication of irrationalities and discordant facts eventually compels a revolutionary change of the whole con-

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ceptual framework in science to one that more successfully embraces the facts and eliminates the basic contradictions of the older theory, so in social change the old perspective becomes inadequate at its contradictions multiply and eventually compel what in science we call the *paradigm shift,* the total revolution in our constitutive categories, our mode of perception.

A Copernican change – basically in the relations between men from the cash-nexus or inequality of status to a human relation of co-operation, involving the end of exploitation; but also a change of all the categories of human thinking involved in a new *Weltanschauung:* not of course a sudden and complete reversal of concepts and relationships, but the *opening* of long period of transition: momentous turning point in the history of man.

But the basic difference between change in scientific theories and change in social system, is that while the former is influenced mainly by the theoretical requirements of a good scientific explanation, the latter is determined by the sequence of technological advances and the necessity for discarding an *inappropriate* economic system of operating the improved productive apparatus for a more *appropriate* one. And this not only demands a total change in the structure of society, but necessarily involves a loss of privilege on the part of those sections of society who benefit so largely by the working of a system; this creates a special kind of difficulty, and requires special measures to overcome it.

The inadequacy of the economic structure to cope with its functions is of course precisely the situation presented by the enormous potentialities revealed by the Moon achievement, and the paralysis of the same powers when we wish to apply them to human betterment.

This involves far more than an endeavour to change out-of-date ideas; not only because the wole conceptual framework of the economic system is linked to class interests, but because it is an integral part of the world system, and is supported and justified by the metaphysical presuppositions underlying economies, law, political theory, ethics and even religion. These are not seen by capitalist man in the perspective of history, as relative to a particular epoch, but as the final, objective nature of the world. And further, because the very nature of man is constituted by his place in the system – the ensemble of social relations proper to that system – and by its mores, values, legal concepts, – by the whole ideological set up that *constitutes* the personality and mind of man in any period, – it appears impossible to change human nature, and therefore impossible to change society.

That is why the most prevalent and convicing argument against socialism in England today is that man is by nature inherently aggressive, individualistic and competitive – that he is »a beast of prey«, to use Spengler's terms, and thus innately incapacitated either to create or function in a co-operative society. What this really means of course is that in *capitalist* society man requires to be competitive and aggressive. This type of human nature, is not *essential* man, but capitalist man. When society was differently constituted, as in medieval times,

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we had not the individualistic type of human nature but a quite different one. As Labriola says somewhere »feudal morality differs from modern bourgeois morality as does chivalry from solvency.«

But the notion of radical change is a closed book with seven seals to capitalist theorists. Our contemporary sociology and political theory teaches nothing else, and affirms the permanence and unchangeability of capitalist society, emphatically, loudly and continuously. This is in effect the sociological standpoint of our British universities, of our intellectuals, of British broadcasting, of our serious weekly journals. This is our conceptual world, our ultimate truth.

It is the saturation and conditioning of the mind by this intellectual environment that now preserves the type of capitalist man. But we may take heart. In other circumstances he has grown into a different man – anthropology well knows the *structural specificity* of other cultures. Could he not conceivably be moulded into a post-capitalist man, a socialist man?

Anthropology and genetics are entirely with us here in showing that man is indeed constantly making and remaking himself, and that he does this precisely by making his tools and then with them making his world. By so doing, as Hegel first showed, and Vico of course, and then with a wealth of detail Karl Marx, man makes both his world and *himself;* and then as his technology advances completely remakes both: »The whole of history«, says Marx, »is nothing but the progressive transformation of human nature. By acting on the world and changing it, man changes his nature.«

Man is unique in that unlike his animal ancestors he is not constituted by his genetically determined adaptations to his environment. On the contrary, he alters and creates that environment, and in doing so creates his own personality, habits, knowledge system, ideas and values. There lies his unique role in history.

So far from being indissolubly linked, like a mole or a bat, or a horse, or a bird, to one mode of specialised life, he is infinitely malleable, unspecialised, a maker of tools and machines, and therefore a maker of the social structure necessary to their efficient use; capable therefore of organising and re-organising the social and economic pattern in harmony with his developing technological resources; and thus building one form of society after another, one civilisation after another, each with its whole unique complex of culture patterns, institutions, and values, each with its new type of man, its own variety of human nature – capitalist society with its required pattern of individualistic, competitive man; socialism with the pattern of co-operative man.

But since man as we find him in capitalist society is conditioned by that society, especially by his exploitation in the wage relationship, how is he to escape from its mental limitations and distortions? How can he create a new society based on fundamentally different principles?

Who is to educate the educators?

Marx's answer is that development of technology make social change necessary if human needs are to be met; and that in spite of the endeavours of obsolete classes to preserve out-of-date economic sys-

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tems beyond their period of usefulness, because they still operate in their interests, the danger and wries of a system on decline will overcome man's confidence in the unchanging nature of things as they are. The interests of the majority, and especially those most closely connected with the new and powerful, but fettered, forces of production, will get their way, and bring the economic structure in line with the advanced technology.

It is essential to note that this is not an automatic process, determined inevitably by economic necessity. It does not occur at all apart from the activity of the mind, the critical examination of the economic situation, the scientific solution of the problem and the discovery of a new economic pattern. It does not happen apart from intellectual conviction obtained by polemical discussion, from a radical change of mind. But this also requires the destructive criticism of bourgeois ideology and the promulgation of a new system of human thought.

We need specially to consider the indispensable ideological struggle which this revolutionary transition involves. As we have seen the change is not merely one of persuading people of a better idea, like introducing a computer into the administrative apparatus of a factory. It involves the destruction of a solidly constructed world-view and all its categories and built in system of economic, moral and legal principles. It involves the construction and inculcation of a new and rival world-view, perspective, system of categories, in every department of human life. There is required a total shift of the paradigm, extending of course to what are regarded as the scientifically established *laws* of economic life, and the genetically established nature of man.

This would seem intellectually almost impossible but for one fact. An obsolete economic and social system manifests the same disturbance of ideological equilibrium as an outworn scientific conception:

Multiplication of irrationalities and contradictions.

Breakdown and proliferation of secondary theories to deal with these.

Collapse of the whole notion of rational explanation.

And, in the social sphere, the substitution of pessimistic and defeatist concepts for the confident faith of capitalism in its heyday.

And on the other hand, we see at the same time as this ideological disintegration, the emergence, in the world of thought, of counter philosophies of a more constructive complexion, establishing the claims of science and reason, and opposing contemporary nihilism.

The breakdown of outmoded scientific conception would thus seem to be paralleled by the disintegration of the thought of the capitalist world; and at the same time by the coming to birth of new philosophies of wider scope and more fruitful application.

Similarly, while on the one hand a decadent theory of human nature is proclaimed, this reversion to animalism has itself stimulated countertheories of the uniqueness of man, while prevalent irrationalism is vigorously opposed by new logical theories and by the scientific methodology of thinkers like Popper, Hospers and Nagel.

What becomes very clear is that the way forward requires a sound critique of the ideology of a whole society in decline. Failing that there arises from the collapse of capitalism not socialism but the po-

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And on the other hand, we see at the same time as this ideological disintegration, the emergence, in the world of thought, of counter philosophies of a more constructive complexion, establishing the claims of science and reason, and opposing contemporary nihilism.

The breakdown of outmoded scientific conception would thus seem to be paralleled by the disintegration of the thought of the capitalist world; and

at the same time by the coming to birth of new philosophies of wider scope and more fruitful application.

Similarly, while on the one hand a decadent theory of human nature is proclaimed, this reversion to animalism has itself stimulated countertheories of the uniqueness of man, while prevalent irrationalism is vigorously opposed by new logical theories and by the scientific methodology of thinkers like Popper, Hospers and N agel.

What becomes very clear is that the way forw ard requires a sound critique of the ideology of a whole society in decline. Failing that there arises from the collapse of capitalism not socialism but the po

litics of cultural despair; for the battle for socialism cannot be won by men whose minds are dominated by the ideology of dying world. In our society workers, teachers, scientists, writers, the man in the street, socialists themselves, are living in an intellectual environment that cannot be escaped. Either they must break with it and change their minds, or the world must continue to suffer and disaster must ensue. Therefore the first task on the philosophical front is to subject the philosophical theories that pertain to the world as it is to drastic criticism. The second task is to replace them by a reconstruction of philosophy, taking the fullest advantage of the best work in contemporary logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, so much of which, in spite of the errors which even the best philosophies cannot escape, is soundly based and thoroughly scientific, and which will help us to present a world-view that convincingly explains and fortifies a world in transition.

We have to set forth rationally and in convincing terms a counter-ideology – an alternative world-view supporting the political and economic policies of socialism.

Before economic theory, however correct, can be made operative, or even the political organisation of the masses for political struggle can be effective, an ideological battle must be fought and won. As Marx said: »Before the proletariat fights out its battles on the barricades it announces the coming of its rule with a series of intellectual victories.«

This ideological struggle has not yet developed to the intensity that the situation demands. Those victories have still to be won. It remains the major task of socialist and progressive intellectuals in our day and age.

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DAS PROBLEM DER MACHT IN DER ANARCHISTISCHEN MARXISMUS-KRITIK

Arnold Künzli

Basel

Rudi Supek hat in seinem einleitenden Referat darauf hingewiesen, daß man für die diesjährige Sommerschule das Thema »Macht und Humanität« gewählt habe, weil die jugoslawischen Marxisten in besonderem Maße besorgt seien darüber, was im Augenblick in den sozialistischen Staaten an Machtmißbrauch und offener Gewaltanwendung geschehe, vor allem als Folge der sowjetischen Intervention in der CSSR. Ich möchte hier anknüpfen, um die im Zusammenhang von Theorie und Praxis zu sehende Frage zu erörtern, wer oder was dafür verantwortlich ist, daß im Namen des Marxismus und Sozialismus heute zum Teil eine Machtpolitik getrieben wird, die sich kaum unterscheidet von der traditionallen Machtpolitik, wie sie sich in Europa spätestens mit dem Entstehen der absolutistischen Monarchien eingebürgert hatte, und die außenpolitisch ebensosehr imperialistische wie innenpolitisch konterrevolutionäre Züge aufweist.

Es wäre hier zunächst einmal mehr die bereits oft erörterte Frage zu stellen, inwiefern die Theorie von Marx nicht allein schon dadurch entscheidend deformiert wurde, daß der erste Versuch, sie zu verwirklichen, in einem Staate und einer Gesellschaft erfolgte, in denen beinahe keine einzige der von Marx selbst genannten Voraussetzungen für eine sozialistische Revolution nach seinen Vorstellungen gegeben war. Es wäre die Frage, inwieweit die Oktoberrevolution tatsächlich beanspruchen hann, eine marxistische und soizalistische zu sein, und – darüber hinaus – inwieweit das an authentischer Marxscher Theorie, was zumindest der Intention nach in die Oktoberrevolution und später in die Sowjetideologie und -praxis integriert wurde, nicht dem übermächtigen Druck der russischen geschichtlichen Tradition erlag und so der Marxismus bis zur Unkenntlichkeit russifiziert worden ist. Aber selbst wenn man – was mir legitim zu sein scheint – diese Frage weitgehend positiv beantworten wollte, bliebe dennoch eine weitere Frage übrig: wenn der Stalinismus sich jahrelang auf die Theorie von Marx berufen konnte, ohne daß ihm, von Ausnahmen abgesehen, von nichtrussischen Marxisten grundsätzlich widersprochen wurde – das Ge-

DAS PROBLEM DER MACHT IN DER ANARCHISTISCHEN MARXISMUS-KRITIK

Arnold Kiinzli

Basel

In his introductory speech, Rudi Supek pointed out that the topic "Power and Humanity" was chosen for this year's summer school because the Yugoslav Marxists were particularly concerned about what was going on in the socialist states at the moment Abuse of power and open use of force is happening, mainly as a result of the Soviet intervention in CSSR. I would like to start here in order to discuss the question, to be seen in the connection between theory and practice, who or what is responsible for the fact that in the name of Marxism and socialism a power politics is being pursued today that hardly differs from traditional power politics , as it had become naturalized in Europe at the latest with the emergence of the absolutist monarchies, and which has foreign policy just as much imperialist as domestic politically counter-revolutionary traits.

First of all, the question, which has already been discussed many times, should be asked here as to what extent Marx's theory was decisively deformed simply by the fact that the first attempt to realize it was made in a state and a society in which almost not a single one of the prerequisites for a socialist revolution named by Marx himself was met according to his ideas. It would be the question to what extent the October Revolution can actually claim to be a Marxist and socialist one, and -

moreover - to what extent that authentic Marxist theory, which was at least intentionally integrated into the October Revolution and later into Soviet ideology and practice, did not succumb to the overwhelming pressure of the Russian historical tradition and thus Marxism was Russified beyond recognition is. But even if one were to answer this question largely in the affirmative - which seems to me to be legitimate - one further question would still remain: if Stalinism could rely on Marx's theory for years without, with a few exceptions, not being able to rely on it - was contradicted in principle by Russian Marxists - the Ge-1 0 0

genteil war bekanntlich der Fall: sozusagen sämtliche Marxisten der ganzen Welt erblickten jahrzehntelang im sowjetischen »Marxismus-Leninismus« die einzige legitime Interpretation der Marxschen Theorie –, dann muß man sich zumindest fragen, welches die Lücken in der Marxschen Theorie sind, die eine solche Entwicklung ermöglichten. Oder anders formuliert: die Frage lautet, inwiefern die Theorie von Marx – sei es durch »blinde Flecke«, sei es gar durch zu wenig abgesicherte Anweisungen – für das Entstehen eines in ihrem Namen errichteten, nur notdürftig säkularisierten absolutistischen Gottesgnadentums nach den vergilbten Rezepten etwa eines Robert Filmer verantwortlich gemacht werden kann und muß.

Diese Frage sind nicht neu. Sie sind zum Teil schon zu Lebzeiten von Marx gestellt worden, und zwar unter anderem von den Anarchisten. Wer heute die Schriften der Anarchisten durchstöbert, der stellt überrascht fest, daß diese geradezu mit Exaktheit eine – in ihren Augen unausweichliche – Entwicklung der Marxschen Theorie zur Praxis eines bürokratischen Etatismus repressiver Natur vorausgesagt haben. So hat etwa Bakunin erklärt, Marx und seine Freunde seien auf dem besten Wege, »das Volk an eine neue Kandare zu nehmen«. Sie »geben vor, daß allein die Diktatur – selbstverständlich die ihre – die Freiheit des Volkes herbeiführen könne; darauf antworten wir, daß keine Diktatur ein anderes Ziel haben kann, als so lange wie möglich zu dauern«. Die angeblich vorübergehende Diktatur werde unvermeindlich »zur Wiederherstellung des Staates, der Privilegien, der Ungleichheiten und aller Unterdrückungen des Staates« führen, zur Bildung einer Regierungsaristokratie, »die unter dem Vorwand des Allgemeinwohls, oder um den Staat zu retten, von neuem mit der Ausbeutung und Unterwerfung beginnt«. Dieser Staat werde »um so eigenmächtiger sein, als sein Despotimus sich sorgfältig unter dem Anschein eines unterwürfigen Respekts ... für den Volkswillen verbirgt«.[1]

Bakunin wurde nicht müde, von der Verbindung einer jakobinischen Revolution mit »der Errichtung eines mächtigen zentralisierten revolutionären Staates« zu warnen, da dies »die militärische Diktatur für einen neuen Herrn zur Folge haben« und den »Tod der Revolution« bedeuten würde. Diese neuen revolutionären Staaten würden »ebenso zentralisierend und despotisch wie die heutigen Staaten sein«. Es würde zu einer »nur dem Namen nach« revolutionären Autorität führen, »die in Wirklichkeit nur eine neue Reaktion wäre, da sie tatsächtich die durch Dekrete beherrschten Volksmassen von neuem zum Gehorsam, zur Unbeweglichkeit, zum Tode verurteilen würde«.[2] Für ihn war es »klar, daß das System von Marx ... zur Errichtung einer sehr starken sogenannten Volksmacht führt, das heißt zur Herrschaft einer intelligenten Minderheit, die allein fälig ist, die bei einer Zentralisation unvermeidlich sich ergebenden verwickelten Fragen zu erfassen, und folglich zu Knechtschaft der Massen und ihrer Ausbeutung durch

[1] Zit. in Daniel Guérin: Anarchismus. Begriff und Praxis. Frankfurt a. M. 1967, p. 24 f.

[2] Zit. in Max Nettlau: Der Anarchismus von Proudhon zu Kropotkin, Berlin 1927, p. 110.

On the contrary, as is well known, it was the case: for decades, so to speak, all Marxists from all over the world saw in the Soviet "Marxism-Leninism" the only legitimate interpretation of Marx's theory. One must at least ask

oneself what the gaps in Marx's theory are that made such a development possible.

Or to put it another way: the question is to what extent Marx's theory - be it due to "blind spots" or even due to instructions that are not sufficiently secure - for the emergence of an absolutist godly blessing erected in its name and only poorly secularized dentums can be held responsible according to the yellowed recipes of Robert Filmer, for example, and mufi.

This question is not new. Some of them were asked during Marx's lifetime, among others by the anarchists. Whoever rummages through the writings of the anarchists today is surprised to find that they predicted with absolute accuracy a - in their eyes inevitable - development of Marx's theory into the practice of a bureaucratic statism of a repressive nature. Bakunin, for example, declared that Marx and his friends were well on the way "to put the people on a new rein."

They "pretend that only the dictatorship - of course theirs -

could bring about the freedom of the people; to which we reply that no dictatorship can have any other aim than to last as long as possible. The supposedly temporary dictatorship would inevitably lead "to the restoration of the state, the privileges, the inequalities and all the oppressions of the state," to the formation of a governmental aristocracy, "which, under the pretext of the common good, or to save the state, would again engage in exploitation and submission begins". This state will 'be all the more arbitrary as its despotism carefully disguise itself under the semblance of subservient respect . . . hidden for the people's will«.1

Bakunin never ceased to warn against the association of a Jacobin revolution with "the establishment of a powerful centralized revolutionary state," as this would result in "military dictatorship for a new master" and the "death of the revolution."

would mean. These new revolutionary states would be "just as centralizing and despotic as the states of today." It would lead to revolutionary authority "in name only"

"which in reality would only be a new reaction, since it would in fact condemn the popular masses ruled by decrees anew to obedience, to immobility, to death."2 For him it was "clear that the system of Marx . .. leads to the establishment of a very strong so-called people's power, i.e. to the rule of an intelligent minority, which alone is capable of comprehending the complicated questions that inevitably arise from centralization, and consequently to the servitude of the masses and their exploitation by 1 cit.

in Danici Gućrin: Anarchism. concept and practice. Frankfurt a. M. 1967, p. 24 f.

** Cited in Max Nettlau: Der Anarchismus von Proudhon zu Kropotkin, Berlin 1927, p. 110*

diese intelligente Minderheit. Das ist das System revolutionärer Autoritäten, der aufgezwungenen und von oben geleiteten Freiheit – das heißt, es ist eine schreiende Lüge«.[3]

Dabei anerkannte Bakunin durchaus die Verdienste, die Marx sich um das Proletariat erworben hatte, ja, er schrieb ihm sogar einmal: »Du siehst also, lieber Freund, daß ich Dein Schüler bin, und ich bin stolz darauf, es zu sein.«[4] Sogar noch auf dem Höhepunkt der Marxschen Kampagne gegen ihn schrieb er in einem zur Veröffentlichung bestimmten Dokument, er huldige den Bürgern Marx und Engels, den Schöpfern der Internationalen: »Unsere Achtung für sie ist rein und tief, aber sie geht nicht bis zur Götzenanbetung und wird uns niemals dazu hinreißen, ihnen gegenüber die Rolle von Sklaven zu übernehmen. Und obgleich wir den ungeheuren Diensten volle Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, die sie der Internationalen geleistet haben und selbst jetzt noch leisten, so werden wir doch bis aufs Messer bekämpfen ihre falschen autoritären Theorien, ihre diktatorischen Anmaßungen ...«[5] Diesen autoritären Charakter der Marxschen Theorien führte Bakunin – das ist vielleicht für die heutige Diskussion von besonderer Bedeutung – unter anderem darauf zurück, daß diesen Theorien ein Prinzip zugrunde liege, »das ..., von einem relativen Gesichtspunkt aus gesehen, vollkommen richtig ist, das aber vollkommen falsch wird, wenn es absolut betrachtet und gestellt wird, als die einzige Grundlage und erste Ursache aller anderen Prinzipien«.[6] Bakunin, der ja ursprünglich auch von Hegel beeinflußt war, hatte sich – in seinem Selbstverständnis wenigstens – in einen radikalen Antimetaphysiker verwandelt und was er Marx hier vorwarf, ist, ein Priester metaphysischer Abstraktionen[7] geworden zu sein und eine – an sich richtige – Partikularerkenntnis verallgemeinnert und verabsolutiert zu haben. Seine leidenschaftliche Ablehnung alles Atoritären – der er freilich gelegentlich selbst untreu wurde – ließ ihn erkennen, welche Gefahren einer Theorie immanent waren, die mit dem Anspruch auf verbindliche Wahrheit auftrat: die Päpste, so meinte er, könnten sich in ihrem Wahrheitsanspruch wenigstens auf den Heiligen Geist und die Gnade beziehen, aber »Herr Marx hat keine solche Entschuldigung ... Sobald aber das Absolute nicht existiert, kann es für die Internationale kein unfehlbares Dogma geben, folglich keine offiziele politische oder ökonomische Theorie, und unsere Kongresse dürfen nie die Rolle allgemeiner Kirchenversammlungen beanspruchen, welche für alle Anhänger und Gläubigen obligatorische Prinzipien verkünden«.[8] Alles das liest sich, obgleich ein halbes Jahrhundert vor der

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[3] Michael Bakunin: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. III, Berlin 1924, p. 117.

[4] Brief vom 22. 12. 1868. Zit. in Franz Mehring: Karl Marx, Berlin 1960, p. 410 f. – S. zum Verhältnis von Marx und Bakunin auch Arnold Künzli: Karl Marx. Eine Psychographie. Wien 1966, p. 355 ff.

[5] Zit. in Mehring, a. a. O., p. 477 f.

[6] Michael Bakunin: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. I, Berlin 1921, p. 90 ff.

[7] S. dazu, was Bakunin über dieses Thema schreibt in »Gott und der Staat«. In: Michail Bakunin: Philosophie der Tat, Köln 1968, p. 168 f.

[8] Michael Bakunin: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. III, a. a. O., p. 222.

this intelligent minority. This is the system of revolutionary authoritarianism, of freedom imposed and directed from above - that is, it is a blatant lie'

In doing so, Bakunin fully recognized the services that Marx had rendered to the proletariat, indeed he even wrote to him once:

"So you see, dear friend, that I am your student, and I am proud to be."4 Even at the height of Marx's campaign against him, he wrote in a document for public release that he was doing homage to the commoners Marx and Engels, the creators of the Internationale: Our respect for them is pure and deep, but it does not reach the point of idolatry and will never enlighten us to assume the role of slaves towards them. And while we do full justice to the tremendous services they have rendered and are rendering to the International, we will fight to the knife their false authoritarian theories, their dictatorial pretensions .. ."5 This authoritarian character of the Bakunin attributed Marx's theories - and this is perhaps of particular importance for today's discussion - to the fact that these theories are based on a principle "which ... from a relative point of view is completely correct, but which is completely wrong becomes, if it is considered and posed absolutely, as the only basis and first cause of all other principles.'6 Bakunin, who was also originally influenced by Hegel, had -

in his self-understanding at least - transformed into a radical anti-metaphysicist and what he accused Marx of here is that he had become a priest of metaphysical abstractions7 and had generalized and made absolute a particular knowledge that was correct in itself. His passionate rejection of all atoritarians - to which he was occasionally unfaithful himself - made him realize the inherent dangers of a theory that claimed binding truth: the popes, he believed, could at least base their truth claims on the saint spirit and grace, but »Herr M arx has no such excuse. . . But as soon as the Absolute does not exist, there can be no infallible dogma for the International, hence no official political or economic theory, and our Congresses must never claim the role of general church assemblies proclaiming obligatory principles for all adherents and believers' All of this reads, although half a century before the 3 Michael Bakunin: Collected Works, Vol. Ill, Berlin 1924, p. 117

4 Letter of December 22, 1868. Quoted in Franz Mehring: Karl Marx, Berlin 1960, p. 410

f. - S. on the relationship between Marx and Bakunin also Arnold Kiinzli: Karl Marx.

A Psychography. Vienna 1966, p. 355 ff.

s Zit. in Mehring, a. a. 0 ., p. 477 f.

• Michael Bakunin: Collected Works, Vol. I, Berlin 1921, p. 90 ff.

7 See what Bakunin writes on this subject in God and the State. In: Mikhail Bakunin: Philosophy of Action, Koln 1968, p. 168 f.

8 Michael Bakunin: Collected Works, Vol. III, op. a. Oh, p. 222

Oktoberrevolution geschrieben, wie eine perfekte Ideologiekritik – oder besser Ideopraxiskritik[9] – an einem halben Jahrhundert Sowjetmarxismus.

Bakunin hat denn weiter auch mit frappierender Hellsichtigkeit vorausgesagt, wohin eine sich auf die Theorie der Diktatur des Proletariats berufende und den Machtapparat des Staates in ihren Dienst stellende Revolution in Russland führen würde. Er prophezeite, daß eine russische Revolution, die versuchen würde, den »auf der Unterdrückung jeder Äusserung des Volkswillens gegründeten« Staat Peters des Großen zu perpetuieren, das Gegenteil des Erstrebten erzielen könnte. »Man kann das Etikett wechseln, das unser Staat trägt, seine Form . . . , aber im Grunde bleibt er immer der Gleiche.« Wenn dieser russische Staat nicht zerstört werde, müsse man sich »mit der schändlichsten und fürchterlichsten Lüge . . . versöhnen: der *roten Bürokratie.*« Und er sagte Stalin voraus: »Nehmt den radikalsten Revolutionär und setzt ihn auf den Thron aller Russen oder verleiht ihm eine diktatoriale Macht . . . , und ehe ein Jahr vergeht, wird er schlimmer als der Zar selbst geworden sein.«[10]

Aber kehren wir zu Marx zurück. Es gibt auch aus der Feder von Pierre-Joseph Proudhon einige merkwürdig hellsichtige Bemerkungen zu unserem Thema, die umsomehr ins Gewicht fallen, als sie aus der Zeit *vor* Marxens Kampfschrift gegen Proudhon – »Das Elend der Philosophie« – stammen. Marx hatte bekanntlich Proudhon 1846 aus Brüssel aufgefordert, sich mit Beiträgen aus Paris an seinen Korrespondenzbüro zu beteiligen. In seinem Briefe vom 17. Mai 1846 an Marx lehnte Proudhon diese Einladung höflich ab, denn »je fais profession avec le public, d'un antidogmatisme économique presque absolu . . . Mais, pour Dieu! après avoir démoli tous les dogmatisme à priori, ne songeons point à notre tour à endoctriner le peuple, ne tombons pas dans la contradiction de votre compatriote Martin Luther, qui, après avoir renversé la théologie catholique, se mit aussitôt, à grand renfort d'excommunications et d'anathèmes, à fonder une théologie protestante . . . – . . . ne nous faisons pas les chefs d'une nouvelle intolérance, ne nous posons pas en apôtres d'une nouvelle religion . . .«[11] Dieser Brief Proudhons ist zwei Jahre vor Veröffentlichung des »Kommunistischen Manifests« geschrieben worden. Nichts spricht dafür, daß Proudhon sich damals von irgendeiner persönlichen Animosität Marx gegenüber hätte leiten lassen.

Pjotr Kropotkin hat in seinem Buche »Worte eines Rebellen« ähnliches gesagt, wenn er von der vom Marxismus propagierten »revolutionären Diktatur« meinte: »Für uns Anarchisten ist die Diktatur eines Individuums oder einer Partei – was im Grunde genommen dasselbe ist – definitiv gerichtet . . . Wir wissen, daß Revolution und Regierung unvereinbar sind . . . Wir wissen, wohin selbst jede bestgemeinte Dik-

[9] Der Begriff »Ideopraxis« zur Kennzeichnung der Praxis einer zur Ideologie pervertierten Theorie ist von Peter Weidkuhn geprägt worden in: Ideologiekritisches zum Streit zwischen Fasnacht und Protestantismus in Basel. In: Schweizer Archiv für Volkskunde, 65. Jg., Basel 1969, p. 51.

[10] Zit. in Guérin, a. a. O., p. 25 f.

[11] Zit. in P.-J. Proudhon: Les Confessions d'un Révolutionnaire, Paris 1929, p. 435.

Written in October Revolution as a perfect critique of ideology—or rather critique of ideopractice9—of half a century of Soviet Marxism.

Bakunin also predicted with astonishing clairvoyance where a revolution in

Russia based on the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and putting the power apparatus of the state at its service would lead. He prophesied that a Russian revolution attempting to perpetuate the state of Peter the Great "founded on the suppression of every expression of the popular will" could achieve the opposite of what was desired. »One can change the label our state bears, its form . . . but basically he always stays the same.« If this Russian state is not destroyed, one would have »to face the most shameful and terrible lie . . . reconciled: to the Red bureaucracy." And he predicted Stalin: "Take the most radical revolutionist and put him on the throne of all Russians or give him dictatorial power. . . and before a year goes by he will be worse than the Tsar himself.'10

But let us return to Marx. There are also some curiously lucid observations on our subject from the pen of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, which are all the more important because they predate Marx's polemic against Proudhon - The Poverty of Philosophy. As is well known, Marx had Proudhon in 1846

aus Brussel aufgefordert, sich mit Beitragen aus Paris an seinen Korrespondenzbiiro zu beteiligen. In seinem Briefe vom 17. Mai 1846 an Marx lehnte Proudhon diese Einladung hoflich ab, denn »I make profession with the public, of an almost absolute economic anti-dogmatism. . . But, for God! after having demolished all a priori dogmatism, let us not think in our turn of indoctrinating the people, let us not fall into the contradiction of your compatriot Martin Luther, who, after having overturned Catholic theology, immediately began, with great reinforcement of excommunications and anathemas, to found a Protestant theology. . . . . . let us not make ourselves leaders of a new intolerance, let us not pose as apostles of a new religion .. .«n Dieser Brief Proudhons ist zwei Jahre vor Veroffentlichung des »Kommunistischen Manifests« geschrieben worden. Nichts spricht dafiir, dafi Proudhon sich damals von irgendeiner personlichen Animositat Marx gegeniiber hatte leiten lassen.

Pyotr Kropotkin said something similar in his book Words of a Rebel when he said of the "revolutionary dictatorship" propagated by Marxism: "For us anarchists, the dictatorship of an individual or a party - which is basically the same thing - is definitively judged. . . We know that revolution and government are incompatible. . . We know where even the best-intentioned dict-

' The term »ideopraxis« to characterize the practice of a theory converted to ideology was coined by Peter Weidkuhn in: Idcologickriti-sches on the dispute between Fasnacht and Protestantism in Basel. In: Schweizer Archiv für Volkskunde, vol. 65, Basel 1969, p. 51

10 Zit. in Guerin, a. a. 0., p. 25 f.

11 Zit. in P.-J. Proudhon: The Confessions of a Revolutionary, Paris 1929, p. 435.

tatur notwendigerweise führt: zur Ermordung der wahren Initiative der Revolution! ... Diejenigen, welche die Diktatur predigen, bemerken gewöhnlich nicht, daß sie ... nur den Boden für jene vorbereiten, von denen sie später erwürgt werden.«[12] 1919 richtete Kropotkin aus Russland, wohin er aus seinem englischen Exil nach der Oktoberrevolution hoffnungsvoll zurückgekehrt war, eine Botschaft an die Arbeiter des Westens, in der er diese vor dem Herannahen einer »ungeheuren Bürokratie» warnte: »Ich bin der Ansicht, daß dieser Versuch, auf höchst etatistischer Basis und unter dem eisernem Gesetz der Diktatur einer Partei eine kommunistische Republik zu errichten, mit einem großen Fiasko endet. Russland lehrt uns, wie der Kommunismus sich nicht durchsetzen kann.«[13] Und kurz vor seinem Tode, im März 1920, schrieb Kropotkin an Lenin: »Russland ist nur dem Namen nach eine revolutionäre Republik geworden. Heute wird es nicht durch Sowjets, sondern durch Parteikomitees regiert ... Sollte die gegenwärtige Situation noch viel länger andauern, wird sich das Wort 'Sozialismus' in einen Fluch verwandeln, genau so wie es der Parole der 'Gleichheit' vierzig Jahre lang nach der Herrschaft der Jakobiner ergangen ist.«[14]

Ähnliches haben auch weniger bekannte Anarchisten gesagt. Rudolf Rocker veröffentliche schon 1920 ein Buch über »Die Bankrotte des russischen Staatskommunismus«, in dem er die angebliche Diktatur des Proletariats als die Diktatur einer Partei denunzierte, die sich auf die Gewalt der Bajonette stütze: »Unter der Diktatur des Proletariats hat sich in Russland eine neue Klasse entwickelt, die Kommissariokratie ...«[15] Nachdem er sich im Sommer 1920 einige Monate lang in Russland umgesehen hatte, veröffentlichte der spanische Anarchist Angel Pestaña einen Bericht, in dem es heißt: »Die Prinzipien der kommunistischen Partei sind genau das Gegenteil dessen, was sie in den ersten Augenblicken der Revolution verkündet hat .. Die kommunistische Partei hat beschlossen, ... daß der, der nicht kommunistisch denkt (d. h. 'kommunistisch' in ihrem Sinn), nicht das Recht hat, zu denken ... Die kommunistische Partei hat dem Proletariat die heiligen Rechte abgesprochen, die ihm die Revolution verliehen hatte.«[16]

Aus einer ganz anderen, mystisch-idealistischen Welt herkommend, kritisierte der deutsche anarchistische Sozialist Gustav Landauer den Marxismus. Diesem Einsamen, Übersensiblen, zutiefst vom Geiste des Judentums Geprägten – er war mit Martin Buber befreundet –, der an die »Abschaffung des Kriegs durch Selbstbestimmung des Volkes« glaubte, von Tolstois Idee der Gewaltlosigkeit ebenso ergriffen war wie vom Gedanken der sozialistisch-anarchistischen Revolution und der wegen seiner Beteiligung an der Münchner Räterepublik von deutscher Soldateska wie ein Vieh erschlagen werden sollte – diesem Verehrer Meister Eckhardts, Spinozas und Goethes blieb die Theorie von Marx vollkommen fremd. Keiner hat sie, vom Sozialismus her, so erbittert bekämpft wie er. Seine Kritik richtete sich vor allem gegen

[12] Peter Kropotkin: Worte eines Rebellen, Wien 1924, p. 177 f.
[13] Zit. in Guérin, a. a. O., p. 92.
[14] Zit. in Paul Avrich: The Russian Anarchists, Princeton–New Jersey 1967, p. 226 f.
[15] Zit. in Guérin, a. a. O., p. 93.
[16] Ebd., p. 101 f.

nature necessarily leads: to the murder of the true initiative of the revolution! . . . Those who preach dictatorship do not usually realize that they . . . only preparing the ground for those by whom they will later be

strangled.'12 In 1919, from Russia, to where he had hopefully returned from his post-October Revolution exile in England, Kropotkin addressed a message to workers in the West, warning them of the approaching of an "enormous bureaucracy" warned: "I believe that this attempt to set up a communist republic on a highly statist basis and under the iron law of one-party dictatorship will end in a great fiasco. Russia teaches us how communism cannot prevail.'13 And shortly before his death, in March 1920, Kropotkin wrote to Lenin: 'Russia has become a revolutionary republic in name only. Today it is not governed by soviets but by party committees.. . If the current situation lasts much longer, the word 'socialism' will turn into a curse, just like the slogan of 'equality'

came forty years after the reign of the Jacobins."14

Lesser-known anarchists have said similar things. As early as 1920, Rudolf Rocker published a book on The Bankruptcies of Russian State Communism, in which he denounced the alleged dictatorship of the proletariat as the dictatorship of a party that relied on the force of the bayonets: "Under the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia a new class developed, the commissario-cracy . . .'15 After touring Russia for a few months in the summer of 1920, the Spanish anarchist Angel Pestana published a report stating: 'The principles of the Communist Party are exactly the opposite of what it proclaimed in the first moments of the revolution.. The communist party decided to. .. that he who does not think communist (i.e. 'communist' in their sense) has no right to think .. . The communist party has denied the proletariat the sacred rights which the revolution had bestowed upon it.«16

Coming from a completely different, mystical-idealistic world, the German anarchist socialist Gustav Landauer criticized Marxism. This lonely, overly sensitive man, deeply influenced by the spirit of Judaism - he was a friend of Martin Buber - who believed in the "abolition of war through self-determination of the people"

believed that he was just as gripped by Tolstoy's idea of non-violence as he was by the idea of a socialist-anarchist revolution and who, because of his participation in the Munich Council Republic, should be killed like cattle by German soldiers - this admirer of Master Eckhardt, Spinoza and Goethe was left with the theory of M arx completely alien. From a socialist point of view, no one fought them as bitterly as he did. 12 Peter Kropotkin: Words of a Rebel, Vienna 1924, p. 177 f.

13 Zeit. in Gućrin, a. a. O., p. 92.

14 Zit. in Paul Avrich: The Russian Anarchists, Princeton-New Jersey

1967, p. 226 f.

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15 Zit. in Gućrin, a. a. O., p. 93.

14 Ebd., p. 101 f.

die Marxsche These, daß der Sozialismus dialektisch aus dem Kapitalismus hervorgehen werde: »Der Kapitalismus ... hat nicht die Entwicklungsfreundlichkeit geübt, sich langsam und brav in den Sozialismus umzuwandeln; er hat auch nicht das Wunder getan, in seinem platzenden Zusammenbruch den Sozialismus zu gebären. Wie sollte das Prinzip des Schlechten, des Drucks, der Beraubung und der Philisterroutine auch Wunder tun?«[17] Für Landauer war es undenkbar, daß aus dem Schlechten des Kapitalismus ohne radikale geistige Erneuerung das Gute des Sozialismus hervorgehen könnte, da sonst der Sozialismus durch den Ungeist des Kapitalismus geprägt bliebe: »Von oben, auch von einer revolutionären Regierung, kann nur afgehoben und befohlen werden. Der Sozialismus muß gebaut, muß errichtet, muß aus neuem Geiste heraus organisiert werden.«[18] Sonst besteht »die ungeheure Gefahr ..., daß Schlendrian und Nachahmung sich auch der Revolutionäre bemächtigen und sie zu Philistern des Radikalismus, des tönenden Worts und der Gewaltgebärde machen; ... durch Dekrete könnte man die Menschen höchstens in ein neues Wirtschaftsmilitär einreihen ...«[19] Dadurch aber, »daß man die Menschen (er meint die Proletarier, A. K.) von Schuld freispricht und als Geschöpfe der sozialen Bedingungen erklärt, macht man diese Produkte der Gesellschaft nicht anders als sie sind.«[20] Weiter wandte Landauer sich vor allem gegen den »Wissenschaftswahn des Marxismus«, der glaube, die Zukunft vorausberechnen zu können. Der Marxismus sei »eine Sache, die verzweifelte Ähnlichkeit mit dem militärischen und bürokratischen Wesen hat.«[21] Er führe zu einem Staatskapitalismus mit einer »Tendenz zur Uniformierung und Nivellierung«: »aus dem Proletarier des kapitalistischen Betriebs ist der Staatsproletarier geworden ..., alle Menschen ohne Ausnahme sind kleine Wirtschaftsbeamte des Staates.«[22] Landauer prägte auch schon das Wort vom »Polizeisozialismus«.[23]

Gewiß sind die Anarchisten mit ihrer Kritik an Marx und am Marxismus zum Teil weit über das Ziel hinausgeschossen oder haben sich gelegentlich auch von persönlichen Ressentiments und naiv-utopischen Vorstellungen den Blick für die Wirklichkeit trüben lassen. Bakunins Polemik gegen Marx ist nicht frei von antisemitischen und germanophoben Projektionen. Kropotkin hat seinen Marx nur oberflächlich studiert. Landauers umfangreiche Kritik am Marxismus, von der hier nur eben ein kleiner Ausschnitt vermittelt werden konnte, ist oft auf peinliche Weise von Haßaffekten inspiriert, die vielleicht – wie Heinz-Joachim Heydorn vermutet – partiell als Reaktion des tief im Judentum wurzelnden anarchistischen Mystikers auf Marxens jüdischen Selbsthaß zu deuten sind.[24] Schließlich ist es von Bedeutung, daß

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[17] Gustav Landauer: Aufruf zum Sozialismus, Frankfurt a. M., 1967, p. 48.
[18] Ebd., p. 49.
[19] Ebd., p. 50.
[20] Ebd., p. 52.
[21] Ebd., p. 100.
[22] Ebd., p. 104.
[23] Ebd., p. 167.
[24] S. Heydorns Vorwort zu seiner Ausgabe von Landauers »Aufruf zum Sozialismus«, a. a. O., p. 28 f.

Marx's thesis that socialism will emerge dialectically from capitalism: 'Capitalism . . . has not practiced the development friendliness of slowly and dutifully transforming itself into socialism; nor did it perform the

miracle of giving birth to socialism in its bursting collapse. How should the principle of the bad, the pressure, the robbery and the philistine routine also work wonders?"17 For Landauer it was unthinkable that the good of socialism could emerge from the bad of capitalism without radical intellectual renewal, otherwise socialism would remain marked by the demon of capitalism: 'From above, even from a revolutionary government, one can only abolish and give orders. Socialism must be built, must be erected, must be organized out of a new spirit.«18 Otherwise there is »the enormous danger . . . that sloppiness and imitation also take hold of the revolutionaries and turn them into philistines of radicalism, of loud words and violent gestures; . . . At most, decrees could include people in a new economic military. . ."19 But by "acquitting people (he means the proletarians, A.K.) of guilt and declaring them to be creatures of the social conditions, these products of society are not made any different than they are."20 Landauer went further above all against the "scientific mania of Marxism", which believes in being able to calculate the future in advance. Marxism is "something that bears a desperate resemblance to the military and bureaucratic nature."21 It leads to a state capitalism with a "tendency towards uniformity and leveling": "the proletarian of the capitalist enterprise has become the state proletarian. . . , all people without exception are minor economic officials of the state.«22 Landauer also coined the term »police socialism«.23

To be sure, some of the anarchists went far beyond the mark with their criticism of Marx and Marxism, or they occasionally allowed their view of reality to be clouded by personal resentment and naive-utopian ideas. Bakunin's polemics against Marx are not free from anti-Semitic and Germanophobic projections. Kropotkin studied his Marx only superficially. Landauer's extensive critique of Marxism, of which only a small excerpt could be conveyed here, is often embarrassingly inspired by Hafi affects, which perhaps - as Heinz-Joachim Heydorn suspects - partly as a reaction of the anarchist mystic, who is deeply rooted in Judaism, to Marx's Jewish are to be interpreted self-importantly.24 Finally, it is important that 17 Gustav Landauer: Call for Socialism, Frankfurt a. M., 1967, p. 48

18 Ebd., p. 49.

«• Ebd., p. 50.

28 Ebd., p. 52.

21 Ebd., p. 100.

22 Ebd., p. 104.

23 Ebd., p. 167.

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24 S. Heydorn's foreword to his edition of Landauer's "Call for Socialism", op. a. Oh, p. 28 f.

alle diese Anarchisten die Jugendschriften von Marx nicht kannten, sodaß ihre Marx-Interpretation gelegentlich eine etwas vulgärmarxistische Färbung aufweist.

Aber selbst wenn das alles mit eingerechnet wird, bleibt die Tatsache bestehen, daß zumindest die Entwicklung des Sowjetmarxismus die Kritik dieser Anarchisten auf eine schlechthin verblüffende Weise bestätigte. Was war es, das sie hellsichtig machte? Die Antwort auf diese Frage muß im Wesen des Anarchismus selbst gesucht werden. Anarchist wird nur, wer – sei es aus mehr subjektiv-psychischen, sei es aus mehr objektiven Gründen – aus Leidenschaft für eine umfassende Freiheit und Autonomie des Menschen aller institutionalisierten Macht von Menschen über Menschen fundamental mißtraut und in dieser die Quelle alles Bösen und aller Korrumpierbarkeit des homo sapiens sieht. Was immer man gegen die Theorie und Praxis der Anarchisten sagen kann – und es ist nicht wenig – : sie haben einen sechsten Sinn für die aller Macht und Autorität innewohnenden Gefahren für die Freiheit und Würde des Menschen. Deshalb ist für sie der Überbau – vor allem in Form von Staat und Regierung – wichtiger als die Basis. Die Abschaffung der Herrschaft des Menschen über den Menschen erhält bei ihnen Priorität vor der – nach ihrer Theorie dieser impliziten – Abschaffung der Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen. Zwar differieren Anarchismus und Marxismus im Endziel einer klassenhosen Gesellschaft, die des Staates nicht mehr bedarf, kaum, aber umsomehr in den Mitteln, wie dieses Endziel zu erreichen ist. Die Kritik der Anarchisten an Marx richtet sich sozusagen ausschließlich gegen die von ihm vorgeschlagenen Mittel zur Erreichung dieses Endziels, wobei sie zum Teil Marxens autoritären Charakter für die Wahl dieser Mittel verantwortlich machen. Auch wenn man diese mehr psychologische Frage ausklammert, bleibt die Tatsache von Bedeutung, daß die Anarchisten als erste von einem sozialrevolutionären Standpunkt aus die Frage nach der Rolle der Macht in der Theorie von Marx – und deren späteren Umsetzung in die Praxis – aufgeworfen und mit ihrem Spürsinn für die aller Macht immanenten Gefahren so tatsächlich den Punkt getroffen haben, an dem bisher der Versuch, unter Berufung auf Marx Sozialismus zu verwirklichem, auf jene Barriere des Etatismus gestoßen ist, die an manchen Orten die revolutionäre Welle des Marxismus konterrevolutionär zurückwirft und die zu durchbrechen lediglich Jugoslawien relativ gelungen ist.

Es wäre also, ausgehend von der anarchistischen Kritik, die Frage nach der Rolle der Macht, in der Theorie von Marx zu stellen. Das Problem ist umfangreich und kann hier nur eben skizziert werden. Die Theorie von Marx gründet auf der Überzeugung, daß Macht im wesentlichen eine ökonomische Kategorie sei. *Politische* Macht ist für Marx ein Element des Überbaus, sie ist nur ein Derivat ökonomischer Macht. Deshalb kann man die politische Macht nicht – wie die Anarchisten es, ihrerseits einseitig, fordern – direkt, sondern nur indirekt über eine revolutionäre Wandlung der sie bedingenden ökonomischen Basis bekämpfen und dialektisch aufheben. Nach erfolgter sozialer Revolution, und d. h. nach Beseitigung des durch das Privateigentum an den Produktionsmitteln gebildeten ökonomischen Fundamentes, stellt sich für Marx das Problem der politischen Macht, die er mit der

none of these anarchists knew the youthful writings of Marx, so that their interpretation of Marx occasionally shows a somewhat vulgar Arxist coloring.

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But even taking all this into account, the fact remains that at least the development of Soviet Marxism confirmed the critiques of these anarchists in an absolutely startling way. W hat was it that made her clairvoyant? The answer to this question must be sought in the nature of anarchism itself.

Only someone who - be it for more subjective-psychic, be it for more objective reasons - out of passion for a comprehensive freedom and autonomy of people fundamentally distrusts all institutionalized power of people over people and in this the source of all evil and all corruptibility, becomes an anarchist of homo sapiens sees. Whatever can be said against the theory and practice of the anarchists - and it is not a little - they have a sixth sense for the dangers to human freedom and dignity inherent in all power and authority. Therefore for them the superstructure -

primarily in the form of state and government - more important than the base.

The abolition of man's dominion over man is given priority over the - according to their theory, this implicit - abolition of the exploitation of man by man. It is true that anarchism and Marxism hardly differ in the ultimate goal of a class-less society that no longer needs the state, but all the more so in the means of achieving this ultimate goal.

The anarchists' critique of Marx is directed, so to speak, exclusively against the means he proposes to achieve this ultimate goal, blaming in part on Marx's authoritarian character for the choice of these means. Leaving aside this more psychological question, the fact remains significant that the anarchists were the first to raise the question of the role of power in Marx's theory - and its later practical application - from a social-revolutionary point of view, and with their instinct for the dangers inherent in all power have actually hit the point where the attempt to realize socialism by invoking Marx has encountered the barrier of statism, which in some places has counter-revolutionary the revolutionary wave of Marxism and which only Yugoslavia has relatively succeeded in breaking through.

Starting from the anarchist critique, the question of the role of power in Marx's theory should be asked. The problem is extensive and can only be outlined here.

Marx's theory is based on the belief that power is essentially an economic category. For Marx, political power is an element of the superstructure, it is

only a derivative of economic power. For this reason, political power cannot be combated directly - as the anarchists, for their part, one-sidedly - demand, but only indirectly via a revolutionary change in the economic basis that determines it and abolished it dialectically. After the social revolution has taken place, and d. H. After removing the economic foundation formed by private ownership of the means of production, Marx is faced with the problem of political power, which he gained with the 106th

Macht der Bourgeoisie identifiziert, kaum mehr. Gewiß tritt zunächst an die Stelle der bourgeoisen die proletarische Macht, aber deren Charakter ist ein anderer als der Charakter jener. Die proletarische Macht steht nicht mehr im Dienste des privaten Interesses einer partikularen Klasse, sondern im Dienste des öffentlichen Interesses der sich zur klassenlosen formierenden Gesamtgesellschaft. Sie ist nicht mehr Macht der Ausbeutung, sondern Macht zur Beseitigung der Ausbeutung, nicht mehr Macht der Entfremdung, sondern Entfremdung von dieser Macht, nicht mehr Macht gegen den Menschen, sondern Macht für den Menschen, nicht mehr Macht als Gegenspieler der Freiheit, sondern Macht als Wegbereiter der Freiheit. Als solche stirbt sie mit ihrer Konsolidierung ab. Sie verwandelt sich in Freiheit und ihr proletarischer Triumph ist ihr Tod. Das heißt: wenn politische Mach eine ökonomische Kategorie der Klassengesellschaft ist, wird sie, nachdem sie ihre letzte Aufgabe erfüllt hat, diese zu zertrümmern, gegenstandslos. Wo keine Basis mehr da ist, bricht der Überbau in sich selbst zusammen.

Im Gegensatz zu Marx ist nun für die Anarchisten – die sich hier paradoxerweise mit ihrem Antipoden Hobbes treffen – die Macht zumindest primär keine ökonomische, sondern eine eigenständige politische Kategorie. Der »Überbau« hat hier weitgehend autonomen Charakter, wenn er nich sogar die Rolle der Basis übernimmt, und muß deshalb in direktem Angriff zertrümmert werden. Was Freiheit und Sozialismus verunmöglicht, ist für die Anarchisten primär die Existenz eines Staates, einer Regierung, einer Bürokratie, ganz gleich, ob an deren Schalthebeln Bourgeois oder Revolutionäre sitzen, denn Revolution und Regierung sind unvereinbar. Für die Anarchisten spielt die politische Staatsmacht deshalb weitgehend die Rolle, die bei Marx der ökonomischen Macht des Privateigentums zukommt. Die Expropriateure müßen vom Privateigentum an den politischen Machtmitteln expropriiert werden. Deshalb kann – zumindest in einer idealtypischen Form des Anarchismus – Freiheit nicht durch ihren ärgsten Widersacher, den Staat, sondern nur durch ihre spontane Verwirklichung errungen und verteidigt werden. So wie es Bakunin einmal formulierte: »Die Freiheit kann und soll sich nur durch sich selbst verteidigen, und es ist ein gefährlicher Widersinn, sie zu beeinträchtigen unter dem . . . Vorwand, sie zu beschützen . . «.[25]

Es soll hier nicht weiter untersucht werden, welcher Realitätswert dieser Theorie der Anarchisten zukommt. Was hier einzig zur Debatte steht ist der Realitätswert ihrer Kritik am Marxismus. Diese ist von der Überzeugung inspiriert, daß die politische Macht, eben weil sie primär keine ökonomische, sondern eine eigenständig-politische Kategorie sei, auch eine soziale Revolution in unverändert gefährlicher Form überdauern und so die Revolutionäre selbst korrumpieren kann. Ganz besonders, wenn diese Revolutionäre sich auch noch auf eine Theorie stützen, die expressis verbis die Errichtung einer Staatsdiktatur der Revolutionäre fordert. Der anarchistische »enragé« Jean-François Varlet hat in seiner im Gefängnis geschriebenen Broschüre »L'Explosion« die These verfochten, daß Revolution und Regierung inkompati-

[25] Michail Bakunin: Philosophie der Tat, a. a. O., p. 322.

Power of the bourgeoisie identified, hardly more. To be sure, proletarian power will take the place of the bourgeoisie first, but its character is different from that of the former. The proletarian power is no longer in the

service of the private interests of a particular class, but in the service of the public interests of the classless society as a whole. It is no longer power of exploitation, but power to abolish exploitation—no longer power of alienation, but alienation from that power, no longer power against man, but power for man, no longer power as an opponent of freedom, but power as a pioneer of freedom. As such, it dies out with its consolidation. It turns into freedom and its proletarian triumph is its death. That is to say: if political power is an economic category of class society, after it has fulfilled its final task of crushing it, it becomes irrelevant. Where there is no longer a base, the superstructure collapses on itself.

In contrast to Marx, for the anarchists - who paradoxically meet their antipode Hobbes here - power is at least primarily not an economic category, but an independent political category. The "superstructure" here has a largely autonomous character, if not even assuming the role of the base, and must therefore be smashed in a direct attack. For the anarchists, what makes freedom and socialism impossible is primarily the existence of a state, a government, a bureaucracy, regardless of whether they are in the hands of bourgeois or revolutionaries, because revolution and government are incompatible. For the anarchists, therefore, political state power plays largely the role that Marx assigns to the economic power of private property. The expropriators must be expropriated from private ownership of the means of political power. Therefore - at least in an ideal-typical form of anarchism - freedom cannot be won and defended by its worst adversary, the state, but only by its spontaneous realization. As Bakunin once put it: "Freedom can and should defend itself only by itself, and it is dangerously absurd to interfere with it under the . . . . . Pretext to protect her .. «.25

It will not be further investigated here what reality value this theory of the anarchists has. The only thing at issue here is the realism of their critique of Marxism. This is inspired by the conviction that political power, precisely because it is not primarily an economic category but an independent political category, can also survive a social revolution in an unaltered dangerous form and thus corrupt the revolutionaries themselves.

Especially when these revolutionaries are also based on a theory that expressly demands the establishment of a state dictatorship for the revolutionaries. The anarchist "enrage" Jean-François Varlet, in his pamphlet L'Explosion, written in prison, has advocated the thesis that revolution and government are incompatible.

*** Mikhail Bakunin: Philosophy of Action, op. a. Oh, p. 322*

bel seien, da auch Revolutionäre, die die politische Macht innehaben, sich an dieser berauschen und sie für alle Zeiten behalten wollen.[26] Zumindest in diesem Punkte haben die Anarchisten weiter gesehen als Marx, der sich mit seiner Reduktion der Macht auf eine ökonomische Kategorie die Einsicht in die tieferen politischen, psychologischen, biologischen und allgemein anthropologischen Hintergründe des Machtproblems verbaut und es deshalb unterlassen hat, die Möglichkeiten eines Mißbrauchs und einer Entartung revolutionärer Macht zu überlegen und einzukalkulieren und gleichzeitig die nötigen Sicherungen zur Verhütung solcher Entwicklungen in seine Theorie einzubauen.

Gewiß spielt dabei auch noch das eschatologische Element im Denken von Marx eine Rolle, das ihn das Proletariat als eine heilsgeschichtliche Potenz auffassen und damit überfordern ließ.[27] Der spekulative Charakter des Marxschen Proletariatsbegriffs immunisierte diesen allzusehr gegen die Erfahrung, daß auch Proletarier nur Menschen sind – und ihre Führer mit ihnen. So erscheint es denn auch mehr als fraglich, ob eine sozialistische Revolution, die sich gemäß der Theorie von Marx tatsächlich auf dem Boden einer hochentwickelten kapitalistischen Gesellschaft ereignet hätte, eine etatistische Entartung nach sowjetischem Muster hätte vermeiden können. Der neue Mensch wartet nicht schon um die Ecke, kaum sind die Expropriateure expropriiert. So gesehen erscheint das Debakel des Etatismus wesentlich auch als eine Frage des Versäumnisses von Marx, das Problem der Macht gründlich durchdacht zu haben, was wiederum weitgehend als eine Folge seiner allzu optimistischen Anthropologie und der heilsgeschichtlichen Elemente in seinem Proletariatsbegriff – wie in seiner Geschichtskonzeption überhaupt – gedeutet werden muß. Hier könnte eine unvoreingenommene Auseinandersetzung mit der anarchistischen Kritik an Marx und am Marxismus – und darüber hinaus mit der Philosophie des Liberalismus, die ja zum Teil gewisse anarchistische Elemente enthält – wohl dazu beitragen, bisher Versäumtes nachzuholen und so die große Mauer des Etatismus zu sprengen, die den Weg in eine Gesellschaft mit menschlicherem Antlitz versperrt.

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[26] S. Alain Sergent – Claude Harmel: Histoire de l'Anarchie, Le Portulan 1949, p. 82.

[27] S. dazu auch was Albrecht Wellmer über die »eschatologische Überhöhung des Proletariats« durch Marx, in der »ein theoretisches Korrelat für den Verfall der Praxis« zu sehen sei, schreibt in: Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie und Positivismus, Frankfurt a. M., 1969, p. 56.

be at hand, since revolutionaries who hold political power also want to get intoxicated with it and keep it for all time.26

At least on this point, the anarchists saw further than Marx, who, with his

reduction of power to an economic category, blocked his insight into the deeper political, psychological, biological and generally anthropological background of the problem of power and therefore failed to do so to consider and calculate the possibilities of an abuse and a degeneration of revolutionary power and at the same time build into his theory the necessary safeguards to prevent such developments.

Certainly, the eschatological element in Marx's thinking also plays a role, which allowed the proletariat to see him as a power of salvation history and thus overtax him.27 The speculative character of Marx's concept of the proletariat immunized him too much against the experience that proletarians, too, were only human are - and their leaders with them. So it seems more than questionable whether a socialist revolution, which, according to Marx's theory, actually took place on the soil of a highly developed capitalist society, could have avoided a statist degeneration on the Soviet model. The new man is not waiting around the corner the moment the expropriators are expropriated. Seen in this way, the debacle of statism also appears essentially as a question of Marx's failure to have thoroughly thought through the problem of power, which in turn is largely a consequence of his overly optimistic anthropology and the salvation-historical elements in his concept of the proletariat - as in his Historical conception in general - has to be interpreted. Here an unbiased discussion of the anarchist criticism of Marx and Marxism - and also of the philosophy of liberalism, which in part contains certain anarchist elements - could help to catch up on what has been neglected so far and thus to break down the great wall of statism , which blocks the way to a society with a more human face.

2» S. Alain Sergent - Claude Harmel: History of Anarchy, Le Portulan 1949, p. 82.

**7 See also what Albrecht Wellmer writes about the “eschatological superiority of the proletariat” by Marx, in which “a theoretical correlate for the decline of practice” can be seen, in: Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie und Positivism, Frankfurt a. M., 1969, n. 56.*

HUMAN NATURE, POWER AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

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Until very recently, power has not been a word that has been on the lips or flowed from the pens of very many contemporary philosophers. Bertrand Russell wrote a book about it in 1938, Hannah Arendt discusses it in several of her works, and Herbert Marcuse points to it and deals with it throughhout his reflection. But beyond that, at least in the English-speaking world, power seems not merely to be of peripheral importance to contemporary philosophers; it has been downright neglected.

And that's a rather peculiar if not ironical situation. You don't have to turn the pages of very many philosophical classics to realize that, if not by name then by implication, power has been a basic concern of the central figures of the western philosophical tradition.

We need but think of the eudaemonistic tradition in European philosophy to see the centrality of »power« in philosophical reflection. The Greek notion of aretai or virtue, for example, is of interest in this connection, and the way such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza developed their thought in relation to it has direct bearing upon a philosophical understanding of power. Virtue or virtues are a man's or group's excelences, his (or their) powers, his (or their) ability to succeed in particular endeavors as well as in life in general. Plato of course »cosmoscises« this notion of virtue or power: the power of a man or a group is to succeed, yes, but it is at the same time the achievement of a congruence between his (or their) action and being and the intelligible structure of the Cosmos. To know the good is to do the good.

Aristotle in a sence strips the intelligible dimension of something of its transcendence and thereby redefines virtue or power as the realization or actualization of the immanent (but determined) potential of the species. Life is an art, true, but still the will in this natural law tradition is subordinate to the intellect. In other words, virtue, power or success (in act and in being) is a result of actualizing that potential or

HUMAN NATURE, POWER AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

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those potentials given to us as members of the species »rational animals«. Motion is the reduction of potency to act; human growth or becoming is to become what you (and we) already generically are.

And Spinoza, beautiful Spinoza, expresses quite clearly the close connection between the phenomenon of power and philosophical reflection. In a very real sense, he takes us back to the cosmic notions of Plato in his thoughts. Power is not force. Rather, power is such force realized or actualized, and it might be defined as the ability of any system or being to survive or be. For a man, of course, within the broad context of God in all of his modes and atributes, power means the realization of this essence, and that realization (paradoxically enough) depends upon understanding, i. e. seeing everything sub specie aeternitatis as a determined (logically) aspect of God or Being. Our power and our liberty consist in willing to become and be what in the context of nature we essentially are.

Well, we could go on with this, but I think my first point has been established: The classical tradition of philosophy, in one way or another, was fundamentally concerned with »power«.

Both Marxism, especially the early Marx, and Existentialism are contemporary movements of philosophy which might be considered to be sibling rivals and rebellions against Hegel. Both inherit from Hegel an historical sense, the modernist notion that what man and individual men are is not the result of their being members of a biological species but rather is the result of an historically constituted and conditioned development. We are a becoming, a process which is determined by ourselves either through »labor« for Marx or »subjective truth« for Kierkegaard. Thus, for the Marx of 1844, man *is* his labor, i. e. an alienation of himself whereby he transformes nature into useful products to satisfy his needs, thereby creating himself by creating the social relations and general conditions in which he lives. And for Kierkegaard, existence is a process of self-constitution »70,000 leagues over the deep,« i. e. a becoming wherein we write the script for the play we are in while we are in it.

For both the early Marx as well as the Existential thinkers, then, man is a process. In Ivan Svitak's words, »man is a history of his own definitions, the determination of himself.«[1] But more importantly than this likeness (which after all they share with Hegel) is the fact that for both there is no built-in end to this becoming and self-constitution. There is not, as with thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle or Spinoza, a culmination or end which can be achieved and which might be termed satisfaction, happiness, or power. All is open now, the vista from either perspective overlooks a never ending process of self-transcendence. After all, for Marx we labor together to fulfill needs, but no sooner have we transformed nature and ourselves through labor than we face new needs and thus a never ending spiral of catapulting over ourselves to create new »worlds« to fulfill those voracious force-needs within and amongst us. And for the Existential thinkers, the process of self-constitution through »subjective truth« or »will to power« or

[1] Ivan Svitak, »The Sources of Socialist Humanism,« *Socialist Humanism*, ed. by Fromm, New York (1966), p. 17.

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»resolute decision« is likewise never ending. The end of life is in the living of it, i. e. in self-growth and development, and to speak of goals in this context is either naive or a matter of »bad conscience«. As Kierkegaard put it in the *Postscript:* »It will be evident that the ideal of a persistent striving is the only view of life that does not carry with it an inevitable disillusionment«.[2]

What this means, of course, is that a significant shift has occurred in European philosophical speculation concerning power, a shift which seems most significant to me. To put it baldly: power is no longer the achievement of a goal, whether that be the grasp of the intelligible structure of the universe as for Plato, the realization of a generic nature as for Aristotle, or the ability to be through an »understanding« of all of nature for Spinoza, and perhaps even for Hegel. Rather, now, power is the ability *to be,* the living of process, a constant self-becoming. Kierkegaard puts this well in the *Sickness Unto Death:* »A self, every instant it exists, is in process of becoming, for the self (katà dynamin) is only that which it is to become«.[3] And for Marx »positive communism« is the abolition of alienation in its various forms and the return of man as laborer to himself, i. e. a return to the natural process of fulfilling his needs and creating his nature by transforming the world in which he lives. He says in the *German Ideology:*

> »History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the form of capital, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding ones and therefore, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.«[4]

Power, then, is the actualization of an energy to go beyond, it is the *process* of self-transcendence and self-constitution, either as laborer over against nature (Marx) or as active agent with others over against death and other limits and conditions of our lives (the Existentialists). We seek power because we seek ourselves! Power is nothing but the endless process of self-growth, the ability, in one way or another, to be involved in that process which is the growth of oneself and the shared human world of our daily concerns. Force, we might say with Spinoza, is the potential thrust toward self-transcendence and becoming; power is the process itself.

Power is not only the achievement of becoming and self-growth, it also entails personal involvement and decision in that growth. Notice, for example, that in the following informal list of ordinary words non-autonomy is not only pejorative but is equated with indecision and powerlessness.

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[2] Kierkegaard, *The Concluding Unscientific Postscript,* Princeton (1944), p. 110.
[3] Kiekegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death,* New York (1954), p. 44.
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4 Marx, The German Ideology, New York (1947), p. 88.

weak
pushed around
manipulated
forced
used
helpless
controlled
dominated

But in the following list, autonomy is equated with responsibility, decisivemess and the achievement of humanness. A »person« is *powerfull.*

self-determined
strong
independent
self-controlled
free
responsible

Power is self-transcendence, yes, but at the same time it involves a personal dimension of decision and engagement in that process. In fact, power, which *is* self-growth, is nothing but the decisive engagement of a person in the creation of his own future.

Let me say here that I *do* mean *personal growth,* but I don't mean by that a simply inward process having nothing to do with others and the world around. On the contrary, I believe we must analyze human nature in terms primarily of active life in a human world (Marx's Praxis). This maens that changes in my being are always »with« others and entail alterations, for all of us together, of the world of meaning and value which we share, our situational lived world. Personal power then is never isolated: it is situated in a human context with others and changes in one entail changes in the other. If I become a revolutionary while teaching at a university, I have done so as a person with felt needs in a (to me) limiting situation, and the changes in me show up in my activity in the world and bear upon my relations to others in that world. We are not talking, then, about the »lonely« individual who is abstracted out of any context, whether economic or social or political.

Merleau-Ponty says:

> »this subject is no longer alone, is no longer consciousness in general or pure being for itself. He is in the midst of other consciousnesses which likewise have a situation; he is for others, and becomes generic subject. For the first time since Hegel, militant philosophy is reflecting not on subjectivity, but on inter-subjectivity.«[5]

Power then is the very act of self-growth or becoming, an act which is not isolated within the individual, but which, because we are social and involved in a shared world, is precisely an event out in the world

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with implications for and influence in that world. Furthermore, as we have seen, this power is not a means to anything beyond itself: it is an end in itself; life is a becoming, and the validity of life lies in the process itself.

If this be true, then we might expect to find power to be a fundamental characteristic of all human life and institutions, as indeed I think is the case. Kolakowski has said: »Nowhere in the universe could man find a well so deep that he would not see his own face at the bottom of it.«[6] We might alter that a bit to say: Nowhere in the human world could we find a human relation, group, institution or human endeavor so inhuman that we could not find power at the bottom of it, as an essential ingredient of it. Men grow, they are temporal beings. Because of this, their relations and institutions likewise grow and are historical, i. e. involve power, whether of groups or individuals. Any social philosophy must take this into account, and any sociology and social psychology which ignores such »power« does so to its own disadvantage. Indeed, one suspects not simply naiveté in such myopia: one suspects an unrecognized power defense on the part of those sociologists, social psychologists and philosophers who studiously ignore the problem.

Bertrand Russel rightly makes power as central to the social sciences as is energy to the physical sciences. And Kenneth Clark in an article in which he castigates the social sciences for ignoring the phenomenon of power, says:

> »The problem of power is fundamental and pervasive in man's interaction with his material environment as well as with his social environment; within himself, in his interpersonal relations, in intergroup and international relations. Power permeates every aspect of human life and is therefore unavoidable.«[7]

There have been various definitions of social power offered over the years, but all of them involve *decision* and personal involvement in events.[8] In other words, social power means participation by individuals and groups in the events and actions which shape their world, and thus themselves. As we said, power *is* participation in self-growth, and social power is the same thing, but limited to the social realm.

Every man seeks to be powerful, seeks to become what he lacks, seeks to be. But that means that he seeks to participate in the constitution of himself and the world in which he lives. He seeks, then, to par-

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[6] Kolakowki, »Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth,« *Revisionism*, ed. Labedz, New York (1962), p. 187.

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[8] Some traditional sociological definitions of power:
McIntosh: The purposive control of events, or the ability to do so.
Mills: The ability to make decisions which have major consequences.
Weber: The ability to control the behavior of others.
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ticipate in the decisions which shape himself and the world he shares with others. The release of power is the release of self; it is the achievement of identity, whether personal or social. My conclusion, of course, is that participatory democracy is the ideological social result of the basic human drive for power. Men seek to participate in those decisions which affect their lives because they seek to be what they are not yet.

We have recently witnessed, and shall continue to witness I believe, an upsurge of power expressions around the world and in various social contexts. French students and professionals nearly toppled the Gaullist government; Czechoslovakian students led the struggle to break the power strangle-hold of the party; Italian students put their professors on trial; American blacks have nearly brought the educational establishment down in their movement for community control of their schools. Wherever we look we see, as a prime characteristic of our time, a world-wide movement to overthrow control *by others* (wether colonial governments, a monolithic party or plain bureaucracy) and to broaden the enfranchisement of masses of people in the decisions and processes which determine their lives.

The thirst to be is a characteristic of human life, yes, but especially of the young. Facing a world which borders on suicide, living in social and institutional context which, in the name of love and freedom, breed pain and suffering, apathy, hatred and disintegration, our young people and our minorities seek power to overcome the lacks they feel: black power, student power, female liberation, the third world, the disadvantaged everywhere, etc. It is only by such power that people and groups change, for as we have seen, power *is* change.

James Comer, for example, in an interesting article in the *Scientific American*, explains the historical and social context for Black Power and the benefits such power has already bestowed upon black Americans. Power is necessary, not merely for economic and political ends, but especially to overcome a traumatized, self-defeating, apathetic and self-denigrating style of life forced upon American blacks for over two hundred years. Black Power is not so much a means as an end, i. e. the development and institution of dignity and self-reliance, a new identity. Massive and immediate action is called for, he says, but not white action. »The form of that action should be attuned ... to the historically determined need for Negro political and economic power that will facilitate Negro progress and give Negroes a reasonable degree of control over their own destiny.«[9]

All persons seek to so structure their physical and social environment through their behavior that they attain a high potential for getting what they want out of the environment. In other words, people seek power, in various personal and social forms, because they seek to be more than they are. To blunt or turn aside that power, out of fear or greed or plane inertia, is to do harm to persons. It is to foster alienation and various forms of social pathology.

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Listen to the description one journalist wrote concerning some alienated but rebellious French professionals in France of May, 1968.

»Dignity is a key issue to French medical strikes . . . as a visitor to the Faculté de Médicine, the main medical school in Paris quickly discovers. The students who have occupied the school have plastered its halls with revolutionary posters, but the gripes they voice are not political; they boil down to a feeling that the school treats its students like children.

The present system of medical study and organization of hospitals dates back to Napoleon and has not been changed since, says a young student nurse. It is practically a military system. She complains that nurses are not permitted to give opinions to doctors and that many procedures can't be done without the approval of the hospital's chief doctor, who is appointed for life by the government. A male medical student interjects that students never get to examine a patient until after graduation and thus have no chance to assume gradually the responsibilities they will face as doctors.

A neuropsychiatrist who joints the discussion indicates that even full-fledged specialists feel subjected to indignities – stemming chiefly from the chief doctor's power over other doctors' chances for promotion. He claims that promotions sometimes go to doctors with political influence and that the need to pay obeisance to the boss extends even to an expectation that all doctors will call on the chief doctor on New Year's Day to extend good wishes. I would probably do so anyway, but I want to do so because I want to, the neuropsychiatrist says.

Teachers are aggrieved chiefly because they feel they have no voice in an educational system run by government-appointed administrators. Many regard the system itself as outdated, too, and they intend to change it. In the northern French city of Maubeuge, for instance, striking teachers at a big technical high school, met over the week-end to draft recommendations for reforms – with the assistance of committees of their pupils.

There has never been an opportunity to make our opinions known, says a black-haired woman striker who teaches English in Maubeuge. Everything comes down from the top. She goes on to voice complaints that were common in U. S. schools decades ago: We feel there is a discrepancy between school and life. There is to much emphasis on giving knowledge, not enough on training the personality. We have pupils who know a lot of things, but they are not able to cope with life.«[10]

One student who participated in the cultural revolution at Peking University in 1966–67 expresses his joy at the newly discovered sense of participation: »Now that we dare to speak, dare to act, it's wonderful! We've never felt like this before.« He goes on to describe round-the-clock meetings, spontaneous and exuberant expressions of pent-up

[10] »White Collar Revolt,« *The Wall Street Journal*, June 5, 1969, p. 1.

Listen to the description one journalist wrote concerning some alienated but rebellious French professionals in France of May, 1968.

»Dignity is a key issue to French medical strikes . . . as a visitor to the

Faculte de Medicine, the main medical school in Paris quickly discovers. The students who have occupied the school have plastered its halls with revolutionary posters, but the gripes they voice are not political; they boil down to a feeling that the school treats its students like children.

The present system of medical study and organization of hospitals dates back to Napoleon and has not been changed since, says a young student nurse. It is practically a military system.

She complains that nurses are not permitted to give opinions to doctors and that many procedures can't be done without the approval of the hospital's chief doctor, who is appointed for life by the government. A male medical student interjects that students never get to examine a patient until after graduation and thus have no chance to assume gradually the responsibilities they will face as doctors.

A neuropsychiatrist who joints the discussion indicates that even full-fledged specialists feel subjected to indignities - stemming chiefly from the chief doctor's power over other doctors'

chances for promotion. He claims that promotions sometimes go to doctors with political influence and that the need to pay obeisance to the boss extends even to an expectation that all doctors will call on the chief doctor on New Year's Day to extend good wishes.

I would probably do so anyway, but I want to do so because I want to, the neuropsychiatrist says.

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grievances and long-repressed hopes and desires for real educational reform at Peking University. Ultimately, he says, the cultural revolution aims at taking power away from an elitist and fossilized party bureaucracy and giving it to the people by instituting a »widening mass participation in state affairs such as Marx and Lenin foresaw as the prerequisite for communist society. The 'revolutionary masses' are seizing power not only through their representatives in the Peking Revolutionary Committee, but also directly, in their factories, communes, or institutions, through the 'revolutionary rebels' within.«[11]

Power is to man what energy is to nature. »Participatory Democracy« is the social and political ideal which most directly reflects that intimate relation.

[11] V. Nee, »The Cultural Revolution at Peking University,« *Monthly Review*, July–August, 1969, pp. 68–72.

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C u l t" ra l Revolution at Peking University,« Monthly Review, July-August, 1969, pp. 68-72.

NATION UND MACHT

Dušan Pirjevec

Ljubljana

Im Rahmen unseres allgemeinen Themas Macht und Humanität auch über Nation zu sprechen, bedeutet, dasjenige sprechen zu lassen, was uns selbst in der Sache der Nation wesentlich und entscheidend bestimmt hat. Dieses Wesentliche und Entscheidende ist unser Partisanenkrieg, aufgefaßt als nationaler Befreiungskampf; das Wesentliche, worauf es uns in der Frage der Nation ankommt ist, auf seine Weise in den Prinzipien zusammengefaßt, die diesen Kampf geführt haben, durch ihn bestätigt wurden und zu ihrer Wahrheit gelangt sind. Diese Prinzipien sind am umfassendsten in beiden Ausgaben von Kardeljs Buch *Die Entwicklung der slowenischen Nationalfrage* ausgearbeitet.

In der ersten Ausgabe wird die Nation als »historisch entstandene dauernde Gemeinschaft der Sprache, der wirtschaftlichen Zusammengehörigkeit, des Territoriums und der psychischen Struktur, die ihren Ausdruck in den Besonderheiten der Kultur findet« beschrieben. Diese Bestimmungen werden nicht als originelle Definitionen des Verfassers präsentiert, sie werden vielmehr in Anführungszeichen gesetzt, da es sich eigentlich um die bekannte These Stalins handelt.

Aus einer Reihe von theoretischen Gründen und aufgrund seiner Erfahrungen mit dem Stalinismus hat der Autor in der zweiten Ausgabe die Definition modifiziert und folgendermaßen zusammengefaßt: »Die Nation ist also eine spezifische Volksgemeinschaft, entstanden aufgrund der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung der Epoche des Kapitalismus, auf einem geschlossenen Territorium und im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Sprache und einer nahen ethnischen und kulturellen Verwandschaft im allgemeinen«.

Die Nation wird also als eine spezifische Volksgemeinschaft bestimmt, in deren Konzept zwei Elementenkomplexe eingebaut sind. Das sind vor allem konkrete ökonomisch-soziale Elemente, die in der Formulierung über die gesellschaftliche Arbeitsteilung der kapitalistischen Epoche zur Sprache kommen, woraus folgt, daß gerade die für die Produktionsverhältnisse des Kapitalismus und für den Kapital-

NATION AND POWER

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In the context of our general theme of power and humanity, to also speak about the nation means to let speak what has essentially and decisively determined us in the matter of the nation. What is essential and decisive is our partisan war, conceived as a national liberation struggle; the essence of what matters to us in the question of the nation is summed up in his own way in the principles that have waged this struggle, been vindicated by it, and come to their truth. These principles are most fully elaborated in both editions of Kardelj's book The Development of the Slovene National Question.

In the first edition, the nation is described as "an historically evolved enduring community of language, economic affiliation, territory, and psychic structure, which finds expression in the peculiarities of culture." These provisions are not presented as the author's original definitions; rather, they are placed in quotation marks, since they are in fact Stalin's well-known thesis.

For a number of theoretical reasons and because of his experience with Stalinism, the author modified the definition in the second edition and summarized it as follows:

"The nation is therefore a specific national community, created on the basis of the social division of labor of the epoch of capitalism, on a closed territory and within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural kinship in general".

The nation is thus defined as a specific people's community, in the concept of which two complexes of elements are built.

Above all, these are concrete economic and social elements that are discussed in the formulation of the social division of labor in the capitalist epoch, from which it follows that precisely those for the production conditions of capitalism and for capital-117

prozeß charakteristische Arbeitsteilung eine neue Art der menschlichen Gemeinschaft, eine neue Art des Mit-seins, der historischen Existenz und Anwesenheit verlangt und möglich gemacht hat.

Zur Definition der Nation gehört jedoch nicht nur dieses genau fixierte Bedürfnis nach einer neuen gesellschaftlichen Form, denn dieses Bedürfnis an sich ist noch nichts echt Nationales. Um von diesem Bedürfnis und seiner Verwirklichung eben zur Nation zu gelangen, müssen überdies noch jene Elemente in Erscheinung treten, die durch folgende Bezeichnungen evoziert werden: gemeinsame Sprache, kompaktes Territorium, nahe ethnische und kulturelle Verwandschaft sowie eine einheitliche, in der Besonderheit der Kultur zum Ausdruck kommende psychische Struktur. Dies allein sei das echt Nationale, dies allein gäbe der neuen Gemeinschaft das Recht auf die Bezeichnung *Nation.*

Die ökonomisch-sozialen Elemente sind zeitlich ziemlich genau loziert und begrenzt; das gilt indessen für die national-ethnische Determinante nicht. Die ökonomisch-sozialen Elemente sind historisch später, bzw. jünger als die national-ethnischen Merkmale. Um die durch den Kapitalprozess produzierten gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnisse realisieren zu können, und zwar in einer Form, der der Name *Nation* tatsächlich zukommt, bedarf es einer schon vorher bestehenden Sprache, eines kompakten Territoriums, einer ethnischen Verwandschaft, kulturellen Verwandschaft usw. Diese national-ethnischen Bestimmungen sind also historisch-chronologisch älter, vom Standpunkt der sozialen Bedürfnisse des Kapitals aus gesehen so alt, daß sie nur als *Nationalität* definiert werden konnten: dies leitet sich von *natio* ab, und *natio* ist dasselbe wie *natus,* der Geborene. Das Nationale als Ableitung aus *natus-natio* ist also *das Geborene,* und das bedeutet auch jenes Erste und Älteste: der Mensch erhält sein national-ethnisches Gepräge schon durch seine Geburt.

Dieser historisch-chronologische Vorrang der ethnischen Determinanten bedingt auch deren Unabhängigkeit von sozialen Bedürfnissen des Kapitalprozesses. Die national-ethnische Bestimmung und Strukturierung bestanden schon lange bevor der Kapitalprozeß seine Forderung nach einer neuen Art des Zusammenschlusses in Form einer Nation »stellen« konnte. Die national-ethnischen Determinanten waren schon lange da, sozusagen zum Anfassen nahe, darauf wartend, daß sie vom Kapitalprozeß auf eine neue Ebene, auf die Ebene der Nation gehoben werden.

Die national-ethnischen Determinanten sind kein Produkt des Kapitalprozesses, sie sind auch kein Produkt der Nation, allerdings auch kein Schöpfer der Nation im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes. Es sieht nämlich alles so aus, als wären sie in Hinsicht auf das gesellschaftliche Geschehen des Kapitals etwas völlig Passives, was eindeutig aus folgenden Sätzen Kardeljs hervorgeht: »Die Frage der Sprache und der Kultur nahm in den wirtschaftlichen Bestrebungen des Bürgertums einen wichtigen Platz ein. Der feudale Adel war nicht an die Sprache seiner Nation gebunden. Die Sprache der feudalen Höfe waren Latein und Französisch. Dem Bürgertum indessen stellte sich diese Frage anders. Erstens war die Nationalsprache die

process-characteristic division of labor has created a new kind of human community, a new kind of being-with that demands and makes possible historical existence and presence.

However, the definition of the nation does not only include this precisely fixed need for a new social form, for this need in itself is not yet truly national. In order to get from this need and its realization to the nation, those elements must also appear that are evoked by the following designations: common language, compact territory, close ethnic and cultural affinity and a unified culture specific to the Psychic structure coming into expression. This alone is what is truly national, this alone gives the new community the right to be called a nation.

The economic-social elements are fairly precisely located and limited in time; however, this does not apply to the national-ethnic determinant. The economic-social elements are historically later or younger than the national-ethnic characteristics. In order to be able to realize the societal needs produced by the capital process, and to do so in a form that actually deserves the name e nation, a pre-existing language, a compact territory, an ethnic affinity, cultural affinity, etc. are required. These national-ethnic ones Determinations are thus historically-chronologically older, so old from the point of view of the social needs of capital that they could only be defined as nationality: this derives from natio, and natio is the same as natus, the born. The national as a derivation from natus-natio is therefore what was born, and that also means that which is first and most ancient: man already receives his national-ethnic character through his birth.

This historical-chronological precedence of ethnic determinants also means that they are independent of the social needs of the capital process. The national-ethnic determination and structuring existed long before the capital process could "make" its demand for a new kind of association in the form of a nation. The national-ethnic determinants were already there, close at hand, so to speak, waiting to be lifted from the capital process to a new level, the level of the nation.

The national-ethnic determinants are not a product of the capital process, nor are they a product of the nation, but they are also not a creator of the nation in the true sense of the word. Everything looks as if they were something completely passive with regard to the social events of capital, which is clearly evident from the following sentences of Kardelj: »The question of language and culture played an important role in the economic efforts of the bourgeoisie a. The feudal nobility was not bound by the language of their nation. The languages of the feudal courts were Latin and French. The bourgeoisie, meanwhile, faced this question differently. First, the national language was 118

einzige Grundlage, auf der die Zentralisierung erfolgreich durchgeführt werden konnte; und zweitens war die Nationalsprache das einzige Kommunikationsmittel am Markte, das heißt an dem Ort, wo es den Grundschichten des Volkes direkt begegnete. *Zu einer freien Entwicklung des Handels war also die freie Entwicklung der Nationalsprache und ihr Fortschritt notwendig.«*

Dieses Problem wird eingehender in der zweiten Ausgabe des Buches erörtert, indem besonders hervorgehoben wird, wie außerordentlich charakteristisch es sei, daß das Entstehen der neuen, dem Kapitalprozeß entsprechenden Gesellschaftsform keineswegs im Rahmen des Feudalstaates erfolgte, sondern im Rahmen der ethnischen Gemeinschaft, also im Rahmen der Sprache und der Kultur, was zuletzt durch die Behauptung erläutert wird, daß die freie Entwicklung und der Fortschritt der Nationalsprache für die freie Entwicklung der Wirtschaft unumgänglich gewesen seien.

Die ethnisch-nationalen Bestimmungen wurden in einen Anpassungsprozeß hineingeworfen und für etwas verwendet, was sie selbst nicht sind, oder anders gesagt: sie wurden in einer ganz bestimmten, und zwar ausschließlich in dieser Richtung aktiviert. Die Nation ist also eine spezifische Aktivierung dieser Grundbestimmnugen des Menschen, so daß die Nation als eine neue Form der menschlichen Gemeinschaft nur dann in Erscheinung tritt, wenn auch diese spezifische Aktivierung der Sprache, der Kultur, der ethnischen Verwandschaft, des kompakten Territoriums, also jener Determinanten, die schon seit jeher – von der Geburt an – bestehen vor sich geht. Dieses Aktivieren kommt offenbar von aussenher, vom Bedürfnis nach der freien Entwicklung einer spezifischen Wirtschaftsform, und zwar ausschließlich von dieser. Ist also die ethnisch-nationale Determinante in jeder Hinsicht älter, ursprünglicher und primärer, wenn auch ohne sie eine Nation überhaupt nicht sein kann, so ist es dennoch klar, daß dieses Ursprüngliche und Primäre in Hinsicht auf die Nation keinesfalls eine derart aktive Kraft darstellt, die von sich selbst aus die Nation als eine neue Form der menschlichen Vereinigung zu schaffen vermag. Die Nation wird eigentlich von einer anationalen Kraft geschaffen, von einer Kraft also, für die die Welt des Ethnisch-Nationalen und Geborenen prinzipiell und als solche eigentlich völlig irrelevant ist. Für diese Kraft, den Kapitalprozeß, sind die ethnisch-nationalen Elemente nur mit Rücksicht auf ihre eigenen Interessen »interessant« und deshalb kann ihre auf die Nation ausgerichtete Aktivierung lediglich diejenigen Gebiete erfassen, die eben diesen Interessen entsprechen.

Die Unterscheidung der ethnisch-nationalen Bestimmungen und alles Geborenen von der Aktivität ökonomisch-sozialer Elemente läßt wenigstens grundsätzlich die Möglichkeit offen, die Nation ohne Berufung auf Nationales und Ethnisches, ohne Rücksicht darauf, was durch *natus-natio* spricht, zu begreifen und zu bestimmen. Diese Möglichkeit wird durch den bekannten Vortrag Renans *Was ist eine Nation?* aus dem Jahr 1882 bestätigt. Die Gründe und Konstituanten der Nation suchend analysiert Renan eingehend folgende Elemente: Rassendeterminiertheit, gemeinsame Sprache, gemeinsame Religion,

only basis on which the centralization could be carried out successfully; and secondly, the national language was the only means of communication in the market, that is, in the place where it met the lower classes of the

people directly. The free development of the national language and its progress were therefore necessary for the free development of trade.«

This problem is discussed in more detail in the second edition of the book, emphasizing how extremely characteristic it is that the emergence of the new form of society corresponding to the capital process did not take place within the framework of the feudal state, but within the framework of the ethnic community, that is, within the of language and culture, which is finally explained by the assertion that the free development and progress of the national language were indispensable for the free development of the economy.

The ethnic-national determinations were thrown into a process of adjustment and used for something that they themselves are not, or in other words: they were activated in a very specific, and exclusively in this direction. The nation is therefore a specific activation of these basic human determinations, so that the nation appears as a new form of human community only when this specific activation of language, culture, ethnic kinship, compact territory, i.e. that determinants that have always existed - from birth - is going on.

This activation obviously comes from outside, from the need for the free development of a specific form of economy, and exclusively from it. If, then, the ethno-national determinant is in every respect ancient, primordial and primary, even if without it a nation cannot exist at all, it is nevertheless clear that this primordial and primary is by no means such an active force in relation to the nation that capable of creating the nation as a new form of human union. The nation is actually created by an anational force, that is, by a force for which the world of the ethnic-national and the native is in principle and as such actually completely irrelevant. For this force, the capital process, the ethnic-national elements are only out of consideration for their own interests

"interesting" and therefore their nation-oriented activation can only cover those areas that correspond to those very interests.

The distinction between ethnic-national determinations and everything that is born from the activity of economic-social elements leaves open the possibility, at least in principle, of comprehending and determining the nation without reference to national and ethnic elements, without regard to what speaks through natus-natio. This possibility is illustrated by Renan's well-known lecture What is a nation? from 1882 confirmed. Seeking the foundations and constituents of the nation, Renan analyzes in detail the following elements: racial determination, common language, common religion, 119

gemeinsame wirtschaftliche Interessen und geographische Faktoren, verwirft sie aber einer nach dem anderen kategorisch, indem er erklärt, der Mensch sei kein Sklave seiner Rasse, Sprache, Religion, Ökonomie und seines Territoriums, so daß nicht ein einziges dieser Elemente zur Definition der Nation herangezogen werden könne. Hier schwanden also aus der Nation alle ethnischnationalen Bestimmungen, alles Erste und Geborene, ebenso schwanden auch einige der sozial-ökonomischen Elemente, die in die zitierte marxistisch-kommunistische Definition der Nation eingebaut wurden. Nur der Mensch ist geblieben, der kein Sklave ist, es ist also der freie Mensch geblieben als freies Subjekt, und somit dürfen wir schließen, daß die Nation eine Schöpfung der Freiheit ist und daß sie demnach überhaupt nicht auf dem Nationalen und Geborenen beruht. Tatsächlich betont Renan mit allem Nachdruck, daß eine Nation nur durch sich selbst existiere. Sie ist also eine freie Selbstschöpfung und in ihr gibt es nichts vom Nationalen und Geborenen, von demjenigen Ersten und Ursprünglichen.

Was ist dann eine Nation, wie ist eine Nation überhaupt möglich? Renan antwortet: »Eine Nation ist eine Seele, ein geistiges Prinzip. Zwei Dinge, die in Wahrheit eines sind, bilden diese Seele, dieses geistige Prinzip. Das eine liegt in der Vergangenheit, das andere in der Gegenwart. Das eine ist der gemeinsame Besitz eines reichen Vermächtnisses an Erinnerungen; das andere ist die gegenwärtige Übereinstimmung, der Wunsch zusammen zu leben, der Wille fortzufahren, jenes Erbe nutzbar zu machen, das man ungeteilt empfangen hat. Der Mensch wird nicht improvisiert. Die Nation, wie das Einzelwesen, ist das Ergebnis einer langen Vergangenheit voller Anstrengungen, Opfer und Hingebung. Der Ahnenkult ist der legitimste von allen; die Vorfahren haben uns zu dem gemacht, was wir sind. Eine heroische Vergangenheit, große Männer, der Ruhm – das ist das gesellschaftliche Kapital, auf dem man einen nationalen Gedanken aufbaut. Hat man in der Vergangenheit zusammen Ruhm erworben und einen gemeinsamen Willen in der Gegenwart; hat man große Dinge zusammen vollbracht und will sie weiter vollbringen, dann hat man die wesentlichen Vorbedingungen, um ein Volk zu sein. ... Eine Nation ist mithin eine große Solidarität, beruhend auf dem Gefühl der Opfer, die man gebracht hat und derer, die man noch zu bringen gewillt ist. Sie setzt eine Vergangenheit voraus; sie bestätigt sich dennoch in der Gegenwart durch eine fühlbare Tatsache: durch die Übereinstimmung, den klar ausgedrückten Wunsch, das gemeinsame Leben fortzuführen. Die Existenz der Nation ... ist ein Alltagsplebiszit, wie die Existenz des Individuums eine fortwährende Bejahung des Lebens ist.« Vgl. Hannah Vogt, Nationalismus gestern und heute. Texte und Dokumente. Opladen, 1967, S. 140–141.

Der Ausgangspunkt ist in jedem Fall die Vergangenheit – und die Vergangenheit ist eine heroische, das sind große Männer, große Taten, das ist der Ruhm. Eine große, ruhmreiche und heroische Vergangenheit bildet das gesellschaftliche Kapital, auf dem allein man eine Idee der Nation aufbauen kann. In der bekannten Terminologie des

common economic interests and geographic factors, but categorically rejects them one by one, declaring that man is not the slave of his race, language, religion, economy and territory, so that not a single one of these elements is

used to define the nation could.

Here, then, all ethnic-national determinations disappeared from the nation, all that was first and born, as well as some of the socio-economic elements that were built into the Marxist-Communist definition of the nation quoted above. Only the person who is not a slave has remained, so the free person has remained as a free subject, and thus we may conclude that the nation is a creation of freedom and that it is therefore not at all based on what is national and what is born. Indeed, Renan emphatically emphasizes that a nation exists by itself alone. It is therefore a free self-creation and in it there is nothing of the national and the born, of that first and original.

What then is a nation, how is a nation even possible?

Renan replies: »A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.

Two things that are in truth one make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the shared ownership of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the present agreement, the desire to live together, the will to continue to utilize that inheritance that one has received undivided. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the result of a long history of effort, sacrifice and dedication. Ancestor worship is the most legitimate of aliens; our ancestors made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, fame - these are the social capital on which a national idea is built. Did you win fame together in the past and a common will in the present; if you have accomplished great things together and want to continue to accomplish them, then you have the essential prerequisites for being a people. .. . A nation is thus a great solidarity, based on a sense of the sacrifices that have been made and those that are yet to be made. It presupposes a past; it is nevertheless confirmed in the present by a tangible fact: by agreement, by the clearly expressed desire to continue living together. The Existence of the Nation. . . is an everyday plebiscite, just as the existence of the individual is an ongoing affirmation of life." See Hannah Vogt, National i s m s Gester und heute. texts and documents. Opladen, 1967, pp. 140-141.

In any case, the starting point is the past - and the past is a heroic one, there are great men, great deeds, that is glory. A great, glorious, and heroic past constitutes the social capital on which alone one can build an idea of the nation. In the familiar terminology of the 120th

neunzehnten Jahrhunderts bedeutet dies, daß es sich hier um die Begründung der sogenannten historischer Nationen handelt, woraus der Schluß gemacht werden dürfte, Renans Definition sei einseitig, da sie den sogenannten nichthistorischen Nationen nichts biete, denen offenbar jenes gesellschaftliche Kapital nicht zur Verfügung stehe, das die Hauptbedingung der Idee einer Nation sei. Da sich jedoch in Europa auch unhistorische Nationen als selbständige und souveräne gesellschaftliche Einheiten affirmierten, könnte man daraus schließen, daß Renans Gedanken keinesfalls die Nation als solche bestimmen können.

Ein solcher Schluß ließe jedoch die wesentlichen Implikationen jener Auffassung der Nation außer Acht, die gerade durch Renans Gedanken so klar zur Sprache kamen. Denn diese ruhmreiche, heroische und große Vergangenheit ist nicht nur ein gesellschaftliches Kapital als solches, sie ist gleichzeitig ein Vorbild und Modell für die Gegenwart, sie bedeutet allein an sich nichts, sie bleibt nur Idee, sie wird zu keiner Wirklichkeit, es sei denn, es besteht der Wille, die Vergangenheit, die großen Taten in der Gegenwart fortzusetzen. Es bedarf nicht nur einer großen Vergangenheit, es bedarf auch einer großen Gegenwart. Eine Nation besteht wirklich, nur wenn sie als Ruhm, Heldentum und Größe geschieht, das heißt, als eine große historische Aktion. Eine Nation ist historische Aktion, beziehungsweise Bereitschaft und Wille zur historischen Aktion. Als solche ist eine Nation von sich selbst her gleichzeitig auch der Raum, worin der Mensch kein Sklave, weder der Sprache noch der Religion, sondern frei ist. Eine Nation ist also eine freie Aktion, die sich selbst setzt. Das Sich-Berufen auf eine große und ruhmreiche Vergangenheit heißt nichts anderes als nur, daß sich die Nation als Aktion in der Aktion begründet. Eine Nation ist mithin eine in sich selbst begründete und aus sich selbst hervorgehende historische Aktion. Wie eine Nation als Ganzes, so geht auch eine historische Aktion nur aus sich selbst hervor, sie hat keinen Grund außerhalb ihrer selbst, sondern sie setzt sich selbst, sie ist zu nichts und niemanden verpflichtet und also frei. Eben dieses völlige Frei-Sein einer historischen Aktion, die Tatsache, daß sie aus sich selbst hervorgeht und demnach eine Schöpfung der Freiheit ist, ist auch die wesentliche Chance und Möglichkeit aller unhistorischen Nationen, denn eine solche Aktion kann wo immer und wann immer, zu jeder Zeit in Erscheinung treten. Nur in diesem Licht kann man die paradoxalen Schicksale kleiner und unhistorischer Nationen begreifen.

Es stellt sich aber ein anderes Problem: wie kann das Prinzip einer in sich selbst begründeten Aktion verschiedene und zumindest im Prinzip gleichberechtigte Nationen bzw. historische Aktionen konstituieren? Diese Frage fragt nach dem Pluralismus der Aktion.

Das einzige, womit Renan die Nation überhaupt begründen kann, ist die These, daß die Existenz der Nation die Freiheit verbürge; gäbe es nämlich keine Nationen, behauptet er, hätte die Welt nur ein Gesetz und nur einen Herrn, und daraus folgt, daß das Wesen der Nation darin liege, daß sie selbst ihr eigenes Gesetz und ihr eigener Herr sei, und das bedeutet lediglich, daß sie nur durch sich selbst ist

In the nineteenth century, this means that we are dealing here with the foundation of the so-called historical nations, from which the conclusion could be drawn that Renan's definition is one-sided, since it offers nothing

to the so-called non-historical nations, which obviously do not have that social capital at their disposal , which is the main condition of the idea of a nation. However, since non-historical nations in Europe also affirmed themselves as independent and sovereign social units, one could conclude that Renan's thoughts could in no way determine the nation as such.

Such a conclusion, however, would ignore the essential implications of that conception of the nation which was expressed so clearly by Renan's thoughts. Because this glorious, heroic and great past is not only a social capital as such, it is at the same time a model and model for the present, it in itself means nothing, it remains only an idea, it does not become reality unless there is a will to continue the past, the great deeds in the present. Not only does it require a great past, it also requires a great present. A nation really exists only when it happens as glory, heroism and greatness, that is, as a great historical action. A nation is historical action, or readiness and will for historical action. As such, a nation is by itself at the same time the space in which man is not a slave, neither to language nor to religion, but is free. So a nation is a free action that sets itself.

Invoking a great and glorious past means nothing other than that the nation begins as action within action. A nation is, therefore, a self-contained and self-generating historical action. Like a nation as a whole, a historical action only emerges from itself, it has no reason outside of itself, but sets itself, it is not obliged to anything or anyone and is therefore free.

It is precisely this complete freedom of a historical action, the fact that it emerges from itself and is therefore a creation of freedom, that is also the essential chance and possibility of all unhistorical nations, because such an action can happen anywhere and anytime appear at any time. Only in this light can one understand the paradoxical fates of small and unhistorical nations.

But another problem arises: how can the principle of an action that is self-substantiated constitute different and at least in principle equal nations or historical actions? This question asks about the pluralism of action.

The only thing that Renan can justify the nation with is the thesis that the existence of the nation guarantees freedom; for if there were no nations, he maintains, the world had but one law and one lord, and it follows that the essence of the nation is that it is itself its own law and lord, and that means only that she is only by herself 121

und durch nichts anderes. Eine Nation ist nur durch sich selbst, ist sich selbst Gesetz und Herr, und all dies ist sie durch ihre freie Aktion. Eine Nation ist also Subjekt.

Diese Bestimmungen führen uns zurück zu den marxistischen Definitionen. Kardelj stellt nämlich auch Folgendes fest: »Im Sinne der obigen Definition ist es klar, daß innerhalb der gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen der Nationalstaat die größtmögliche freie Entwicklung der Nation ermöglicht... Die Nationen haben demnach ein Recht auf Selbstbestimmung – der Begriff der Selbstbestimmung kann wirklich nur im Recht einer jeden Nation existieren, einen eigenen Staat zu schaffen, im Recht auf Loslösung.«

Drei Begriffe sind entscheidend: der Nationalstaat, die freie Entwicklung der Nation und die Selbstbestimmung. Das Ziel ist auf jeden Fall die freie Entwicklung der Nation, die nur durch einen eigenen Staat verwirklicht werden kann, zu dem man nur im Rahmen und aufgrund von Selbstbestimmung gelangen kann. Die Selbstbestimmung ist der wichtigste Grund der freien Entwicklung, woraus folgt, daß diese Entwicklung eine unaufhörliche Verwirklichung der Selbstbestimmung ist. Das Geschehen der Nation ist das Geschehen der Selbstbestimmung, oder wie es Ivan Cankar ausdrücken würde: Die Nation schreibt sich selbst ihr Schicksal, oder auch: »Die Nation als Einheit des politischen Willens, die selbst über ihr Schicksal entscheiden will« (Fr. Zwitter, »Sodobnost«, 1964, S. 1062).

Selbstbestimmung wird als Freiheit, bzw. als freie Entwicklung der Nation aufgefaßt, und Freiheit ist nichts anderes als Entscheiden über das eigene Schicksal, jedoch so, daß dieses freie Entscheiden über sich selbst wesentlich an einen eigenen Staat gebunden ist; daher handelt es sich also nicht nur etwa um Kontemplation, grundsätzliche Deklarationen oder schriftliche Bestimmungen. Es geht um die Beherrschung und Gestaltung des eigenen Schicksals innerhalb einer konkreten sozial-historischen Situation, innerhalb der »gegenwärtigen« gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten und mittels von Instrumenten, die einzig und allein diesen Gegebenheiten entsprechen – und das ist eben der Staat. Nicht der Staat schlechthin, weder ein altorientalisches Imperium noch eine griechische Polis. Der Staat als Geschehen und Instrument der Selbstbestimmung und Freiheit ist jener Typ des Staates, der im neuzeitlichen Europa und Amerika entstand und definitiv durch die Französische Revolution geformt und generalisiert wurde. Die Nation als Selbstbestimmung ereignet sich also in einer gegebenen historisch-sozialen Welt und stellt eine der Möglichkeiten der Geschichtlichkeit und der Sozialität des Menschen dar. In diesem historischen und sozialen Zusammenhang setzt die Selbstbestimmung eine gewiße Aktivität und Eigenaktivität voraus. So wie man heute die Selbstbestimmung allgemein versteht, kann sie sich nur im Kampf oder in der Aktion behaupten. Ein passives Verhalten kann nie als beispielgebendes Gestalten des eigenen Schicksals aufgefaßt werden: Passivität bedeutet für uns Unterwerfung unter das Schicksal, Freiheitsverlust und Abdizierung. Die Beherrschung des eigenen Schicksals ist nur Aktion, jedoch immer eine freie, d. h. eine solche Aktion, die aus dem eigenen, nicht aus fremdem Willen entsteht, aus jenem

and by nothing else. A nation is only by itself, is its own law and master, and all this it is by its free action. A nation is therefore a subject.

These definitions bring us back to the Marxist definitions. Namely, Kardelj

also states the following: »In the sense of the above definition, it is clear that within the present social conditions the nation-state enables the greatest possible free development of the nation.. . The nations therefore have a right to self-determination - the concept of self-determination can really only exist in the right of every nation to create its own state, in the right to secession.«

Three concepts are crucial: the nation state, the free development of the nation and self-determination. In any case, the goal is the free development of the nation, which can only be achieved through a state of its own, which can only be achieved within the framework and on the basis of self-determination. Self-determination is the most important reason for free development, from which it follows that this development is a continuous realization of self-determination. What happens in the nation is what happens in self-determination, or as Ivan Cankar would put it: the nation writes its own fate, or also: "The nation as a unit of political will that wants to decide its own fate"

(Fr. Zwitter, "Modernity", 1964, S. 1062).

Self-determination is understood as freedom, or as free development of the nation, and freedom is nothing other than deciding about one's own fate, but in such a way that this free decision about oneself is essentially tied to one's own state; therefore it is not just about contemplation, policy declarations or written regulations. It's about mastering and shaping one's own destiny within a concrete socio-historical situation, within the "present" social realities and using instruments that correspond solely to these realities - and that is precisely the state. Not the state par excellence, neither an ancient oriental empire nor a Greek polis. The state as event and instrument of self-determination and freedom is the type of state that arose in modern Europe and America and was definitively shaped and generalized by the French Revolution. The nation as self-determination thus occurs in a given historical-social world and represents one of the possibilities of historicity and human sociality. In this historical and social context, self-determination presupposes a certain activity and personal activity. The way self-determination is generally understood today, it can only assert itself in battle or in action. Passive behavior can never be understood as exemplary shaping of one's own destiny: for us, passivity means submission to destiny, loss of freedom and commitment. Controlling one's own destiny is only an action, but always a free one, i. H. such an action, which arises from one's own will, not from someone else's, from that 122

eigenen Willen, also, der der Wille zur Selbstbestimmung, bzw. zu einer großen historischen Aktion ist als Wille, jene große, ruhmreiche und heroische Vergangenheit fortzusetzen. Die Nation als Selbstbestimmung, als tägliches Plebiszit ereignet sich als freie historische Aktion.

Die Nation als Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung im Sinne der historischen Aktion bedeutet nichts anderes als Sich-selbst-Herr-sein und Sich-selbst-Gesetz-sein. Gesetz und Herr sein heißt aber verordnen, befehlen, beherrschen, mit einem Wort, Macht innehaben, d. h. Macht über das eigene Schicksal, bzw. über den gesamten Bereich der Welt, in dem das Schicksal geschieht. Herrschen, beherrschen, verordnen, befehlen und sich selbst bestimmen – all das ist seiner tiefsten Bestimmung zufolge dasselbe wie Macht innehaben, mächtig sein bzw. Macht sein. Nation als Selbstbestimmung in der Weise der historischen und freien Aktion ist also Macht. Und da die Nation eigentlich Wille ist, die ruhmreiche Vergangenheit fortzusetzen, so folgt daraus, daß eine Nation Wille zur Macht ist.

Die Macht, bzw. der Wille zur Macht geschieht im Fall der Nation innerhalb einzelner Nationen. Das Geschehen und Selbstgeschehen der Macht wird durch die Grenzen einzelner Nationen begrenzt, und mithin handelt es sich um eine Begrenzung bzw. Selbstbegrenzung der Macht. Das ist der Pluralismus der Macht. Im Pluralismus als Selbstbegrenzung der Macht beruht also das Prinzip der Existenz von mehreren Nationen. Die Nationen sind Selbstbegrenzung der Macht, bzw. des Willens zur Macht und sie können nur im Zeitalter solcher Begrenzungen und eines solchen Pluralismus oder Polyzentrismus bestehen; daher bietet sich die Möglichkeit, die Nation und das Prinzip der Nation eben durch Selbstbegrenzung der Macht und des Willens zur Macht zu begreifen.

Selbsbegrenzung bedeutet, daß die Macht noch nicht völlig frei ist, daß sie also nicht aus sich und für sich ist, daß sie noch nicht ihr eigener Grund und zugleich der Grund, d. h. Unter-lage oder sub-iectum von allem ist. Die Macht in ihrer Selbstbegrenzung ist noch nicht ihr eigener Ursprung, sie ist vielmehr begründet in etwas und geht aus etwas hervor, das nicht sie selbst ist. Im Rahmen der Nation geht die Macht hervor und gründet sich in dem, das *natus-natio* heißt, also im Geborenen. Der Pluralismus und Polyzentrismus der Macht ist also Selbstbegründung der Macht im Nationalen und Ethnischen. Diese Begründung in einem anderen ist die Verborgenheit der Wahrheit der Selbstbegründung; das ist also die Verborgenheit jener Wahrheit, die durch Renans Behauptung, die Nation sei nur durch sich selbst, ausgesprochen wird und die sich durch Selbstbestimmung als Grunddimension der Nation verdeutlicht. Mit anderen Worten: durch die Begründung im Nationalen, Ethnischen und Geborenen birgt sich die Wahrheit, daß der wahre Grund von allem eigentlich die Macht selbst ist, daß sie selbst das einzig wirkliche sub-iectum, die einzige Unter-lage und der Grund von allem ist, dies jedoch derart, daß sie selbst ohne irgendeinen Grund ist, völlig frei, durch nichts gebunden, niemandem verantwortlich, so daß ihre Wahrheit eigentlich ein *Nihil – Nichts* ist. Durch die Begründung in

own will, that is, which is the will to self-determination, or to a great historical action as a will to continue that great, glorious and heroic past. The nation as self-determination, as a daily plebiscite, occurs as a free

historical action.

The nation as freedom and self-determination in the sense of historical action means nothing other than being master of oneself and being one's own law. But to be law and lord means to decree, to command, to rule, in a word, to have power, i. H. Power over one's destiny or over the entire area of the world in which destiny occurs. Rule, dominate, decree, command and determine oneself - according to its deepest purpose, all of this is the same as having power, being powerful or

be power. Nation as self-determination in the manner of historical and free action is power. And since the nation is properly the will to perpetuate the glorious past, it follows that a nation is the will to power.

The power, or the will to power, happens in the case of the nation within individual nations. The events and self-events of power are limited by the borders of individual nations, and therefore it is a question of a limitation or self-limitation of power. This is the pluralism of power. The principle of the existence of several nations is based on pluralism as self-limitation of power. Nations are self-limitations of power, or of the will to power, and they can exist only in an age of such limitations and such pluralism or polycentrism; hence the possibility of understanding the nation and the principle of the nation precisely through self-limitation of power and the will to power.

Self-limitation means that power is not yet completely free, that it is not of itself and for itself, that it is not yet its own ground and at the same time the ground, i. H. Under-lage or sub-iectum of everything. Power in its self-limitation is not yet its own origin, rather it is grounded in and emanates from something other than itself. Within the framework of the nation, power emerges and is based in what is called natus-natio, that is, in what is born. The pluralism and polycentrism of power is therefore the self-justification of power in the national and ethnic. This grounding in another is the concealment of the truth of self-grounding; this is the obscurity of that truth which is expressed by Renan's assertion that the nation exists only through itself and which is made clear by self-determination as the fundamental dimension of the nation. In other words, through grounding in the national, ethnic, and native, lies the truth that the true ground of everything is actually power itself, that power itself is the only real sub-iectum, the sole foundation and ground of everything but this is such that it is itself without any reason, completely free, bound by nothing, responsible to no one, so that its truth is actually a nihil - nothing. By reasoning in 123

national-ethnischen Determinanten birgt sich also die ursprüngliche nihilistische Wahrheit der Macht als Ursprung ihrer Freiheit, unaufhörlicher Selbstintensivierung und Selbsttranszendierung.

Das Schicksal des Nationalen und Ethnischen und das Schicksal der Nation selbst hängen also von Implikationen der Selbstbegründung als Verborgenheit der Wahrheit der Macht und des Willens zur Macht ab. Alles Nationale, Ethnische und Geborene muß demnach seine Bedeutung verlieren, wenn der Wille zur Macht im Prozeß seiner Selbstintensivierung einmal soviel Wille und Macht in sich sammelt, daß er sich als er selbst, d. h. als die einzige Unter-lage oder sub-iectum der Welt entbergen »kann«. Dieser Sammelprozeß ist Versammlung in die Wahrheit, ist Entbergung und Verwirklichung, ist Befreiung des Willens zur Macht von allem, das nicht er selbst ist, und mithin Befreiung von allem Nationalen und Ethnischen. Der Wille zur Macht kehrt zu sich selbst zurück, er re-evoluiert zu sich selbst; so kann man sagen, daß eine Revolution als eine Umkehr innerhalb der Macht selbst geschieht. Ein Moment der Umkehr und der Revolution ist zweifellos auch der Gedanke Renans, in dem nichts Ethnisches, Nationales und Geborenes mehr enthalten ist.

In dieser Umkehr und Revolution geschieht das Ende der Nation: mithin erklärt es sich, daß der Gedanke vom Ende der Nation wesentlich zum Gedankengut des Marxismus gehört, der ja den Revolutionsgedanken par excellence darstellt. Kardelj spricht z. B. sehr deutlich über das Absterben der Nationen, ihre Verschmelzung, die Entstehung einer allgemein menschlichen Kultur, so daß der Mensch zum »direkten Weltbürger« wird, was wiederum bedeutet, daß der Mensch am Weltgeschehen nicht mehr vermittels Nation, sondern direkt als solcher teilhaben wird.

Die Frage nach der Nation und der Macht wird zur Frage nach dem Ende der Nation. Wie ist es heute um diese Frage bestellt? Als Antwort darauf soll ein sehr wortreiches Dokument, ein Bestseller, das Buch *»Die amerikanische Herausforderung«* des französischen Journalisten Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber angeführt werden. Dieser beginnt seine Untersuchung mit relativ alten und allgemein bekannten, sowie reich dokumentierten Feststellungen über den technologischen Abgrund, der Europa und Nordamerika trennt und in dem sich die Gefahr verbirgt, daß Europa füher oder später dem amerikanischen technologischen Kolonialismus zum Opfer fallen wird. Die sich daraus ergebende Frage ist die Frage nach der Macht. »Europa hat einen Markt, aber keine Kraft geschaffen«, es hat also keine Kraft, es hat keine Macht, und so stellt sich der Verfasser die Frage: »Wo ist die europäische Macht?«; da Europa machtlos ist, hat es sein »Schicksal nicht mehr in eigenen Händen«. Das Problem Europas ist also das der Macht, dies ist aber zugleich die Frage, wie das eigene Schicksal in eigene Hände zu nehmen ist.

Die Macht als Beherrschung und Gestaltung des eigenen Schicksals ist eigentlich die der Nation wesentlich zukommende Bestimmung, sie tritt indessen heute offenbar nur noch innerhalb einer weiteren, d. h. transnationalen Struktur auf – in europäischen Ausmaßen. Im Horizont der Macht, der Selbstbestimmung und der Beherrschung des

National-ethnic determinants thus conceal the original nihilistic truth of power as the origin of its freedom, incessant self-intensification and self-transcendence.

The fate of the national and ethnic, and the fate of the nation itself, thus depends on implications of self-justification as the concealment of the truth of power and the will to power. Everything national, ethnic and native must therefore lose its meaning once the will to power in the process of its self-intensification gathers so much will and power in itself that it presents itself as itself, i. H. as the only base or subjectum "can" reveal to the world. This gathering process is gathering into the truth, is disclosure and realization, is liberation of the will to power from everything that is not itself, and consequently liberation from everything national and ethnic. The will to power returns to itself, it re-evolves to itself; thus one can say that a revolution happens as a reversal within power itself. A moment of reversal and revolution is undoubtedly Renan's thought, which no longer contains anything ethnic, national or native.

In this reversal and revolution comes the end of the nation; thus it becomes clear that the idea of the end of the nation belongs essentially to the ideas of Marxism, which represents the idea of revolution par excellence. Kardelj speaks e.g. B. very clearly about the withering away of nations, their merging, the emergence of a general human culture, so that man becomes a "direct citizen of the world," which in turn means that man no longer participates in world events through the nation, but directly as such becomes.

The question of the nation and power becomes the question of the end of the nation. How is this question today? In response to this, a very verbose document, a bestseller, the book The American Challenge by the French journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber should be cited. The latter begins his investigation with relatively old and well-known, as well as well-documented statements about the technological gulf separating Europe and North America, and in which lies the danger that Europe will sooner or later fall victim to American technological colonialism. The question that arises is that of power. "Europe created a market but no power", so it has no power, it has no power, and so the author asks the question:

"Where is the European power?"; since Europe is powerless, it "no longer has its fate in its own hands." So the problem of Europe is that of power, but at the same time it is the question of how to take one's own destiny into one's own hands.

Power as the control and shaping of one's own destiny is actually the determination that essentially belongs to the nation. H.

transnational structure - on a European scale. In the horizon of power, self-determination and domination of the 124

Schicksals gibt es keine Nation mehr, sie wurde von der Macht, bzw. vom Willen zur Macht verlassen, er hat sie hinter sich gelassen, weil er bereits in weitere Räume überging. Macht kann nur mehr in Europa sein; damit Europa mächtig ist, darf sie sich allerdings nicht als Konföderation, sodern nur als Föderation ereignen, in der nicht durch allgemeine Übereinstimmung, sondern durch Stimmenmehrheit verwaltet wird. Europa muß zur »technologischen Gemeinschaft« werden, deren Verwirklichung »ein Test gegen den Nationalismus und für den Rationalismus« ist, was zugleich bedeutet, endlich einmal die Tatsache zu erfassen, daß »die Nation nicht die letzte Stufe der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung darstellt«. Es gibt keinen Zweifel: die Macht hat sich von der Nation befreit, von allem Nationalen, Ethnischen und Geborenen. Wie wir ausgeführt haben, ist jedoch diese Befreiung eine Umkehr innerhalb der Macht, eine Befreiung zur eigenen Wahrheit, und so müssen wir die Frage stellen, wie der Name dieser Wahrheit heißt, ob sie überhaupt schon deutlich gesprochen hat, ob dies nicht etwa jene allgemein menschliche Kultur ist, von der Kardelj spricht, in der der Mensch zum direkten Weltbürger wird?

Europa muß, um mächtig zu sein, zur »technologischen Gemeinschaft« werden, woraus folgt, daß Macht Technologie ist und gerade Technologie jene allgemein menschliche Kultur ist, nach der wir fragen. Aus demselben Buch erfahren wir, »daß Legionen, Bodenschätze und Kapital nicht mehr Merkmale oder Instrumente der Macht« sind. »Die moderne Macht« ist die »Fähigkeit, Erfindungen in den Produktionsprozess einzubeziehen«, also Technologie. »Die Schwerpunkte« der Macht liegen nicht mehr »in der Erde, in Zahlen, in Maschinen, sondern im Geist, also im menschlichen Denk- und Schaffensvermögen«.

Es sieht also so aus, als wäre das, was uns am größten und edelsten erscheint, der schöpferische menschliche Geist, der Ursprung der Macht. Jawohl, der schöpferische Geist, allerdings aufgefaßt als Ursprung der Macht und reduziert im Sinne der Bedürfnisse und Möglichkeiten der Technologie als Macht, denn die Macht ist »Ausnützung und systematische Vervollkommung aller Instrumente des Verstandes, nicht nur auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft, sondern auch auf dem Kampffeld der Organisation und Verwaltung«. Das ist jenes Neue und Wesentliche: das Kampffeld der Organisation und Verwaltung, das ist es, wofür sich Europa noch nicht geöffnet hat, weil es noch immer unter der Herrschaft des Irrationalismus lebt, d. h. »im Fetischismus der Vorschriften«, die vom Vater auf Sohn übertragen werden, und im Geist »der Gottgesandheit der Macht«, d. h. im charismatischen Charakter der Macht, in der Macht also, die heilig ist, gegründet auf das Nationale und Ethnische und deshalb irrational und unwirksam.

Der menschliche schöpferische Geist als Verstand und als rationale Organisation und Verwaltung ist heute das Geschehen der Macht. Dieser neue Organisations- und Verwaltungstyp ist eigentlich Kybernetik (kybernáo, guberno, steuern, herrschen, verwalten). Kybernetik ist, wie Heidegger sagt, die neue »Grundwissenschaft«, die alle anderen Wissenschaften »bestimmen« und »steuern« wird. Die Kyber-

Destiny there is no longer a nation, it was created by the power, resp.

abandoned by the will to power, he has left them behind because he has already passed into other spaces. Power can only be in Europe; In order for

Europe to be powerful, however, it must not take place as a confederation, but only as a federation, administered not by general agreement but by majority vote. Europe must become a 'technological community', the realization of which is 'a test against nationalism and for rationalism', which means at the same time finally recognizing the fact that 'the nation is not the last stage of social development'. There is no doubt: power has freed itself from the nation, from everything national, ethnic and native. As we have explained, however, this liberation is a reversal within power, a liberation to one's own truth, and so we must ask the question what the name of this truth is, whether it has already been spoken clearly at all, whether this is not the case in general human culture that Kardelj speaks of, in which man becomes a direct citizen of the world?

To be powerful, Europe must become a "technological community," which means that power is technology, and that technology is the very common human culture we are asking about. From the same book we learn "that legions, resources, and capital are no longer signs or instruments of power." "The modern power" is the "ability to incorporate inventions into the production process", ie technology. "The focal points" of power are no longer "in the earth, in numbers, in machines, but in the spirit, i.e. in the human ability to think and create".

So it seems that what seems greatest and noblest to us is the creative human spirit, the source of power. Yes, the creative spirit, but understood as the origin of power and reduced in the sense of the needs and possibilities of technology as power, because power is "exploitation and systematic perfection of all instruments of the mind, not only in the field of science, but also on the battlefield of organization and administration«. This is what is new and essential: the battlefield of organization and administration, this is what Europe has not yet opened up to because it still lives under the rule of irrationalism, i. H.

'in the fetishism of regulations', which are passed on from father to son, and in the spirit of 'the God-givenness of power', i. H.

in the charismatic character of power, that is, power that is sacred, national and ethnic, and therefore irrational and ineffective.

The human creative spirit as mind and as rational organization and administration is the happening of power today.

This new type of organization and administration is actually cybernetics (kyberndo, guberno, to control, to rule, to administer). Cybermetics is, as Heidegger says, the new "fundamental science" that will "determine" and "control" all other sciences. The Kyber-125

netik »entspricht der Bestimmung des Menschen als handelnd-gesellschaftlichen Wesens. Denn sie ist die Theorie der Steuerung des möglichen Planens und Einrichtens menschlicher Arbeit« (Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, 64). Kybernetik ist der heutige Name für Macht, das ist aber die völlige Rationalisierung des menschlichen schöpferischen Geistes, der nur dann Macht ist, wenn er sich als Kybernetik verwirklicht und wirkt, indem er sich von allem Irrationalen, Traditionellen, Heiligen, Natürlichen und freilich auch von allem Nationalen, Geborenen usw. lossagt.

Die Selbstbefreiung des Willens zur Macht bedeutet keineswegs, daß am Ende der Nation auch alles Nationale und Ethnische irgendwie versickert oder verschwindet. Mann kann es immer noch in das Selbstgeschehen der Macht und des Willens zur Macht einschließen, jedoch nicht um diese zu beschränken oder die Degradierung des menschlichen schöpferischen Geistes auf rationale Operationen zu verhindern, sondern um sie als Ansporn zu jeweils stärksten Willens- und Machtausdehnung wirken zu lassen. Damit wird der Wille zur Macht irrationalisiert, er wird wahnsinnig, nicht etwa in dem Sinn, daß er sich damit in der Macht potenzierte und sich selbst überträfe. Er wird zu einer zerstörerischen, tödlichen und vernichtenden Macht. Das ist eine wahnsinnige Nation. Die Nation als irrationale Macht ist im Nationalen und Geborenen begründete Macht, ist Unzulänglichkeit der Macht, da die wahre Macht nur der gänzlich rationalisierte menschliche schöpferische Geist ist. Man erhält Macht nicht mehr im Namen der Nation, des Nationalen und Ethnischen, sondern nur aufgrund der Technologie und Kybernetik. Das Problem der Nation ist immer noch eine Art des Zusammenlebens, nur muß sie und Rationalisierung.

Als Gemeinschaften bestehen die Nationen also immer noch, so daß das Wort vom Ende der Nation nur teilweise richtig ist, bzw. dieses Ende etwas anderes bedeutet als allgemein angenommen. Die Nation ist immer noch eine Art des Zusammenlebens, nur muß sie jetzt gänzlich außerhalb des Nationalen, Ethnischen und Geborenen verstanden werden. Die Nationen sind noch immer Subjekte und Aktionen, aber Subjekt ist jetzt der in Wissenschaft umgewandelte menschliche Geist, während die technologische Revolution, die Kybernetik, die Informatik jetzt Aktion ist. Es geschieht eine wesentliche Veränderung der Geschichte selbst und der Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen, wovon auch Servan-Schreiber viel zu sagen weiß, etwa: »Fortschritt ist Kampf, wie das Leben Kampf ist. Diese Tatsachen waren immer klar und die gesamte Geschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft unterscheidet sich fast bis heute nicht von der Geschichte der Kriege. Heutzutage nähern sich fortgeschrittene Gesellschaften, die Vereinigten Staaten, die Sowjetunion, Europa dem Ende dieser Geschichte. Konflikte unter ihnen werden nur noch theoretisch oder atomar sein. Diese andere Hypothese, die Hypothese von der Vernichtung, können wir natürlich nicht ausschließen. Aber in unserem Nachdenken, in unserer Arbeit müßen wir von einer historischen Hypothese ausgehen, und das ist der atomare Frieden: sie heißt Industrie-Krieg.« Diese andere Hypothese ist »Krieg unter Zivilisa-

netik »corresponds to the determination of the human being as an active social being. Because it is the theory of the control of the possible planning and arrangement of human work" (Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denken, 64).

Cybernetics is the modern name for power, but that is the full rationalization of the human creative spirit, which is power only when it materializes and operates as cybernetics, distancing itself from all that is irrational, traditional, sacred, natural, and of course also renounces everything national, native, etc.

The self-liberation of the will to power in no way means that at the end of the nation everything that is national and ethnic somehow seeps away or disappears. One can still include it in the self-acting of power and the will to power, not, however, in order to limit it or to prevent the degradation of the human creative spirit to rational operations, but to act as an incentive to the greatest possible expansion of will and power to permit. In this way the will to power becomes irrational, it becomes insane, not in the sense that it potentiates itself in power and surpasses itself.

He becomes a destructive, deadly, and devastating force.

This is an insane nation. The nation as an irrational power is power rooted in the national and native, is insufficiency of power, since true power is only the fully rationalized human creative spirit. Power is no longer obtained in the name of the nation, the national and the ethnic, but only because of technology and cybernetics. The problem of the nation is still a way of living together, only it has to and rationalization.

The nations still exist as communities, so that the saying about the end of the nation is only partially correct, or

this ending means something different than is generally assumed. The nation is still a way of living together, only now it must be understood entirely outside of the national, ethnic and native. Nations are still subjects and actions, but subject is now the human mind transformed into science, while the technological revolution, cybernetics, computer science is now action. An essential change in history itself and in the historicity of man takes place, about which Servan-Schreiber also has a lot to say, for example:

“Progress is struggle as life is struggle. These facts have always been clear, and almost to this day the entire history of human society is no different from the history of wars. Today, advanced societies, the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe are nearing the end of this story. Conflicts among them will only be theoretical or atomic. Of course, we cannot rule out this other hypothesis, the annihilation hypothesis. But in our thinking, in our work, we must start from one historical hypothesis, and that is nuclear peace: it's called industrial war.' This other hypothesis is 'civil war-126

tionen«, der sich »im geschlossenen planetaren Kamffeld der Technologie, der Wissenschaft und Verwaltung vollzieht«. Das Neue ist also der geschlossene Kampfplatz der Technologie, der Wissenschaft und Selbstverwaltung, während der atomare Krieg als Selbstvernichtung nur eine Wiederholung der alten Geschichte ist, das heißt jener historischen Aktion, die die Nation als Veborgenheit der nihilistischen Wahrheit des Subjekts der Aktion und der Macht als wahnsinnige und vernichtende Macht darstellt.

Und wenn es so ist, erscheint auch unser Land als Gemeinschaft von Nationen in einem völlig neuen Licht. Das Problem dieser Gemeinschaft ist das der Rationalisierung. Diese Gemeinschaft ist eine Gemeinschaft von Subjekten, aus denen – zumindest prinzipiell – alles Dunkle und Irrationale verschwunden ist, sie sind nicht mehr Träger jener großen historischen Aktionen, die eschatologisch als der einzige Weg zum völligen Heil des Menschen und der Nation festgesetzt waren, sie sind heute Träger der technologischen Revolution und damit der Wahrheit der Macht. Sie sind nur dann verantwortlich, wenn sie ihrer Wahrheit entsprechen, die die Wahrheit der neuzeitlichen Subjektivität ist, sie dürfen in ihre Aktion und ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen kein irrationales Element hineintragen, also auch nichts, was in Zusammenhang mit Nationalem, Ethnischem oder Geborenem steht. Jegliches Irrationalisieren oder Eschatologisieren ist voll von katastrophalen Implikationen.

Natürlich bedeutet das nicht, daß die Nationen als Subjekte keine klar profilierten »Persönlichkeiten« mehr seien. Aber diese Verschiedenheiten, auf die wir uns berufen, sind nicht ursprünglich, primär und angeboren, vielmehr handelt es sich nur um Unterschiede in Quantität, Qualität und Struktur einzelner Mächte, als Folge eines unterschiedlichen konkreten historischen Geschehens, der Nation als Wille zur Macht. Diese Unterschiede sind nichts Irrationales oder Unbegreifliches, sie können rational erfaßt und quantitativ bestimmt werden, und zwar unter dem Gesichtspunkt jener Möglichkeiten, die das Prinzip der Nation den Menschen für ihre historische Existenz bietet. In Form einer Hypothese kann im Rahmen unserer Überlegungen darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß den Menschen von der Nation hauptsächlich drei Möglichkeiten ihrer sozial-historischen Verwirklichung geboten wurden: der Staat, die Bewegung und die blockierte Bewegung.

In unserem Land gibt es immer noch eine Nationalfrage, das ist aber nicht mehr die alte Frage danach, was eine fremde und stärkere Nation mit einer anderen und schwächeren macht, vielmehr besteht die Frage darin, was jede einzelne Nation mit sich selbst macht. Die Nationalfrage in unserem Land ist die Frage der Rationalisierung der Macht. Die Rationalisierung der Macht bedeutet ihre Befreiung, was für uns Befreiung zur Teilnahme am Geschehen der Welt-Macht als Technologie bedeutet.

Diese Frage stellt sich heute aufs Dringlichste. Die erste, sich dabei aufzwingende Voraussetzung, besteht darin, daß die Nation als Geschehen des Willens zur Macht und als Problem der Macht begriffen wird, das heißt unter anderem, daß unser eigenes Institutionalsystem

tion«, which »takes place in the closed planetary battlefield of technology, science and administration«. The new is thus the closed battlefield of technology, science and self-government, while nuclear war as self-

destruction is only a repetition of old history, that is, of that historical action which the nation as the concealment of the nihilistic truth of the subject of action and power portrayed as an insane and devastating force.

And if that's the case, our country as a community of nations will appear in a completely new light. The problem of this community is that of rationalization. This community is a community of subjects from which - at least in principle - everything dark and irrational has disappeared, they are no longer carriers of those great historical actions that were eschatologically determined as the only way to the full salvation of man and the nation, they are today bearers of the technological revolution and thus of the truth of power. They are only responsible if they correspond to their truth, which is the truth of modern subjectivity, they must not introduce any irrational element into their action and mutual relations, that is, nothing related to the national, ethnic or native. Any irrationalizing or eschatologizing is full of catastrophic implications.

Of course, this does not mean that the nations as subjects are no longer clearly profiled "personalities." But these differences to which we refer are not original, primary and innate, rather they are only differences in the quantity, quality and structure of individual powers, as a consequence of a different concrete historical event, the nation as will to power . These differences are not irrational or incomprehensible; they can be rationally grasped and quantified in the light of those possibilities which the principle of the nation offers people for their historical existence. In the form of a hypothesis, it can be pointed out in the context of our considerations that the nation offered people mainly three possibilities of their socio-historical realization: the state, the movement and the blocked movement.

There is still a national question in our country, but it is no longer the old question of what one foreign and stronger nation is doing to another and weaker one, rather the question is what each individual nation is doing to itself. The national question in our country is the question of the rationalization of power. The rationalization of power means its liberation, which for us means liberation to participate in world power as technology.

This is the most pressing question today. The first prerequisite that is imposed is that the nation is understood as an event of the will to power and as a problem of power, which means, among other things, that our own institutional system 127

nicht mehr als Repräsentation der mit charismatischem Heiligenschein verklärten Nation, sondern als Repräsentation von Machtzentren begriffen wird, die im Sinne der Bedürfnisse und des Geschehens der Macht unaufhörlich angepaßt und funktionalisiert werden müssen.

Das Ende der Nation ist also deren Versammlung in ihre eigenen höchsten Möglichkeiten, in die Möglichkeiten des Willens zur Macht. Das ist die Rationalisierung der Macht, das heißt Ablassen von ihr und deren Entlassen aus dem Nationalen, Ethnischen und Geborenen. Das Ende der Nation ist die radikale Trennung der Gemeinschaft vom Nationalen, der Macht vom Geborenen. Diese Scheidung bedeutet keineswegs, daß sich jetzt die Macht und das Geborene auf derselben Ebene gegenüberstehen würden, indem etwa jenes Geborene in der Weise der traditionellen historischen Geschehnisse und einer traditionellen historischen Aktion zum Kampf gegen die Macht, gegen Rationalisierung der Macht und gegen Wißenschaft antreten würde, um sich erneut als Nation zu affirmieren, wodurch eine Art Wiedergeburt der Nation erfolgte. Dies wäre eine wahnsinnige Aktion und eine wahnsinnige Nation, dies wäre Vernichtung und Selbstvernichtung.

Aber was bedeutet das Ende der Nation für das Nationale, Ethnische und Geborene? In diesem Ende befreit es sich aus der Nation und aus dem Willen zur Macht. Es kehrt zu sich selbst zurück, als solches eröffnet es sich uns und wir haben uns ihm zu öffnen. In diesem Augenblick, wo wir so vor dem Nationalen und Ethnischen stehen, das wir nicht mehr zur Konstituierung einer neuen eschatologischen Aktion gebrauchen können, und deswegen als Subjekte unseren ursprünglichen Nihilismus, unsere ursprüngliche unbegründete Freiheit auf uns nehmen müssen, wissen wir irgendwie nicht, was dieses Nationale und Geborene eigentlich überhaupt ist. Wir wissen nicht, was wir damit anfangen sollen, und es scheint uns, als ob es dieses Nationale und Ethnische nicht gäbe. Als wäre es ein bloßes Nichts. Und es ist auch ein Nichts. Nichts, das heißt hier, daß uns dieses Geborene zu einem Nichts bestimmt, das einer Aktion, der Macht und dem Willen zur Macht ähnlich ist.

Dieses Geborene ist entleert, entsetzlich verwüstet und verarmt. Das ist unsere Selbstentleerung, Verwüstung und Verarmung. Was wissen wir z. B. von unserer Vergangenheit, auf die wir uns so gerne berufen, um auf ihr unsere sogenannten spezifischen Eigenschaften, unsere Nationalinteressen und Rechte einzelner Nationen zu begründen? Unsere eigene Vergangenheit in irgendeine metaphysische Kategorie verwandelnd haben wir eine ganze Hälfte dieser Vergangenheit als trauriges Dokument der Reaktion und des Obskurantismus über Bord geworfen. Die andere Hälfte aber, von der wir sagen, sie sei fortschrittlich, betrachten wir bloß als Vorbereitung unserer eigenen großen Aktion. In ihrem Licht erhält diese ganze fortschrittliche Vergangenheit Dimensionen ehrlicher, hingebungsvoller und höchst achtungsvoller Anstrengungen, die dennoch bloß Vorbereitungen bleiben und deshalb nicht völlig legitim mit der Größe desjenigen verglichen werden können, das wir nach so vielen mißglückten Versuchen sozusagen mit einem Schlag endlich doch verwirklicht und erfolgreich vollführt haben.

no longer understood as the representation of the nation transfigured with a charismatic halo, but as the representation of centers of power that have to be constantly adapted and functionalized in terms of the needs and events

of power.

The end of the nation, then, is its assembly into its own highest possibilities, into the possibilities of the will to power.

That is the rationalization of power, that is, letting go of it and letting go of it from the national, ethnic, and native.

The end of the nation is the radical separation of the community from the national, of power from the native. This separation does not mean at all that now the power and the native would confront each other on the same level, for example that native fighting in the manner of traditional historical events and a traditional historical action to fight against power, against the rationalization of power and against science in order to reaffirm itself as a nation, whereby a kind of re-birth of the nation took place. This would be an insane action and an insane nation, this would be annihilation and self-destruction.

But what does the end of the nation mean for the national, ethnic and native? In this end it frees itself from the nation and from the will to power. It returns to itself, as such it opens up to us and we have to open ourselves to it. At this moment, when we are so faced with the national and ethnic that we can no longer use them to constitute a new eschatological action, and therefore, as subjects, have to take upon ourselves our original nihilism, our original unfounded freedom, we somehow do not know what what is national and what is born actually is at all. W e don't know what to do with it and it seems to us that this national and ethnic does not exist. As if it were a mere nothing. And it's also nothing. Nothing, that means here that what is born determines us to a nothing that is similar to action, power and the will to power.

This born is empty, horribly desolate and impoverished.

This is our self-emptying, devastation and impoverishment. What do we know e.g. B. of our past, which we refer to in order to base our so-called specific characteristics, our national interests and the rights of individual nations? Converting our own past into some metaphysical category, we have jettisoned a whole half of that past as a sad document of reaction and obscurantism. But the other half, which we say is progressive, we consider merely as preparation for our own great action. In its light, this whole progressive past takes on dimensions of honest, dedicated and highly respectful efforts, which nevertheless remain mere preparations and therefore cannot be compared with the greatness of what, after so many unsuccessful attempts, we finally did in one fell swoop realized and successfully completed.

Was wißen wir von unserer Sprache, auf die wir uns immer als auf das Unabdingbarste berufen? Hat nicht die Nationalsprache innerhalb einer Nation als Kommunikationsmittel des Marktes funktioniert, d. h. als Funktion der freien Entwicklung des Handels und der Produktion? Und wenn es so ist, wie kann man dann die Poesie verstehen, die ja Sprache *par excellence* ist? Was ist Poesie als Kommunikation, als Vermittlung von Botschaften und Informationen?

Im Ende der Nation sehen wir uns in der Verlorenheit aus dem Geborenen. Wir müssen uns in das Geborene erst öffnen, das ist aber nur möglich, wenn wir es nicht mehr zur Begründung des Subjektes, der Aktion und der Macht verwenden. Wir müssen in jener Offenheit bleiben und verharren, die der Unterschied zwischen Nation und Nationalem, zwischen Subjekt und Geborenem ist.

Das Geschehen dieses Unterschieds ist das Ende der Nation, es bedeutet, daß sich die Macht als solche entbirgt, d. h. als Nihilismus und Freiheit. In diesem Unterschied bleiben heißt in dieser Wahrheit selbst bleiben, das ist: sich in das Nationale und Geborene als solches öffnen. In diesem Unterschied bleiben heißt dem Nationalen, Ethnischen und Geborenen treu bleiben. Diese Treue ist Treue zum Leben und für das Leben.

What do we know about our language, which we always refer to as the most indispensable thing? Has not the national language functioned within

a nation as a means of market communication, i. H. as a function of the free development of trade and production? And if so, how can one understand poetry, which is language par excellence? What is poetry as communication, as conveying messages and information?

In the end of the nation we see ourselves lost from what was born. We must first open ourselves into what is born, but this is only possible if we no longer use it to establish subject, action and power. We must stay and persist in that openness which is the difference between nation and national, between subject and born.

The occurrence of this difference is the end of the nation, it means that power as such is revealed, i. H. than nihilism and freedom. To remain in this difference means to remain in this truth itself, that is: to open oneself into what is national and what is born as such. In this difference, to remain is to remain true to the national, ethnic and native. This fidelity is fidelity to life and for life.

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CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF MENTAL VIOLENCE

Ivan Kuvačić

Zagreb

I

The concept of violence is usually associated with a notion implying the application of means which are capable of producing physical, bodily pain and destruction. These means have always served as the most secure support of authority in its effort to insure the obedience of its subjects. However, it is naive to believe that any authority can long maintain itself if it continues to be founded exclusively upon the use of naked force. Aside from the application of physical coercion, which is the most secure and ultimate authority, there exists a wide range of various manipulative levers which comprise the essence of political skill. These also are the means of domination and consequently also of violence. However, there is disagreement in regard to this, since such a conclusion is not always obvious.

The basis of the disagreement lies precisely in that these so-called manipulative techniques do not always conform to the classical concept of violence, which assumes the existence of an opposition and resistance on the part of its victims. These types of techniques most often insure a so-called »voluntary obedience« which gives the impression that the use of violence is absent. This impression results from the fact that »voluntary obedience« is a fundamental preparation or conditioning by means of which resistance is broken at the outset, thereby creating conditions favorable to unrestricted domination. In this regard, we will later on draw a conditional distinction between *physical* violence which occurs when people are governed on the basis of either the potential or actual use of means which can produce physical pain and destruction, and mental violence when government is conducted with the aid of applied manipulative procedures, which make its subjects appear as if they were obeying voluntarily.

It is a characteristic of our time, that as a result of scientific and technical development the latter form of violence is becoming more and more widespred. The role of the cudgel is being exchanged for that of the technique of suggestion, which means that the advertising spe-

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It is a characteristic of our time, that as a result of scientific and technical development the latter form of violence is becoming more and more widespred. The role of the cudgel is being exchanged for that of the technique of suggestion, which means that the advertising spe

cialist and newspaper editor are replacing the gendarme and the jail-keeper. It is not enough to characterize a contemporary state which relies predominantly upon the use of physical violence simply as being tyrannical. Such a state that does not apply the means of mass suggestion, which are so much more powerful and refined, this being the central characteristic of the modern methodology of government, would very soon become conspicuous for its incompetence and ineffectiveness.

If we ask ourselves what it is that is making possible the ever greater application of the subtle forms of violence, then the answer must above all be searched for within the framework of existing conditions. Among these conditions is the existence of powerful mass organizations. People are more and more becoming units of large productive and administrative organizations. The more a country becomes modernnized, the more its inhabitants begin to assume the characteristic of being numbers, capable of being calculated and manipulated. In other words, this means that man progresses insofar as he no longer regards himself to be an individual, insofar as he successfully merges with the established norm of what is to be »average« and »desirable«. Under such conditions, becomes possible the creation of new needs as well as the means for their manipulation, which are founded upon the exploitation of the subconscious mind and which above all make use of certain procedure for the formation of a conditional reflex by means of extensive repetition and the elimination of thought and discussion.

II

This then is the general framework from which arise the several aspects of mental or psychological manipulation, among which we list the following as being the most relevant:

Fascist Manipulation. If we are to raise the question of the internal structural and technical character of fascist government, it must be said to be a skillful combination of psychological manipulation and police terror. Within the framework of the national-socialist theory rascist imperialism, which was conceived of as an appropriate instrument of mass manipulation in the interest of German economic expansion, certain manipulative procedures stand out from the rest and are significant enough so that some authors consider manipulative techniques the essence of Nazism.

»Anti-semitism« is included among the basic elements of fascist manipulation. By placing the blame for all misery and difficulty on an enemy which found itself isolated within the body of a foreign nation incapable of defending itself, the Nazis succeeded in creating a high level of integration in German society. The resentment of middle and lower social strata was channelled in such a way that they not only did not question the system, but rather strenghtened its very basis. This is constructive example which demonstrates the extraordinary power of political action when it has at its disposal the means of mass suggestion. A large part of the total explanation is offered by the theory of the so-called authoritative syndrome, according to which

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in conditions of external social pressure accompanied by internal repression of certain impulses, the individual arrives at an accomodation with society solely by seeking satisfaction in submission and obedience. There develops on the one hand an unquestioning belief in authority and on the other a readiness to attack those who are considered socially inferior and who would prove acceptable as sacrifices, On the social scale, this is characteristic of the lower levels of the middle class where there arises a type of social weakling plagued by insecurity who is prepared to participate in organized violence and aggression. In conditions of general crisis and frustration, as reigned in Germany after the first World War, the authoritative syndrome easily took hold even among other social classes.

Another important element of fascist manipulation consists in the creation of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian organizations, which take control of the individual from the cradle to the grave. Direct human relationships are thus transformed into indirect ones, which threaten even the last remains of human spontaneity. At work, at play, in sports, in cultural and family life – everywhere, encroaches the principle of organization, which significantly advances technical efficiency at the cost of freedom's suppression. It is of great importance that the individual be held in a constant state of tension and activism so that he will not be able to think independently, and since activity unguarded by thought is impossible, activism merely becomes bureaucratic manipulation. In this way the activity of the authoritarian apparatus takes on the appearance of spontaneous mass activity. Such is the technique of the Nazi mass meeting (as developed by Hitler). Hitler writes that the mass meeting is indispensable because it is in the mass meeting that the lonly »common man« for the first time acquires that encouraging sensation of belonging to a large community. When such an individual leaves the small workshop or the large factory and comes to a mass meeting, where he is surrounded by thousands upon thousands of people sharing his beliefs, he falls under the spell of so-called mass suggestion. This kind of mental violence was of course accompanied by the physical terror of the SA and SS formations with the support of the judicial system and other governmental bodies.

Consumer Manipulation is not at all as neutral a factor as it is sometimes said to be. This type of manipulation constantly reproduces and expands the prosperity of the rich at the expense of the poor, and it is reaching its most refined level of development in capitalist countries in which the ever rising level of consumption is a fundamental precondition of growth and expansion of production. In this regard, commercial advertising plays an important role, as it maintains existing and stimulates new drives and needs of the consumer masses. Even education is adapted to this, since in the jargon of pecuniary philosophy »to educate« means »to educate to consume more and more goods«. Here it is not human reality that prevails, rather pecuniary reality is that which produces success, and accordingly, that which sells goods. If the background and structure of the most successful commercial advertisements are analysed, the conclusion is arrived at that they do not pay heed to the rules of rational logic. It simply is

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Even education is adapted to this, since in the jargon of pecuniary philosophy »to educate« means »to educate to consume more and more goods«. Here it is not human reality that prevails, rather pecuniary reality is that which produces success, and accordingly, that which sells goods. If the background and structure of the most successful commercial advertisements are analysed, the conclusion is arrived at that they do not pay heed to the rules of rational logic. It simply is 132

not necessary to do so, since advertisements do not appeal to reason, rather they appeal to basic emotions and drives. In these advertisements an untruthful claim is usually expressed in such a way so as to seem truthful, but without any pretensions to be understood as such. It is not necessary to back the claim up with proof since if the claim does produce results which are beneficial to the one who launched it, then it is truthful. This is the principle of a society in which production is man's highest purpose, wealth being the goal of production. This principle degrades and transforms everything it touches into money. An example would be that a woman losing both her shame and dignity, in view of the fact that her most intimate privacy is being commercialized, could not be evaluated as a negative result if it stimulated the expansion of production. The conclusion is similar with results encouraged by the mass distribution of trash literature, criminal films or even the waging of aggressive acts and wars. The force and influence of pecuniary truth lies in circumstances where the majority finds its own self-realization exclusively in the accumulation of means for raising its material living standard. The minority which opposes this is constantly exposed to the repressive effect of public opinion which in turn is formed and maintained with the aid of the mass communications media.

Stalinist manipulation developed and perfected very effective means for inflicting mental violence, which is complemented and supported by the open application of physical force to the end of suppressing all resistance. Its fundamental strength lies in a monopolistic interpretation and exploitation of revolutionary eschatology which allows for the confusion of boundaries between revolutionary and repressive violence, thereby presenting the conflicts with all opponents as the struggle against counterrevolution. In view of the enormous force of those ideas which arose from the victorious revolutionary upheaval and because of the fact that only one indisputable interpretation of these ideas is permitted, every open deviation from them meets immediately with extraordinary powerful moral and material pressure, similar to that which heretics were subject to in times when the Church was the dominant social institution. Heretofore, the various forms of Stalinist repression have been poorly explained and even more poorly explained have been the social conditions which permitted them to arise in the first place. But even those spare data and accounts that have been passed on to us speak of many forms of physical and mental violence. Of course, it is the latter which is attracting greater attention since understanding the various forms of mental violence is more important for acquiring an understanding of the entire Stalinist system itself. It is arrogant, self-confident violence which hides behind the banner of revolution and looks upon its victims as degraded excommunicates, who have lost all claims to dignity and worth. Thousands and ten thousands simply perished under this pressure. They were so to speak, erased from the birth census as if they had never existed at all. This bears witness to the power of repression i. e. to the impossibility to question and dispute its essence and origin. The victims themselves, though confident of their own guiltlessness, did not have the internal strength to refute the authority of violence which

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chrushed them. Many perished in the belief that they were victims of misunderstandig, intrigue, or the crimes of individual state organs, not bringing the authority of the leader or high party leadership into question. In this regard, the distinction between »subjective« and »objective« truth had a important ideological function, establishing the basis on which a man could be accused and judged though he was not conscious of guilt. While within the framework of market manipulation truth is equated to utility, here the truth is an inhuman category which reveals itself according to its own immanent laws. After rehabilitation, as Khruschev said at the 20th Congress, it was necessary to persuade many communists who have been brought up in that way and later sentenced to eight, ten or fifteen years that they were not guilty after all. The strength of this total repression was significantly weakened after the successful resistance proffered in Yugoslavia and later to some extent in other countries. Like a nightmare, however, it still oppresses enormous areas in which powerful bureaucratic organizations have arisen, developed and found a foothold in the newly arisen social strata and which in harmony with their interests achieved technical progress while simultaneously obstructing every attempt aimed at changing the existing social order. Even though the distruction of Stalin's cult of personality had created a rift in the system one should not disregard the fact that the bearers of the bureaucratic ethos very quickly established a line of defense utilizing at the outset the argument of the adversary in such a way that they attributed the sources of all obvious ills exclusively to the cult of personality, only later when they had secured their position to question the value of this same argument. However the mystic cult of the party has not yet been seriously questioned at all, which by the logic of development in harmony with established interests grows from a means to an end in itself and it is precisely this which is the basis of Stalinist repression. Numerous arrests, torture and murder in prisons and camps are all done in the name of the party »which never errs« and which »carefully follows every trial expecting from the accused and sentenced communists to remain loyal«. »To remain loyal« means to cease to exist as an independent personality and completely identify with the will of the leadership of the party. Numerous acts of mental violence have been committed to this end, with the common goal of breaking every resistance to the monolithic party bureaucracy.

Neither the acts nor their goal are very surprising. In one form or another they are typical of every tyrannical authority. Much more surprising is the effectiveness of Stalinist repression, i. e. the obvious incapability and inability of the victims to proffer moral resistence to violence, even when it seemed possible to do so. It is all the more amazing that many of those victims were tempered revolutionaries who had earlier bravely endured many struggles and torture.

A good part of the explanation lies in understanding the nature of a violence which masquerades as the revolutionary eschatology about which we spoke earlier. But here it is necessary to add that the abovementioned victims were people of an organization who were capable of the greatest exploits and heroism in conflict with the class enemy but almost entirely impotent in conflict with their own organization.

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Just as Protestantism by its teaching »that a man is nothing more than a means of divine glory« – which means that his action has a goal which is outside himself – indirectly paved the way for the mass acceptance of Fascism in Germany, so also in a similar manner did the Stalinist doctrine concerning the relationship of the individual and the masses effect a great influence on the deformation of communists after the October Revolution. The most important and most valuable distinction which a man receives consists in the fact that he is a member of the party. This is the basis of the monolithic structure which gives the communist order the form of a militant phalanx. But this is at the same time the source of the impotence and tragedy which is the price a communist must pay when his party bureaucratizes. Identification with the organization, which is a pre-condition of success in the revolutionary phase, becomes fatal for many in the phase of stabilization. It often occurs that brave revolutionaries become weaklings and cowards after they have been separated and expelled from the organization. They do not possess their *own, personal foothold* and consequently the party leadership easily crushes and discards them.

II

In conclusion, I think that in seeking common sources of all the cited forms of violence it is not necessary to think primarily in terms of the instinctive traits of the human species. No single species is so refinedly destructive as the human species, and this is not because of biological traits which arise from prehistory, but rather because of social conditions which history creates. Civilization restricts instinctive impulses, thus creating the tension which is a continual latent source of violence. It also expands the area in which social inequality can develop and even repressive violence becomes unavoidable as a means of pacifying the oppressed. One cannot deny that the former factor is one of the causes of violence in the example we have analyzed. But it is obvious that in this respect the latter is much more important in all examples. A third factor, which particularly imposes itself in connection with the question of why in the contemporary world, forms of mental violence increasingly repress and replace all the forms of physical violence, concerns the relationship which exists between power and humanitarianism.

It seems that these two categories stand irreconcilably opposed. This means that among the fundamental prerequisites for strengthening human power in relation to nature, is an even greater concentration of social power which consists in an inevitable and constant lessening of human freedom. Because technical progress makes man more and more a part of an all embracing organization, room for the development of his freedom of necessity diminishes. He is relegated to a partial role, which by the mechanical logic of technological interdependence, is firmly incorporated into the general system of labour. The system of labour itself and in harmony with this the way of life also become an essential factor of repressive uniformity and discipline.

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Owing to this, control acquires an immanent character, because it becomes more and more manipulative affirmation and reformist correction of the existing order. While the cities of antiquity and the Middle Ages were surrounded by walls and towers with permanent armed garrisons which were not only a defence against attacks from outside but were also an indispensable guarantee of internal order, today's industrial settlements arise in open spaces and freely expand alongside freeways. In spite of this, because of the isolation of individuals and because of the centralization of a powerful system of telecommunications, control of the contemporary population is much more strict and effective. In perspective, this assumes really frightening dimensions, because it is obvious that programming will increasingly embrace all aspects of life, and as a result creative spontaneity will become the privilege of small elites; while the majority of those freed from physical poverty, assume a condition of spiritual poverty and frustration.

Thanks to the successes of applied science the conviction is constantly growing that technical progress is the inner meaning of human existence. Space exploration and the conquering of other planets is becoming the basis of the technocratic myth, which assumes the function of a very effective, global means in a system of contemporary mental violence. Thus, power as a potential of authority finds a new ideological foothold for oppression and manipulation. In harmony with this, social contradictions in developed countries assume a different, modified character. There are clear indications even now that future generations will resist more and more strongly a policy which subordinates human needs to technological programming. Therefore, although the immediate prospects for increased human freedom are not great, nevertheless an Orwellian pessimistic outlook is not the only alternative which confronts mankind.

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DER INTELLEKTUELLE UND DIE POLITISCHE MACHT*

THESEN

Werner Hofmann
Marburg

I.

Das Verhältnis von Intelligenz und politischer Macht ist kein übergeschichtliches, kein übergesellschaftliches, es stellt sich keineswegs in wiederkehrender Form. In allen vorbürgerlichen Ordnungen ist das Verhältnis zwischen Denkenden und Herrschenden, wenn überhaupt, so ein Problem von Individuen. Erst auf einer fortgeschrittenen Stufe der gesellschaftlichen Epoche tritt sowohl die politische Macht, als *Staat*, wie auch die Intelligenz, als Träger besonderer Wirksamkeiten, gesellschaftlich *verselbständigt* auf. Erst hier könen die Verwicklungen zwischen beiden sozialen Charakter annehmen, erst hier gewinnen sie die Natur von Rollenkonflikten.

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* Der Teilnehmer der VI Sitzung der Korčula-Sommerschule Professor Werner Hofman starb plötzlich bei der Gartenarbeit am 9. November 1969. 1922 geboren promovierte Werner Hofmann 1953 im Fach Nationalökonomie bei Adolf Weber in München. Er habilitierte 1958 an der Hochschule für Sozialwissenschaften in Wilhelmshaven über Nationalökonomie und Wirtschaftssoziologie. Von 1962 an lehrte er an der Universität Göttingen und im Jahre 1966 wurde er Ordinarius für Soziologie an der Universität Marburg und Direktor des Soziologischen Instituts. Er veröffentlichte eine Reihe von Büchern im Gebiet der Ökonomie und Soziologie, darunter: *Die Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung* (1954), *Wohin steuert die Sowjetwirtschaft ? Zur Deutung der Sowjetgesellschaft von heute* (1955), *Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion* (1956), *Europamarkt und Wettbewerb* (1959), *Gesellschaftslehre als Ordnungsmacht. Die Werturteilsfrage heute* (1961), *Die sekuläre Inflation* (1962), *Ideengeschichte der sozialen Bewegung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (1962), *Stalinismus und Antikommunismus. Zur Soziologie des Ost-West-Konflikts* (1967), *Universität, Ideologie, Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Wissenschaftssoziologie* (1968).

Die Thesen, die wir hier veröffentlichen, wurden von Professor Hofmann an der Korčula-Sommerschule ausführlicher entwickelt. Der Tod verhinderte ihn, die ausgedehnte Version seiner Thesen für den Druck vorzubereiten, und so veröffentlichen wir die Thesen in ihrer ursprünglichen, kurzen Form.

(Red.)

*THE IN T ELLEC T U AL AND THE POLITICAL POWER**

T H E S E N

Werner Hofmann

Marburg

I.

The relationship between intelligence and political power is not supra-historical, not supra-social; it does not appear in a recurring form. In all pre-bourgeois orders, the relation between thinkers and rulers is, if at all, a problem of individuals. Only at an advanced stage of the social epoch does political power, as a state, as well as the intelligentsia, as carriers of special effectiveness, appear as socially independent. Only here can the entanglements between the two assume a social character, only here do they take on the nature of role conflicts.

** The participant of the sixth session of the Korcula summer school, Professor Werner Hofman, died suddenly while gardening on November 9, 1969. Born in 1922, Werner Hofmann received his doctorate in 1953 in the subject of National Economics under Adolf Weber in Munich. In 1958 he habilitated at the University for Social Sciences in Wilhelmshaven on national economy and economic sociology. From 1962 he taught at the University of Gottingen and in 1966 he became Professor of Sociology at the University of Marburg and Director of the Sociological Institute. He published a number of books in the field of economics and sociology, including: The National Accounts (1954), Where is the Soviet Economy Headed? On the interpretation of Soviet society by hculc (1955), the labor constitution of the Soviet Union (1956), European market and competition (1959), social theory as a regulatory framework. The question of value judgment today (1961), The se-cult inflation (1962), History of ideas of the social movement of the 19th and 20th*

Century (1962), Stalinism and Anti-Communism. On the sociology of the East-West conflict (1967), Universitat, Ideologic, Gesellschaft. Contributions to the sociology of science (1968).

The theses that we publish here were developed in more detail by Professor Hofmann at the Korčula Summer School. Death prevented him from preparing the expanded version of his theses for printing, so we publish the theses in their original, condensed form.

(Red.)

II.

Intelligenz und politische Macht: das ist auf den ersten Blick die Spannung von Theorie und Praxis, von Einsicht und Handeln. Aber dieses Verhältnis wird zum Problem zwischen beiden Teilgliedern der Gesellschaft nur, weil es ein Problem jeder Seite für sich ist: beim Staat der Kontrast zwischen dem Staatsgedanken und seiner Umsetzung (Verfassungsanspruch und »Verfassungswirklichkeit«), bei der Intelligenz der Gegensatz von selbstbestimmter und gesellschaftsbestimmter Funktion. In beidem äußert sich der allgemeine Widerspruch von *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* einer Gesellschaft.

III.

Als soziale Sondergruppe kann die Intelligenz ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse mit denen der Gesamtgesellschaft verwechseln. Die Freiheit, die sie für sich in Auspruch nimmt, bleibt in der gespaltenen Gesellschaft ein soziales Vorrecht. Die Freiheit des Gedanken aber wird glaubhaft erst in der befreiten Existenz derer, von denen die Intelligenz selbst lebt.

IV.

Im Zeitalter der Koexistenz mehrerer Ordnungen unterliegt die Inteligenz auch in der neuen Gesellschaft der Neigung zur sozialen Absonderung. Ihre Auflehnung gegen die politische Macht bedeutet unter diesen Umständen nicht notwendigigerweise einen Schritt über diese hinaus, sondern hinter sie zurück, solange die Intelligenz selbst bleiben will, was sie ist. »Freiheit« kann eine Losung des Thermidor sein.

V.

Der Konflikt zwischen Intelligenz und politischer Macht kann aufbrechen, solange der Staat als gesellschaftliche Sondergewalt besteht und solange Intellektualität Beruf und gesellschaftliches Vorrecht bleibt, d. h. solange beide gegeneinander wie gegenüber der Produzenten in einer entfremdeten Existenz verharren.

II.

Intelligence and political power: at first glance this is the tension between theory and practice, between insight and action. But this relationship only

becomes a problem between the two parts of society because it is a problem for each side for itself: in the case of the state, the contrast between the idea of the state and its implementation (constitutional claim and "constitutional reality"), in the case of the intelligentsia, the contrast between self-determined and socially responsible - correct function. In both, the general contradiction between possibility and reality of a society manifests itself.

III.

As a special social group, the intelligentsia can confuse their own needs with those of society as a whole. The freedom she claims for herself remains a social prerogative in the divided society. The freedom of thought, however, only becomes credible in the liberated existence of those from whom intelligence itself lives.

IV.

In the age of the coexistence of several orders, intelligence is subject to the tendency towards social segregation, even in the new society. Their rebellion against political power under these circumstances does not necessarily mean a step beyond it, but behind it, as long as the intelligentsia itself wants to remain what it is. "Freedom" can be a motto of Thermidor.

V.

The conflict between intelligentsia and political power can break out as long as the state exists as a special social power and as long as intellectuality remains a profession and social privilege, i. H. as long as both remain alienated from each other and from the producers.

DIE MACHT UND DIE UNMITTELBARE DEMOKRATIE

Franz Marek

Wien

Ich möchte versuchen, im Rahmen der Thematik dieser Woche, einige Fragen der revolutionären Strategie zur Diskussion zu stellen, wobei ich mich auf die europäische Perspektiven beschränken will. Dies, obwohl mir präsent ist, daß diese europäische Perspektiven untrennbar mit der Entwicklung der sogenannten dritten Welt, verbunden sind; dies, obwohl es verlockend wäre, die Haltung zu dem Problemkomplex der dritten Welt als Prüfstein für den sozialistischen Humanismus abzuwandeln, von dem hier soviel und allgemein die Rede war: und dies obwohl es nicht uninteressant wäre, gewisse Dekadenzerscheinungen in der Arbeiterbewegung auch in jenem Eurozentrismus hinzuweisen, dem manche Marxisten verhaftet sind, wenn sie mit europäischen Maßstäben Problemkomplexe Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas beurteilen und verurteilen, – ein bißchen so an die Vorstellungswelt des Columbus erinnert, der in der neuen Welt eine Bestätigung für die Mythen der Antike suchte und bei Begegnung mit den Seehunden glaubte, den gefährlichen, aber attraktiven Sirenen begegnet zu sein.

In ihrer Junius-Broschure hatte Rosa Luxenburg geschrieben: »Was in Frage steht, ist der ganze 45-jährige Abschnitt in der Entwicklung der modernen Arbeiterbewegung. Was wir erlebten ist die Kritik, der Strich und die Summa unter dem Posten unserer Arbeit.« 45 Jahre nach Lenins Tod könnten die Kommunisten, zumindestens Westeuropas, dieses Statement Wort für Wort wiederholen. In der Tat hat der 21. 8. 1968 fü sie ungefähr die Bedeutung, wie der 4. 8. 1914 für die europäische Sozialdemokratie. Es ist offenkundig, daß sie in der Wissens- und in der Gewissensforschung, zu der sie im Jahre 1956 angetreten sind, nicht über die Rinde der Erscheinung gelangt sind: daß sie bei der Analyse der Deformationen, deren Epizentrum in der UdSSR liegt, an der Oberfläche geblieben sind; und daß selbst jene Formel, die in den letzten Jahren in den kommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas sehr beliebt war – daß es nämlich noch Widersprüche gibt zwischen der sozialistischen Eigentumsstruktur und dem politischen Überbau – als unzulängliche Überbrückungshilfe erwiesen hat. Diese Formel hat von allem Anfang an weniger dem Modell des marxistischen Begriffsapparates entsprochen als jener Symplifikation Stalins in der

P OWER AND I N DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Franz Marek

Wien

I would like to try, within the framework of this week's topic, to put up for discussion some questions of revolutionary strategy, confining myself to the European perspective. This, although it is clear to me that these European perspectives are inextricably linked to the development of the so-called third world; this, although it would be tempting to change the attitude towards the complex of problems of the third world as a touchstone for socialist humanism, of which so much and generally has been said here: and this although it would not be uninteresting to see certain signs of decadence in the workers' movement also in to point out that Eurocentrism to which some Marxists are caught when they judge and condemn problem complexes in Asia, Africa and Latin America using European standards - somewhat reminiscent of the ideas of Columbus, who sought confirmation for the myths of antiquity in the New World and upon encountering the seals, believed to have encountered the dangerous but attractive sirens.

In her Junius pamphlet, Rosa Luxenburg wrote: What is in question is the entire 45-year period in the development of the modern labor movement. What we experienced is the criticism, the line and the sum under the item of our work. Forty-five years after Lenin's death, the communists, at least in Western Europe, were able to repeat this statement word for word. In fact, August 21, 1968 is almost as important for them as August 4, 1914 was for European social democracy. It is obvious that in the research of knowledge and conscience, to which they began in 1956, they have not got beyond the bark of the phenomenon: that, in the analysis of the deformations, whose epicenter is in the USSR

lies, have remained on the surface; and that even that formula which has been very popular in the communist parties of Western Europe in recent years - that there are still contradictions between the socialist property structure and the political superstructure - has proved to be an inadequate bridging aid. From the very beginning, this formula corresponded less to the model of the Marxist conceptual apparatus than to that symplification of Stalin in the 139th

Arbeit über die Sprachwissenschaften: daß dem privaten Eigentum an kapitalistischen Produktionsmitteln unbedingt ein kapitalistischer Überbau der sozialistischen Eigentumsstruktur ein sozialistischer Überbau entsprechen muß. Bei dem Gebrauch dieser Formel – in den letzten Jahren in fast allen westeuropäischen kommunistischen Parteien – schwang daher irgendwie die Hoffnung mit, daß sich letzten Endes die sozialistische Basis in eine sozialistische Demokratie umsetzen und durchsetzen muß.
Und nun stehen sie von der nackten, rohen und grausamen Bilanz, daß eine Bewegung die Kontrolle über ihre Führungsgarnitur verloren hat, die sich, wie Eugen Varga in seinem politischen Testament ausgeführt hat, auf eine Nomenklatur stützt, die sich nur aus sich selbst ergänzt und erneuert, in einem Maße, daß die Funktion der Bewegung erstarrt in der Bewegungslosigkeit der Funktionäre; daß die Formel von der führenden Rolle der Partei realiter nur die Rolle der Parteiführung umschreibt, die eine Macht konzentriert und potenziert in einem Maß, die die Feststellung rechtfertigt, daß die Arbeiterschaft von einer Klasse für sich wieder zu einer »Klasse an sich« degradiert wurde, wobei die Formel von der »führenden Rolle der Arbeiterklasse« – wie auch die letzten Wochen in der ČSSR bewiesen haben – nur strapaziert wird, wenn es darum geht, die Campagne gegen unbequeme Intellektuelle zu organisieren.

Auf Grund dieses Führungs- und Leistungssystems sind Erscheinungen wie der 21. August – aber auch wie die Austreibung der Juden aus Polen – nicht zufällige Phänomene, gewiß nicht zwangsläufige, aber dieses Führungs- und Leistungssysthem immanente Phänomene, wobei ich mich die Paranthese nicht versagen kann, daß Marxisten, die den Marxismus als Philosophie der Praxis werten, sich nicht damit begnügen dürfen, bei Diskussionen über den sozialistischen Humanismus deklarative Thesen zu präsentieren, sondern sich auch mit einer so brutalen Tatsache auseinandersetzen müssten: daß Volkspolen in Bälde »rein« von Juden sein wird, nach einem Genozid sui generis, in einem Lande, dessen Führungen sich auf Marx berufen und in dem Rosa Luxenburg geboren ist.

Wahrlich, wenn der junge Marx einmal gesagt hat, daß die sogenannten christlichen Staaten nicht unbedingt staatlicher Ausdruck des Christentums sind, so kann man analog dazu sagen, daß sogenannte sozialistische Staaten, die dieses skizzierte Leistungs- und Führungssysthem adoptiert haben, nicht unbedingt ein staatlicher Ausdruck der Vorstellungen sind, die die Klasiker mit dem Begriff des Sozialismus verbunden haben – und nicht nur deshalb, weil sich der Sozialismus nicht in der Sozialisierung von Produktionsmitteln erschöpft. Hier ist vor zwei Tagen der, wie ich glaube, löbliche Versuch gemacht worden, einen Abriß über die Genesis des Stalinismus und seine Entwicklung zu geben. Ich glaube nun nicht, daß der Versuch sehr geglückt ist, weil lineale Kausalketten und summarische Schlußfolgerungen einer komplizierten Problematik nicht gerecht werden können. Man kann einfach nicht über so eine Tatsache hinweghüpfen, wie die Rolle, die die UdSSR bei der Zerschlagung des Hitlerfaschismus gespielt hat. Und man kann sich nicht jener komplizierten Problematik entziehen, auf die Isaak Deutscher hingewiesen hat, daß nämlich die Ideologie,

Work on linguistics: that private ownership of the capitalist means of production must necessarily correspond to a capitalist superstructure of the socialist property structure. With the use of this formula - in the last few

years in almost all Western European communist parties - there was somehow the hope that in the end the socialist base would have to be converted into a socialist democracy and prevail.

And now they are left with the naked, raw, and gruesome record of losing control of a movement that, as Eugen Varga pointed out in his Political Testament, relies on a nomenclature that is only complementary to itself and renewed, to such an extent that the function of the movement becomes paralyzed in the immobility of the functionaries; that the formula of the leading role of the party really only circumscribes the role of the party leadership, which concentrates and potentiates power to a degree that justifies the statement that the working class has reverted from a class in itself to a "class in itself". was demoted, whereby the formula of the "leading role of the working class" - as the last few weeks in the CSSR have also proved - is only strained when it comes to organizing the campaign against uncomfortable intellectuals.

Because of this system of leadership and performance, phenomena such as August 21 - but also like the expulsion of the Jews from Poland - are not accidental phenomena, certainly not inevitable, but phenomena inherent in this system of leadership and performance, whereby I cannot refrain from paranthesis , that Marxists who value Marxism as a philosophy of practice should not content themselves with presenting declarative theses in discussions about socialist humanism, but also have to deal with such a brutal fact: that people's Poland will soon be "pure" from Jews will be, after a genocide sui generis, in a country whose leaders refer to Marx and in which Rosa Luxenburg was born.

*Truly, if the young Marx once said that the so-called Christian states are not necessarily state expressions of Christianity, one can analogously say that so-called socialist states that have adopted this performance and management system outlined above are not necessarily are a state expression of the ideas that the classics associated with the concept of socialism - and not just because socialism does not stop at the socialization of the means of production. Two days ago, what I believe to be a commendable attempt was made here to give an outline of the genesis of Stalinism and its development. I don't believe that the attempt was very successful, because linear causal chains and summary conclusions from a complicated set of problems are not can do justice. One can skip a-j ^° T ijc c n I -r S0 a*ne fact, like the role played by the USSR in crushing Hitlerite fascism.*

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pointed out, namely the ideologic, 140

die zur Institution geworden ist, gewisse Verpflichtungen mit sich bringt, denen sich auch die Birokratie nicht entziehen kann. Wie dem auch sei, eines steht fest: für den Durchbruch des sozialistischen Wollens in unseren Breitegraden kann nur ein sozialistisches Experiment attraktiv wirken, das mit einem Maximum an Demokratie, mit einem Maximum an Menschenwürde verbunden ist, d. h., daß jene Staaten, die das skizzierte Leistung- und Führungssystem adoptiert haben, für die Attraktivität der sozialistischen Idee einfach ausfallen und wegfallen.

Für uns Kommunisten ist es nicht uninteressant zu wissen, daß wir bei der Analyse der Deformationen, die wir seit 1956 versucht haben, mit Ausnahme von den jugoslawischen Kommunisten, zu wenig erkannt haben, daß eine der entscheidendsten Ausdrucksformen dieser Deformationen der Verzicht auf jene Produzenten-Demokratie war, die uns ursprünglich im Begriff der Sowjets angelacht hat und die dann bei der sogenannten stalinischen Verfassung auch formell abgeschafft wurde; sodaß die Sowjets nur mehr den Namen der Frühzeit trugen, im lokalen Maßstab bestenfalls mit einem gewißen Spielraum für administrative Angelegenheiten, im zentralen Maßstab leere Hülsen mit pseudoparlamentarischer Gymnastik.

Es ist interessant, daß wir voriges Jahr in der ČSSR vor die doppelte Aufgabenstellung gestellt wurden, einerseits – die parlamentarischen Institutionen, die jeden Inhalt verloren hatten und die ein Objekt der Nostalgie der Bevölkerung waren, zu revalosieren – und anderseits, nach bedeutsamen Auseinandersetzungen mit den Arbeitern in den Skoda-Werken, jene Arbeiterräte durchzusetzen, die – wie ursprünglich die Sowjet Organe – einer höheren und direkten Demokratie sein sollten. Wenn Sie wollen, eine kombinierte Problematik, die dann freilich durch die kombinierte Aktion der Warschauer Staaten erledigt worden ist.

Für die Perspektiven der Arbeiterbewegung in den kapitalistischen Ländern erscheint mir diese Orientierung auf die Produktiv-Demoratie für lebenswichtig, lebenswichtig auch für die Auseinandersetzung mit der ausgehöhlten, verfaulten und manipulierten Bourgeois-Demokratie. Wenn Bertrand Russel die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften so dargestellt hat, daß er sagte: »Wir wissen immer mehr über immer weniger. Und es naht der Zeitpunkt, wo wir alles über nichts wissen werden.« So kann man die Entwicklung der Demokratie angesichts der Machtkonzentration bei Technokratie und Bürokratie ungefähr formulieren; immer mehr Leute haben immer weniger zu reden und der Zeitpunkt naht, wo alle nichts zu reden haben werden. In der Tat reduziert sich in kapitalistischer Hülle die Meinungsfreiheit doch immer mehr und mehr auf die Freiheit, das zu meinen, was einem die Meinungsfabriken gebrauchsfertig ins Haus liefern; die Koalitionsfreiheit auf die Auswahl, sich einer der bestehenden Riesenapparaturen zu unterordnen, und die Wahlfreiheit in manchen Ländern, in immer mehr Ländern, auf die Freiheit, an gewissen politischen Schönheitskonkurenzen teilzunehmen, die keine Auswahl zwischen Programmen gestatten, sondern eher eine Auswahl zwischen Gesichtern auf Plakatwänden; ich sage ausdrücklich »Gesichtern«, weil es sich nicht immer um Köpfe handelt.

which has become an institution, entails certain obligations that even the bureaucracy cannot escape. Be that as it may, one thing is certain: for the

breakthrough of the socialist will in our latitudes, only a socialist experiment can be attractive that is connected with a maximum of democracy, with a maximum of human dignity, i. This means that those states that have adopted the performance and management system outlined simply fall away from the attractiveness of the socialist idea and fall away.

For us communists it is not uninteresting to know that in analyzing the deformations which we have attempted since 1956, with the exception of the Yugoslav communists, we have not sufficiently recognized that one of the most decisive expressions of these deformations is the renunciation of those producer Democracy, which originally laughed at us in terms of the soviets and which was then formally abolished in the so-called Stalinist constitution; so that the soviets only bore the name of the early days, on the local scale at best with a certain latitude for administrative matters, on the central scale empty shells with pseudo-parliamentary gymnastics.

It is interesting that last year in the Czechoslovakia we were faced with a double task, on the one hand - to reclaim the parliamentary institutions that had lost all content and which were an object of nostalgia of the population - and on the other hand, after significant disputes with the Workers in the Skoda works to push through those workers' councils which - like the Soviets originally were - were supposed to be organs of a higher and direct democracy. A combined problem, if you like, which of course was settled by the combined action of the Warsaw states.

For the prospects of the workers' movement in the capitalist countries, this orientation towards productive democracy seems to me to be vital, vital also for the confrontation with the hollow, rotten and manipulated bourgeois democracy. When Bertrand Russel presented the development of science in such a way that he said: "We know more and more about less and less. And the time is approaching when we will know everything about nothing.« This is how one can roughly formulate the development of democracy in view of the concentration of power in technocracy and bureaucracy; more and more people have less and less to talk about and the time is approaching when everyone will have nothing to talk about. In fact, in the capitalist shell, freedom of opinion is reduced more and more to the freedom to think what the opinion factories deliver ready-made to your home; the freedom of association to the choice to submit to one of the existing giant apparatuses, and the freedom of choice in some countries, in more and more countries, to the freedom to participate in certain political beauty competitions that do not allow a choice between programs, but rather a choice between faces on billboards; I specifically say "faces" because they are not always heads.

Die Produzentendemokratie erscheint uns auch wichtig angesichts der Krise des Parlamentarismus, deren Zeitgenossen wir sind. Ich glaube, daß die bekannte These Lenins aus dem »Radikalismus«, daß der Parlamentarismus zwar historisch überholt ist, aber nicht im Bewußtsein der Massen, in unserer Zeit nur mehr bedingt richtig ist. Auch für Teile außerhalb der revolutionären Arbeiterbewegung ist es oft ziemlich klar, daß die lebenswichtigen Entscheidungen nicht im Parlament gefällt werden. Ich schlußfolgere daraus keineswegs eine nihilistische Einstellung zu Parlamentswahlen, zu parlamentarischen Kombinationen. Ich glaube, daß die oft verkündete Losung des Boykotts à tout prix manchmal nur eine Sprache der Stärke aus einer Position der Schwäche ist. Entscheidend ist jedoch für die revolutionären Perspektive primordial die Orientierung auf systemschwächende, ja, geradezu systemsprengende Kontroll- und Machtfunktionen der Produzenten, ohne die auch übrigens Nationalisierungs- und Verstaatlichtungsmaßnahmen keinen reellen Fortschritt bedeuten. Eine Orientierung auf revolutionäre Reformen, um die Formulierung von Andre Gorz zu verwenden, die die Größe der sozialistischen Demokratie vorwegnehmen, zumindestens vorwegspüren lassen, systemschwachende vielleicht auch systemsprengende Reformen, Kontrollfunktionen, die in bestimmten Situationen in Machtfunktionen umschlagen können.

In verschiedenen Varianten bricht sich dieser Gedanke in immer mehr Ländern Westeuropas Bahn; in Deutschland in der unglücklichen Formulierung der »Mitbestimmung«, die v. a. in der sozial-demokratischen Interpretation kilometerweit nach Sozialpartnerschaft riecht, aber doch dieselbe Tendenz zum Ausdruck bringt, die in Frankreich den klaren und am jugoslawischen Beispiel formulierten Begriff der Autogestion kennt, in Italien den Begriff *potere operaio nella fabbrica* in England die Formel von *workers' control* und in Skandinavien desen eigenartigen Begriff der »Demokratie auf dem Arbeitsplatz« als Ausdruck der einfachen Tatsache, daß die Menschen dort, wo sie den Großteil ihres bewußten Lebens verbringen und den Großteil ihrer Energie verausgaben, jedes demokratischen Rechts beraubt sind und im wachsenden Maße Kontrolle – zumindestens Kontrolle, wenn nicht Machtfunktionen – in Anspruch nehmen müssen.

Wenn wir diese Frage der Produzenten-Demokratie stellen, ergibt sich sofort die Frage: wer sind Produzenten? Ich glaube. daß wir uns darüber verständigen können, daß wir sie nicht auf die produzierenden »produktiven« Arbeiter reduzieren können. Die Strukturveränderung in der arbeitenden Bewölkerung, die wachsende Anzahl der Angestellten und vor allem die Strukturveränderung im Rahmen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution, die die Wissenschaft immer mehr zur entscheidenden Produktivskraft macht und jene Schicht bildet, die Serge Mallet »la nouvelle classe ouvrière« genannt hat (und die im Schnitt in den meisten kapitalistischen Ländern jährlich um 7% zunimmt, so daß wir in den 80er Jahren 20% der arbeitenden Menschen dieser Schicht als zugehörig betrachten müssen, zwingt uns, diese Menschen miteinzuschließen in den Begriff der Produzenten; ja noch mehr, im Rahmen dieser wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution wandelt sich auch die soziologische Stellung der Studenten, erfährt die

Producer democracy also seems important to us in view of the crisis of parliamentarism that we are contemporaries. I believe that Lenin's well-known thesis from "Radicalism" that

Although parliamentarism is historically outdated, it is not in the consciousness of the masses and is only partially correct in our time.

Even for parts outside the revolutionary labor movement it is often quite clear that the vital decisions are not made in parliament. I do not in any way conclude from this a nihilistic attitude towards parliamentary elections, towards parliamentary combinations. I believe that the often-proclaimed slogan of boycotts a tout prix is sometimes just language of the strong from a position of the weak. Crucial for the revolutionary perspective, however, is primarily the orientation towards system-weakening, even system-busting control and power functions of the producers, without which nationalization and nationalization measures mean no real progress. An orientation towards revolutionary reforms, to use Andre Gorz's formulation, which anticipate the greatness of socialist democracy, at least let it anticipate, system-weakening perhaps also system-explosive reforms, control functions that can turn into power functions in certain situations.

In various variants, this idea is breaking ground in more and more countries in Western Europe; in Germany in the unfortunate formulation of "co-determination," which v. a. in the social-democratic interpretation smells miles away of social partnership, but still expresses the same tendency, which in France knows the clear concept of autogestion formulated using the Yugoslav example, in Italy the concept potere operaio nella fabbrica in England the formula of workers' control and in Scandinavia their peculiar concept of "democracy in the workplace" as an expression of the simple fact that people are deprived of all democratic rights where they spend most of their conscious lives and expend most of their energy, and to an increasing extent control - at least control, if not power functions - have to be claimed.

When we ask this question of producer democracy, the question immediately arises: who are producers? I believe. that we can agree that we cannot reduce them to the producing "productive" workers. The structural change in the working clouds, the growing number of employees and above all the structural change in the context of the scientific and technical revolution, which increasingly makes science the decisive productive force and forms that layer which Serge Mallet called "la nouvelle classe ouvriere". (and which increases on average by 7% annually in most capitalist countries, so that in the 1980s we have to consider 20% of the working people to belong to this class, forces us to include these people in the concept of producers; yes even more, within the framework of this scientific and technical revolution, the sociological position of the students is also changing, experiencing the 142

Universität eine qualitative Funktionsveränderung. Der Kampf gegen die hierarchischen Strukturen der Universität hat gesellschaftskritische, ja, gesellschaftsverändernde Bedeutung. Der Kampf um eine wirkliche revolutionäre Bildungsreform ist so auch ein Kampf um Produzenten-Demokratie und jene Studentenbewegung, die Papst Paul VI so liebevoll »Explosionen der Torheit« nannte, ist in Wirklichkeit eine Ausdrucksform des wachsenden Widerspruchs zwischen Produktivkräften und Produktionsverhältnissen in unserer Zeit.

Man ist versucht auf einen Begriff zurückzugreifen, den Marx im »Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich« verwendet hat; wo er von den »hervorbringenden Kräften der Gesellschaft« gesprochen hat, zum Unterschied von den parasitären und ausbeuterischen. Und mir scheint es notwendig, daß wir, wenn wir die Leninsche Aufgabe nicht aus dem Auge verlieren, Formen des Herankommens an die Revolution zu finden, uns unbedingt auf Etappenziele orientieren müssen, die im wachsenden Maße die Macht der Monopole zugunsten der Kontrolle und eventuell der Machtfunktionen der Produzenten einschränken.

Diese neue Strategie hat bisher keine revolutionäre Alternative gefunden, die über den Bereich des Verbalismus und der Propaganda hinausgeht. Dieser neuen Strategie muß eine neue Bündnis-Politik entsprechen. Das politische Bild der meisten kommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas ist noch immer stark geprägt von der sog. Volksfrontstrategie. Ich teile nicht die negative Einstellung, die in manchen Gruppierungen der Linken heute zu Hause ist, gegenüber dieser Strategie der Vergangenheit, besonders nicht, wenn als retrospektive Alternative gerade jene Politik vorgeschlagen wird, die die kommunistische Internationale u. v. die KPD *vor* der Volksfront gemacht hat und derentwegen sie mitverantwortlich für das Aufkommen des Faschismus wurden. Ich glaube auch nicht, daß große Parteien der revovolutionären Arbeiterbewegung in unserer Zeit unbedingt auf parlamentarische Kombinationen verzichten müßen, die den Differenzierungsprozessen in anderen Parteien Rechnung tragen. Das haben, nebenbei bemerkt, auch die Bolschewiken in ihrer parlamentarischen Taktik gemacht. Aber eins, und darüber könnten wir uns glaube ich verständigen, scheint doch klar, daß diese Volksfrontstrategie den neuen Verhältnissen, der neuen qualitativen Rolle der »nouvelle classe ouvrière«, der neuen qualitativen Rolle der Studenten und Universitäten, den ganzen veränderten Strukturen einfach nicht mehr entspricht. Ihre Konzeption, um den Ausdruck Gramscis zu verwenden, eines »blocco storico«, eines historischen Blockes, war doch im wesentlichen orientiert auf das Bündnis der Arbeiter mit den Kleinbürgern, mit den Bauern, auf parlamentarische Kombinationnen, die zu einer Regierung führen können, die durch demokratische Reformen, gestützt auf die Massenbewegung, den Weg zum Sozialismus ebnet. Aber diese Strategie entspricht einfach nicht mehr den strukturellen Veränderungen, sie entspricht, nebenbei bemerkt, auch nicht, was sehr wichtig ist, den Vorgängen im christlichen Lager, wo viele Menschen von ihrem religiösen Bewußtsein her zu revolutionären Schlußfolgerungen gelangen, Prozesse die einfach nicht mehr parteimäßig erfaßt werden können.

University a qualitative functional change. The fight against the hierarchical structures of the university is socially critical, even socially changing. The struggle for truly revolutionary educational reform is thus

also a struggle for producer democracy, and the student movement that Pope Paul VI so affectionately called "explosions of folly" is in reality an expression of the growing contradiction between productive forces and the conditions of production in our time.

One is tempted to fall back on a concept that Marx in

used "civil war in France"; where he spoke of the "productive forces of society" as distinct from the parasitic and exploitative. And it seems to me that, if we do not lose sight of Lenin's task of finding ways of approaching the revolution, we must orient ourselves towards intermediate goals that will increasingly reduce the power of the monopolies in favor of control and possibly Restrict the producers' power functions.

This new strategy has not yet found a revolutionary alternative that goes beyond the realm of verbalism and propaganda. A new alliance policy must correspond to this new strategy. The political image of most communist parties in Western Europe is still strongly characterized by the so-called popular front strategy. I do not share the negative attitude that some groups on the left have today towards this strategy of the past, especially when, as a retrospective alternative, the very policies that the Communist International and many others are being proposed are being proposed. the KPD made in front of the People's Front and because of which they became jointly responsible for the rise of fascism. Nor do I believe that the major parties of the revo-volutionary workers' movement of our time necessarily have to do without parliamentary combinations that take account of the processes of differentiation in other parties. Incidentally, this is what the Bolsheviks did in their parliamentary tactics. But one thing, and I believe we were able to agree on one thing, seems clear that this popular front strategy is simply no longer appropriate to the new conditions, the new qualitative role of the "nouvelle classe ouvriere", the new qualitative role of the students and universities, the whole changed structures is equivalent to.

Her conception, to use the Gramscis term, one

"blocco storico", a historical block, was essentially oriented towards the alliance of the workers with the lower middle class, with the peasants, towards parliamentary combinations that could lead to a government that, through democratic reforms, supported by the mass movement, paved the way to socialism. But this strategy simply no longer corresponds to the structural changes, it also, by the way, does not correspond, which is very important, to the processes in the Christian camp, where many people, based on their religious consciousness, reach revolutionary conclusions, processes that are simply no longer partisan can be detected.

Was in unserer Zeit notwendig ist, ist ein »blocco storico« zwischen der revolutionären Arbeiterbewegung und jener Bewegung, die aus den Universitäten kommt. Eine Verständigung dieser Strömungen scheint mir die entscheidendste Voraussetzung nicht nur für revolutionäre Perspektiven in unseren Breitengraden, sondern für fortschrittliche Perspektiven in Westeuropa zu sein.

Ich bin mir dessen bewußt, daß das mit Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Der amerikanische Dichter Norman Mailer hat in seinem Buch »Heere aus Nacht« ein bißchen karikierend die Schwierigkeiten einer solchen Verständigung illustriert, indem er also erstens einmal die sog. »alte Linke« geschildert hat, mit dem alten Vorstellungsbild eines Generalsekretariats, das die »Logik des nächsten Schrittes« genau einkalkuliert, und von panischer Angst erfüllt ist, daß irgendwelche Elemente seiner Kontrolle entgleiten können; und auf der anderen Seite die Gruppierung der »neuen Linken«, mit dem »Happening als Erleuchtung« und, wie er es ironisch ausdrückt, die »Revolution ohne Konzept« personifizierend, was offenkundig dem Leser die Schlußfolgerungen zuläßt, daß die alte Linke das Konzept ohne Revolution personifiziert.

Die Schwierigkeiten der Verständigung sind eindeutig und deutlich, aber es ist meine innerste Überzeugung, daß ohne diese Verständigung, ohne diesen historischen Block überhaupt keine revolutionären, ja nicht einmal fortschrittlichen Perspektiven in Westeuropa möglich sind, wobei diese Verständigung zweifellos voraussetzen würde: 1. das grundsätzliche Bekenntnis zum Pluralismus in der revolutionären Bewegung, 2. den Verzicht auf jeden Führungsanspruch irgendeiner Gruppierung, irgendeiner Tendenz, damit auch auf jede Unfehlbarkeit bei der Interpretation der revolutionären Wissenschaft, 3. die wechselseitige Respektierung der Autonomie. Mir scheint diese Verständigung auch notwendig, um jene zwei Klippen zu vermeiden, von denen Rosa Luxemburg gesprochen hat, die Klippe des Rückfalls in das Sektierertum und die Klippe des Verzichtens auf das Endziel, die Klippe der Abkapselung von den entscheidenden revolutionären Tendenzen unserer Zeit und den Umfall in eine Reformbewegung, die nichts anderes ist, als eine Variante der interpretierten Ordnung.

Mir scheint diese Verständigung auch notwendig, um zwei andere Klippen zu vermeiden, die in der Bewegung der letzten Jahre sichtbar geworden sind. Einerseits die etwas prinzipienlose Anbetung der Spontaneität und anderseits die bekannte zentralistisch-bürokratische Gängelung der Bewegung. Es gehört zu den Sünden unserer kommunistischen Partei, daß das Bild über Rosa Luxenburg jahrzehntelang geradezu geprägt worden ist durch jenen Brief, den Stalin 1931 geschrieben hat, weshalb ganze Kader in der Überzeugung aufgewachsen sind, daß Luxenburg und Anbetung der Spontaneität korrelative Begriffe sind, ein Zerrbild übrigens, das komischerweise auch in manchen Gruppierungen der neuen Linken geistert, allerdings mit positiver Wertung.

Worauf es Rosa Luxen in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem bürokratischen Zentralismus angekommen ist, das war, ich zitiere wörtlich, daß die Masse der handelnde Chorus, die Leitungen nur die sprechenden Personen, nur die Dolmetscher des Massenwillens sein sollen, daß

What is necessary in our time is a "blocco storico" between the revolutionary workers' movement and the movement that comes from the

universities. An understanding of these currents seems to me to be the most decisive prerequisite not only for revolutionary perspectives in our latitudes, but also for progressive perspectives in Western Europe.

I am aware that this involves difficulties. The American poet Norman M ailer has in his book

"Heere aus Nacht" illustrates the difficulties of such an understanding in a slightly caricatured manner, by first describing the so-called "old left" with the old image of a general secretariat that precisely calculates the "logic of the next step", and from terrified that any elements might slip out of his control; and on the other side the grouping of the 'new left', personifying the 'happening as enlightenment' and, as he ironically puts it, 'revolution without a concept', which obviously leads the reader to conclude that the old left does that Concept personified without revolution.

The difficulties of understanding are unambiguous and clear, but it is my deepest conviction that without this understanding, without this historical block, no revolutionary, not even progressive perspectives are possible in Western Europe, whereby this understanding would undoubtedly presuppose: 1.

the fundamental commitment to pluralism in the revolutionary movement, 2. the renunciation of any claim to leadership of any group, any tendency, and thus also of any infallibility in the interpretation of revolutionary science, 3. the mutual respect of autonomy. I also think this understanding is necessary in order to avoid those two cliffs that Rosa Luxemburg spoke of, the cliff of falling back into sectarianism and the cliff of renouncing the ultimate goal, the cliff of isolation from the decisive revolutionary tendencies of our time and the fall into a reform movement that is nothing more than a variant of the interpreted order.

It also seems to me that this understanding is necessary in order to avoid two other pitfalls that have become apparent in the movement in recent years. On the one hand, the somewhat unprincipled adoration of spontaneity and, on the other hand, the movement's well-known centralistic-bureaucratic gossip. It is one of the sins of our Communist Party that the image of Rosa Luxenburg was shaped for decades by that letter which Stalin wrote in 1931, which is why whole cadres grew up convinced that Luxenburg and the worship of spontaneity are correlative concepts By the way, this is a distorted image, which, strangely enough, also haunts some groups on the new left, albeit with a positive evaluation.

What Rosa Luxen was concerned with in dealing with bureaucratic centralism was, I quote verbatim, that the masses should be the acting

chorus, the leadership only the speaking persons, only the interpreters of the will of the masses, that 144

Streiks nicht die technischen Angelegenheiten eines Vorstandes sind, nach Belieben beschlossen und auch verboten, eine Art Taschenmesser, das man in der Tasche für alle Fälle zusammengeklappt bereithalten oder auch, meistens so, nach Beschluß zusammengeklappt halten kann.

Die letzten zwei Jahre, sowohl die Bewegung in Frankreich, und, fast möchte ich sagen, ohne die französischen Kameraden verletzen zu wollen, fast noch lehrreicher die Bewegung in Italien, hat Rosa's Worte bestätigt, daß im wirklichen Kampf Madame Geschichte den bürokratischen Schablonen eine Nase dreht und neue Kampfformen entstehen, Formen der direkten Demokratie, die, und das ist das Neue, was wir studieren müssen, sowohl in Frankreich als in Italien, auch Formen der Produzenten-Demokratie sind. Ich denke, es gibt momentan, von den Maikämpfen in Frankreich abgesehen, von denen ja hier schon die Rede war, und die wir in manchen Sprachsektionen ausführlich diskutierten, kein geeigneteres Objekt des Studiums für Funktionäre der Arbeiterbewegung, als die Kämpfe und die Kampfergebnisse in manchen italienischen Betrieben, z. B. die Kämpfe und Kampfergebnisse bei Pirelli, aber auch, was nicht ganz uninteressant ist, die Kämpfe und Kampfergebnisse der Landarbeiter in Puglia. Mir scheint, daß manche Theoretiker, die gerade in der Frage der Produzenten-Demokratie Pionierarbeit geleistet haben und mit Recht darauf hinweisen, daß aufgrund der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution diese »nouvelle classe ouvrière« immer mehr als eine führende Kraft im Kampf um die Produzenten-Demokratie in den Vordergrund rückt, manchmal allzuleicht gewisse Kategorien der Arbeiterschaft, die nicht typisch sind für die wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution und zweifellos auch nicht typisch sein werden, auf dem Altar von Marcuse opfern und für die revolutionäre Perspektive und für den Kampf um eine Produzenten-Demokratie abschreiben.

Es ist in dieser Hinsicht doch nicht uninteressant, daß z. B. die Landarbeiter der Puglia, die bis vor kurzem nicht einmal das Recht auf gewerkschaftliche Vertretung hatten, im Kampf Organe der Produzenten-Demokratie geschaffen haben, die, so wie ihre Brüder bei den Pirelli-Werken, sich nicht mit der Vertretung lohnrechtlicher Belange begnügten, sondern direkt Kontrollfunktion in den Arbeitsprozessen ausüben. Im Kampf sind neue Organisationsformen entstanden, die die bisherigen Formen sprengen; ich denke nur zum Beispiel an das bedeutsame Phänomen der *assemblea operaia,* in italienischen Betrieben, in der die Arbeiter unabhängig von der verschiedenen Gewerkschaftszugehörigkeit, aber auch ohne Gewerkschaftszugehörigkeit, Organe direkter Demokratie des Kampfes und der Vertretung schaffen. Es sind Organe der Produzenten-Demokratie die über den Rahmen der bürgerlichen Demokratie hinwegweisen.

Hier kommt nun der Einwand, der schon in Sprachsektionen erhoben worden ist, daß positive Ergebnisse solchen Kampfes und auch Organe der Produzenten-Demokratie das Risiko in sich tragen, von der etablierten Ordnung inhaliert und integriert zu werden, daß sie sogar zu repräsentativen Organen im Kampf gegen den Fortschritt werden können. Es ist ein bißchen kurios, daß dieser Einwand von

Strikes are not the technical affairs of a board of directors, decided at will

and also forbidden, a kind of pocket knife that you keep folded up in your pocket just in case or also, usually folded up like this, you can keep folded up by decision.

The last two years, both the movement in France and, almost without wanting to offend my French comrades, the movement in Italy, I would like to say almost more instructively, has confirmed Rosa's words that in the real struggle, Madame History has given a nose to bureaucratic templates turns and new forms of struggle are emerging, forms of direct democracy which, and this is the new thing that we must study, both in France and in Italy, are also forms of producer democracy. I think that, apart from the May struggles in France, which have already been mentioned here and which we discussed in detail in some language sections, there is currently no more suitable subject for study for functionaries of the labor movement than the struggles and the results of the struggles in some Italian companies, e.g. B. the struggles and struggles at Pirelli, but also, which is not entirely uninteresting, the struggles and struggles of the farm workers in Puglia. It seems to me that some theoreticians who have done pioneering work on the question of producer democracy rightly point out that, due to the scientific and technical revolution, this "nouvelle classe ouvriere" is becoming more and more a leading force in the struggle for producer democracy. Democracy comes to the fore, sometimes all too easily sacrificing on the altar of Marcuse certain categories of the working class which are not typical of the scientific-technical revolution and undoubtedly will not be typical either, and for the revolutionary perspective and for the struggle for a producer write off democracy.

In this respect it is not uninteresting that e.g. For example, the farm workers of the Puglia, who until recently did not even have the right to trade union representation, have created organs of producer democracy in the struggle, which, like their brothers at the Pirelli works, were not content with representing wage interests , but exercise a direct control function in the work processes. In the struggle, new forms of organization have emerged that break through the previous forms; I am just thinking, for example, of the important phenomenon of the assembled operaia, in Italian factories, in which the workers, regardless of their various union affiliations, but also without union affiliations, create organs of direct democracy of struggle and representation. It is the organs of producer democracy that point beyond the framework of bourgeois democracy.

Here comes the objection, already raised in language sections, that positive results of such a struggle and also organs of producer democracy carry the risk of being inhaled and integrated by the established order, that they even become representative organs in the struggle against progress. It's a bit odd that this objection was raised by 10 PRAXIS

Gruppierungen erhoben wird, die selbst untereinander jede politische Gemeinschaft ablehnen. Der Einwand ist trotzdem legitim, aber er gilt, solange die Lebensordnung nicht grundsätzlich verändert wird, für jeden Schritt, für jede Kritik, für jede Reform und für jeden Erfolg. Sie alle tragen immer und trugen immer das Risiko in sich, zu Arabesken auf den Tapeten des Etablishment zu werden.

Das hat Karl Marx nicht daran gehindert, die Zehn-Stunden-Bill als einen Sieg der politischen Ökonomie des Proletariats zu bezeichnen; das hat Lenin nicht daran gehindert davon zu sprechen, daß man eine Reform darin beurteilen muß, von wem sie errungen wird, unter welchen Umständen sie errungen wird, von welchen Kräften sie errungen wird, mit welchen Perspektiven sie erkämpft wird und ob sie nicht die Voraussetzungen liefert, zu weiteren Kämpfen. Vor allem, so denke ich, müssen wir uns doch von der Tatsache leiten lassen, daß bis jetzt zu dieser skizzierten revolutionären Strategie als Alternative nur Losungen presentiert werden, die über den Bereich der Propaganda und des Verbalismus nicht hinauskommen. Zu den Worten von Marx, die nach wie vor gelten, gehört offenkundig auch das, daß es unsere Aufgabe nicht ist, lautstark Doktrinen zu verkündigen und dann darauf zu warten, daß die Massen andächtig vor ihnen niederknien, sondern daß es unsere Aufgabe ist, Prozesse, wenn sie noch in ihren Anfängen sind, sorgfältig zu studieren und daraus Schlußfolgerungen zu ziehen, die vernünftig und verständlich sind.

groupings that reject any political community among themselves. The objection is nevertheless legitimate, but it applies to every step, every

criticism, every reform and every success, as long as the order of life is not fundamentally changed. They all always carry and always carried the risk of becoming arabesques on the wallpaper of the establishment.

This did not prevent Karl Marx from describing the Ten Hours Bill as a victory for the political economy of the proletariat; This did not prevent Lenin from saying that a reform must be judged by who achieved it, under what circumstances it was achieved, by what forces it was achieved, with what prospects it was fought for and whether it did not meet the prerequisites delivers, to further fights. Above all, I think, we must be guided by the fact that so far only solutions have been presented as an alternative to this outlined revolutionary strategy, which do not go beyond the realm of propaganda and verbalism. Among the words of Marx that still hold true, evidently, is that our job is not to loudly proclaim doctrines and then wait for the masses to kneel devoutly before them, but our job is to To study processes carefully when they are still in their infancy and to draw conclusions that are reasonable and understandable.

AUTHENTISCHE UND PROBLEMATISCHE FORMEN DES SOZIALISTISCHEN HUMANISMUS

Helmut Fleischer

Berlin-West

Louis Althusser hat unrecht, wenn er meint, die marxistische Theorie habe einen Basisbegriff des »Menschen« nicht nötig und dürfte als Theorie kein Humanismus sein. Weder aus einer Marx-Interpretation noch aus prinzipiellen Überlegungen läßt sich das zureichend begründen. Für die Konstruktion des marxistischen Gesellschaftsbegriffs ist ein *theoretischer Begriff des Menschen* (der menschlichen Individuen und ihrer menschlichen Artcharakters) ebenso unerläßlich wie ein *praktischer Begriff des Humanen* für die Programmatik der sozialistischen Bewegung. Dennoch hat Althusser recht, wenn er ein Unbehagen an jener »humanistischen Welle« empfindet, die sich seit dem Ende der Stalin-Ära in der kommunistischen Bewegung ausgebreitet hat, und wenn er Anstoß daran nimmt, daß dieser marxistische Humanismus in den Begriffen des Menschen, der Personalität und der Entfremdung über Dinge redet, die man eigentlich in den konkreteren, organisatorisch-praktischen Termini der »reifen« marxistischen Theorie verhandeln müßte.

Diese Kritik sollte man aufnehmen und näher präzisieren, in der Absicht, strengere *Kriterien der Authentizität* eines sozialistischen Humanismus marxistischer Provenienz zu gewinnen.

Tatsächlich hatte es der Stalinismus im Felde der Theorie dahin gebracht, daß die materialistische Philosophie (ähnlich, wie es Marx an Hobbes kritisiert hatte) *menschenfeindlich* geworden war. Demgegenüber bedeutet es sicher einen wesentlichen Fortschritt, wenn jetzt der Mensch (auch als individuelle Person) wieder ein zentraler philosophischer Gegenstand geworden und die humanistische Tendenz der marxistischen Theorie und Praxis zu neuer Anerkennung gelangt ist. Solche Reflexionen bilden eine wichtige Durchgangsstufe auf dem Wege der Wiedergewinnung der emanzipatorischen Qualität des Marxismus.

Es erweist sich indessen jetzt schon als notwendig, auf eine Problematik jenes sozialistischen Humanismus hinzuweisen. Aus unseren Erfahrungen mit den humanistischen Proklamationen in der bürger-

AUTH EN TICAL AND PROBLEM ATICAL FORMS

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Louis Althusser is wrong when he thinks that Marxist theory does not need a basic concept of "man" and that as a theory it should not be humanism. This cannot be adequately justified either from an interpretation of Marx or from considerations of principle. For the construction of the Marxist concept of society, a theoretical concept of man (of human individuals and their human species character) is just as indispensable as a practical concept of the human for the program of the socialist movement. Still, Althusser is right when he feels uneasy about the "humanist wave" that has been sweeping through the communist movement since the end of the Stalin era, and when he takes offense at the fact that this Marxist humanism, in terms of the people of personality and alienation talks about things that should really be discussed in the more concrete, organizational-practical terms of "mature" Marxist theory.

This criticism should be taken up and made more precise with the intention of gaining stricter criteria for the authenticity of a socialist humanism of Marxist provenance.

In fact, in the field of theory, Stalinism had gotten to the point where materialistic philosophy (similar to how Marx had criticized Hobbes) had become humane. On the other hand, it certainly means significant progress if man (also as an individual person) has again become a central philosophical subject and the humanistic tendency of Marxist theory and practice has gained new recognition. Such reflections form an important transitional stage on the way to regaining the emancipatory quality of Marxism.

However, it is already proving necessary to point out one of the problems of that socialist humanism. From our experiences with the humanist proclamations in the burger-147

lichen Gesellschaft wissen wir, wie sehr ein Humanismus, der im Anthropologisch-Allgemeinen gefangen bleibt, Gefahr läuft, bestenfalls *unpraktisch* und *folgenlos*, schlimmerenfalls eine *kompensatorische Ideologie* zu werden.Wenn die Prinzipien des Humanismus so allgemein und grob definiert sind, betreffen sie im Grunde nur die elementarste Humanität, die sich in einer halbwegs zivilisierten Gesellschaft während friedlicher Perioden nicht allzu schwer etablieren läßt, und schließt folglich nur ganz eklatante Verletzungen menschlicher Würde aus. Je mehr solche elementaren Forderungen erfüllt sind, desto mehr kommt es darauf an, die Inhumanität auch in ihren subtilen und versteckten Formen bloßzulegen und praktisch anzufechten. Der Humanismus wird konkret nur als konkrete Gesellschaftskritik, als Denunziation aller sozialen Privilegien und Formen der Herrschaft, der Fremdbestimmung über Menschen. Erst in solcher Konkretheit kann der sozialistische Humanismus auch praktisch werden.

Hinsichtlich der alten, bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist das eine längst vertraute Sache. Das neue Problem ist, wie die humanen Qualitäten werdender sozialistischer Gesellschaften zu gewährleisten und zu entwickeln sind.

Die geschichtlichen Erfahrungen haben gelehrt, daß die Humanität hier nicht zureichend durch irgendeine Grundqualität der Gesellschaft – durch ihre Produktionsverhältnisse, ihre politisch-demokratische Konstitution oder durch ein ideologisches Credo – garantiert ist. Auf den unteren Stufen des Sozialismus gilt weiterhin, was auch für die vorsozialistischen Gesellschaften gilt: die Humanität ist ganz und gar eine Frage der lebendigen Praxis, der praktisch-wirksamen Potentiale des Forderns und Durchsetzens. Sie ist jeweils definiert durch das, was genügend viele und genügend Qualifizierte Menschen der betreffenden Gesellschaft nicht (oder nicht mehr) hinzunehmen bereit sind. Die Existenz humaner Formen ist stets sehr prekär gewesen: infolge historisch oft ganz episodischer Komplikationen kann es leicht dazu kommen, daß die nur notdürftig domestizierten Energien sozialer Aggression die bis dahin ausgebildeten humanen Potentiale und Sicherungen unversehens wieder zunichte machen – auch noch nach der großen politischen Ouverture einer sozialistischen Revolution. Nur eine permanente Aktivierung von Energien der sozialen Emanzipation vermag dieser Gefahr entgegenzuwirken.

Ein Intellektuellen-Humanismus, der nicht mit der Austragung sozialer Basis-Konflikte (namentlich auch der Autoritätskonflikte auf den verschiedensten Stufen der sozialen Hierarchie) verknüpft ist, mißrät leicht zu einer ideologischen Kompromißformel zwischen einer herrschenden Oligarchie und einer Schicht von Kulturproduzenten, die ja – wenngleich in verschiedenem Grade – beide den arbeitenden Massen gegenüber eine privilegierte Position einnehmen. Fortschritte in der Fundamental-Humanisierung der Gesellschaft gelingen nur im Bunde mit emanzipatorischer Selbsttätigkeit innerhalb der Haupt-Produzentengruppen, mit einer permanenten Anfechtung der Formen und Maßverhältnisse sozialer Subordination (einschließlich der Distributionsnormen für das Sozialprodukt).

ing society we know how much a humanism that remains caught in the anthropological-general runs the risk of becoming at best impractical and inconsequential, at worst a compensatory ideologic. If the principles of

humanism are so broadly and roughly defined, they affect the Reasons only the most elementary humanity, which is not too difficult to establish in a halfway civilized society during peaceful periods, and consequently excludes only very blatant violations of human dignity. The more such elementary demands are fulfilled, the more important it is to expose and practically challenge inhumanity in its subtle and hidden forms. Humanism becomes concrete only as concrete social criticism, as a denunciation of all social privileges and forms of domination, of heteronomy over people. Only in such concreteness can socialist humanism become practical.

As for the old, bourgeois society, this is a long-familiar thing. The new problem is how to ensure and develop the human qualities of emerging socialist societies.

Historical experience has taught us that humanity is not adequately guaranteed here by any basic quality of society - by its production conditions, its political-democratic constitution or by an ideological credo. On the lower levels of socialism, what also applies to pre-socialist societies continues to apply: humanity is entirely a question of living practice, of the practically effective potential of demands and implementation. It is defined by what a sufficient number of sufficiently qualified people in the society in question are not (or no longer) willing to accept. The existence of humane forms has always been very precarious: as a result of historically often quite episodic complications, it can easily happen that the only poorly domesticated energies of social aggression unexpectedly destroy the human potentials and safeguards that have been developed up to that point - even after the great political overture a socialist revolution. Only a permanent activation of energies of social emancipation can counteract this danger.

An intellectual humanism that is not linked to the settlement of social base conflicts (namely also the conflicts of authority on the various levels of the social hierarchy) easily amounts to an ideological compromise formula between a ruling oligarch and a class of cultural producers who - albeit to varying degrees - both occupy a privileged position in relation to the working masses. Progress in the fundamental humanization of society succeeds only in league with emancipatory autonomy within the main producer groups, with a permanent challenge to the forms and proportions of social subordination (including the distribution norms for the national product).

Auch in den Ländern des werdenden Sozialismus befinden sich die Gruppen der kulturschaffenden Intelligenz (deren Grundcharakter wenigstens ebensosehr die Sensitivität wie die Intellektualität ist) in einer sozialen Mittelposition zwischen den Führungsapparaten, die über große Macht verfügen, und einer in ihrem Arbeits- und Alltagsleben nur sehr unvollständig emanzipierten Volksmasse – in einer sozialen Grundsituation also, in der weiterhin beträchtliche aggressive Energien sich akkumulieren und in einer von oben manipulierten Weise (z. B. nationalistisch) entladen können. Die noch ungelöste Aufgabe besteht darin, die Formen des »Normalkonflikts« zu entwickeln, in denen sich die Prozesse der weiteren innersozialistischen Emanzipation (inspiriert durch eine innersozialistische Gesellschaftskritik) progressiv vollziehen können. Der sozialistische Humanismus wird in einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft konkret und praktisch als die Inspiration einer anti-bürokratischen und anti-technokratischen Aktivität.

Ein solcherart realer Humanismus kann sich nicht darauf beschränken, seine Inspiration an den institutionellen Orten der Ideen-Übermittlung wirksam werden zu lassen – Hochschule, Publikationen, öffentliche Vorträge. Der marxistische Humanismus der Philosophen braucht zudem eine *Dimension unmittelbarer, exemplarischer Praxis*, sowohl um sich inhaltlich konkretisieren als auch um konkret wirken zu können, eine exemplarische Praxis, die den marxistischen Philosophen in einen Arbeitskontakt mit Nicht-Philosophen und nicht zum Zwecke der Belehrung in Philosophie bringt. Nur so ist die permanente Neudefinition der Maßverhältnisse historisch möglicher menschlicher Befreiung möglich, während die Isolierung der marxistischen Philosophen in besonderen Institutionen eine Minderung ihrer marxistischen Qualität bedeutet, die doch vor allem daran liegt, daß sie Philosophie in praktisch-emanzipatorischer Absicht ist.

In the countries of developing socialism, too, the groups of culture-creating intelligentsia (whose basic character is at least as much sensitivity as intellectuality) find themselves in a social middle position between the

leadership apparatus, which has great power, and one in their working and everyday life only very incompletely emancipated mass of people - that is, in a basic social situation in which considerable aggressive energies continue to accumulate and can be discharged in a manner manipulated by obcn (e.g. nationalistically). The task that has not yet been solved is to develop the forms of "normal conflict" in which the processes of further inner-socialist emancipation (inspired by inner-socialist social criticism) can progressively take place. Socialist humanism becomes concrete and practical in a socialist society as the inspiration of anti-bureaucratic and anti-technocratic activity.

Such a real humanism cannot confine itself to allowing its inspiration to take effect in the institutional places where ideas are transmitted - universities, publications, public lectures. The Marxist humanism of the philosophers also needs a dimension of direct, exemplary practice, both in order to be able to concretize the content and to have a concrete effect, an exemplary practice that puts the Marxist philosopher into working contact with non-philosophers and not for the purpose of teaching philosophy brings. This is the only way to permanently redefine the scale of historically possible human liberation, while the isolation of Marxist philosophers in special institutions means a reduction in their Marxist quality, which is primarily due to the fact that it is philosophy with a practical, emancipatory intention.

THE IDEA OF MANIPULATION AND MANIPULATION OF IDEAS

Đuro Šušnjić

Beograd

> Truth is at its worst when anything may be truth.
>
> S. J. Lecz

1

The idea of manipulation is based on the assumption that human behaviour is determined by the circumstances under which men live, so that it can be made to change by altering the existing conditions of life.

2

When the external circumstances are too firmly established to be modified without difficulty, the manipulator can achieve his purpose by trying to influence people's perception of those circumstance rather than by striving to alter them. Even if he is unable to make a particular situation different from what it is he should still be capable of affecting the perception of it.

3

People are likely to assume similar attitudes towards various events they consider to belong to the same class. We become aware of this fact when we find out how readily a person changes his mind in respect of a number of events after having changed it in respect of a single one, if he regards them all as belonging to one and the same class. As a rule, thanks to an innate proclivity to making sweeping generalizations exhibited by the human race, it will usually prove sufficient for the manipulator to shake a person's attitude towards a single event in order to create favourable conditions for a radical change of that person's attitude towards a whole class of events.

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4

It is a fact that men have to learn how to think and behave properly. It follows from this that human beings may be taught to think and behave according to the requirements of a given system. Once the values of a system are clearly defined, and are recognized as norms to be adhered to, they remain as permanent sign-posts to guide people in their beliefs, thoughts and modes of behaviour. Effective socialization and manipulation will teach anybody what as well as how to think. In this way *homo sapiens* is reduced to an impersonal automaton, a robot who cannot help doing what he is expected to do.

5

A group is rarely homogeneous as regards its perception of a given situation. More often than not, it consists of three distinct categories of people, viz. (1) of such whose beliefs, values and attitudes coincide with those of the manipulator and who consequently are to be considered his potential or actual followers, (2) of such whose beliefs, values and attitudes are at variance with those of the manipulator and on that account should be regarded as his opponents, and (3) of such who neither share nor oppose the views and attitudes of the manipulator and may therefore be supposed to be neutral. Under these circumstances, the manipulator will preferably transmit his message to a group notorious for the incongruity of attitudes assumed in facing a common problem. The success of his action will depend a great deal on how much incoherence the structure of its public opinion will actually bring into play.

6

Societies relying for all information on a single source are likely to show a higher degree of cohesion, solidarity and mutual understanding than are those which, in this respect, are organized more loosely. However, as soon as the monopoly of imparting information is abolished the probabilities that much incosistent, and even contradictory, information will be in circulation increase with each newly-established information centre. Contradictory messages give rise to conflicting responses within the society and these again increase the probability of social conflicts, unrest and insecurity. No functional society can tolerate a similar state of affairs. So the need is soon felt for a »ministry of truth« which, once established, makes everybody feel at home in a society in which a few people know much and the rest but little or nothing at all. The monopoly of imparting information is incompatible with thinking in alternatives. Now, the amount of power an individual, or a particular group, can exercise over another individual, or group, depends just on how great such a possibility is. From this point of view, the monopoly of imparting information (i. e. of forming ideas) and the manipulation of information (i. e. of ideas) prove to be a strong source of social power.

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7

In order to render manipulation feasible it is, first of all, necessary to turn the public into a crowd. The best means for achieving this is to convert mass media of communication into media of mass information and manipulation. That is to say that the flow of information is to be made one-directional – from the source to the masses – instead of letting communications ply between the source and the public. Information presupposes an ignorant crowd, just as communication presupposes an enlightened public.

8

Ideas are valued in two ways – as to their content and as to their function. In other words, the criteria for evaluation of ideas may be either gnosiological or sociological. That is to say that, under certain circumstances, the value of an idea (or a piece of information) is determined by how far it suits the interests, wishes and needs of those evaluating it rather than by how far it complies with the gnosiological criteria of truth. Anything that satisfies a need in a given situation may be accepted as truth. If our thinking is being done in terms of power and victory, ideological victory is not always synonymous with the victory of an idea. Ideological victory is obtained e. g. when the majority has been forced to accept a false idea as truth. To be really victorious, an idea must be true, and accepted as well as acted upon as such by the majority.

9

In the last analysis, the manipulator takes for granted that he can defeat his opponent without being obliged to destroy him. He is convinced that his antagonists, if adequately manipulated, will be only too glad to fall in with his views and that the loss of freedom that goes with it is the last thing they would be sorry for. The manipulatory relation is characterized by the tendency to reduce a person, or a group of persons, to an appropriate instrument for achieving a specified purpose. It degrades man to a mere object. For the manipulator man is by no means an inscrutable secret. Granted there is anything enigmatic in a human being, the solution of the puzzle is for him a simple technical problem. So manipulation knows no limits except those set by the technical efficiency of manipulation media.

10

Manipulation is a method of controlling the environment, both mental and material, of an individual, or group, with a view to bring- is accepted as true on the sole authority of its source. This means group, as near as possible to the manipulator's criteria. Man's desire

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11

When a piece of information has been imparted to a person, he will form an estimate of its value after examining its content and deciding on the authority of the source it has comme from. However, the value set on the information source is often much more important than that set on its content. The preponderance of the former value may eventually reach such proportions as to render the latter altogether negligible. In such a case, the content of a piece of information is accepted as true on the sole authority of this source. This means that a person is likely to change his attitude not only under the influence of some qualities inherent in a message (a piece of information or an idea) but also because he happens to be under the sway of the information source. Unable to draw a clear-cut line between the information and its source, he fails to discriminate the meaning of the information from the authority of its source. As a consequence, he considers the information to be accurate for no other reason than that it has been imparted to him by an authority. In this way a connection is established between the content and the source of the message. The response is likely to be much stronger if the source issuing the message is considered authoritative, powerful and respectable by the masses receiving it.

12

At this stage, one would be inclined to think that manipulation is likely to be most efficient when applied to groups with a very low educational level and little knowledge of what is going on around them. This would mean jumping to conclusions. Manipulation can have as great a hold on the educated and the well-informed, provided that the message (or information) is modelled to bear upon some individual or collective needs instead of having to do with the rational basis on which the attitudes of a person rest. Moreover, the message has to be expressed in emotional rather than rational symbols.

13

We are living in a world in which division of labour and differentiation of functions are being carried to extremes. Today, even the most expert specialist may be expected to give evidence of ignorance and simple-mindedness in any domain except his own. In such times as ours, when there is a general trend toward specialization, almost everyone depends on everybody else for information about what is happening outside his province and is therefore liable to manipula-

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14

The best method for manipulating people consists in rendering their existential situation uncertain, obscure, indefinite, unstructuralized, ambiguous, unstable, unfamiliar, dubious, and full of apprehension and fear. The chances of exerting a decisive influence on somebody's decisions are much greater if the person concerned is not sure how to answer a given social situation. Automatically, the probability of his influencing others decreases in proportion. Generally speaking, whenever a person is in a state of emotional tension, his ability to make rational decisions is considerably reduced. Under such conditions it is pretty irrelevant whether a piece of information is true or false. The essential point is that the is made to believe it to be true. This is achieved by adapting the information to suit his particular needs. So truthfulness is by no means a criterion for the acceptance of a piece of information or an idea. On the contrary, the manipulator succeeds in his plan by rendering a situation completely or partly obscure and ambiguous, thus preventing people from finding for themselves a way out of it. This done, he supplies them with such information he thinks suitable for provoking a restructuralization of the perceptional elements concerning this particular situation and, finally, suggests a way out that is most convenient to him.

15

Before mass communication media were invented, anything a person might have said or done remained, in regard to consequences, within the bounds of his family or the narrow circle of his personal contacts. In a few cases it might indeed have involved the whole community, or the social class, to which he belonged. Nowadays, however, in an age dominated by powerful means of communication, there is nothing one might choose to do or say but can be immediately brought to notice of millions. It seems very likely that any event of some importance should at present have far-reaching effects, due to the enormous increase of the number of people involved. The consequences may even attain truly enormous proportions.

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When an idea has been launched in the world and starts mixing with all kinds of institutions, necessities, values and interests, as well as with other ideas, its originator will soon lose control over it. From then onwards, his will ceases to play any part in the life of its off-

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spring. As a matter of fact, there is no foreseeing what sorts of social, ideological and ideal contexts, as well as fields of interests, an idea may become involved in the course of its lifetime or, indeed, what are the interpretations it will be given as it comes to be viewed in a number of different perspectives corresponding to as many different standpoints assumed by the above-mentioned forces. We did not become aware of our enormous responsibility for every bit of information imparted to the million by means of mass information media until these had gone a long way through their development. But who on earth is to be made responsible for putting irresponsible persons into responsible positions?

17

That the efficacy of manipulation should not be underestimated may be clearly shown by citing only a few facts. It manages to create a need for needless things. It has changed to a considerable extent the structure of necessities of life. It has brought the masses a great deal nearer to the manipulators' systems of values. It has done much to prolong the status quo. It carries out efficient social control. It has developed a revolution of anticipation to take the ¬lace of the anticipated revolution. It is doing everything in its power to calm critical thought.

18

Is there any hope of salvation for mankind? Dare men defy the forces determined to manipulate them at all costs? What are the chances that they could prevent conscious control from being substituted by the control of the consciousness? By way of a reply let me propound another set of questions from which, I think, at least one part of the answer may be inferred. How is it possible that those who consider mass information media to be mere means for mass manipulation are still conscious of manipulation? That they too have not succumbed to the mighty forces of painless persuasion? Could it not be the result of a natural process, a concomitant of the very development of means of manipulation, if men become more and more aware of being imposed upon and are resolved to offer resistance to this foul practice?

19

Resistance to manipulation means in the first place resistance to institutionalized thinking. If we do not want speach to be reduced to recitation of stereotyped formulas, nor that thought becomes dogma and science becomes ideology, we have no choice but to try, over and over again, to shake the foundations of institutionalized thinking by challenging its doctrine and disputing the accuracy of its tenets. There is a story which seems sufficiently to the point to bear quoting: »An angel once said to the Devil, 'I will defeat you by endowing every individual with high ideals', to which the devil replied, 'I will win in the end, for I will institutionalize the ideals.'«

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L'UNITE EUROPEENE ET MONDIALE DES LUTTES REVOLUTIONNAIRES AUJOURD'HUI

Pierre Broué

Grenoble

L'année 1968 a constitué un tournant dans le déroulement de la lutte des classes et notamment dans le processus capital commencé en 1953, la crise du stalinisme qui coïncide aujourd'hui avec celle de l'impérialisme.

Jusqu'en 1968, les manifestations de la crise du stalinisme ont été épisodiques, localisées, éparpillées, particularisées et n'entraînaient pas à première vue de conséquences profondes ni surtout générales: alors qu'à Budapest, c'était la résistance des travailleurs organisés dans leurs conseils ouvriers derrière le conseil ouvrier central du Grand-Budapest, que les chars russes avaient eu à briser à partir de leur deuxième intervention, de nombreux militants se réclamant du marxisme et pensant de bonne foi avoir rompu avec le stalinisme ont accepté les explications données et cautionné, au moins par leur silence, une répression anti-ouvrière. Les luttes antibureaucrautiques et les luttes antiimpérialistes étaient en outre éparpillées, tant géographiquement que par leurs formes et les objectifs qu'elles se donnaient. Il n'y avait au premier abord qu'un lien très peu évident entre la lutte des écrivains soviétiques, par exemple, contre la censure et la répression, le développement des guerillas paysannes en Amérique latine, les grèves tournantes ou les grèves sauvages – contre la tactique des grèves tournantes – menées par certains secteurs du prolétariat d'Europe occidentale.

Loin d'aboutir à éclairer la conjonction de la bureaucratie et de l'impérialisme, la conjonction des luttes antibureaucratiques et antiimpérialistes conduisait même à l'impasse les militants qui cherchaient. C'est ainsi qu'en 1956, alors que l'expédition franco-britannique contre Suez et l'intervention russe en Hongrie relevaient de la même politique de défense du statu quo et se servaient l'une à l'autre de couverture et de justification, seule une infime minorité de militants comprenaient le lien entre elles. En France, par exemple, militants communistes et socialistes se rejetaient à la tête les crimes de Guy Mollet

THE UNITED EUROPE AND THE WORLD AND THE SLUTS

R E V O LU T IO N N A IR E S A U JO U R D 'H U I

Pierre Broue

Grenoble

The year 1968 constituted a turning point in the unfolding of the class struggle and in particular in the capital process which began in 1953, the crisis of Stalinism which today coincides with that of imperialism.

Until 1968, the manifestations of the crisis of Stalinism were episodic, localized, scattered, particularistic and did not, at first sight, entail any profound or, above all, general consequences: whereas in Budapest, it was the resistance of the workers organized in their workers' councils behind the central workers' council of Greater Budapest, which the Russian tanks had had to break from their second intervention, many militants claiming to be Marxists and believing in good faith that they had broken with Stalinism accepted the explanations given and sanctioned, at least by their silence, an anti-worker repression. The anti-bureaucratic struggles and the anti-imperialist struggles were moreover scattered, both geographically and in terms of their forms and the objectives they adopted. At first glance, there was only a hardly obvious link between the struggle of Soviet writers, for example, against censorship and repression, the development of peasant guerrillas in Latin America, the rotating strikes or the savage grave - against the tactics of rotating strikes - carried out by certain sectors of the Western European proletariat.

Far from succeeding in shedding light on the conjunction of bureaucracy and imperialism, the conjunction of anti-bureaucratic and anti-imperialist struggles even led the militants who were looking for it to a dead end. Thus in 1956, when the Franco-British expedition against Suez and the Russian intervention in Hungary were part of the same policy of defense of the status quo and used each other as cover and justification, only a tiny minority of activists understood the link between them. In France, for example, communist and socialist militants rejected Guy Mollet's crimes in their heads.

et de Maurice Thorez, sans voir que l'un et l'autre participaient de la même répression et se trouvaient du même côté de la barricade dans la lutte des classes.

C'est sans doute sur cette base objective et comme résultat de la pression idéologique de l'impérialisme qu'on a pu voir fleurir pendant toute cette période les idées les plus confuses sur le cheminement des luttes révolutionnaires pendant cette période: l'idée qu'il était possible de diviser le monde de ce point de vue en »secteurs« ou en »zones«, l'idée que l'»épicentre« des mouvements révolutionnaires s'était déplacé et se trouvait désormais dans le Tiers-Monde etc . . .

L'année 1968 marque le début d'une période nouvelle en ce qu'elle a permis la mise en place d'éléments de clarifications, posé nettement les problèmes. En effet, en France, l'appareil du Parti communiste et de sa fraction qui dirige la C. G. T., violant le sentiment et la conscience de nombre de ses militants, s'est mis ouvertement au service du Parti de l'ordre et a combattu pour mettre fin à la grève générale de dix millions de travailleurs. En Tchécoslovaquie, l'intervention de l'Armée de l'U. R. S. S. a ouvertement revêtu un caractère contre-révolutionnaire, celui d'une entreprise dirigée contre un mouvement de masses, des revendications et une pratique ouvrières qui menaient à la destruction de l'appareil stalinien et à la reconquête par la classe ouvrière de ses organisations. Les manifestations étudiantes ont revêtu un caractère international et surtout internationaliste, le lien et la solidarité étant évidents et consciemment exprimés entre les mouvements de Belgrade, Varsovie et Paris. Enfin et surtout, l'opposition politique en Union soviétique pour la défense des droits civiques et des libertés démocratiques dans le cadre du socialisme s'est élargie au plan international avec le geste historique de Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel et leurs camarades manifestant sur la Place rouge contre l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie, et la lutte menée ultérieurement par Grigorenko, Iakhimovitch, Iakir et leurs camarades.

Il est capital d'essayer de comprendre le lien qui s'est ainsi manifesté entre les luttes des masses dans les différents pays ainsi que le caractère de la période qu'elles ouvrent. Personne dans le monde n'a osé sous-estimer le fait que dix millions de travailleurs français se soient lancés dans le plus grand mouvement de grève de l'histoire de ce pays avancé au moment même où de nombreux théoriciens allaient proclamant que l'»épicentre« des grandes luttes avait définitivement quitté ces mêmes pays avancés. La grève générale et ce qu'il représentait pour les travailleurs français, et en même temps une lutte contre le capitalisme dont ce régime était le rempart: concrètement les travailleurs en grève ont engagé la lutte contre un régime qui remettait en question les conquêtes de décennies de lutte ouvrière, qui leur promettait le chômage, la déqualification des jeunes, la surexploitation, des conditions de travail toujours aggravées, la misère pour beaucoup. Tel était l'objectif négatif de la grève. Mais que voulaient les grévistes, et pour quoi se battaient-ils? Non comme l'écrit Stojanović[1] pour la »gestion« des entreprises, car la grève générale de Mai–Juin 1968 n'a pas

[1] Svetozar Stojanović, »Prospect of Socialist Revolution in the Present Time«, *Praxis*, ed. internationale, No 1–2, 1969, p. 207.

and Maurice Thorez, without seeing that both participated in the same repression and found themselves on the same side of the barricade in the class struggle.

It is undoubtedly on this objective basis and as a result of the ideological pressure of imperialism that we have seen the most confused ideas flourish throughout this period on the course of the revolutionary struggles during this period: the idea that 'it was possible to divide the world from this point of view into »sectors« or »zones«, the idea that the »epicenter« of the revolutionary movements had moved and was now in the Third World etc . ..

The year 1968 marks the beginning of a new period in that it allowed the setting up of elements of clarifications, poses clearly the problems. Indeed, in France, the apparatus of the Communist Party and of its faction which leads the C.G.T., violating the feelings and conscience of many of its militants, has openly put itself at the service of the Party of Order and has fought for end the general strike of ten million workers. In Czechoslovakia, the intervention of the Army of the U. R.S.S. openly assumed a counter-revolutionary character, that of a company directed against a mass movement, workers' demands and practice which led to the destruction of the Stalinist apparatus and the reconquest by the working class of its organizations. The student demonstrations took on an international and above all internationalist character, the bond and solidarity being evident and consciously expressed between the movements in Belgrade, Warsaw and Paris. Last but not least, the political opposition in the Soviet Union for the defense of civil rights and democratic freedoms within the framework of socialism expanded internationally with the historic gesture of Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel and their comrades demonstrating in the red against the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the struggle subsequently waged by Grigorenko, Yakhimovich, Yakir and their comrades.

It is crucial to try to understand the link which has thus been shown between the struggles of the masses in the different countries as well as the character of the period which they open. Nobody in the world dared to underestimate the fact that ten million French workers launched the largest strike movement in the history of this country at the very moment when many theoreticians were going to proclaim mant that the "epicenter" of the great struggles had definitively left these same advanced countries. The general strike and what it represented for the French workers, and at the same time a struggle against capitalism of which this regime was the bulwark: concretely the workers on strike engaged in the struggle against a regime which called into question the conquests of decades of workers' struggle, which promised them unemployment, the deskilling of young people, over-exploitation, ever-worsening working conditions, misery for many. This was the negative objective of the strike. But what did the strikers want, and what were they fighting for? Not as Stojanovic writes for the »management« of companies, because the general strike of May-June 1968 did not 1 Svetozar Stojanović, »Prospect of Socialist Revolution*

été une grève gestionnaire: à cet égard elle fut beaucoup moins »gestionnaire« que ne l'avait été celle de juin 1936, et *a fortiori* que la grève qui a constitué le début de la révolution espagnole de 1936.[2] Mais elle n'était pas non plus une »grève revendicative simple«. Les revendications des travailleurs – celles de l'usine Renault, par exemple, telles qu'elles furent reprises par les travailleurs de milliers d'entreprises – qu'elles aient été celles qui concernaient la garantie de l'emploi, l'abolition des décrets sur la sécurité sociale, la garantie de 1000 Francs mensuels minimum ou l'introduction de l'échelle mobile des salaires, étaient des revendications mortelles pour le capitalisme français, des revendications qu'il ne pouvait satisfaire sans mettre en cause son existence même. Les travailleurs français en avaient conscience: leur détermination de mettre un coup d'arrêt, de ne plus subir, s'exprimait avec éclat dans le mot d'ordre de la grandiose manifestation du 13 mai: »Dix ans, c'est assez!« Et, une fois de plus, le grand mouvement de la classe déployant ses forces, arrêtant les machines et occupant les usines, les rues et les places, l'organisation même de la grève sur une échelle ausssi gigantesque, la conscience de la force du nombre, du sentiment de solidarité lui faisaient entrevoir une société plus humaine et plus fraternelle, se traduisaient par une volonté de changement peut-être confuse dans son expression, mais nette dans son orientation: la classe ouvrière français entendait prendre son sort entre ses propres mains, et c'est ce qui a donné au mouvement son caractère révolutionnaire.

Or ce mouvement sans précédent a été coiffé, d'abord, dévié puis arrêté ensuite, en définitive combattu avec succès par le Parti communiste français et sa fraction à la tête de la C. G. T., en d'autres termes, par l'appareil stalinien en France. C'est en effet sous son influence et en résultat de ses efforts considérables que la grève générale n'a pas été unifiée ni même contrôlée par les grévistes eux-mêmes, qu'elle a été plutôt le résultat d'une addition de grèves simultanées au lieu de constituer le mouvement irrésistible de la classe, ce qui a permis, au cours de l'ultime phase, d'émietter le front gréviste par la conclusion d'accords particuliers et des rentrées séparées, et surtout, par l'adhésion du P. C. F. et de la direction de la C. G. T. à la perspective des élections pour mettre fin à la grève générale. Tout au cours du mouvement, le même appareil stalinien a fait d'énormes efforts, justifiés dans sa propagande par la peur de la guerre civile, pour le maintenir dans des limites légales, au niveau de la lutte pour un compromis sur les revendications ouvrières. Les journaux bourgeois ennemis de la grève n'ont pas été touchés par la grève, et ce sur l'intervention de la C. G. T. elle-même, et il n'y a eu aucune riposte au célèbre discours de de Gaulle appelant ses partisans à faire front. Dans certains cas, la fraction stalinienne de la C. G. T. a même eu recours à des mots d'ordre de type »grève gestionnaire« – comme pour la sécurité sociale – afin d'émousser précisément le caractère révolutionnaire du mouvement. Le fait que le Parti stalinien en France soit apparu en Mai-Juin

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[2] Les partisans du mot d'ordre de l'»autogestion« dans les pays capitalistes, comme objectif du mouvement ouvrier auraient intérêt a méditer cette question que j'ai seulement abordée avec E. Témime dans notre étude sur *La Révolution et la Guerre d'Espagne.*

was a managerial strike: in this respect it was much less "managerial" than had been that of June 1936, and a fortiori than the strike which constituted the beginning of the Spanish revolution of 1936.2

But neither was it a »simple industrial strike«. The demands of the workers - those of the Renault factory, for example, as they were taken up by the workers of thousands of companies - whether they were those concerning the guarantee of employment, the abolition of decrees on social security, the guarantee of a minimum of 1,000 francs a month or the introduction of a sliding scale of wages, were deadly demands for French capitalism, demands which it could not satisfy without jeopardizing its very existence. The French workers were aware of this: their determination to put a stop to it, to suffer no more, was expressed with brilliance in the slogan of the grandiose demonstration of May 13: "Ten years is enough "And, once again, the great movement of the class deploying its forces, stopping the machines and occupying the factories, the streets and the squares, the very organization of the strike on such a gigantic scale, the consciousness of the strength of numbers, of the feeling of solidarity gave him a glimpse of a more humane and more fraternal society, resulted in a desire for change, perhaps confused in its expression, but clear in its orientation: the French working class intended to take its fate between its own hands, and that is what gave the movement its revolutionary character.

But this unprecedented movement was first capped, deviated and then stopped, ultimately fought successfully by the French Communist Party and its faction at the head of the C.G.T., in other words, by the apparatus Stalinist in France. It is indeed under his influence and as a result of his considerable efforts that the general strike was not unified or even controlled by the strikers themselves, that it was rather the result of an addition of simultaneous strikes. instead of constituting the irresistible movement of the class, which made it possible, during the final phase, to crumble the strike front by the conclusion of special agreements and separate returns, and above all, by the adhesion tion of the P. C. F. and the leadership of the C. G. T . the prospect of elections to end the general strike. Throughout the movement, the same Stalinist apparatus made enormous efforts, justified in its propaganda by the fear of civil war, to keep it within legal limits, in the struggle for a compromise on workers' demands. The bourgeois newspapers opposed to the strike were not affected by the strike, and this on the intervention of the C. G. T. itself, and there was no response to the famous speech of de Gaulle calling on his supporters to do forehead. In some cases, the Stalinist fraction of the C.G.T. has even resorted to slogans of the "managerial strike" type - as for social security -

precisely in order to blunt the revolutionary character of the movement. The fact that the Stalinist Party in France appeared in May-June

** Proponents of the slogan of "self-management" in capitalist countries, as the objective of the labor movement, would do well to ponder this question, which I only tackled with E. Tćmime in our study on Revolution and War from Spain.*

1968 comme le parti de l'ordre bourgeois et du parlementarisme dans des circonstances aussi propices à une orientation révolutionnaire exige d'être expliqué et compris.

Il ne peut l'être en dehors de l'explication historique du stalinisme lui-même. Le stalinisme est né en Russie – faut-il le rappeler? – après des années de lutte du pouvoir soviétique – celui des conseils ouvriers et paysans – contre l'intervention armée des puissances du reste du monde. Il est né, dans ce cadre historique, de l'isolement de la révolution dans un pays arriéré, inculte, au bas niveau technique, où la classe ouvrière constituait une infime minorité au milieu d'une masse énorme de paysans sans aucune instruction. C'est de la désintégration du prolétariat russe, de son isolement au lendemain de la guerre civile qu'est née finalement, en arbitre au-dessus des classes exprimant à la fois la poussée des couches paysannes et la pression de l'impérialisme, cette couche privilégiée de bureaucrates monopolisant le pouvoir, les *apparatchiki* gouvernant au moyen de la police politique dont Stalin n'a été que l'incarnation et le porte-parole. Mais la bureaucratie n'a pas vaincu sans combat. Elle a dû, pour vaincre, soutenir une dure lutte, en particulier contre l'opposition de gauche. Avant d'imposer le type de Parti stalinien monolithique et bureaucratiquement centralisé, elle a dû briser les traditions et la démocratie ouvrières qui vivaient au sein du Parti bolchevique. Avant d'imposer l'objectif de la construction du socialisme dans un seul pays, elle a dû briser les traditions internationalistes vivantes dans le Parti bolchevique. Elle a dû, finalement, pour assurer son règne, détruire le Parti bolchevique lui-même et ses hommes – un phénomène qui culmine en 1937 avec les Procès de Moscou et la grande purge – et lui substituer la hiérarchie d'un appareil de fonctionnaires de Parti et d'Etat, un régime qui n'a de »soviétique« que le nom.

Né de la défaite de la révolution en Europe après octobre 1917, le stalinisme a, à son tour, nourri de nouvelles défaites, tant du fait qu'il a conduit le même combat dans les différents Partis communistes que parce que la théorie du »socialisme dans un seul pays« constituait un obstacle sur la voie d'une politique révolutionnaire. Il porte une écrasante responsabilité dans la défaite sans combat de la classe ouvrière allemande face à Hitler en 1933, puisque c'est lui qui dicte aux communistes allemands la folle tactique de refus du front unique qui permet la victoire des bandes nazies: le désir de la bureaucratie de maintenir à tout prix le statu quo sur lequel elle repose en fait un facteur contre-révolutionnaire. Dans les années qui suivent, les partis staliniens – en France comme en Espagne à partir de 1936 – combattent la révolution non seulement pour le compte des intérêts diplomatiques du gouvernement de Moscou mais pour le compte de la bureaucratie et de sa préservation en U. R. S. S. même: comme l'écrivait en 1936 le communiste tchécoslovaque Zavis Kalandra – qui devait être pendu en 1950 – l'action ouvrière dans les pays avancés pouvait constituer un dangereux exemple pour la classe ouvrière dépossédée de ses conquêtes par la bureaucratie stalinienne.[3] Et pourtant – et il est capital de le

[3] Josef Guttman, Zavis Kalandra, *Odhalené tajemstvi moskhevskeho procesu*, 27 août 1936, cité par la *Vérité*, No 544, juin 1969.

1968 as the party of bourgeois order and parliamentarism in circumstances so favorable to a revolutionary orientation demands to be explained and understood.

It cannot be outside the historical explanation of Stalinism itself. Stalinism was born in Russia - need we remember that? - after years of struggle for Soviet power - that of the workers' and peasants' councils - against armed intervention by the powers of the rest of the world. It was born, in this historical context, from the isolation of the revolution in a backward, uneducated country, at a low technical level, where the working class constituted a tiny minority in the midst of an enormous mass of peasants without any education. It is from the disintegration of the Russian proletariat, from its isolation in the aftermath of the civil war that was finally born, as an arbiter above the classes expressing both the thrust of the peasant strata and the pressure of imperialism, this privileged stratum of bureaucrats monopolizing power, the apparatchiki governing by means of the political police of which Stalin was only the incarnation and the spokesperson. But the bureaucracy did not win without a fight. In order to win, it had to sustain a hard struggle, in particular against the leftist opposition. Before imposing the monolithic and bureaucratically centralized type of Stalinist Party, it had to break the traditions and the working-class democracy that lived within the Bolshevik Party. Before imposing the goal of building socialism in one country, it had to break the living internationalist traditions in the Bolshevik Party. She finally had to, to ensure her reign, destroy the Bolshevik Party itself and its men - a phenomenon that culminated in 1937 with the Moscow Trials and the great purge - and replace it with the hierarchy of an apparatus of civil servants. Party and State, a regime which is "Soviet" only in name.

Born of the defeat of the revolution in Europe after October 1917, Stalinism, in its turn, nurtured new defeats, both because it led the same fight in the different Communist Parties and because the theory of "socialism in one country" constituted an obstacle on the way to a revolutionary policy. He bears an overwhelming responsibility for the defeat without a fight of the German working class against Hitler in 1933, since it is he who dictates to the German Communists the mad tactic of refusal of the united front which allows the victory of the Nazi gangs: the The bureaucracy's desire to maintain at all costs the status quo on which it is based makes it a counter-revolutionary factor. In the years that followed, the Stalinist parties - in France as in Spain from 1936 - fought the revolution not only on behalf of the diplomatic interests of the Moscow government but on behalf of the bureaucracy and its preservation in the U.S.S.R. itself: as the Czechoslovak communist Zavis Kalandra - who was to be hanged in 1950 - wrote in 1936 - workers' action in the advanced countries could constitute a dangerous example for the working class dispossessed of its conquests by the Stalinist bureaucracy.3 And yet - and it is capital of the

** Josef Guttman, Zavis Kalandra, Exposing the lies of the Moscow trial, 27*

comprendre –, pendant toute cette période, le stalinisme a joui de la confiance de larges masses ouvrières, de ces larges masses ouvrières que sa politique contribuait pourtant à livrer à leur ennemi de classe: l'Union soviétique, les Partis communistes, sur la base de leur identification avec la révolution d'octobre 1917, jouissaient de la confiance de l'avant-garde ouvrière dont les militants communistes constituaient les cadres organisateurs. Sur cette base, et grâce à l'écrasement de toute démocratie ouvrière notamment dans les syndicats qu'ils contrôlent, les hommes de l'appareil stalinien exerçaient sur la classe ouvrière d'un pays comme la France un véritable monopole politique.

De ce point de vue, l'année 1968 n'a vu se produire aucune rupture dans la continuité de la politique stalinienne. La politique du Parti communiste français face à la grève générale, celle du gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. face au mouvement de masses en Tchécoslovaquie ont le même caractère contre-révolutionnaire. A Prague, il s'agissait de maintenir les privilèges de la bureaucratie et son monopole politique, d'empêcher un exemple contagieux pour les travailleurs de tous les pays, Union soviétique y compris, et de maintenir un important pays d'Europe centrale dans la vassalité du gouvernement de Moscou, et cette politique a eu la bénédiction du président Johnson et des milieux dirigeants de l'impérialisme mondial. A Paris, il s'agissait de préserver le statu quo, de maintenir le régime gaulliste qui apparaissait utile à la politique dite de »coexistence pacifique«, comme d'empêcher une prise de conscience de la part de la classe ouvrière qui aurait signifié la mise en question du rôle de l'appareil stalinien et surtout de son monopole d'organisation au sein de la classe ouvrière. Contrairement à ce que pensent certains, les parties communistes d'occident ne sont pas, quel que soit le degré de leur »social-démocratisation«, identifiables à des partis social-démocrates: les soucis majeurs de leur appareil sont en effet ceux de la bureaucratie et c'est seulement par son intermédiaire qu'ils se sont fais les agents de leur bourgeoisie, ce qui explique qu'aujourd'hui une partie de ces appareils, orientée sur la droite, réclame une indépendance vis-à-vis de Moscou qui est en réalité pour eux l'allégeance directe à leur propre bourgeoisie.

Le phénomène capital de l'année 1968 est la révélation, nettement formulée dans une avant-garde encore faible numériquement, mais confusément ressentie dans de très larges masses, de ce rôle contre-révolutionnaire de la bureaucratie stalinienne à l'Est comme à l'Ouest.

Pour le comprendre, il est nécessaire de revenir sur la façon dont s'est déroulée cette première étape de la crise du stalinisme, en d'autres termes, du début de l'émancipation de la classe ouvrière à son égard qui rend à nouveau possible sa lutte mondiale contre l'impérialisme. Le rôle des étudiants a été considérable, tant à Varsovie, qu'à Prague ou Paris. Leurs luttes ont joué le rôle de »détonateur«, et, en France, en Tchécoslovaquie, en Argentine, les étudiants ont montré que la lutte était possible, qu'elle payait et c'est leur action qui a facilité une mise en branle de la classe ouvrière que les appareils ont été incapables d'empêcher. En Allemagne de l'ouest, à Belgrade, à Mexico, les choses ne sont pas allées jusque là, à la fois parce que les bureaucrates ont su utiliser toutes les armes possibles pour dresser une barrière entre étudiants et ouvriers, et parce que, théorisant leur courte

to understand

throughout this period, Stalinism enjoyed the confidence of the broad working masses, those broad working masses whom its policy nevertheless helped to hand over to their class enemy: the Soviet Union, the Communist Parties, on the basis of their identification with the revolution of October 1917, enjoyed the confidence of the working vanguard of which the communist militants constituted the organizing frameworks. On this basis, and thanks to the crushing of all workers' democracy, particularly in the unions they control, the men of the Stalinist apparatus exercised a veritable political monopoly over the working class of a country like France.

From this point of view, the year 1968 saw no break in the continuity of Stalinist policy. The policy of the French Communist Party in the face of the general strike, that of the government of the U. R. S. S. against the mass movement in Czechoslovakia have the same counter-revolutionary character. In Prague, it was a question of maintaining the privileges of the bureaucracy and its political monopoly, of preventing a contagious example for the workers of all countries, including the Soviet Union, and of maintaining an important Central European country in the vassalage of the Moscow government, and this policy has had the blessing of President Johnson and the ruling circles of world imperialism. In Paris, it was a question of preserving the status quo, of maintaining the Gaullist regime which appeared useful to the so-called policy of "peaceful coexistence", as well as preventing an awareness on the part of the working class which would have meant the calling into question the role of the Stalinist apparatus and above all its monopoly of organization within the working class. Contrary to what some think, the communist parties of the West are not, whatever the degree of their "social-democratization", identifiable with social-democratic parties: the major concerns of their apparatus are in fact those of the bureaucracy and it is only through its intermediary that they made themselves the agents of their bourgeoisie, which explains why today a part of these apparatuses, oriented on the right, demands independence vis-a-vis of Moscow which is in reality for them the direct allegiance to their own bourgeoisie.

The capital phenomenon of the year 1968 is the revelation, clearly formulated in an avant-garde still weak numerically, but confusedly felt in very large masses, of this counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the East as in the West.

ˆ To understand this, it is necessary to return to the way in which this first stage of the crisis of Stalinism unfolded, in other words, the beginning of the emancipation of the working class with regard to it which makes its world struggle against imperialism again possible. The role of the students

was considerable, as much in Warsaw as in Prague or Paris. Their struggles played the role of »detonator«, and, in France, in Czechoslovakia, in Argentina, the students showed that the fight was possible, that it paid off and it was their action which facilitated the setting in motion of the working class whom the apparatuses have been unable to prevent. In West Germany, in Belgrade, in M exico, things have not been allied so far, both because the bureaucrats have been able to use all possible weapons to erect a barrier between students and workers, and because, theorizing their short

expérience, les étudiants se sont imaginés qu'ils constituaient véritablement l'avant-garde de la société et sont allés vers les ouvriers en »professeurs rouges«, en maîtres à penser, sans le sentiment de profonde solidarité indispensable, sans avoir compris que l'action qu'ils menaient n'avaient de sens que s'ils se considéraient eux-mêmes seulement comme le détachement avancé de la classe ouvrière dans l'université.

C'est la classe ouvrière française, au cours de sa grève générale, qui a fait, en France, chanceler l'Etat gaulliste. C'est la classe ouvrière tchécoslovaque qui a donné son élan irrésistible au printemps de Prague et qui a constitué, le 21 août et depuis, le bastion de la résistance à l'offensive contre-révolutionnaire. C'est parce que la classe ouvrière française a finalement été jugulée par les appareils qui lui ont imposé la reprise du travail, que le régime a pu connaître une brève restauration. Mais c'est aussi parce que la classe ouvrière n'a pas été vaincue et qu'elle commence à avoir conscience de sa force et de son besoin d'unité pour le combat, que De Gaulle a dû partir, et que le régime aujourd'hui encore hésite devant une politique que lui dictent les besoins du maintien du régime du profit, mais dont il sait qu'elle provoquera des luttes gigantesques et dans un avenir très proche. Enfin, le rôle joué par les travailleurs au cours de ces grands combats de 1968 a pulvérisé toutes les sottises à la mode sur l'»intégration« de la classe ouvrière à la »société industrielle« et autres théories tendant à nier la permanence de la lutte des classes.

Les combats révolutionnaires de 1968 ont également abattu définitivement une autre barrière: celle que l'on appelait le »rideau de fer«: on prend conscience aujourd'hui de l'unité européenne et mondiale des luttes de classes. La répression en Tchécoslovaquie a constitué une défaite grave pour le mouvement révolutionnaire et a été ressentie comme telle tant à Paris qu'à Berlin ou Belgrade. En même temps, la lutte de la classe ouvrière, avant comme après l'intervention, constitue en elle-même un facteur révolutionnaire profond, un élément important de la destruction du mythe du socialisme dans les pays dominés par la bureaucratie stalinienne. C'est à cause d'elle que tout un chacun peut se rendre compte aujourd'hui qu'à Prague, la presse de la bureaucratie combat avec acharnement la théorie du »rôle dirigeant de la classe ouvrière« dont l'identification au Parti stalinien est désormais impossible. C'est à cause d'elle que les militants communistes qui ont commencé à s'organiser pour la défense ou mieux pour la conquête des libertés démocratiques ont été solidaires des travailleurs tchécoslovaques et ont condamné la contre-révolution armée aux mains des bureaucrates qui oppriment les travailleurs de l'U.R.S.S. comme les travailleurs de Tchécoslovaquie et d'ailleurs. Le résultat est qu'aujourd'hui, de Paris à Moscou en passant par Prague et Belgrade, nombreux sont les militants qui ont compris le rôle contre-révolutionnaire du stalinisme, ce rôle très concret de défense de l'impérialisme qu'il assume aujourd'hui dans le monde. La première brèche a été ouverte dans le stalinisme. Il s'agit aujourd'hui de l'élargir pour pouvoir réellement abattre l'impérialisme.

experience, the students imagined that they were veritable

ˆ n t 1 vanguard of society and approached the workers as "red professors", as masters of thought, without the feeling of deep solidarity which is

indispensable, without having understood that the action they were carrying out had no meaning unless they considered themselves only the advanced detachment of the working class in the university.

It was the French working class, during its general strike, which made the Gaullist State stagger in France. It was the Czechoslovak working class which gave its irresistible impetus to the Prague Spring and which constituted, on August 21 and since, the bastion of resistance to the counter-revolutionary offensive. It is because the French working class was finally controlled by the apparatuses which forced it to return to work, that the regime was able to experience a brief restoration. But it is also because the working class has not been defeated and is beginning to realize its strength and its need for unity for the fight, that De Gaulle had to leave, and that the regime today still hesitates before a policy dictated by the needs of maintaining the profit regime, but which it knows will provoke gigantic struggles in the very near future. Finally, the role played by the workers during these great struggles of 1968 pulverized all the fashionable nonsense about the "integration" of the working class into "industrial society" and other theories tending to deny the permanence of the class struggle.

The revolutionary struggles of 1968 also brought down another barrier definitively: that which was called the "Iron Curtain": we are now becoming aware of the European and world unity of class struggles. The repression in Czechoslovakia constituted a serious defeat for the revolutionary movement and was felt as such in Paris as well as in Berlin or Belgrade. At the same time, the struggle of the working class, both before and after the intervention, constitutes in itself a profound revolutionary factor, an important element in the destruction of the myth of socialism in the countries dominated by the Stalinist bureaucracy. It is because of her that everyone can realize today that in Prague the press of the bureaucracy fiercely combats the theory of the "leading role of the working class", whose identification with the Stalinist Party is now impossible. It is because of her that the communist militants who began to organize themselves for the defense or better still for the conquest of democratic freedoms were in solidarity with the Czechoslovak workers and condemned the armed counter-revolution in the hands of the bureaucrats who oppress the workers of the U.S.S.R. like workers in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. The result is that today-

today, from Paris to Moscow via Prague and Belgrade, many are the militants who have understood the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism, this very concrete role of defense of imperialism which it assumes today in the world. The first breach was opened in Stalinism. It is now a question of widening it in order to be able to really bring down imperialism.

De ce point de vue, on a assisté un peu partout, mais surtout en occident, à une série de réactions et d'interprétations des événements, compréhensibles et expliquables, mais qui pourraient avoir des conséquences catastrophiques. Dire et écrire aujourd'hui que la classe ouvrière n'est plus la seule force susceptible de changer la société, c'est se résigner, renoncer au combat et en particulier à la lutte contre l'emprise des appareils qui essaient de l'endormir par des théories bien surannées sur la »transition pacifique« et les »voies parlementaires«. Dire aujourd'hui que le problème *du pouvoir* ne se pose plus, c'est blanchir le stalinisme de tout ce qu'il a fait pour empêcher que ce problème soit posé au cours de la lutte en France. Dire que c'est le mot d'ordre d'»auto-gestion« qui prend la première place dans les revendications ouvrières en pays capitaliste, c'est masquer le problème des rapports de production et le problème capital de la nature de classe de l'Etat, comme dans le cas de la »co-gestion universitaire« qui revient, par le biais des crédits, à inviter étudiants et enseignants à appliquer eux-mêmes la politique de la bourgeoisie, quémander des crédits auprès des capitalistes, sélectionner les étudiants en fonction des besoins de l'»économie« – du capitalisme–, briser le mouvement syndical au profit d'une organisation corporatiste. Théoriser une situation de fait transitoire, développer les idées sur le rôle des »minorités agissantes« et la valeur des »actions exemplaires«, c'est faciliter provocation et répression, isoler les révolutionnaires des masses, contribuer à discréditer jusqu'à l'idée de manifestation et d'action. De ce point de vue, les attaques récemment conduites contre des militants ou des réunions du P. C. F. par des commandos de groupes se réclamant du »gauchisme« constituent pour les bureaucrates un appoint inestimable. Les militants ont à surmonter encore bien des confusions afin de ne pas donner d'armes à leurs adversaires.

Un effort de clarification est absolument et immédiatement nécessaire. La situation est en effet nouvelle dans la mesure où apparaissent en Europe et dans le monde des signes de la poursuite de cette crise révolutionnaire dont nous avons vécu la première étape en 1968. Sera-t-elle sans lendemain, ou constituera-t-elle pour les générations de demain, le prologue, la répétition générale, comme l'a été en définitive la révolution de 1905 par rapport à celle de 1917? Cela dépend en grande partie des efforts de clarification, d'explication théorique à donner, d'un point, qu'il faut faire. Une foule de problèmes à la fois anciens et nouveaux se posent. Dans le domaine des objectifs le problème de l'égalité sociale, de la démocratie directe, du système et du rôle des conseils, de la question nationale. Dans le domaine des moyens, celui du rôle et de la place des organisations traditionnelles, différent selon qu'il s'agit des partis et des syndicats, celui de l'expression des révolutionnaires dans un langage clair, accessible à tous, celui du langage à trouver entre militants de l'Est et de l'Ouest, celui de la place des intellectuels et des étudiants dans le mouvement ouvrier et révolutionnaire, celui, enfin, de la démocratie ouvrière à retrouver, des tendances et des fractions.

De la clarification de ces questions dépend le choix de mots d'ordre et en définitive l'élaboration d'un programme mondial de révolution socialiste répondant à la fois aux exigences globales et universelles de

From this point of view, we have witnessed almost everywhere, but especially in the West, a series of reactions and interpretations of events, understandable and explainable, but which could have catastrophic consequences. To say and write today that the working class is no longer the only force capable of changing society is to resign oneself, to renounce the fight and in particular the fight against the influence of the apparatuses which try to put it to sleep. outdated theories on »peaceful transition« and »parliamentary ways«.

To say today that the problem of power no longer arises is to whitewash Stalinism of all that it has done to prevent this problem from being posed during the struggle in France. To say that it is the slogan of "self-management" which takes the first place in workers' demands in a capitalist country is to hide the problem of the relations of production and the capital problem of the nature of class of the State, as in the case of "university co-management" which amounts, by means of credits, to inviting students and teachers to apply the policy of the bourgeoisie themselves, to ask for credits from capitalists, to select students according to the needs of the "economy" - of capitalism -, to break the union movement in favor of a corporatist organization. Theorize a transitory de facto situation, develop ideas on the role of »acting minorities«

and the value of “exemplary actions” is to facilitate provocation and repression, to isolate the revolutionaries from the masses, to contribute to discrediting even the idea of demonstration and action. From this point of view, the attacks recently carried out against militants or meetings of the Communist Party by commandos of groups claiming to be “left-me” constitute an invaluable aid for the bureaucrats. The militants still have to overcome many confusions in order not to give arms to their adversaries.

An effort of clarification is absolutely and immediately necessary. The situation is indeed new insofar as there are appearing in Europe and in the world signs of the continuation of this revolutionary crisis, the first stage of which we experienced in 1968. Will it be without a future, or will it constitute it for the generations of tomorrow, the prologue, the general rehearsal, as was the revolution of 1905 in relation to that of 1917? This largely depends on the efforts of clarification, of theoretical explanation to be given, of a point, that must be made. A host of problems, both old and new, arise. In the domain of objectives, the problem of social equality, of direct democracy, of the system and role of the councils, of the national question. In the field of means, that of the role and place of traditional organizations, which differ according to whether it is a question of parties and trade unions, that of the expression of revolutionaries in a clear language, accessible to all, that of language to be found between militants from the East and the West, that of the place of intellectuals and students

in the workers' and revolutionary movement, that, finally, of workers' democracy to be found, of tendencies and factions.

On the clarification of these questions depends the choice of slogans and ultimately the elaboration of a world program of socialist revolution responding both to the global and universal requirements of 162

la situation et aux conditions spécifiques des pays différents. Rien ne sera fait sur ce plan en dehors de l'organisation des révolutionnaires, en dehors de la construction du parti révolutionnaire qui a manqué tant en Allemagne, France et Espagne dans les années trente que depuis, en France, en Italie, en Tchécoslovaquie ou en Hongrie. Ses formes et même ses principes peuvent et doivent être discutés puisqu'il est capital d'en faire un instrument de révolution et non le contraire. Mais il est capital qu'il soit *international*. Tant il est vrai qu'aucune garantie contre la dégénérescence d'un parti ou même d'une révolution n'existe avant la victoire de la révolution à l'échelle de la planète. Tant il est vrai aussi que la situation nouvelle créée en 1968 exige la reprise de ce que les bolcheviks avaient considéré comme la tâche principale après leur victoire en Russie, la construction d'une Internationale, qu'ils n'ont pu mener à bien, mais qui seule pourra concentrer les expériences, bâtir ce programme et lutter à l'échelle du monde.

C'est pourquoi j'espère que la discussion sera riche et la contradiction vigoureuse. A l'étape présente, nous avons à apprendre, à comprendre, à aiguiser analyses et perspectives afin de préparer ce que personne au monde – ni à Washington, ni à Moscou – ne peut éviter, l'explosion révolutionnaire, dont il dépend de l'action de gens comme nous qu'elle soit un pas en avant vers le socialisme ou, au contraire, le dernier sursaut avant la chute dans la barbarie d'une nouvelle guerre mondiale, cette fois nucléaire.

the specific situation and conditions of different countries. Nothing will be done on this plan apart from the organization of the revolutionaries, apart from the construction of the revolutionary party which was lacking both in

Germany, France and Spain in the 1930s and since then in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia or in Hungary. Its forms and even its principles can and must be discussed since it is essential to make it an instrument of revolution and not the contrary. But it is essential that it is international. So true is it that no guarantee against the degeneration of a party or even of a revolution exists before the victory of the revolution on the scale of the planet.

It is also so true that the new situation created in 1968 requires the resumption of what the Bolsheviks had considered the main task after their victory in Russia, the construction of an International, which they were unable to carry out. well, but which alone will be able to concentrate the experiments, build this program and fight on a world scale.

This is why I hope that the discussion will be rich and the contradiction vigorous. At the present stage, we have to learn, to understand, to sharpen analyzes and perspectives in order to prepare for what no one in the world - neither in Washington nor in Moscow - can avoid, the revolutionary explosion, on which action depends. people like us that it is a step forward towards socialism or, on the contrary, the last leap before the fall into barbarism of a new world war, this time nuclear.

ERNST BLOCH UND GEORG LUKÁCS – EHRENDOKTOREN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZAGREB

Anläßlich des dreihundertjährigen Jubiläums der Universität Zagreb wurde den großen marxistischen Denkern Ernst Bloch und Georg Lukács der Titel des Ehrendoktors erteilt. E. Bloch und G. Lukács haben diese Ehren angenommen, womit auch der Universität Zagreb eine große Ehre erwiesen wurde.

Aus Gesundheitsgründen konnte G. Lukács der feierlichen Promotion nicht beiwohnen. E. Bloch flog zur Promotion aus Zürich, doch konnte das Flugzeug wegen des Nebels nicht landen und mußte nach einem vergeblichen Kreisen über Zagreb nach Zürich zurückkehren. So wurden Bloch und Lukács in Abwesenheit am 18. Dezember promoviert.

Indem wir Ernst Bloch und Georg Lukács, auf deren Migliedschaft im Redaktionsrat von »Praxis« wir stolz sind, zu dieser Ehre herzlichst gratulieren, möchten wir ihnen noch viele Jahre schöpferischer Tätigkeit wünschen.

E. BLOCH AND G. LUKACS

ERNST BLOCH AND GEORG LUKACS - HONORARY DOCTORS

DER A IV ERSITA T ZAGREB

On the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the University of Zagreb, the great Marxist thinkers Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukacs were awarded honorary doctorates. E. Bloch and G. Lukacs accepted these honours, which was also a great honor for the University of Zagreb.

For health reasons, G. Lukacs could not attend the graduation ceremony. E. Bloch flew from Zurich to do his doctorate, but the plane could not land because of the fog and had to return to Zurich via Zagreb after circling in vain.

Bloch and Lukacs received their doctorate in absentia on December 18th.

Congratulating Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukacs, whose membership in the editorial board of »Praxis« we are proud of, on this honor, we would like to wish them many more years of creative work.

WORTE DES DANKS FÜR DIE VERLEIHUNG DER EHRENDOKTORWÜRDE IN ZAGREB 18. XII 1969

Der Zagreber Ehrendoktor erfüllt mich mit einer der angemessensten Freuden, die ich mir denken kann. Wurde er doch von einer so angesehenen Universität wie der in Zagreb verliehen. Und Zagreb liegt in einem Land, das als erstes mit großem Mut den Weg begann zu einem menschlichen, unschematischen, einzig genuinen Sozialismus. Im besonderen ist Zagreb sozusagen die Heimatsuniversität von tonangebenden Philosophen der Zeitschrift »Praxis«, diesem so wichtigen gegenwärtig fast einzigen Organ eines lebendigen innegehaltenen Marxismus. Die »Praxis« hat dadurch nicht nur internationale Bedeutung, sie trägt auch zum geistigen Ruhm Jugoslawiens bei, unbeirrt von aller Versteinerung und allen Verdinglichungen der Mediokrität, denen gerade heutiger Marxismus so oft ausgesetzt ist. Hohes Niveau ist in dieser Zeitschrift so selbstverständlich wie es in bedeutend offizielleren außerhalb Jugoslawiens eine Ausnahme wurde. Und es gehört zum Geist der »Praxis«, daß Zagreb unter den deutschschreibenden Autoren nicht nur Heisenberg sondern auch Lukacs den Ehrendoktor verlieh, der sich gerade dadurch als echt sozialistischer erweist. Sozialistisch in der Offenheit für die wirklich gegenwärtige und ununterdrückbare revolutionäre Tendenz wie Latenz und ihre Horizonte; die Aufschrift an den Bahnübergängen, gar an allen Kopfbahnhöfen ohne Kopf heißt hier wirklich nicht: »Halt, wenn die Karriere geschlossen ist«. Derart also ist es eine besonders unbedenkliche Auszeichnung, den Doctor honoris causa von einer Universität in Jugoslawien sowohl aus dem Kreis der dort blühenden Theorie wie jener Praxis zu erhalten, die ihn symptomatisch ermöglichte und so nicht auf den Namen einer vorzüglichen Zeitschrift begrenzt ist.

Ich danke seiner Magnifizenz für die Begrüßung, Kollegen Vranicki für die Laudatio, im besonderen einer Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät für die Ehrenpromotion bei der festlichen Gelegenheit ihres dreihundertjahrigen Jubiläums. Der Universität Zagreb insgesamt die schönsten Wünsche für die kommenden dreihundert Jahre.

ERNST BLOCH

»Die Worte des Danks...«, von E. Bloch für die festliche Promotion in Zagreb vorbereitet, wurden nach dem mißlungenen Versuch zur Promotion zu kommen dem Rektor der Universität Zagreb zugesandt. (Red.)

WORTDANKS FOR THE VERLEIHUNG

DER EHRENDOKTORWORDE IN ZAGREB 18. XII 1969

The honorary doctorate from Zagreb fills me with one of the most fitting pleasures I can think of. After all, it was awarded by such a prestigious university as Zagreb. A nd Zagreb is in a country that was the first to embark with great courage on the path to a humane, unschematic, genuine socialism.

In particular, Zagreb is, so to speak, the home university of the leading philosophers of the journal »Praxis«, which is so important and currently almost the only organ of a living, sustained Marxism. The »practice« not only has international significance, it also contributes to the intellectual fame of Yugoslavia, undeterred by all the petrification and all reification of mediocrity, to which modern-day Marxism is so often exposed. High level is as self-evident in this magazine as it has become an exception in much more official ones outside of Yugoslavia.

And it is part of the spirit of "practice" that Zagreb, among the authors who write in German, bestowed not only Heisenberg but also Lukacs with an honorary doctorate, who thereby proves to be genuinely more socialist. Socialist in openness to the really present and irrepressible revolutionary tendency like latency and its horizons; the inscription at the level crossings, let alone at all terminus stations without a head, really doesn't say: "Stop when your career is closed." In this way, it is a particularly harmless distinction to receive the Doctor honoris causa from a university in Yugoslavia, both from the circle of theory flourishing there and from the practice that made it possible symptomatically and is therefore not limited to the name of an excellent journal .

I thank his Magnificence for the welcome, colleagues Vranicki for the laudation, in particular a High Philosophical Faculty for the honorary doctorate on the festive occasion of its three hundredth anniversary. Best wishes to the University of Zagreb for the coming three hundred years.

ERNST BLOCH

“The words of thanks .

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prepared by E. Bloch for the celebratory doctorate in Zagreb, were sent to the Rector of the University of Zagreb after the unsuccessful attempt to get the doctorate. (Red.) 166

BERTRAND RUSSELL
(1872–1970)

Gajo Petrović

Zagreb

Bertrand Russell, 97, died, at his home, Plas Penrhyn, Penrhyndeudraeth.

When he was eighty, he reflected on the fear of death oppressing some old people and he maintained that this feeling – for which there is some justification in the young, who fear that they might be cheated of the best things that life has to offer – is »somewhat abject and ignoble« in old people, who have had the opportunity to experience life and to achieve whatever they were capable of doing. »An individual human existence«, wrote Russell, »should be like a river – small at first, narrowly contained within its banks, and rushing passionately past bolders and over waterfalls. Gradually the river grows wider, the banks recede, the waters flow more quietly, and in the end, without any visible break, they become merged in the sea, and painlessly lose their individual being. The man who, in old age, can see his life in this way, will not suffer from the fear of death, since the things he cares for will continue. And if, with the decay of vitality, awareness increases, the thought of rest will be not unwelcome. I should wish to die while still at work, knowing that others will carry on what I can no longer do, and content that what was possible has been done.«[1]

Russell's wish to die while still at work came true. News correspondents could report that »he died in the room he loved best«, surrounded by books and unfinished work.[2]

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[1] B. Russell, *Portraits from Memory and other Essays*, London, 1956, p. 52. From the essay »How to Grow Old«, first published in 1952.

[2] »To the last he was working hard, pouring out his thoughts and opinions. A prodigious river of letters flowed in and out of his home. Just before the weekend he finished a statement on the Middle East which his secretary took to a parliamentary conference in Cairo; he was conducting a lengthy correspondence on Vietnam, his overriding concern, with U Thant and others; he was keeping up a constant battle for political prisoners everywhere. – On Sunday evening, as ever,

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However, could Russell die knowing that others would carry on his work and »content that what was possible has been done«? To raise this question is to ask about the value and importance of Russell's thought and work, to ask about his contribution to philosophy and history. An evaluation of a thinker's work should include not only his greatness, but also his limitations and shortcomings. But is the death of a philosopher the right moment for an objective critical examination of his work? Is this not an occasion when respect and deference permit mention only of what was good and valuable? An affirmative answer is perhaps correct in general, but here what holds generally, does not hold for Russell.

Russell was a passionate fighter for freedom and justice against slavery and violence. However, he hated lies, insincerity and duplicity perhaps even more than unfreedom and unjustice. Without hypocrisy and false benevolence he used to express his opinions about his friends and his enemies, about his contemporaries and predecessors with full sincerity and straightforwardness. Thus, if we wish to express our esteem in a way adequate to him, we can do so only by speaking about him, even in this moment, openly and critically, without falsity and insincerity.

What, then, is the significance and value of Russell's thought and life-work?

The difficulty of answering this question lies not only in evaluation, but also in reconstruction of what could be regarded as Russell's most characteristic and important philosophical views. From 1896, when he published his first book *(German Social Democracy)* until his recent death Russell published some seventy books and pamphlets.[3] And whereas with other philosophers one usually knows which book or books should be regarded most important in their work, with Russell this is not the case. To a written question directed to him in 1957 by two Yugoslavs »Which of your published works do you regard as the most adequate expression of your present views and which of them do you consider your most valuable contribution to

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he relaxed over a glass of his favourite whisky. Then he went to his room from which he liked to gaze at the sea and the white cottage across the Glaslyn estuary.« (Trevor Fishlock, »He died in the room he loved best, between gaunt mountains and sea«, *The Times*, Wednesday, February 4, 1970, p. 9.)

[3] *German Social Democracy* (1896), *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (1897), *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900), *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), *Principia Mathematica* (with A. N. Whitehead), vol. I–III (1910–1913), *Philosophical Essays* (1910), *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* (1910), *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), *Scientific Method in Philosophy* (1914), *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* (1914), *The Philosophy of Bergson* (1914), *War – the Offspring of Fear* (1915), *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916), *Policy of the Entente 1904–1914* (1916), *Justice in War-time* (1916), *Political Ideals* (1917), *Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism* (1918), *Mysticism and Logic and other Essays* (1918), *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920), *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), *Free Thought and Official Propaganda* (1922), *The Problem of China* (1922), *The ABC of Atoms* (1923), *Icarus; or, the Future of Science* (1924), *How to be Free and Happy* (1924), *What I believe* (1925), *The ABC of Relativity* (1925), *On Education, especially in Early Childhood* (1926), *Why I am not a Christian* (1927), *The Analysis of Matter* (1927), *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927), *Sceptical Essays* (1928), *Marriage and Morals* (1929), *Has Religion*

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philosophy?« Russell replied: »The most adequate expression of my *theoretical* view is *Human Knowledge: its Scope and Limits.* In political theory I should place first my book *Power;* as regards political practice, I should commend *Human Society in Ethics and Politics.«*[4]

Is a philosopher the best judge of the value of his own works? Would Russell himself at some other time, say ten years earlier or later, mention exactly the same works as the most adequate expression of his views? At any rate, it would not be surprising if Russell were to mention, instead of any of the three works mentioned above, some other of his famous books such as *The principles of Mathematics, Principia Mathematica* (with A. N. Whitehead), *The Problems of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External World, Principles of Social Reconstrucion, Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism, An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, The Analysis of Mind, The Analysis of Matter, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, On Education, Freedom and Organization, 1814–1914, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, History of Western Philosophy.* Neither would it be surprising had Russell as the most adequate expression of his views recommended some of his famous collections of essays, such as *Philosophical Essays, Mysticism and Logic, Sceptical Essays, In Praise of Idleness, Unpopular Essays, Logic and Knowledge, Portraits from Memory.*

However, the difficulty is not the great number of published works. In the course of his long life Russell explored almost all philosophical fields – from the philosophy of mathematics, phisolophy of science, logic, theory of knowledge and metaphysics to the philosophy of education, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of culture, philosophy of history and history of philosophy. From the field of philosophy he sometimes stepped over into the field of literature, political journalism and the popularization of science. Have these excursions outside of the field of philosophy something to do with his basic philosophical conceptions? And where are the center of his interests and the starting point of his conceptions within philosophy?

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[4] From a letter from B. Russell to G. Petrović and A. Tanović, May 27, 1957. The letter was published in *Književne novine*, Belgrade.

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If we were to address this question to Russell himself, the answer might be very different depending on the time when we asked him, and sometimes even not merely on the time, but also on the instant and mood. In the early phases of his activity we encounter the view that philosophy is or at least should become science. In this phase he would maintain that logic is »the essence of philosophy« and that »every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical.«[5] To be sure, he warned that in this context he did not mean a »mathematical« but a »philosophical« logic, but the relationship between the two remained somewhat unclear.[6] In accordance with the thesis of the scientific nature of philosophy, and of logic as its core, Russell in this phase opposed the inclusion of ethics, social and political philosophy and related fields in philosophy, so that he regarded his own ethical, social, political and educational views as his nonphilosophical views, which he had the right to hold as a citizen, but which were not philosophical simply because he himself was a philosopher.

Russell's views considerably changed in later periods. Giving up the idea of philosophy as a science, or a branch of science he removed logic from the center of philosophy (and even from the province of philosophy in general),[7] and he broadened the frontiers of philosophy to include many views that he previously classified as nonphilosophical. In this period we encounter very often paradoxical and mutually exclusive definitions of philosophy. In one of his essays Russell thus wrote: »Philosophy has been defined as »an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly«; I should define it rather as »an unusually ingenious attempt to think fallaciously.«[8]

When he was asked to clarify his conception of philosophy, Russell replied: »What I have to say about the definition of »philosophy« I have said at the beginning of my *History of Western Philosophy.*«[9]

If we read this beginning to which Russell refers us, we shall see that the idea of a scientisic philosophy has been abandoned. »The conceptions of life and the world which we call »philosophical« are

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[5] B. Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy.* First published in 1914, reprinted 1953, G. Allen & Unwin, London, p. 42.

[6] Discussing the relationship between the two, Russell writes: »Mathematical logic, even in its most modern form, is not *directly* of philosophical importance except in its beginnings. After the beginnings, it belongs rather to mathematics than to philosophy. Of its beginnings, which are the only part of it that can properly be called *philosophical* logic, I shall speak shortly. But even the later developments, though not directly philosophical, will be found of great indirect use in philosophizing.« *(Op. cit.,* p. 5).

[7] »Logic, it must be admitted, is technical in the same way as mathematics is, but logic, I maintain, is not part of philosophy.« (B. Russell, *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits.* G. Allen & Unwin. First published in 1948, third impression 1956, London, p. 5.)

[8] B. Russell, *Unpopular Essays,* Simon and Schuster, New York 1950, p. 45.

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I have said at the beginning of my History of Western Philosophy.«9

If we read this beginning to which Russell refers us, we shall see that the idea of a scientisic philosophy has been abandoned. »The conceptions of life and the world which we call »philosophical« are 5 B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External W orld as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. First published in 1914, reprinted 1953, G. Allen & Unwin, London, p. 42.

• Discussing the relationship between the two, Russell writes: »Mathematical logic, even in its most modem form, is not directly of philosophical importance except in its beginnings. After the beginnings, it belongs rather to mathematics than to philosophy. Of its beginnings, which are the only part of it that can properly be called philosophical logic, I shall speak shortly. But even the later developments, though not directly philosophical,

will be found of great indirect use in philosophizing.« (Op. cit., p. 5).

7

P us be admitted, is technical in the same way as mathematics is, but logic, I maintain, is not part of philosophy.« (B. Russell, Human Knowledge.*

Its Scope and Limits. G. Allen Sc Unwin. First published in 1948, third impression 1956, London, p. 5.)

8 B. Russell, Unpopular Essays, Simon and Schuster, New York 1950, p. 45.

** From the May 27, 1957, letter to G. Petrović and A. Tanović.*

a product of two factors: one, inherited religious and ethical conceptions; the other, the sort of investigation which may be called »scientific«, using this word in its broadest sense..«[10]

Observing that the word »philosophy« has been used in many different ways, Russell explains the way in which he himself intends to use it: »Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is somehting intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite krowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All *definite* knowledge – I should contend – belongs to science; all *dogma* as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy.«[11]

After he has enumerated a number of important questions which in his opinion belong to philosophy, because science cannot answer them and the confident answers of theologians seem no longer convincing,[12] Russell describes as follows the relationship between science, theology and philosophy: »Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great importance. Theology, on the other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where in fact we have ignorance, and by doing so generates a kind of impertinent insolence towards the universe. Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them. To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralysed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it.«[13]

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[10] B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, G. Allen & Unwin, London, first published in 1946, fifth impression 1955, p. 10.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] The questions are: »Is the world divided into mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind and what is matter? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent powers? Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our innate love of order? Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at once? Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of living that is noble, in what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it? Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued, or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards death? Is there such a thing as wisdom, or is what seems such merely the ultimate refinement of folly? To such questions no answer can be found in the laboratory. Theologies have professed to give ansvers, all too definite; but their very definiteness causes modern minds to view them with suspicion. The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them, is the business of philosophy.« (*Op. cit.*, pp. 10–11.)

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

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However the whole difficulty in analyzing Russell's philosophy does not lie only in the great number of books published and in an insufficiently rigorous delimitation of the field of philosophy, or in the great shift of its boundaries. The difficulty lies equally in the frequent change of Russell's philosophical conceptions. He soon changed his early Millian inclinations for Kantianism and then for an ardent Hegelianism, to turn later into an even more ardent anti-Hegelianism. He started as a liberal and pacifist, became later socialist, communist and even Bolshevik, but after his visit to the Soviet Union he cooled down and became very critical of communism. In the last years of his life he again came closer to the old socialist and communist ideals. In metaphysics and theory of knowledge he defended a platonistic »realism«, new realism, logical atomism, neutral monism, pluralism. About the change of his attitude toward mathematics Russell himself says: »I set out with a more or less religious belief in a Platonic eternal world, in which mathematics shone with a beauty like that of the last Cantos of the Paradiso. I came to the conclusion that the eternal world is trivial, and that mathematics is only the art of saying the same thing in different words.«[14]

Is it possible to sind some unity, skeleton, or logic in this chaos of fields, conceptions and phases? Or was Russell's philosophy without a central idea and devoid of an inner unity?

Bertrand Russell gave different answers to the question of what philosophy really is, but if we go not only by these individual statements, but by his total philosophical activity, an answer emerges rather univocally. It is well known that Russell first became famous as a logician. His contribution to symbolic logic is hard to overestimate. However, precisely from the ranks of those who should be most grateful to him for this contribution – from the ranks of mathematical logicians – voices have been heard recently that Russell's conception of logic is in many respects superficial and ill-reasoned, that in both depth and rigour he falls considerably behind his great predecessor Gottlob Frege, as well as behind some of his own contemporaries and followers. There is certainly some truth in this, but a special investigation would be necessary to ascertain how much. Regardless of the extent to which his critics are right in certain details, however, Russell surpassed them in at least one thing: for him symbolic logic was not the first and the last world in philosophy, and especially not the whole of philosophy. He constructed his symbolic logic as a part of an attempt to found mathematics by deducing it from logic, and he undertook this attempt in the hope of arriving at firm and certain knowledge. Not mathematics as mathematics, nor logis as logic captivated Russell's mind and drew him into its embrace. Mathematics and logic attracted Russell as fields of a possible certain knowledge. His attempt to arrive at sound, absolutely certain knowledge at least in this field proved unsuccessful, but Russell fearlessly confessed this both to himself and to others and without any

[14] B. Russell, *Portraits from Memory and other Essays*, G. Allen & Unwin. London 1956, p. 56.

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sentimentality he left over to others to worry about these fields to which he devoted nearly two decades of his life and to which he made such an important contribution.[15]

However, if mathematics and logic attracted Russell because he hoped to find certain knowledge in them this is not to say that in knowledge he was interested only in the possibility of its certainty. Russell never believed that we can achieve ultimate certainty in great metaphysical questions. Nevertheless, he kept trying to solve the riddle of the world. Far from being merely an epistemologist, Russell kept trying to understand and explain both the natural world which is the basis and the persupposition of our existence, and the human, historical world which grows on this basis. And far from simply describing and diagnosing this human world, he was its passionate critic and a fearless fighter for changing it – within those limits where he saw this possibility.[16]

Russell sometimes called himself a »sceptic«, and others called him this, too. He called one collection of his papers Sceptical Essays, and the well-known book by Alan Wood was entitled: »Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic«.

Some of Russell's texts allow the conclusion that his scepticism, like that of Descartes, was merely methodical, that this was a doubt which appears at the beginning of philosophizing only to surrender to a firm and certain knowledge. Thus, in his work *An Outline of Philosophy* Russell maintains that there are some problems which many people find interesting, which do not belong to any science, and which have something in common: a doubt about what generally passes for knowledge. And he adds: If one wants to remove the doubt, a special investigation is needed which we designate by the name »philosophy«.[17]

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[15] Describing after many years his experience with mathematics and logic, with the help of which he tried to found it, Russell wrote: »I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. I thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere. But I discovered that many mathematical demonstrations, which my teachers expected me to accept, were full of fallacies, and that if certainty were indeed discoverable in mathematics, it would be in a new kind of mathematics, with more solid foundations than those that had hitherto been thought secure. But as the work proceeded, I was continually reminded of the fable about the elephant and the tortoise. Having constructed an elephant upon which the mathematical world could rest, I found the elephant tottering, and proceeded to construct a tortoise to keep the elephant from falling. But the tortoise was no more secure than the elephant, and after some twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the conclusion that there was nothing more that *I* could do in the way of making mathematical knowledge indubitable.« (B. Russell, *Portraits from Memory and other Essays*, p. 53.)

[16] That Russell not only accidentally and unwittingly took part in attempts to change the world is attested by his own words: »The serious part of my life ever since boyhood has been devoted to two different objects which for a long time remained separate and have only in recent years united into a single whole. I wanted, on the one hand, to find out whether anything could be known; and, on the other hand, to do whatever might be possible towards creating a happier world.« (B. Russell, *Portraits from Memory and Other Essays*, p. 53.)

[17] B. Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, London 1927, p. 1.

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One could infer from this that philosophy is able to remove the doubt with which it starts. But in other places Russell says clearly that philosophy can never remove the doubt completely. This is not to say that it is entirely powerless and futile. »Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.«[18]

Scepticism, which is the prime-mover of philosophy, according to Russell, cannot be entirely removed by philosophy: Russell's scepticism is not only methodological, but also theoretical. However Russell's scepticism is not as radical as Pyrrho's. The radicalism of Phyrro was alien to Russell. »I am a British Whig«, he says, »with a British love of compromise and moderation.«[19]

In contradistinction to radical sceptics Russell was ready to accept certain opinions at least as more or less probable. »I am prepared to admit any well-established result of science, not as certainly true, but as sufficiently probable to afford a basis for rational action.«[20]

In another sense Russell's moderate scepticism could be considered most radical, because this is a scepticism which is sceptical to itself. In criticising the ancient scepticism Russell observed that »scepticism as a philosophy is not merely doubt, but what may be called dogmatic doubt«.[21] Radical scepticism, precisely because of its dogmatic character, was unacceptable to Russell. Against scepticism Russell maintains: »But although every part of what we should like to consider »knowledge« may be in *some* degree doubtful, it is clear that some things are almost certain, while others are matters of hazardous conjecture. For a rational man, there is a scale of doubtfulness, from simple logical and arithmetical propositions, and perceptive judgments, at one end, to such questions as what language the Myceneans spoke or »what song the Sirens sang«, at the other.«[22]

Thus, Russell's is a scepticism which could be called total but moderate. It is total because there is no field which is entirely inaccessible to it; it is moderate because there is no field where it triumphs entirely and excludes the possibility of at least probable judgments.

[18] B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, first printed 1912, reprinted 1936, p. 243–244.

[19] B. Russell, *Sceptical Essays*, G. Allen & Unwin, London. First published in 1935. First published in »Unwin Books« 1960. Fifth Impression 1966, p. 9.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

[21] B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 257.

[22] B. Russell, *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits*. Third impression, London 1956, p. 398.

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In contradistinction to those sceptics who in their doubt stopped before the field of mathematics and logic, conceding that an absolutely certain knowledge is possible in this field, Russell maintained that errors are possible in mathematics and logic, too, and refused to admit a field of absolute certainty. And in contradistinction to those sceptics who believed that in metaphysical questions scepticism may reign without limitations, because there are no rational reasons for preferring one metaphysical conception to another, Russell believed that in these ultimate questions rational discussion and more or less probable hypotheses are possible.

Sometimes one can hear the opinion that Russell had certain views on basic ontological questions, but that they changed so quickly and chaotically that it is impossible to find in them a firm constant, or at least a logic of development. Against such views one can maintain that Russell had an ontological conception of his own, a vision of the world which was the starting point for all of his special philosophical views and which, despite all changes, from the moment when he first developed it at the beginning of the twentieth century remained basically the same. This is the conception of *logical atomism.*

This view of Russell's development is in agreement with his own, expressed at the beginning of his intellectual autobiography: »My philosophical development may be divided into various stages according to the problems with which I have been concerned and the men whose work has influenced me. There is only one constant preoccupation: I have throughout been anxious to discover how much we can be said to know and with what degree of certainty or doubtfulness. There is one major division in my philosophical work: in the years 1899–1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism and the technique of Peano in mathematical logic. This was so great a revolution as to make my previous work, except such a was purely mathematical, irrelevant to everything that I did later. The change in these years was a revolution; subsequent changes have been of the nature of an evolution.[23]

Bertrand Russell entered the scene of British philosophy at one of its rather untypical moments. The wave of neoidealism in European philosophy, which rose as a reaction to hitherto dominant positivism, dashed and inundated even England in the last decades of 19th century. As a reaction against the traditional empiricism, scepticism pluralism, psychologism, relativism, utilitarianism, and practicism, which dominated British philosophy for centuries, different variants of idealism came to the fore, and the center of the scene was dominated by those peculiar neo-Hegelians, the »absolute idealists« (F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, H. H. Joachim). Specticism towards the deepest secrets of the world was replaced by a dogmatic metaphysics, philosophical pluralism by an idealistic monism, empiricism by speculation, analysis by synthesis, relativism by absolutism. During his studies at Cambridge (1890–1894) the young Russell came under the influence of the dominant philosophical orientation. His first philo-

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sophical book *(An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry,* written in 1895–96, published in 1897) is predominantly Kantian, and his unfinished texts from 1896–1897, which were in part published much later (in his autobiography), are entirely Hegelian, – of course in the sense in which Hegelianism was conceived in England at that time. Russell himself says of this: »I was at this time a full-fledged Hegelian, and I aimed at constructing a complete dialectic of the sciences, which should end up with the proof that all reality is mental. I accepted the Hegelian view that none of the sciences is quite true, since all depend upon some abstraction, and every abstraction leads, sooner or later, to contradictions. Wherever Kant and Hegel were in conflict, I sided with Hegel.«[24]

However the Hegelian vision of the world, both in its authentic form and in that which was given to it by the British absolute idealists, was too alien not only to all traditions of British thinking but also to Russell's personal predispositions and initial intellectual impulses. The revolt against Hegel produced Russell's vision of the world, which he himself adequately termed »logical atomism«, and which despite all later doubts, modifications and additions he never entirely abandoned. According to this conception, the world is not an indivisible whole (as this was held by the English neo-Hegelians) but a whole analysable into mutually independent parts. If not in practice, in theory we must be able to arrive at the ultimate simple constituents of the world.

Through some of his statements Russell himself blurred the true origin and nature of this conception. In his foreword to the series of lectures which he delivered under the title »The Philosophy of Logical Atomism« in London in 1918 (and where he most systematically and fully developed this conception)[25] Russell maintained that in them he explains »certain ideas he 'learnt' from his 'friend and former pupil' Ludwig Wittgenstein«[26] Despite this declaration, we must maintain that he did *not* learn the basic idea of the philosophy of logical atomism from Wittgenstein. This idea is implicitly contained in his conception of symbolic logic, which he conceived and elaborated entirely independently of Wittgenstein, largely when the latter was still a boy. This naturally does not exclude the possibility that Wittgenstein stimulated Russel to an explicit formulation of the philosophical presuppositions of his symbolic logic and that, after he had accepted and independently developed the philosophy of logical atomism, he also influenced the elaboration of Russell's conception.

Russell's contention that he learned logical atomism from Wittgenstein might mislead to a false path also because it suggests that his version of this theory is not essentially different from Wittgenstein's. However the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's con-

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[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

[25] He explained the main traits of this conception already in his book *Our Knowledge of the Exernal World* (1914), and he gave a concise sketch of it in his »Logical Atomism« in the volume *Contemporary British Philosophy,* First series, 1924.

[26] B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge.* Essays 1901–1950, London 1956, p. 177.

sophical book (An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, written in 1895-96, published in 1897) is predominantly Kantian, and his unfinished texts from 1896-1897, which were in part published much

later (in his autobiography), are entirely Hegelian, - of course in the sense in which Hegelianism was conceived in England at that time.

Russell himself says of this: »I was at this time a full-fledged H egelian, and I aimed at constructing a complete dialectic of the sciences, which should end up with the proof that all reality is mental. I accepted the Hegelian view that none of the sciences is quite true, since all depend upon some abstraction, and every abstraction leads, sooner or later, to contradictions. W herever Kant and Hegel were in conflict, I sided with H egel.«24

However the Hegelian vision of the world, both in its authentic form and in that which was given to it by the British absolute idealists, was too alien not only to all traditions of British thinking but also to Russell's personal predispositions and initial intellectual impulses. The revolt against Hegel produced Russell's vision of the world, which he himself adequately termed »logical atomism«, and which despite all later doubts, modifications and additions he never entirely abandoned. According to this conception, the world is not an indivisible whole (as this was held by the English neo-Hegelians) but a whole analysable into mutually independent parts. If not in practice, in theory we must be able to arrive at the ultimate simple constituents of the world.

Through some of his statements Russell himself blurred the true origin and nature of this conception. In his foreword to the series of lectures which he delivered under the title »T he Philosophy of L o g ical Atomism« in London in 1918 (and where he most systematically and fully developed this conception)20 Russell maintained that in them he explains »certain ideas he 'learnt' from his 'friend and former pupil' Ludw ig W ittgenstein«26 Despite this declaration, we must maintain that he did not learn the basic idea of the philosophy of logical atomism from Wittgenstein. This idea is implicitly contained in his conception of symbolic logic, which he conceived and elaborated entirely independently of Wittgenstein, largely when the latter was still a boy. This naturally does not exclude the possibility that Wittgenstein stimulated Russel to an explicit formulation of the philosophical presuppositions of his symbolic logic and that, after he had accepted and independently developed the philosophy of logical atomism, he also influenced the elaboration of Russell's conception.

Russell's contention that he learned logical atomism from W ittgenstein might mislead to a false path also because it suggests that his version of this theory is not essentially different from Wittgenstein's.

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ception of logical atomism lay not only in the concrete elaboration of this conception but also in conceiving its basic sense. For Wittgenstein, the philosophy of logical atomism was a means for showing the helplessness of philosophical theory before the basic problems of human life. For Russell this was a positive philosophical doctrine, better than others and capable of further development.[27]

In his lectures on the philosophy of logical atomism Russell defends the thesis that logic is fundamental to philosophy, but he also acknowledges metaphysics as a legitimate philosophical discipline. In his first lecture he announces that he will outline a logical doctrine, which results from the philosophy of mathematics (»not exactly logically, but as what emerges as one reflects«), and on the basis of this logical doctrine a certain kind of metaphysics.[28]

The relationships between the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics as indicated here are far from clear. The true nature of the logic which is meant here is unclear; also unclear is the way these »disciplines« emerge from one another. But one thing is certain: Russell does not want to have logic only, but metaphysics also. Russell calls his doctrine »atomism« because the logic which he wants to advocate is »atomistic« as opposed to the »monistic logic of the people who more or less follow Hegel«. Refusing to regard »the apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely of phases and unreal divisions of a single indivisible Reality«, he maintans that the world is constituted of ultimate simples, of a kind of »atoms« which could be discovered by the process of analysis. The atoms he wants to discover are not physical but logical, and this is why he calls his atomism »logical«.

Russell warns that analysis, which is the method of discovering logical atoms, must not be confused with definition. A definition in the sense of a correct description is possible even for simple qualities, but analysis, on the contrary, is only possible in regard to what is complex. Ultimately it always depends upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain simple symbols. The best starting-point for analysis is »undeniable data«, and »undeniable« in this connection is not a logical but a psychological term. It means a sort of thing that nobody would deny, although it is logically possible to do so. »Undeniable data« happen to have a wonderful property: they are always »rather vague and ambiguous«. It is the task of analysis to start from them and to arrive at something precise and clear although not undeniable.

The first truism, the first »undeniable datum« from which Russell's analysis of the world starts is »that the world contains *facts*, which are what they are whatever we may choose to think about them, and that there are also *beliefs*, which have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false.«[29]

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[27] I wrote more about this distinction between Russell and Wittgenstein, and about Wittgenstein's conception of logical atomism in my essay »Logical Atomism and the Philosophy of the Unspeakable in the Tractatus of Ludwig Wittgenstein«, in *Od Lockea do Ayera (From Locke to Ayer)*, Kultura, Beograd 1964, p. 112–153.

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The key role in this statement belongs to the concept of »fact«, and Russell immediately undertakes to clarify it. A fact, he explains, means the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. By a fact he does not mean a particular existing thing, because no particular thing by itself makes a proposition true or false. On the other hand, things and facts are both »part of the real world«. What is the relationship between them? »The things in the world have various properties and stand in various relations to each other. That they have these properties and relations are *facts*, and the things and their qualities or relations are quite clearly in some sense or other components of the facts that have those qualities or relations.«[30]

Although the facts are what makes the propositions true or false, they are themselves neither »true« nor »false«. They simply are. The duality of truth and falsehood belongs to propositions, judgments, statements and beliefs. According to Russell, there is a strictly infinite number of different forms that facts (and corresponding propositions) may have. The most important division of facts (and propositions) is certainly that into simple (atomic) and complex.

Terms in atomic propositions are called by Russell »particulars«. Particulars are mutually independent. »That is to say, each particular that there is in the world does not in any way logically depend upon any other particular. Each one might happen to be the whole universe; it is merely empirical fact that this is not the case.«[31]

Refraining from further exposition of Russell's views about the kinds and mutual relationships between facts, things, relations, qualities, proposition etc., we can on the basis of the basic theses mentioned conclude that Russell really possesed a general vision of the world which was the basis for all of his special conceptions. The theory of »neutral monism« which he advocated for a time is only one of the more concrete ontological conceptions which the theory of logical atomism allows. Russell's theory of truth and knowledge – one of the variants of the traditional correspondence theory – is an integral part of the theory of logical atomism. His theory of logical analysis, which is one of the enduring features of his philosophy results naturally from (and again results in) his theory of logical atomism.[32] An atomistic and analytic approach is the lasting basis for all of Russell's conceptions in questions of ethics, social and political philosophy and philosophy of education.

It is not difficult to see that Russell's general vision of the world as expressed in the conception of logical atomism is directly opposed to Hegel's. Attributing to Hegel certain views which he in that form never held – for example the contention that all multiplicity of the world is purely illusory, or the assertion that every analysis, being a falsification of reality, is inadmissible – Russell even exaggerated his

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[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 192.
[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 202.
[32] In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that Russell did not deny a value to synthesis but insisted that it should be based on analysis: »The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis.« (*Op. cit.*, p. 341.)

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opposition to Hegel. But even if one disregards these artificially added differences, there can be no doubt that Russell's atomistic conception of the world is contrary to Hegel's. Because of its one-sided analyticity and atomism it is essentially inferior to Hegel's. However, owing to its analytical penetration it very well sees certain essential »details« which might escape vast synthetic visions.

Its dual nature is perhaps best seen in Russell's social and political conceptions. Marx's criticism of contemporary society as a society of a sels-alienated man, his vision of a truly human community, his demand for a revolutionary negation of the existing world remained basicaly alien to Russell. Russell's humanism has most frequently the forms of liberalism, pacifism, humanitarianism; when it assumed the forms of socialism and communism, it remained predominantly within the limits of an evolutionary and reformistic one.

Although on the whole below the level of Marx's vision of socialism, and unable to understand and accept it in its integrity, Russell had understanding and respect for many of its important elements. Acknowledging that Marx's materialistic conception of history »contains very important elements of truth«, Russell sometimes went even further and was ready to concede that nearly everything was acceptable in Marx – everything except what was Hegelian in him.

While unable to grasp the whole meaning of major social events of our epoch, Russell often brilliantly analysed individual, often very important, aspects of them. In particular he frequently showed surprizing and exceptionally lucid insight and saw very well things that one would expect him to neglect or overlook. We satll mention only two examples: his analysis of the dangers connected with the development of science and technology and his analysis of Bolshevism.

Russell always pleaded for the development of science and for the introduction of scientific methods in knowledge and life. From such a thinker one would not expect too great an awarenes of dangers from the development of science and technology. However, it was precisely Bertrand Russell who, before Huxley and Orwell, in his book *The Scientific Outlook* (1931) described the »brave new world«. In the third part of that book Russell describes the »Scientific Society« – a society which has been »created deliberately with a certain structure in order to fulfill certain purposes«, and which »employs the best scientific technique in production, in education, and in propaganda«.[33]

The scientific society as conceived by Russell will be a world State, with central government, army and organization of production. In it »every man willing to work will be kept in comfort, and every man unwilling to work will be kept in prison« (220). Individual freedom will diminish more and more. Both quantity and quality of population rate will be scientifically controlled. The ruling class, »probably not hereditary but more analogous to the rulers of the Catholic Church«, will succesfully control and direct the lives of subjects. Education will be organized separately for ordinary men, and separately

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for future rulers. In the first group every initiative and insubordination will be trained out. »There will be, of course, an official metaphysics, which will be regarded as intellectually unimportant but politically sacrosanct« (256). The only intense feeling will be »devotion to science and the State« (266). Literature will be replaced by athletics, and those suffering from boredom will be encouraged to ascend Mount Everest or fly over the South Pole. The only sin will be insubordination to the State. Sadism and perversions will flourish. Maintaining that »in the end such a system must break down either in an orgy of bloodshed or in the discovery of joy« (267) Russell immediately observes with a sceptical self-irony that this might be merely a naive optimism.

Going over to a serious tone, Russell remarks that the scientific society described by him should not be taken altogether as serious prophecy, but as »an attempt to depict the world which would result if scientific technique were to rule unchecked« (269). But he also warns that the danger here is not entirely unreal. The reality of this danger lies in the fact that in the past several centuries science has undergone (but not yet finished) a development which could be described briefly as »the passage from contemplation to manipulation« (270). A little more broadly, the essence of this process, according to Russell, is in the following: »Science in its beginnings was due to men who were in love with the world. They perceived the beauty of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the mountains. Because they loved them their thoughts dwelt upon them, and they wished to understand them more intimately than a mere outward contemplation made possible . . . But step by step, as science has developed, the impulse of love which gave it birth has been increasingly thwarted, while the impulse of power, which was at first a mere camp-follower, has gradually usurped command in virtue of its unforeseen success. The lover of nature has been baffled, the tyrant over nature has been rewarded. . . . Disappointed as the lover of nature, the man of science is becoming its tyrant« (271–272).

But if Russell so calmly and in so detailed a way describes a society in which the power impulse has completely overhelmed the impulse of love, and in which man has renounced the world as its lover, in order to be able to conquer it more successfully as its technician, does not this mean that Russell's sympathies are at least partly with the scientific society? In this respect Russell's text is without ambiguities: »The scientific society in its pure form, which is what we have been trying to depict, is incompatible with the pursuit of truth, with love, with art, with spontaneous delight, with every ideal that men have hitherto cherished, with the sole exception of ascetic renunciation« (274). And further: »The lover, the poet and the mystic find a fuller satisfaction than the seeker after power can ever know, since they can rest in the object of their love, whereas the seeker after power must be perpetually engaged in some fresh manipulation if he is not to suffer from a sense of emptiness. I think therefore that the satisfactions of the lover, using that word in its broadest sense, exceed the satisfaction of the tyrant, and deserve a higher place among the ends of life« (275).

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We can therefore state that Russell, who was always an admirer and champion of science, was able to offer an excellent analysis of the dangers inherent in the development of science and technology, and above all an exciting but terrifying picture of a scientific society in which man, disappointed as »the lover of nature« has become its (and his own) tyrant.

Another example is Russell's analysis of Bolshevism given in the book *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920). With extraordinary penetration, Russell even then anticipated and foresaw many aspects of what later developed and acquired the name of »Stalinism«. While emphasising his agreement with the aims proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, Russell expressed doubts about the means by which they attempted to attain them.[34] Rejecting first of all the unlimited use of violence in building a new society, Russell also criticized the tendency to transform Marxism into a religious belief with set dogmas and sacred texts. Believing that workers' leaders can betray the workers' movement not only by selling themselves to capitalists, but also by using the power they have acquired for their own ends (instead of the ends of society), Russell expressed the fear that this other development might lead in Russia to »the establishment of a bureaucratic aristocracy, concentrating authority in its own hands and creating a regime just as oppressive and cruel as that of capitalism« (136).

Later criticism of Stalinism, often unawares repeated that of Russell. However, in contradistinction to some people who, when they became disappointed in Stalinism, entirely deserted not only socialist, but all other progressive positions, Russell even in the moment of his disappointment was able to draw a line between the way in which Communism was developing in Russia, and the communism itself: »I went to Russia a Communist, but contact with those who have no doubts has intensified a thousandfold my own doubts, not as to Communism in itself, but as to the wisdom of holding a creed so firmly that for its sake men are willing to inflict widespread misery« (p. 42). Expressing the fear that Russian Communism might deviate from Socialism, Russell nevertheless appreciated the greatness of the work started by the October Revolution: »The Russian Revolution is one of the great heroic events of the world's history. By far the most important aspect of the Russian Revolution is as an attempt to realize Communism. I believe that Communism is necessary to the world, and I believe that the heroism of Russia has fired men's hopes in a way which was essential to the realization of Communism in the future« (p. 6). However, is there any hope that Communism might ever succeed in the world, if it fails in Russia now? Russell's answer is: »Russian Communism may fail and go under, but Communism itself will not die« (187).

[34] »I am compelled to reject Bolshevism for two reasons: First, because the price mankind must pay to achieve Communism by Bolshevik methods is too terrible; and secondly because, even after paying the price, I do not believe the result would be what the Bolsheviks profess to desire.« (B. Russell, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, G. Allen & Unwin, London, first published November 1920, reprinted February 1921, p. 155–156. Further references to this book in text.)

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Russell's belief in the future success of Communism was closely connected with his opinion that the Russian form of Communism is not the only one possible: »I believe that the West is capable of adopting less painful and more certain methods of teaching Socialism than those that have seemed necessary in Russia« (20). Holding that there are different roads to Socialism, Russell recomended the following one to England: »Self-government in industry is, I believe, the road by which England can best approach Communism« (182).

Thus better than many Marxists Russell saw both the dangers in the development of science and technology and the dangers involved in applying inadequate forms to achieve socialism – especially in endeavours to unify efforts toward socialism on the Russian model.

However, Russel not only wrote with penetration and wit about social problems. With his whole being he fought for what he thought was right.[35] Here he was ready to take all risks connected with such behaviour. Thus, during the World War I he was removed from his teaching post at Cambridge because of his pacifist attitude, he was prevented from going to the U. S. A. and teaching at Harvard by refusal of a passport, and finally he was sentenced to six months in prison. In the same prison (in Brixton) he spent again seven days near the end of the ninth decade of his life (1961) because, as president of

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[35] Showing a certain understanding for philosophers who can be distracted from vital human problems by their concern for pure theory, Russell could not speak of them without a touch of irony. An example of this is his description of a conversation with Branislav Petronijević in London, during the First World War: »A man who impressed me, not so much by his ability as by his resolute absorption in philosophy even under the most arduous circumstances, was the only Yugoslav philosopher of our time, whose name was Branislav Petronievič. I met him only once, in the year 1917. The only language we both knew was German and so we had to use it, although it caused people in the street to look at us with suspicion. The Serbs had recently carried out their heroic retreat before the German invaders, and I was anxious to get a first-hand account of this retreat from him, but he only wanted to expound his doctrine that the number of points in space is finite and can be estimated by considerations derived from the theory of numbers. The consequence of this difference in our interests was a somewhat curious conversation. I said, »Were you in the great retreat?« and he replied, »Yes, but you see the way to calculate the number of points in space is . . .« I said, »Were you on foot?« and he said, »Yes, you see the number must be a prime.« I said, »Did you not try to get a horse?« and he said, »I started on a horse, but I fell off, and it should not be difficult to find out what prime«. In spite of all my efforts, I could get nothing further from him about anything so trivial as the Great War. I admired his capacity for intellectual detachment from the accidents of his corporeal existence, in which I felt that few ancient Stoics could have rivalled him. After the First War he was employed by the Yugoslav Government to bring out a magnificent edition of the eighteenth-century Yugoslav philosopher Boscovic, but what happened to him after that I do not know.« (B. Russell, *Portraits from Memory and other Essays*, pp. 28–29.)

Whereas Russell wrote with a mild irony about the attitude of Petronijević, he much more mercilessly criticised the contemporary ordinary language philosophy (which resulted from the later Wittgenstein) with its interest merely in determining the meaning of words: »These philosophers remind me of the shopkeeper of whom I once asked the shortest way to Winchester. He called to a man in the back premises: »Gentleman wants to know the shortest way to Winchester.« »Winchester?« an unseen voice replied. »Aye.« »Way to Winchester?« »Aye.« »Shortest way?« »Aye.« »Dunno.« He wanted to get the nature of the question clear, but took no interest in answering it.« *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

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the »Committee of one Hundred« he organized peaceful sit-down demontrations in the Parliament Square in protest against nuclear armament. But Russell's social activity in the postwar period – especially his struggle for a ban on nuclear weapons, his fight for condemnation of the war crimes (and the whole imperialistic war) in Vietnam, his condemnation of the occupation of Czechoslovakia – all is so well-known that it is unnecessary to go into detail about it.

It should be emphasized, however, that Russell's voice was heard in public not only in connection with such major issues as Vietnam, but often also with seemingly less important individual cases of persecution, when individuals because of their convictions and activity were confronted with that organized violence called State or Government. Raising his voice not only in the defence of abstract principles, but also of living individual men, Russell pitilessly exposed those who excercise power and violence. The correctness of Russell's attitude on various social questions, can certainly be controversial, but there is no doubt that in his public activity he always was led by his principles. In this respect, what he said in his witty »obituary« written for himself in 1937 holds true in its entirety: »His life, for all its waywardness, had a certain anachronistic consistency, reminiscent of that of the aristocratic rebels of the early nineteenth century. His principles were curious but such as they were, they governed his actions.«

The telegram sent on the occasion of Russell's death by a representative of the corrupt South Vietnam regime condemned Russell's political naiveté and particularly the founding of the international tribunal for war crimes in Vietnam. This evoked universal reaction of condemnation and disgust in world public opinion. However this was the sincere and open reaction of a proponent of an inhuman regime to the death of the great philosopher and humanist, so that there is no real need to be shocked about it. Rather one should feel disgusted and shocked at the crocodile tears shed over the bier of the great fighter for human rights by certain other suppressors of freedom and humanity. Therefore, it should be said at this time that despite his social origin, and despite the weakness and inconsistency of his philosophical conceptions, Bertrand Russell belongs not to ruling classes and strata, but to those wh oare, as he was, ready to fight for a better human world.

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THEODOR W. ADORNO (1903–1969)
DIE UNWAHRHEIT DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT ZWISCHEN REVOLUTION UND KRITIK

Abdulah Šarčević

Sarajevo

Nur Denken, das ohne Mentalreservat, ohne Illusion des inneren Königtums seine Funktionslosigkeit und Ohnmacht sich eingesteht, erhascht villeicht einen Blick in eine Ordnung des Möglichen, Nichtseienden, wo die Menschen und Dinge an ihrem rechten Ort wären.

Th. W. Adorno

1. *Ein Denker im Streit*

Est ist nur natürlich, wenn wir uns fragen, wie es möglich ist, einen Denker, Philosophen, Ästhetiker, Soziologen, Kunst-Theoretiker aus den Vorstellungen und Legenden herauszuschälen, die seine Mitarbeiter, Zeitgenossen, Gleichgesinnten und Gegner von ihm haben oder über ihn denken. Adornos Geschick erscheint jetzt, nach einem plötzlichen Tod[1] kaum weniger widerspruchsvoll. In ihm verflechten sich die Paradoxe und Ungewißheiten, die Reife und Naivität der Epoche, in der wir leben oder zu leben versuchen.

Ist Theodor Adorno eigentlich ein nachrevolutionärer Denker? Ist er der König der linken Intellektuellen? Oder ist Adorno einer der zweideutigen Dissidenten und Kritiker der spätkapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft und ihrer Kultur? Vielleicht erleidet auch er den Fluch derer, die, so wie einst Rimbaud, folgerten: »Das Unsichtbare sehen und das Unhörbare hören bedeutet anderes als den Geist toter Dinge aufnehmen«?

Vielleicht sollten wir, im Gegensatz zu einer solchen Fragenserie, die natürlich ihre positive oder negative Bedeutung haben, ihre posi-

[1] Dies wurde in der zweiten Augusthälfte des Jahres 1969 notiert, gleich nach Erhalt der Nachricht, daß Theodor Adorno am 6. August in der Schweiz gestorben war.

TH EO D O R W. A DO RNO (1903-1969)

T H E U N W H R H E IT T H E R M O D E R N E N G E S E L L S C H A F T

Abdullah Sarcevic

Sarajevo

Only thinking that admits its functionlessness and impotence without a mental reserve, without the illusion of inner kingship, perhaps catches a glimpse of an order of the possible, nonexistent, where people and things were in their right place.

Th. W. Adorno

1. A thinker in contention

It is only natural if we ask ourselves how it is possible to extract a thinker, philosopher, aesthetician, sociologist, art theorist from the ideas and legends that his collaborators, contemporaries, peers and opponents have of him or about him think. Adorno's fate seems scarcely less contradictory now, after a sudden death. In it, the paradoxes and uncertainties, the maturity and naivety of the epoch in which we live or try to live intertwine.

Is Theodor Adorno actually a post-revolutionary thinker? Is he the king of the left intellectuals? Or is Adorno one of the ambiguous dissidents and critics of late capitalist industrial society and its culture? Perhaps he, too, suffers the curse of those who, like Rimbaud once, reasoned: "To see the invisible and to hear the inaudible is other than taking in the spirit of dead things"?

Perhaps, in contrast to such a series of questions, which of course have their positive or negative meaning, we should pose their positive This was noted in the second half of August 1969, immediately after receiving the news that Theodor Adorno died on August 6th in Switzerland was.

tive oder negative Philosophie, Theologie, noch unbekannte Fragen stellen, jene Horizonte entdecken, die sich dessen bewuß wären, daß die heutige Form des Denkens, Wahrnehmens-wenn auch noch so luzid theoretisch unausweichlich und verifiziert-heute unzulänglich, fragmentarisch ist, um dem Denken der widerspruchsvollen Gegenwart Sinn zu geben.

Adorno ist gegen jede Erfahrung von Verdinglichung revoltiert, aber ohne Revolte. Er ist ein erbitterter und empfindlicher Kritiker des Gesetzes des Seins, beziehungsweise des Nicht-Seins in der modernen kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft, aber seine Erbitterung hat sich in den Frieden der kritischen Kontemplation und des Denkens gewandelt. So spinnen sich um Adorno die Gegensätze der zeitgenössischen Geschichte, die ihrerseits auf eine Denkmöglichkeit außerhalb der klassischen Kategorien hinweisen, wie das Macht und Ohnmacht, Revolution oder Oportunismus, Aktivität oder Passivität sind.

Es scheint, als trüge seine Biographie etwas Gegensätzliches in sich. Auf der einen Seite die Philosophie. auf der anderen eine klare Kritik aller Phänomene der spätbürgerlichen Zivilisation. Für ihn ist nichts als solches sakrosankt. Und doch reicht seine Interessensphäre von der Soziologie bis zur Ästhetik des Films, der Musik usw. Das zeigt auch seine einfache Biographie deutlich: geboren am 11. September 1903 in Frankfurt/Main als Sohn eines jüdischen Händlers. Hier wird er von 1919 bis 1925 Musik, und zwar Komposition und Klavier studieren, da er auch an der selben Universität Studien der Philosophie und Soziologie absolviert. Erwähnen wir auch das, daß Adornos Verbindung zur Musik tiefer motiviert ist, nicht nur in seinem Geist, auch in seiner Natur: seine Mutter, Maria Calveli-Adorno della Piana war Sängerin. Die Tatsache, daß seine Studien der Philosophie, Soziologie und Ästhetik der Musik eines der zentralen Motive und Elemente seines Werkes darstellen, ist nicht bedeutungslos. Dabei darf man nicht vergessen, daß Adorno der Kenner der modernen Musik ist, den Thomas Mann in bezug auf die musikalische Dimension seines Romans »Doktor Faustus« befragt hat. Einige Wochen nach seinem Tod wird das Münchner Verlagshaus Rogner u. Bernhard sein Werk herausgeben, das den Titel trägt »Kompositionen für Filme«. Die Presse hat Auszüge aus einem Kapitel (»Ideen zur Ästhetik«) aus dem Buch, das in Zusammenarbeit mit Hanns Eisler entstand und noch 1944 in England erschien, gebracht.

Es ist auf jeden Fall interessant, daß sich Adorno-nachdem er 1924 auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie promoviert hatte-mit Publizistik befaßte. Zur gleichen Zeit studiert er in den Zwanziger-Jahren bei Alban Berg Komposition und komponiert einige Lieder und Streichquartette. Es ist sehr interessant, daß Adorno ein Mitarbeiter des Institutes für soziale Forschung in Frankfurt wird (im Jahr 1930), und schon 1931 habilitiert er mit einer sehr originellen Arbeit über die Philosophie S. Kierkegaards. Diese Karriere wird aber sogleich unterbrochen: Hitler kommt an die Macht, Adorno wird entlassen, 1934 emigriert er nach England, so wie viele Denker und Künstler auch, und setzt seine theoretische Aktivität in Oxford fort. Von großer Bedeutung ist auch seine Übersiedlung in die Vereinigten Staaten, wo

tive or negative philosophy, theology, ask as yet unknown questions, discover those horizons that were aware that today's form of thinking, of perception-however lucidly theoretically inevitable and verified-is

today insufficient, fragmentary, to think to give meaning to the contradictory present.

Adorno revolted against every experience of reification, but without revolt. He is a bitter and sensitive critic of the law of being and non-being in modern industrial capitalist society, but his bitterness has been transformed into the peace of critical contemplation and thought. Thus the contrasts of contemporary history are spun around Adorno, which in turn point to a possibility of thinking outside the classical categories, such as power and powerlessness, revolution or opportunism, activity or passivity.

It seems as if his biography contained something contradictory.

On the one hand philosophy, on the other a clear criticism of all phenomena of late bourgeois civilization. For him nothing as such is sacrosanct. And yet his sphere of interest ranges from sociology to the aesthetics of film, music, etc. This is also clearly shown by his simple biography: born on September 11, 1903

in Frankfurt/Main as the son of a Jewish dealer. Here he will study music from 1919 to 1925, specifically composition and piano, since he is also studying philosophy and sociology at the same university. Let us also mention that Adorno's connection to music is more deeply motivated, not only in his spirit but also in his nature: his mother, Maria Calveli-Adomo della Piana, was a singer. The fact that his studies in the philosophy, sociology and aesthetics of music constitute one of the central motifs and elements of his work is not meaningless. It should not be forgotten that Adorno is the connoisseur of modern music whom Thomas Mann asked about the musical dimension of his novel Doctor Faustus. A few weeks after his death, the Munich publishing house Rogner & Bernhard will publish his work, entitled »Compositions for Films«. The press published excerpts from a chapter ("Ideas on Aesthetics") from the book, which was written in collaboration with Hanns Eisler and was published in England in 1944.

In any case, it is interesting that Adorno - after he had died in 1924

in the field of philosophy-befafite with journalism. At the same time, in the 1920s, he studied composition with Alban Berg and composed a number of songs and string quartets. It is very interesting that Adorno becomes a collaborator of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (in 1930), and already in 1931 he habilitates with a very original work on the philosophy of S. Kierkegaard. But this career is

immediately interrupted: Hitler comes to power, Adorno is dismissed, 1934

he emigrated to England, as did many thinkers and artists, and continued his theoretical activities in Oxford. Also of great importance is his colonization in the United States, where 185

er 1938 am Institut für soziale Forschung arbeitet, das in der Zwischenzeit in dieses Land verlegt war. Hier lernt er im Lauf ausführlicher Forschung die Produktion und Reproduktion des Lebens in Amerika, mit ihrem Geist, ihrer Kraft der modernen Reklame genauer kennen, sowie die Massen-Kommunikationsmittel. Seit 1949 ist er erneut an der Universität Frankfurt, endlich als Ordinarius und Direktor des Institutes für soziale Forschung, zusammen mit seinem langjährigen Freund und Gleichgesinnten Max Horkheiner, er beginnt seine Kritik der spätbürgerlichen Kultur, besonders der Soziologie des Wissens, der Ideologie, der Phänomenologie, der Ontologie der Existenzphilosophie. In dieser Polemik, in den Studien der Philosophie und Soziologie der neueren Musik, in den »Noten zur Literatur« (I, II, III, 1958/65), in der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« (gemeinsam mit Horkheimer 1947), in den Studien über Hegel usw. hat Adorno sehr differenziert und hochgeistig verschärft seine kritische Denkmethode entwickelt, eigentlich die »negative Dialektik«.

2. *Die negative Dialektik und Unwahrheit des Abendlandes*

Es ist natürlich, sich beim Begriff der n e g a t i v e n D i a l e k t i k aufzuhalten, nicht nur als einem gedanklichen, philosophischen Erbgut des Abendlandes, vor allem Hegels, sondern auch als einer Lebensform und Denkform in der geschichtlichen Gegenwart. Die negative Dialektik ist nämlich der fundamentale Begriff im Denken Adornos. Auf der einen Seite bleibt sie ein Medium des Begriffes, eine Note des s u b j e k t i v e n Denkens. Auf der anderen Seite ist sie vom Ehrgeiz erfaßt, das geschichtiche und gesellschaftliche Subjekt auszusagen, in der modernen Industriegesellschaft die U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t als Leistung der bürgerlichen Geschichte zu entdecken, als verdeckte Mittelbarkeit.

Wenn es so ist, ist sie nicht eigentlich – unter anderen – ein sich Verstecken in das Unaussprechliche der Dialektik des Abendlandes? Ist nicht die negative Dialektik eine Art Rettung der Pantomime, des Systems der Bewegung und der Gesten der dialektischen Geschichte des Abendlandes, die Entwicklung dessen, was als »Körper«, außerhalb des Begriffes und der Philosophie bleibt? Das sind, so scheint es, Fragen, die noch kein Werturteil in sich tragen. Es ist nicht möglich, sie gleich zu beantworten. Erst nach der Ausführung bestimmter Prämissen, werden wir sehen, ob eine Atwort überhaupt möglich ist. Möglicherweise werden wir erfahren, ob sie überhaupt notwendig ist.

Die kritische Theorie dieses zeitgenössischen Philosophen und Soziologen beruht auf den Erfahrungen der Dissonanz. Theoretisch ist sie mit der negativen Dialektik des Abendlandes, vor allem mit den Erhellungen von Hegels Begriffen der Entfremdung (Verfremdung), Verdinglichung verbunden. Sonst sind die Denkweise, der Stil Adornos, die Beschäftigung mit den Möglichkeiten des K o n k r e t e n, natürlich in einer ungewöhnlichen Bedeutung auf der einen Seite außerordentliche Wegweiser, auf der anderen Seite aber drängt der Grundwortschatz den Gedanken in einen bestimmten Rahmen, und trägt so – wie im übrigen auch alles andere Denken – eine Versteinerungstendenz in sich.

In 1938 he was working at the Institute for Social Research, which had meanwhile been transferred to this country. Here, in the course of detailed research, he learns more about the production and

reproduction of life in America, with its spirit, its power of modern advertising and the means of mass communication. Since 1949 he is again at the University of Frankfurt, finally as professor and director of the Institute for Social Research, together with his long-time friend and like-minded M ax Horkheiner, he begins his critique of late-bourgeois culture, especially the sociology of knowledge, the Ideologic, the phenomenology, the ontology of existential philosophy. In this polemic, in the studies of the philosophy and sociology of modern music, in the "Notes on Literature" (I, II, III, 1958/65), in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (together with Horkheimer 1947), in the Studies on Hegel, etc., Adorno developed his critical thinking method in a very differentiated and highly intellectual way, actually the »negative dialectic«.

2. The negative dialectic and untruth of the West It is natural to stay with the concept of negative dialectics, not only as an intellectual, philosophical heritage of the West, especially Hegel, but also as a way of life and way of thinking in the historical present. The negative dialectic is namely the fundamental concept in Adorno's thinking. On the one hand, it remains a medium of the concept, a note of sub j e c t i ve thinking. On the other hand, it is seized by the ambition to testify to the historical and social subject, to discover the unm i 11 e 1-bartness in modern industrial society as an achievement of bourgeois history, as hidden indirectness.

If so, isn't it actually - among other things - a hiding in the unspeakable of Western dialectics?

Isn't the negative dialectic a kind of salvation of pantomime, of the system of movement and gestures of the dialectic history of the West, the development of that which as "body" remains outside of concept and philosophy? T hese are, it seems, questions that do not yet contain any value judgments. It is not possible to answer them immediately. Only after the implementation of certain premises will we see whether an answer is possible at all. Possibly we will learn whether it is necessary at all.

The critical theory of this contemporary philosopher and sociologist is based on the experiences of dissonance. Theoretically, it is connected with the negative dialectics of the West, above all with the elucidation of Hegel's concepts of alienation (alienation), reification. Otherwise, the way of thinking, the style of Adorno, the preoccupation with the possibilities of the concrete are, of course, in an unusual meaning, on the one hand extraordinary signposts, on the other hand, however, the basic vocabulary forces the thought into a certain framework and thus

carries it

- like all other thinking - a petrification tendency in itself.

Was besonders interessant ist, ist Adornos Analyse des kritischen Selbstbewußtseins, der Natur der Theorie, der Dialektik des Verhältnisses zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Interessant deshalb, weil das revolutionäre Denken bisher das Privileg jener Marxisten war, die ihr gedankliches, philosophisches, soziologisches, anthropologisches, ästhetisches usw. Werk mit bestehenden oder möglichen Organisationen, großen Bewegungen unter kollektiver Anstrengung, mit radikalen Veränderungen der zeitgenössischen Industriegesellschaft verbunden haben.

Wie soll das begründet werden? Für die Sozialisten und Kommunisten – von Marx bis Bloch-war die Trennung von Theorie und Praxis immer ein Zeichen der Entfremdung. Die Entfremdung aber ist ein Übel, der Zerfall der einheitlichen geschichtlichen Substanz. Mehr noch: sie ist die Verdinglichung dessen, was nicht zu verdinglichen ist. Und gerade deshalb-da die Einheit der geschichtlichen Substanz ein Synonym für Wahrheit ist-ist die Entfremdung eine Verdeckung der Wahrheit, eine Verfälschung. Kurz gesagt: Unwahrheit. Was geschieht dann mit dem Geist?

3. Das Pathos des Unbedingten und der konsequente Menschentyp

Der Geist setzt die Zivilisation der materiellen Arbeit, ihre Dialektik des Objektivismus voraus. In diesem Sinne-wieder nach dem Muster der Metaphysik des Abendlandes von Plato und Aristoteles-sagt man auch unter den Marxisten: das ist Schein, eine Essenz ohne Existenz. Es ist augenscheinlich, streng prinzipiell, daß nur dann der Geist dient und überhaupt der Repression dienen kann, dem unterroristischen Terror. Man kann also spüren, woher die Kritik über die Entzweiung des Geistes und der materiellen Produktion, der anderen historischen Sphären kommt. Der Kritiker wird zum konsequenten Menschen: er ist, wie das Karl Jaspers ausdrücken würde, ein Rigorist, Fanatiker, Logizist, Substanzialist. Die Prinzipien der Kritik sind bestimmt und definiert. Die Frage, ob wir uns für sie entscheiden steht nicht mehr, sondern die um ihre Realisierung mit allen ihren Folgen; entgegen alle Gegensätzlichkeiten, Widerstände, Antinomien, deren die Realität des Seins in der Geschichte voll ist. Es ist also von einem bestimmten Menschentyp die Rede, vom radikalen Menschen, der diesen Antinomien gegenüber »blind« ist. Damit das ganze noch ungewönlicher wird, das ist der Mensch, der Gegenstand unserer Bewunderung ist, der für jede Ungewißheit eine Antwort bereit hat, der demnach also Sinn für Gegensätzlichkeit hat, die er nicht verneint, sondern sie fühlt und als ursprüngliches Ubel anerkennt. In diesem Sinn bietet der Konsequente Mensch einen bestimmten Begriff und eine bestimmte Definition des Lebens: das Leben ist vor allem möglich als Struktur, die man mechanisch, rational berechnen, planen und nicht weniger auch vorwegnehmen kann. Er bewahrt das Andenken der Prinzipien, schließt sich fest in den Rahmen und die Grenzen der Konsequenzen. Dem konsequenten Menschentyp, dem Rigoristen, Substanzisten, bedeutet die Form alles, die Inhalte schwinden, sich in Materialien verwandelnd. Jaspers geht aber noch weiter in der Ana-

What is particularly interesting is Adorno's analysis of critical self-awareness, the nature of theory, the dialectic of the relationship between theory and practice. Interesting because revolutionary

thinking has so far been the privilege of those Marxists who have linked their intellectual, philosophical, sociological, anthropological, aesthetic, etc. work with existing or possible organizations, large movements under collective effort, with radical changes in contemporary industrial society.

How should that be justified? For socialists and communists - from Marx to Bloch - the separation of theory and practice has always been a sign of alienation. Alienation, however, is an evil, the disintegration of the unified historical substance. Even more: it is the reification of what cannot be reified. And precisely because the unity of historical substance is a synonym for truth, alienation is a covering up of truth, a falsification. In short: untruth. Then what happens to the spirit?

3. The pathos of the unconditional and the consequent human type
The spirit presupposes the civilization of material work, its dialectic of objectivism. In this sense—again following the example of the metaphysics of the West by Plato and Aristotle—Marxists also say: this is appearance, an essence without existence. It is obvious, strictly in principle, that only then does the spirit serve and can serve repression, sub-roristic terror. So one can feel where the criticism about the dichotomy of spirit and material production, the other historical spheres, comes from. The critic becomes a consistent human being: he is, as Karl Jaspers would put it, a rigorist, fanatic, logicist, substantialist. The principles of criticism are determined and defined. The question of whether we decide in favor of it no longer stands, but that of its realization with all its consequences, in the face of all contradictions, resistances, antinomies, of which the reality of being in history is full. We are therefore talking about a specific type of human being, the radical human being, who is "blind" to these antinomies. So that the whole thing becomes even more unusual, it is the human being who is the object of our admiration, who has an answer ready for every uncertainty, who accordingly has a sense for opposites, which he does not deny but feels and recognizes as an original evil . In this sense, the Consistent Man offers a specific concept and definition of life: life is possible first of all as a structure that can be mechanically, rationally calculated, planned, and no less anticipated. He preserves the memory of principles, shutting himself firmly in the framework and limits of consequences. For the consistent human type, the rigorist, substanceist, form means everything, content disappears, transforming itself into materials. But Jaspers goes even further in the Ana

lyse dieses Typus. Er macht uns deutlich, daß dieser in sich das Pathos des Unbedingten, dem zufolge er jeden Kompromiß geringschätzig betrachtet, in sich trägt. Daher verläuft sein Leben in einer Richtung. Wie wir sehen, ist der Schluß, daß dieser Menschentyp im Negativen, in der Macht der Antinomien sieht, nur Übel, klar.

Im Licht dieser Analyse müssen wir auch den Marxisten als Kritiker betrachten, wenn er den Zwiespalt zwischen Geist und materieller Produktion diffamiert, sowie den zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Theodor Adorno ist im diesem Sinn kein konsequenter Typus des Menschen und Denkers, daher auch kein klassischer Marxist. Adorno spielt auf den Standpunkt an, daß diese epochale Spaltung auf einer bestimmten Stufe des Geschichtsprozesses erfolgte, der wiederum aus der blinden Übermacht der materiellen Praxis erfolgt, und sich potentiell auf die Freiheit bezieht. Das Bestehen auf der Macht, diese Spaltung zurückzuziehen, die bei den größten Marxisten in der Sphäre der dialektischen Spekulation oder Utopie blieb, und sich in der Erfahrung im gewaltsamen »Auflösen« dieser Spaltung zeigt-wäre für Adorno auf der einen Seite idealistisch und andererseits regressiv.

Als Ausgangspunkt seiner negativen Dialektik, seines Suchens und Entdeckens der Wahrheit hat Adorno den Standpunkt eingenommen, daß ohne Überfluß des Geistes, der sich auf die Praxis reduziert, für uns der Konkretismus entsteht und besteht.

4. *Eine Wirklichkeit des Konkretismus: Das Handeln im Schatten der Aktion*

Das dauernde Drängen des Konkretismus in den Sphären und in der Aktion der technologischen und Industrie-Gesellschaft zeigt, daß er sich gut mit technokratischen, positivistischen Tendenzen verträgt, aber er hat-laut Adorno-mehr Bezugspunkte als er selbst sich das vorstellen kann.

Das ist jenes, was uns erklärt, nach Adorno, daß Marx Furcht hatte, es könnte sich ein neuer bestimmter Barbareiprozeß entwickeln. Die neueste geschichtliche Erfahrung nach Auschwitz und Hiroschima zeigt aber, daß Marx' Furcht längst überschritten ist. Aus der Natur der Aktion des Konkretismus, der das Unvereinbare vereint: den Konservatismus und die Revolution-ist es augenscheinlich, daß die Menschheit, die im normalen Funktionieren ihrer Technik und Technologie ein solches Übel vollzieht, es als alltägliche Situation zuläßt, damit eigentlich das ratifiziert, was das Schlimmste ist: man muß dem Gewäsch von den Gefahren der Entspannung lauschen.

Der Konkretismus, eigentlich der jetzige Praktizismus, die erreichte Praxis ist jener historische Prozeß, aus dem die Barbarei wächst und quillt. Der Technologie als System der Barberei gegenübergestellt, ist das Denken entweder der Verzweiflung überlassen oder der Abdikation, der Ohnmacht, oder sie sucht in sich selbst, in der *Dialektik des Selbstbewußtseins,* des reinen, unverdinglichten, des schrecklich dissonanten, einen Archimed'schen Punkt, eine *Anlehnung,* ein *Refugium.* Denn die Barberei ist so weit forgeschritten, indem sie mit dem

lyse this type. He makes it clear to us that he carries within himself the pathos of the unconditional, according to which he regards every compromise with contempt. Therefore, his life goes in one direction.

As we can see, the conclusion that this type of person sees only Obel in the negative, in the power of antinomies, is clear.

In the light of this analysis we must also regard the Marxist as a critic when he defames the dichotomy between spirit and material production, and that between theory and practice. In this sense, Theodor Adorno is not a consistent type of man and thinker, and therefore not a classical Marxist either. Adorno alludes to the view that this epochal split occurred at a certain stage in the historical process, which in turn arises from the blind supremacy of material practice and potentially relates to freedom. To insist on the power to retract this split, which in the case of the great Marxists remained in the sphere of dialectical speculation or utopia, and which is shown in experience in the violent "dissolving" of this split, would be idealistic for Adorno on the one hand and on the other hand regressive.

As the starting point of his negative dialectics, his search and discovery of truth, Adorno took the position that concretism arises and exists for us without the overflow of spirit, which is reduced to practice.

4. A reality of concretism: acting in the shadow of action

The constant thrust of concretism in the spheres and in the action of technological and industrial society shows that it gets along well with technocratic, positivist tendencies, but, according to Adorno, it has more reference points than he himself can imagine.

This is what explains to us, according to Adorno, that Marx was afraid that a new definite barbaric process could develop. However, the most recent historical experience after Auschwitz and Hiroshima shows that Marx's fears have long since been overcome. From the nature of the action of concretism, which unites the irreconcilable: conservatism and revolution, it is evident that mankind, which in the normal functioning of its technique and technology performs such an evil, allows it as an everyday situation, so actually which ratifies what is worst: one must listen to the talk of the dangers of detente.

Concretism, actually the current practicism, the practice that has been achieved is that historical process from which barbarism grows and wells. Confronted with technology as a system of barbarism, thinking is either left to despair or to abdication, to powerlessness, or it seeks an Archimede within itself, in the dialectic of self-consciousness, of the pure, unreified, of the terribly dissonant 'schen point, a support, a refuge. Because the barbering has progressed so far that with the 188

Eintreten der Geschichte in die Überschallgeschwindigkeit konvergiert, daß es ihr gelingt, alles, was sich ihr entgegenstellt und widersetzt anzustecken.

Ich glaube, daß die Selbstverneinung dieser Tatsache bei vielen stürmischen und geistvollen Marxisten, linksgerichteten Intellektuellen einerseits eine Verstümmelung gedanklicher und theoretischer Projekte hevorgerufen hat, sie andererseits aber vor die Tore des bisher unbekannten revolutionären Dezisionismus geführt hat. In diesem engen Raum, scheint es, können sie konsequente Denker sein-natürlich nur in dem Sinn, den ich hier bezeichnet habe, nur als Aktionisten. Die Koinzidenz mit mehr oder weniger Abscheu gegen den *Überfluß an Theorie,* die oft auch als leere Spekulation bezeichnet wird, als überwundene Metaphysik usw., diese Koinzidenz also, die uns an vergangene Ereignisse erinnert, an analoge geschichtliche Situationen, die einmal Gegenstand der Kritik waren-ist sicht zufällig. Sie hat in dem Augenblick begonnen, da die Theorie *unmittelbar* auf die Kritik des Bestehenden gerichtet war, die repressive Praxis, und so konnte sie die Negation nur nach einem Modell denken und nach der immanenten Methodologie eben dieser Praxis. Die Wirkung wird dann dem Aktionskreis unmittelbar gleichgesetzt, dem Engagement, der unmittelbaren bürgerlichen Variation der Praxis.

5. *Der Fetischismus des Instrumentalismus*

Dieses Urteilen aber ist weit davon entfermt, sich in bestimmte Formen von Fatalismus abzuschließen, mit Rücksicht auf die gegenwärtigen Antinomien, die wir nach dem *klasischen* Denk-Modell bürgerlich nennen; diese Gegenwart-möchte ich hinzufügen- ist in der geschichtlichen Dimension noch nicht verunsichert, keineswegs aber zerstört, im Selbstbewußtsein des Menschen kompromittiert oder angezweifelt. Was ist das für ein Fatalismus, und welche sind seine Implikationen? Erstens ist man zur Erkenntnis gelangt, daß die Mittel längst den Zweck und die Idee überdeckt haben. Mit der gegebenen Gesellschaft gegenübergestellt bedeutet das, daß die Ziele verjagt sind, exkommuniziert, und zwar im Bezug auf die historische Realität-in der Vergangenheit, Inaktualität, in den Gegenstand der historisch-hermeneutischen Theorie. *Ihr Refugium ist demnach also die theoretische Sphäre, das Unwirkliche im allgemeinen.* Man ist auch zu der Erkenntnis gelangt, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob das ausgesprochen wurde oder nicht, daß es notwendig ist, das was als deaktualisierte Situation verurteilt wurde, als leeres Theoretisches und Spekulatives, als das, was den Begriff Ziel enthält, daß man auch das in ein Mittel, also Instrumentum umwandeln muß.

Wenn wir sagen in ein Instrumentum, dann meinen wir in Macht. Mit anderen Worten, man tut das, wogegen man sich erhebt und protestiert, kontestiert. Das kann natürlich eine *apokryphe Form* des Fatalismus sein, der Fatalismus, der sich selbst ungewist, weil er mittelbar die Totalität und den Terror der Struktur affirmiert und eingesteht, noch mehr das Modell des Bestehenden, seiner Produktion und Reproduktion. Die bürgerliche technologische Industriegesell-

entering history into supersonic speed, that it succeeds in infecting everything that opposes and resists it.

I believe that the self-denial of this fact has, on the one hand, caused a

mutilation of thought and theoretical projects by many stormy and witty Marxists, left-wing intellectuals, but, on the other hand, has led them to the gates of hitherto unknown revolutionary decisionism. In this narrow space, it seems, they can be consistent thinkers - of course only in the sense I have described here, only as actionists.

The coincidence with more or less disgust at the excess of theory, which is also often called empty speculation, metaphysics vanquished, etc., this coincidence that reminds us of past events, of analogous historical situations that were once the subject of criticism -is looks random. It began at the moment when theory was aimed directly at the critique of what existed, the repressive practice, and so it could only think of negation according to a model and according to the immanent methodology of precisely this practice. The effect is then directly equated with the sphere of action, with the commitment, with the immediate civic variation of practice.

5. The Fetishisms of Instrumentalism

But this judging is far from concluding in certain forms of fatalism, with regard to the contemporary antinomies, which we call bourgeois according to the classical model of thought; this present - I would like to add - is not yet uncertain in the historical dimension, but in no way destroyed, compromised or doubted in the self-confidence of man. What is this fatalism and what are its implications? First, it has come to be recognized that the means have long since eclipsed the end and the idea. Contrasted with the given society, this means that the goals are expelled, excommunicated, namely in relation to the historical reality - in the past, inactuality, into the object of historical-hermeneutic theory. Accordingly, their refuge is the theoretical sphere, the unreal in general. One has also come to realize, whether this has been said or not, that what has been condemned as a deactualized situation, as empty theoretical and speculative, as containing the notion of goal, it is necessary to also that must be converted into a means, i.e. an instrumentum.

When we say instrument, we mean power.

In other words, you do what you stand up and protest against, protest. This can of course be an apocryphal form of fatalism, the fatalism that is uncertain of itself because it indirectly affirms and admits the totality and terror of the structure, even more so the model of the existing, its production and reproduction. The bourgeois technological industrial society

schaft wird auf bürgerliche Art angegriffen. Ein solcher Aktionismus, der nicht auf das Motiv der Kontestierung zurückgeführt werden sollte, ist tief von der Substanz durchdrungen, gegen die er rebelliert, ist weit vom hippiehaften Verhalten ertfernt, auf einer höheren Stufe betäubt er sich durch Aktion, indem er Strukturen ändert und Gegenstände, die sich außerhalb der Aktion selbst befinden.

6. *Das Wunder des Aktionismus, die Ernüchterung der Negativen Dialektik*

Im Licht dieses Aktionismus wird es uns klar, daß eine solche kritische Theorie die Identität und den Gegenstand ihrer Kritik erreicht. Nun, sie versucht, eine Sicht des Passivismus, der auch Fatalismus ist, zu überwinden, indem sie in den Aktionismus verfällt als höhere und feinere Form des Fatalismus allein. Ihm kann man im Sinne von Hegel und Marx ein ehrliches Bewußtsein nicht absprechen. Noch weniger kann man ihm absprechen, daß er durch die *Erfahrung* und die *dauernde Verschiebung* der *»Realisierung der Philosophie«* und *des Sozialismus* belehrt wäre, nach dem Maß der antibürgerlichen Substanz oder des spekulativ-utopischer Vernunft. Eine immer größere *Rationalität des Übels,* der Entfremdung; eine immer stärkere Solidarität der modernen technologischen Gesellschaft, den Menschen *überflüssig* zu machen, alle Quellen seines Revoltes zu ersticken und seines revolutionären Widerstandes, den Terror zu »humanisieren« und zu »demokratisieren«; Gewalt in den »freien Willen« jedes Menschen zu zerlegen; auch die letzte Spur des eigenes Bewußtseins und der Würde durch Instrumente total zu entleeren – wie es Instrumente der Vermittlung, der Industrie, der Reklame, der Massenkommunikation sind; all das hat auf der Seite des Geistes den Revolt akkumuliert, andererseits die gräßliche »Ernüchterung« unter der Formel: gegen barbarische Totalität können nur noch barbarische Mittel angewandt werden hervorgebracht. Gegen jene, die die Demokratie verletzt haben, sind auch undemokratische Mittel gerechtfertigt.

Es steht nicht mehr nur der tatsächliche Fatalismus dieses Aktionismus in Frage. Che Guevara ist, natürlich nur als Mythos, denn das ist nicht mehr *Philosophie*-nur noch eine Möglichkeit des Guerilla im Rahmen der halbbürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Der Gedanke an die gegenwartige Philosophie, der Gedanke vor allem an das Denken marxistischer Provenienz, will etwas anderes beweisen, etwas Gegenteiliges, daß der Gedanke Ohnmacht bedeutet, daß er also *außer den Chancen der Revolution* liegt, verurteilt für das geschichtliche Reservat. Auch dieser Standpunkt kann zweideutig sein: Es kann zunächst bedeuten, daß diese Zivilisation, die Gegenstand eines Mythos ist, noch mehr selbst ein Mythos, *das revolutionäre Denken als vorrevolutionäres* verurteilt hat oder als *nachrevolutionäres;* zweitens, daß dieses Denken selbst abdiziert hat, in der Sphäre der Theorie verbleibend, an sich selbst die *Liquidierung eines revolutionären Substrates* vorgenommen hat, also damit einverstanden war, demnach positiv, wissenschaftlich, historisch usw. zu werden.

community is attacked in a civil manner. Such actionism, which should not be reduced to the motive of contestation, is deeply imbued with the substance against which it rebels, is far removed from hippy

behavior, at a higher level it numbs itself with action, changing structures and objects , which are outside of the action itself.

6. The miracle of actionism, the disenchantment of negative dialectics

In the light of this activism, it becomes clear to us that such a critical theory achieves the identity and object of its critique.

Well, it tries to transcend a view of passivism, which is also fatalism, by falling into actionism as a higher and finer form of fatalism alone. One cannot deny him an honest consciousness in the sense of Hegel and Marx. One can even less deny that he was taught by experience and the constant postponement of the "realization of philosophy" and socialism according to the measure of anti-bourgeois substance or speculative-utopian reason. An ever greater rationality of evil, of alienation; an ever stronger solidarity of modern technological society to make man superfluous, to smother all sources of his revolt and his revolutionary resistance, to "humanize" terror and to

"democratize"; to decompose violence into the "free will" of every human being; to completely empty even the last trace of one's own consciousness and dignity through instruments - such as instruments of mediation, industry, advertising, mass communication; All of this has accumulated revolt on the side of the spirit, while on the other hand it has produced graphic "disenchantment" under the formula: only barbaric means can be used against barbaric totality. Undemocratic means are also justified against those who have violated democracy.

It is no longer just the actual fatalism of this activism that is in question. Che Guevara is, of course, only as a myth, for that is no longer philosophy - just another possibility of the guerrilla within the framework of semi-bourgeois society. The thought of contemporary philosophy, the thought above all of thinking of Marxist provenance, wants to prove something else, something to the contrary, that the thought means powerlessness, that it lies beyond the chances of the revolution, condemned for the historical reserve.

This point of view, too, can be ambiguous: it can mean, first of all, that this civilization, which is the object of a myth, even more a myth itself, has condemned revolutionary thought as pre-revolutionary or as post-revolutionary; secondly, that this thinking itself abdicated, remaining in the sphere of theory, set about liquidating a revolutionary substrate, that is, agreed to become positive, scientific, historical, and so on.

Der einen und der anderen Richtung ist die Erbitterung und die Erkenntnis eigen, daß »die operative Rationalität wenig Platz für die geschichtliche Vernunft hat und auch wenig Nutzen von ihr« (Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch). Nun, das sind zwei verschiedene, entgegengerichtete Richtungen, die durch verschiedene Arten an den Fatalismus gebunden sind.

II

1. *Eine schwache Hoffnung auf den totalen Umsturz, die Rationalität der Macht*

Wir haben diese zwei Richtungen genommen, um Adornos Negative Dialektik klarer differenzieren zu können. Und um ihre sozialen und politischen Implikationen begreifen zu können. Von diesem Punkt aus wird die Erfahrung der Negativen Dialektik wesentlich. Hier ist vor allem die Erfahrung der zeitgenössischen empirischen Welt der Rationalität; die Erkenntnis, daß sich die Hoffnung auf den totalen Umsturz und die totale Revolution in einem kürzeren Zeitraum, eine Hoffnung, die vor fünfzig Jahren noch berechtigt erschien, heute aber zu illusorisch, abstrakt und spekulativ ist, die Hoffnung auf diese totale Veränderung der bürgerlichen Erfahrungswelt, nach dem Toben des Nationalismus, nach den Erfahrungen der stalinistischen Diktatur, nach der jetzigen »Unsterblichkeit« der totalen Repression und universalen Geschichtsmanipulation, erweist sich als *Naivität einer bestimmten Phase,* eines historischen Augenblicks. Bei Adorno resultiert das in gefährliche Einsichten und Beobachtungen: nach dieser Erfahrung der Macht ohne Gewalt, ist diese Macht so untrennbar mit dem verbunden, was *geändert werden* müßte.

Es scheint, daß die moderne Gesellschaft allen Effekt der Gewalt in den *Formen der Rationalität* erfaßt hat. Solche Gewalt kann schwer als partielle identifiziert werden, als persönliche, nationale oder internationale, weil sie ihrer Ursprung nach anonym ist. Sie ist aber gleichzeitig mit der Repression und dem Fortschritt der Industrie- und Postindustriegesellschaft verbunden. Daher kann die bürgerliche Gesellschaft nicht mehr vom *Horizont ihrer Negation die ihre Motive und Wurzeln im Gefühl des Verlierens von »Substanz«, »Persönlichkeit«, »Humanum« im metaphysischen Sinn hat,* analysiert werden. Es kann natürlich nicht der gedankliche Trieb zur Rebellion sein, denn dann ist der geschichtliche Anachronismus die Quelle der Negation. Da verbrüdert sich der Konservativismus mit der Revolution. Das bedeutet nichts anderes als daß die bürgerliche Gesellschaft die Subversion gebiert, die sowohl in der Theorie als auch in der Praxis die Erinnerung, an die Substanz bewahrt, die die bürgerlich veränderte Zeit in Strukturen zersetzt, in Welt-systemen, in der Gesellschaft der Tatsachen. Das kann spekulativ-utopische Formen annehmen, die so dialektisch erfaßt, elastisch, ernsthaft, wie das in Blochs »Geist der Utopie« der Fall ist, noch die Revolution denken.

Both tendencies are characterized by exasperation and the recognition that "operational rationality has little place for historical reason and

little benefit from it" (Marcuse, The One-Dimensional Man). Well, these are two different, opposing tendencies that are tied to fatalism in different ways.

II

1. A faint hope of total overthrow, the rationality of power

We have taken these two directions in order to be able to more clearly differentiate Adorno's Negative Dialectics. And to be able to understand their social and political implications. From this point the experience of the Negative Dialectics becomes essential. Here, above all, is the experience of the contemporary empirical world of rationality; the realization that the hope of total overthrow and total revolution will come within a shorter period of time, a hope that fifty years ago seemed justified but is now too illusory, abstract and speculative, the hope of this total change in the bourgeois world of experience , after the raging of nationalism, after the experiences of the Stalinist dictatorship, after the current "immortality" of total repression and universal manipulation of history, proves to be the naivety of a certain phase, of a historical moment. With Adorno this results in dangerous insights and observations: after this experience of power without violence, this power is so inextricably linked to what needs to be changed.

It seems that modern society has captured all the effects of violence in the forms of rationality. Such violence is difficult to identify as partial, personal, national or international, because it is anonymous in origin. At the same time, however, it is linked to the repression and progress of industrial and post-industrial society. Therefore, bourgeois society can no longer be analyzed from the horizon of its negation, which has its motives and roots in the feeling of losing "substance", "personality", "humanum" in the metaphysical sense.

Of course, it cannot be the mental urge to rebel, for then the historical anachronism is the source of the negation. Here conservatism is fraternizing with the revolution.

This means nothing other than that bourgeois society gives birth to the subversion that, both in theory and in practice, preserves the memory, of the substance that decomposes bourgeois-changed time in structures, in world systems, in the society of facts . This can take on speculative-utopian forms which, as dialectically grasped, elastically and seriously as is the case in Bloch's "Spirit of Utopia," still think of revolution.

2. *Die Totalität der Repression, Gewalt und Opportunismus*

Für uns ist es von weitaus größerer Bedeutung, was mit der negativen Dialektik ist, wenn sie konstatiert, daß in einer Zeit totaler Repression die Gewalt das Prinzip des Fortschrittes der Gesellschaft ist, die verändert werden muß. Über diese Frage hat Adorno bestimmter in dem Augenblick gesprochen, als die Demonstrationswelle und die Bewegung des Kontestierens sich ernsthaft über die Strukturen des Westens ergossen, und als die klassische Linke, theoretisch und praktisch in der Lage war, daß ihr gesagt wurde, sie befinde sich in der Entfremdung, in der bürgerlichen Welt wohl, wo sie als Opposition an den Strukturen und Tendenzen teilhat jenes Gegenstandes, der zuerst der Kritik und der sozialistischen Transzendierung würdig war.

Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist das Bestehen der totalen Repression. Der Schuldzusammenhang der Gesellschaft und mit ihm der »Prospekt der Katastrophe« wurden tatsächlich total. Es erlaubt nach der immanenten Logik des Fortschrittes nichts und niemandem, sich im zu widersetzen, ausgenommen natürlich das, was diese Struktur des Verdeckens und Verblendens – ohne Verblendung als Ziel, bezeichnet. Die Totalität der Repression »behandelt« jede Aktion nur in einem Sinn: als Fähigkeit, an ihren eigenen Formen teilzunehmen.

Dem konsequent folgend entsagt die Menschheit entweder dem Zusammenprall mit der Gewalt oder die vermeintlich »radikale politische Praxis erneuert das alte Entsetzen«. Adorno interessiert zutiefst die Verbindung der Aktion, im weitesten Sinn, mit der Tatsache, daß die *bürgerliche Welt* gänzlich so geworden ist, wie die Bürger sie sich vorstellen. Die Allmacht dieser Tatsache ruft ein tragisches Dilemma hervor: denn, »wer nicht den Übergang zu irrationaler und roher Gewalt mitvollzieht«, der trifft tatsächlich nebenan den Reformismus der, nach Adorno, von jeher der Mitschuldige am Fortbestand und der Reproduktion eines *schlechten* Ganzen war.

Diese Erkenntnis nimmt dem konsequenten Denker, dem Marxisten z. B., jenes Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstgefühl, an der Verwirklichung verdeckter geschiftlicher Inhalte teilzunehmen. Sein Optimismus beginnt zweifellos vor den gegenwärtigen Erfahrungen zu zerbrechen: es beginnt sein Apell an den Ethos der Subjektivität. Das koinzidiert teilweise mit der angewachsenen Empfindlichkeit für lebendige Gegensätze, die dieser konsequente Denker immer noch als ursprüngliches Übel empfindet.

Der Gedanke, daß hier kein Kurzschluß hilft, daß das, was helfen könnte immer noch tief verdeckt ist, daß die Dialektik in einer solchen bürgerlichen Welt in die Sophistik vertrieben ist, wenn er pragmatisch auf den nächsten Schritt fixiert ist-ist aus der Erkenntnis des Totalen geboren.

3. *Die ungewisse Dialektik in der Haut des bürgerlichen Schicksals*

In diesem Fall ist das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis entscheidend an den Standpunkt gebunden, daß die bürgerliche Welt endlich ihre eigene Philosophie verwirklicht hat, daß sie in der Er-

2. The totality of repression, violence and opportunism For us it is of far greater importance what about the negative dialectic when it

states that in a time of total repression, violence is the principle of progress of the society that needs to be changed . Adorno spoke more decisively about this question at the moment when the wave of demonstrations and the movement of protesting were in earnest spilling over the structures of the West, and when the classical left was, theoretically and practically, able to be told that it was there in alienation, probably in the bourgeois world, where, as opposition, it participates in the structures and tendencies of that object which was first worthy of criticism and socialist transcendence.

Of crucial importance is the existence of total repression. The guilt context of society and with it the

"Prospect of Disaster" actually became total. It allows nothing and no one to oppose it, according to the immanent logic of progress, except, of course, what this structure of concealment and glamor—without glamor as a goal—designates. The totality of repression "treats" each action in only one sense: as an ability to participate in its own forms.

Consequently, humanity either renounces the clash with violence or the supposedly "radical political practice renews the old horror". Adorno is deeply interested in the connection between the action, in the broadest sense, and the fact that the bourgeois world has become exactly how the bourgeoisie imagine it. The omnipotence of this fact evokes a tragic dilemma: because "who does not go along with the transition to irrational and brute force" actually hits the reformism next door, which, according to Adorno, has always been partly to blame for the continued existence and reproduction of a bad one Whole was.

This knowledge takes the consistent thinker, the Marxist z. B., that self-confidence and self-feeling to participate in the realization of hidden business content. His optimism undoubtedly begins to crumble in the face of contemporary experience: his appeal to the ethos of subjectivity begins. This coincides in part with the increased sensitivity to living contrasts, which this consistent thinker still regards as a primal evil.

The idea that short-cutting doesn't help here, that what could help is still deeply hidden, that dialectics in such a bourgeois world has been expelled into sophistry, if it is fixed pragmatically on the next step-is from knowledge born of the total.

3. The uncertain dialectic in the skin of bourgeois destiny In this case the relationship between theory and practice is crucially tied to the

point of view that the bourgeois world has finally realized its own philosophy, that it is in the 192

fahrungswelt ist, wie sie sonst der Bürger-Mensch sich von Descartes bis Hegel vorstellt. Es muß gesagt werden, daß das Falsche vom Primat der Praxis, das Falsche, an dem heute alle partizipieren, sich in der Vorrangigkeit der Taktik über alles andere zeigt. Die Mittel und Methodologie entfremden sich bis zum Äußersten und werden selbstständig, indem sie zu Strukturen und Prinzipien des Formens und der Revolutionierung der Welt in der wir leben werden.

Damit kommen wir zu dem Schluß, daß nicht nur die Mittel das Ziel blockieren, sondern auch, wenn sie reflexionslos dienen, ohne Vermittlung, ohne Theorie, doch von ihm entfremdet sind. Indem die Zeichen dieser n e u e n S i t u a t i o n erforscht werden, die bestimmt ist, unserer Meinung nach die tragische Grenze auch der Kontestation, können wir auch das Verhältnis, die Konvergenz innerhalb eines solchen Trends zu diskutieren und autoritärer Impulse feststellen. Es ist nötig, alle verdeckten Motive eines neuen Prozesses zu suchen und zu beweisen, in dem die Diskussion aus autoritären Quellen kommt. Es handelt sich aber darum, daß die Taktik, die Diskusion genauer die Öffentlichkeit selbst, die eine rein bürgerliche Kathegorie ist, völlig beschnitten und auf mittelbare Weise liquidiert hat.

Der konformistische Standpunkt der Diskussionen entsteht daraus, daß für jene, die diesen modernen Trend wollen und organisieren, nicht das von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist, was die Diskussion bringen könnte: das sind vor allem Beschlüsse höchster Objektivität, die Situation der Koinzidenz der Intentionen und Argumentationen. Aufgrund seiner eigenen Analyse hat Adorno festgestellt, daß sich die Diskussion in einer inadäquaten Situation entwickelt. Damit ist der Geist als konformistisch definiert. Ohne Denken dient die Diskussion unwiderruflich der Manipulation, dem Zynismus der zeitgenössischen gesellschaftlichen Macht.

4. *Beginnt die Ära der Pseudoaktivität und Pseudodenkens?*

Aufrund dieser Einschränkung verliert jedes Argument seine Verbindung zur Intention der Veränderung, mit dem Impuls der Vermittlung. Aus der kritischen Basis entwurzelt ist das Argument noch ein Synonym för den Positivismus des Denkens, der Negation der negativen Dialektik des geschichtlichen Geschehens. Adorno hat es nicht nötig, sich etwas auszudenken: niemand nimmt mehr wahr, was der Kontrahent auslegt und darlegt. Und jeder gelangt zu Standard-Formeln. Aber der Weg des Fortschrittes ist nicht nur mit der Dethronisierung jeder Substanz der Geschichte, auch der negativen Dialektik gepflastert, er läßt uns in einem bisher unbekannten Zweifel: ist es möglich, heute E r f a h r u n g zu erwerben und ist sie überhaupt möglich?

Was kann man an Adornos Analyse aussetzen? In seiner sehr differenzierten Kritik beweist er, daß es zum *Zerfall des alten Optimismus der Philosophie gekommen ist, der erwartet hat, die empirische Geschichte allein könne den Kommunismus der Natur andeuten.* Es geschieht nämlich, daß jeder Partner in der Diskussion, im Dialog zur Funktion eines dominierenden Planes wird: er wird teilhaftig an dem

The world of experience is as otherwise imagined by the common man

from Descartes to Hegel. It must be said that the falsity of the primacy of practice, the falsity in which everyone participates today, is shown in the primacy of tactics over everything else. The means and methodology are alienated to the extreme and become autonomous, becoming structures and principles for shaping and revolutionizing the world in which we live.

With this we come to the conclusion that not only do the means block the end, but also, when they serve without reflection, without mediation, without theory, they are alienated from it. Exploring the signs of this new s i t u a t i o n that is destined, in our opinion, to the tragic limit of contestation too, we can also note the relationship, discussing the convergence within such a trend, and authoritarian impulses.

It is necessary to search and prove all the hidden motives of a new process in which the discussion comes from authoritarian sources. The point, however, is that the tactics, the discussion, to be more precise, completely curtailed and indirectly liquidated the public sphere itself, which is a purely bourgeois category.

The conformist point of view of the discussions arises from the fact that for those who want and organize this modern trend, what the discussion could bring is not of essential importance: these are primarily decisions of the highest objectivity, the situation of the coincidence of intentions and arguments. Based on his own analysis, Adorno found that the discussion was developing in an inadequate situation. This defines the mind as conformist. Without thinking, the discussion irrevocably serves the manipulation, the cynicism of contemporary social power.

4. Is the era of pseudoactivation and pseudodetics beginning?

Because of this limitation, every argument loses its connection to the intention of change, with the impulse of mediation. Uprooted from the critical basis, the argument is still a synonym for the positivism of thought, the negation of the negative dialectic of historical events. Adorno doesn't need to think anything up: no one notices what the opponent interprets and explains. And everyone arrives at standard formulas. But the path of progress is not only paved with the dethronement of every substance of history, including the negative dialectic, it leaves us with a hitherto unknown doubt: is it possible to acquire experience today and is it possible at all?

What can be faulted in Adorno's analysis? In his very differentiated

critique he proves that the old philosophical optimism, which expected that empirical history alone could indicate the communism of nature, has collapsed. Namely, it happens that each partner in the discussion, in the dialogue, becomes a function of a dominant plan: he becomes partaker of the I S pr a x i s

verdinglichten und dem zu verdinglichenden Bewußtsein. Adornos Analyse dieser *Teilnahme ist unübertroffen -und trostlos.* Das kritische Selbstbewußtsein evidentiert, daß jeder Partner im Dialog eingeengt wird, allein durch die Technik der Diskussion, sowie durch den »Solidaritätszwang zu etwas Verwertbarem. In dem Sinn erwartet man von Marx' Denken immer noch, daß es ein *Rezept* für gesellschaftliches Handeln sei. Oder der Partner erlebt eine Diskreditierung vor den eigenen Anhängern. Nicht so selten spricht man vom Forum, der Publizität wegen.

Das, wogegen Adorno gekämpft hat-in der Sphäre der Reflexionen und Begriffe, im Medium der Sprachdialektik-war die instrumentale Welt. Es war die Welt der Pseudoaktivität, die sich nur durch dauernde Reklame am Leben erhält. So erhält die Diskussion den Schein kritischen Denkens. Die Bereitschaft den, der in ihr nicht bereit ist, die Postulate der instrumentalen Welt zu b e f o l g e n, zu diqualifizieren, macht die Diskussion zur Farce. Ein Pseudodenken wäre ohne die Allmacht der Reklame und der Publizität nicht möglich.

Theodor Adorno zufolge waltet hinter der Technik ein autoritäres Prinzip: »der Dissentierende müsse die Gruppenmeinung annehmen«. Adorno wendet viel Geistesschärfe und Geist bei der Analyse dieser Erscheinung an. Mehr noch, sein Schluß ist klar: der Aktionismus etabliert sich schließlich, schließt an den bestehenden Trend an. Der Grund, auf dem der Aktionismus beruht ist der bürgerliche Instrumentalismus, dessen wesentliches Merkmal es ist, die Mittel zu fetischisieren, »weil seiner Art Praxis die R e f l e x i o n auf die Zwecke unerträglich« ist.

5. *Abgrenzungen gegen Widerstände gegen die moderne Zivilisation*

Im Versuch, die Pseudoaktivität kritisch zu erfassen, die Praxis, suggeriert Adornos negative Dialektik, trotz ihrer *Sprünge* und Fehler, einen Zugang zum bürgerlichen Instrumentalismus, der die Naivität überwindet, die auch bei gewissen Arten des modernen Marxismus da ist. Die Auseinandersetzung im Schoße der negativen Dialektik entwickelt und offenbart den Konflikt zwischen der *Macht des Widerspruchs* und *der bürgerlichen Nivellierung,* die mit den Motiven und Intentionen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft identisch ist. Auch die Pseudoaktivität, die bestehende Form der Praxis, die die Theorie und Erkenntnis um so mehr sterilisiert, je mehr diese »den Kontakt mit dem Objekt und den Sinn für Proportionen verliert«, ist -laut Adorno-ein Produkt objektiver gesellschaftlicher Bedingungen.

Die Theorie ist nur noch fähig, sich anzupassen. Von Adornos Standpunkt aus gesehen, ist jetzt eine scheinrevolutionäre Geste »komplementär jener militärtechnischen Unmöglichkeit spontaner Revolution«, auf die schon seinerzeit Jürgen von Kempski hingewiesen hat. Das bedeutet tatsächlich, daß für jene, die Bomben herstellen und sie ausnützen, Barrikaden komisch werden. Es wird auf und mit den Barrikaden gespielt, solange es die Herrschenden zeitlich bemessen gestatten. Natürlich kann es sich mit den Guerillatechniken der

reified and the consciousness to be reified. Adorno's analysis of this participation is unsurpassed - and bleak. Critical self-confidence is evident that every partner in the dialogue is narrowed down solely by

the technique of discussion and by the »compulsion of solidarity towards something usable. In that sense, Marx's thinking is still expected to be a recipe for social action. Or the partner experiences discrediting in front of their own supporters. Not so seldom one speaks of the forum, because of the publicity.

What Adorno fought against—in the sphere of reflections and concepts, in the medium of language dialectics—was the instrumental world. It was the world of pseudo-activity, kept alive only by constant advertising. This gives the discussion the appearance of critical thinking. The willingness to diqualify those who are not willing to obey the postulates of the instrumental world turns the discussion into a farce. Pseudo-thinking would not be possible without the omnipotence of advertising and publicity.

According to Theodor Adorno, an authoritarian principle prevails behind the technique: "the dissenter must accept the group opinion."

Adorno applies great intellectual acuity and spirit in analyzing this phenomenon. What's more, his conclusion is clear: actionism finally establishes itself, following the existing trend. The reason on which actionism is based is bourgeois instrumentalism, the essential feature of which is to fetishize the means "because its kind of practice reflecting on the ends is unbearable."

5. Demarcations Against Resistances Against Modern Civilization In an attempt to critically grasp pseudo-activity, practice, Adorno's negative dialectics, despite their cracks and blunders, suggests an approach to bourgeois instrumentalism that transcends the naivety also found in certain species of modern Marxism is there. The confrontation in the bosom of negative dialectics develops and reveals the conflict between the power of contradiction and bourgeois leveling, which is identical with the motives and intentions of bourgeois society. According to Adorno, pseudo-activity, the existing form of practice that sterilizes theory and knowledge all the more the more they "lose contact with the object and the sense of proportion," is a product of objective social conditions.

The theory is only capable of adapting. From Adorno's point of view, now is a pseudo-revolutionary gesture

"complementary to that military-technical impossibility of spontaneous revolution," which Jurgen von Kempski pointed out at the time. This actually means that for those who make bombs and exploit them, barricades become comical. It is played on and with the

barricades as long as the rulers allow it. Of course it could be the guerrilla techniques of the 1 9 4

Dritten Welt anders verhalten. Adorno hat dabei im Auge, daß in der bestehenden verwalteten Welt nichts bruchlos funktionieren kann.

Der konformistische Standpunkt der Diskussionen entsteht daraus, die unterentwickelten sich als M u s t e r«.

Also wir sagen es gleich, daß die Pseudoaktivität aus dem Stand der technischen Produktionskräfte kommt, die -nach Adorno-sie zugleich zum Schein verdammt. Zweifellos war das eine außerordentliche Gelegenheit, daß sich Adorno an die Analyse dieses Bürgerlichen, im Wesen geschichtlosen Trends anlehnen kann. Das ist leider nicht alles. Das Verhältnis zwischen Protest und Pseudoaktivität zeigt eine *Pseudodialektik als immanente Logik der technologischen Zivilisation.* An dieser Stelle genügt es festzustellen, daß Adorno eine epochale Tatsache entscheidend erfaßt: Wie nämlich die Personalisierung falsch darüber hinwegtröstet, daß es im anonymen Getriebe nicht mehr um den Einzelnen geht, so verblendet auch die Pseudoaktivität über die Depotenzierung einer Praxis, die ein Wesen, das frei und autonom wirkt voraussetzt, ein Wessen, das schon länger nicht mehr besteht.

Adorno meint, die Pseudoaktivität als Reflex auf eine rational beherrschte und regulierte Welt, reproduziert diese in sich; für uns alle ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, daß die »Prominenzen des Protests«, geboren im bürgerlichen Kreis der Produktion und Reproduktion des Lebens, nichts anderes als Virtuosen im geschäftlichen Verhalten und in formalen Prozeduren, in versteckten komerziellen Transaktionen sind. Die Elite-Einheit, die gegen die allgemeine Nivellierung anstürmt, die gegen die allgemeine Korruption und Prostitution protestiert, und das im Namen des Menschen, es scheint, als wäre sie selbst von dem *verblendet, was sie verneinen und transzendieren möchte;* denn das ist das Paradox der Kontestation, radikale Gegner von Institutionen, verschworene Feinde der Verdummung durch die zeitgenössischen Formen der bürgerlichen Rationalität und der technologischen Zivilisation-wenn die Rede vom breitesten Kontext ist-wollen die Wünsche von meist zufällig konstituierten Gruppen, institutionalisieren.

6. *Das Medium die moderne Lebensphilosophie*

Das gilt auch für die intellektuelle Seite der Kontestation und Rebellion. Das, wovon sie spricht was das Herrschende in ihrer Theorie ist, das möchte sie »verbindlich« machen, zum Institutionellen, Universalen. Diese Gefahr mußte Adorno erkennen, als er zuließ-natürlich nur ironisch-daß McLuhan im Recht sei mit der These, daß das Medium eigentlich eine *Botschaft* sei. Dennoch, von einem anderen Standpunkt aus gesehen, bedeutet das-weitab vom anthropologisch-humanistischer Kritik-daß diese technologische Zivilisation mit der Substitution der Zwecke, mithilfe von Medien, Mitteln, Motive, Fähigkeiten und Mächten in den Menschen selbst ersetzt. Das sind heute Worte im allgemeinen Gebrauch, ohne ironischen Beiklang. Alle geselschaftlichen Organisationen und Institutionen, der Staat, der Parteiapparat, Industrie-Vereinigungen, Organisationen und Instrumen-

third world behave differently. Adorno has in mind that nothing can

function seamlessly in the existing managed world.

The conformist point of view of the discussions arises from this, the underdeveloped ones as patterns«.

So let's say right away that the pseudo-activity comes from the state of the art of technical production forces, which - according to Adorno - at the same time condemns it to appearances. Undoubtedly, this was an extraordinary opportunity for Adorno to lean on the analysis of this bourgeois, essentially non-historical trend. Unfortunately that's not all. The relationship between protest and pseudo-activity reveals a pseudo-dialectic as the inherent logic of technological civilization. At this point it suffices to state that Adorno decisively grasps an epoch-making fact: just as personalization falsely consoles the fact that the anonymous hustle and bustle is no longer about the individual, so pseudo-activity also blinds about the demotion of a practice that that works freely and autonomously presupposes a being that hasn't existed for a long time.

Adorno thinks that pseudo-activity, as a reflex to a rationally controlled and regulated world, reproduces this in itself; for all of us it is of crucial importance that the "prominence of protest", born in the bourgeois circle of production and reproduction of life, are nothing more than virtuosos in business behavior and in formal procedures, in covert commercial transactions. The elite unit that storms against general leveling, that protests against general corruption and prostitution, and does so in the name of man, seems blinded itself by what it might deny and transcend; For that is the paradox of controversy, radical opponents of institutions, sworn enemies of dumbing down by contemporary forms of bourgeois rationality and technological civilization—if we are talking about the broadest context—want to institutionalize the wishes of mostly randomly constituted groups.

6. The medium the modern philosophy of life

This also applies to the intellectual side of contestation and rebellion. What she talks about, what is dominant in her theory, she would like to make "binding," institutional, universal. Adorno had to recognize this danger when he admitted - only ironically, of course - that McLuhan was right with the thesis that the medium was actually a message. However, seen from another point of view, far from the anthropological-humanistic criticism, this means that this technological civilization is replaced with the substitution of ends, means, means, motives, abilities and powers in the people themselves.

These are words in common use today, without ironic overtones. All social organizations and institutions, the state, the party apparatus, industrial associations, organizations and instruments-195

te der öfsentlichen Meinung, die empirischen Wissenschaften, benützen die Tatsache, daß das Medium eine Art B o t s c h a f t ist ausgiebig, Lebensauschauung, Art des »Perzipierens«, *moderne Philosophie der Gesellschaft.*

7. *Instrumentalisierung, Fortschritt, Subjektlosigkeit*

Das bedeutet andererseits, daß die Medien die vorherrschende Ideologie sind. Und das eine Ideologie als Form des Forschritts der bürgerlichen Welt, auf jeden Fall, als verdinglichtes und zu verdinglichendes Bewußtsein, das heute demonstriert wird, natürlich im exakten und rationalen Manipulieren und Verfügung über die Grundzüge der Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen. Es ist schon lange erkannt, daß eine *solche Ideologie die Gegensätze nivelliert und die antagonistischen Fähigkeiten der Gesellschaft und des Menschen in die Sphäre der Spekulation verdammt.* Die gesamte Materie der negativen Dialektik wendet sich dagegen, diesen Prozeß der *Instrumentalisierung* als Weg der Verinnerlichung zu bezeichnen. Der Mechanismus des Mediums läßt nämlich das Bilden einer Subjektivität nicht zu. Zweifellos usurpiert die Instrumentalisierung den Platz der Subjektivität-der heute Gegenstand der Kritik im Namen eines humanistischen Plädoyers ist-, der Subjektivität, die sie transformiert in Operationsordnungen.

Theodor Adorno hat deshalb einige Motive der negativen Dialektik, die den totalen Charakter der Zivilisation in Frage stellt, ausgesagt. Diese Zivilisation, die auf der unumgänglichen Instrumentalisierung als Bürgen des Fortschritts ihrer produktiven Sphäre, besteht. Sie kommt auf eine einfache und klare Idee: in der Pseudoaktivität, bis zur scheinbaren Revolution, koinzidiert die objektive Tendenz der zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft mit der Zersetzung der Subjektivität. »Parodistisch bringt die Weltgeschichte diejenigen hervor, deren sie bedarf«.

Was aber ist mit der Frage, wie weit und ob die negative Dialektik durch die Motive des A k t i o n i s m u s infiziert ist. In einem gewissen Sinn könnte man sagen, daß ein Argument unter so vielen, die der Aktionismus heute bietet, eine überaus suggestive Macht erhalten hat: man muß sich für die Aktion und die Protestbewegung entscheiden, gerade deshalb weil man ihre o b j e k t i v e Hoffnungslosigkeit erkannt hat. Solch eine politische Strategie beruft sich dann auf Marx' Muster zur Zeit der Pariser Kommune, oder auf das Einspringen der kommunistischen Partei beim Zusammenbruch der anarchosozialistischen Räteregierung 1919 in München. So verweist z. B. Adorno auf die Logik des Protestes: das heißt, so wie jene Wirkungs- und Verhaltensweise vom Verdacht frei waren, so müßten jene, die die Möglichkeit anzweifeln, das aussichtslose Tun unterstützen.

8.*Identität der Kritik wird in Frage gestellt, Ära der Gleichgültigkeit*

Diese Logik der Aktion verbinden wir mit den *Möglichkeiten* der negativen Dialektik. Es sieht konsequent und logisch aus, wenn wir aus folgende Weise denken: die unausweichliche Niederlage einer solchen Aktion bietet die Solidarität als moralische Instanz auch de-

Public opinion, the empirical sciences, make extensive use of the fact that the medium is a kind of message, view of life, way of "perceiving", modern philosophy of society.

7. Instrumentalization, progress, non-subject On the other hand, this means that the media are the dominant ideology. And that an ideologic as a form of progress of the bourgeois world, in any case, as a reified and to be reified consciousness, which is demonstrated today, of course, in the exact and rational manipulation and disposal of the basic features of the historicity of man. It has long been recognized that such an ideology levels the antagonisms and condemns the antagonistic capacities of society and man to the sphere of speculation. The entire matter of negative dialectics opposes designating this process of instrumentalization as a path of internalization. The mechanism of the medium does not allow the formation of a subjectivity. Undoubtedly, instrumentalization usurps the place of subjectivity—which today is the subject of criticism in the name of a humanistic plea—subjectivity that it transforms into operational orders.

Theodor Adorno therefore stated some motives of the negative dialectic, which questions the total character of civilization. This civilization, which insists on the inevitable instrumentalization as a guarantee of the progress of its productive sphere.

She comes up with a simple and clear idea: in the pseudo-activity, up to the apparent revolution, the objective tendency of contemporary society coincides with the decomposition of subjectivity.

»Parodistically, world history produces those whom it needs«.

But what about the question of how far and whether the negative dialectic is infected by the motives of a c t i o n i sm. In a certain sense, one could say that one argument among so many that actionism offers today has acquired an exceedingly suggestive power: one must choose action and protest movement precisely because one has recognized their objective hopelessness. Such a political strategy then invokes Marx's

Pattern at the time of the Paris Commune, or the intervention of the communist party in the collapse of the anarcho-socialist council government in Munich in 1919. For example, B. Adorno on the logic of protest: that is, just as that mode of action and behavior were free from suspicion, so those who doubt the possibility must support the hopeless action.

S. Criticism's identity is called into question, era of indifference. We combine this logic of action with the possibilities of negative dialectics. It seems consistent and logical if we think like this: the inevitable defeat of such an action also offers solidarity as a moral authority de-196

nen, die die Katastrophe vorhergesehen haben, die es abgelehnt haben, sich unter dem Diktat der einseitigen Solidarität zu krümmen. Adorno will sagen: der »Appel an den Heroismus verlängert in Wahrheit jenes Diktat«. Dann ist es, zweifellos, konsequent, wenn er hinzufügt, daß jener, der den Sinn dafür noch nicht verloren hat, darin keinen unterdrückten und gefährlichen Ton übersehen kann.

Es scheint, als träfen wir in dieser Zusammensetzung die Dimension, der zufolge Adornos *negative Dialektik vom Aktionismus differenziert wird.* In ihr liegt *ein gewisses Philisterium.* Denn in einem solchen System des Aktionismus, beweist Adorno, kann man in einem sicheren Amerika Nachrichten von Auschwitz ertragen-als Emigrant-; es wäre leichtsinnig zu glauben, der Vietnam-Krieg raube jemandem den Schlaf. Bei anderen Gelegenheiten hat Adorno ein kritisches Inventar der Protestmotive vorgenommen, besonders in der Negativen Dialektik, um eine Demystifizierung hervorzurufen, die nur eines zeigt: wer sich selbst einbildet, daß er als ein Produkt der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft der bürgerlichen Kälte und Gleichgültigkeit frei sei, der »hegt Illusionen über die Welt und so über sich selbst«.

Die Geschichte bietet sogar die Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß *niemand mehr ohne diese Kälte leben könnte.* Deshalb demystifiziert die Negative Dialektik auch das humane Mitleid als modernen Mythos. Die Macht und der Effekt des Systems der Verwaltung zeigt seine Kraft in der Unmöglichkeit der Identifikation mit fremden Leiden, Erniedrigung oder Entfremdung. Diese Unfähigkeit ist vernichtend in uns allen erwachsen. Ohne elementäre Prämissen zur Anteilnahme am geschichtlichen Leben, an der Kommunikation, am Miterleben (Mitaufnehmen), am Mithandeln bleibt auch das klarste Bewußtsein vom Humanismus leer, und unterliegt noch mehr dem Philisterium und unendlicher Simulierung. Wenden wir uns wieder an Adornos Argumentation.

Gerade diese Unfähigkeit der Identifikation mit fremdem Leiden und Sterben, mit einem Völkermord, rationalisiert den Gewissenszwang. Nun, da wo ein Halten möglich war, das an den Marginen des größten Schreckens stand, so wie das Adorno ausdrückt, das die Verschwörer vom 20. Juli erfuhren, die lieber – wie das bekannt ist – »ihren qualvollen Untergang riskierten als Untätigkeit« -hier gelangt die Protestaktion in das Medium des tragischen Bewußtseins, in die tragische Form des Ereignisses.

Jetzt folgt für uns auf jeden Fall das deutliche Formulieren des Schlußes, der aus den erwähnten Prämissen folgt. Wenn wir nämlich aus der Distanz fordern, uns wie die Kontestanten zu fühlen, die lieber den Untergang riskierten als das Nicht-Handeln, dann »verwechselt die Vorstellungskraft mit der Gewalt der unmittelbaren Gegenwart«, Kontemplation mit dem Körper der lebendigen Aktion. Dieser weitere Kontext der Kontestations-Erfahrung und des Rebellierens gegen die repressive Zivilisation, die vom Aktionismus betäubt ist als ihrer Lebensphilosophie, behält das tragische Motiv und die Grenzen jeder Aktion im Auge.

Adorno unterstreicht auch die für die Philosophie der Aktion relevanten Folgen. Einerseits beweist er, daß purer Selbstschutz in dem,

who foresaw the catastrophe, who refused to squirm under the dictates of unilateral solidarity. Adorno wants to say: the "appeal to heroism actually lengthens every dictate." Then, no doubt, it is

consistent when he adds that anyone who has not yet lost the sense of it cannot fail to see any suppressed and dangerous tone in it.

It seems as if in this composition we hit the dimension according to which Adorno's negative dialectic is differentiated from actionism. There is a certain philistinism in her. Because in such a system of actionism, Adorno proves, one can endure news of Auschwitz in a safe America—as an emigrant—; it would be foolish to think that the Vietnam War would deprive anyone of sleep. On other occasions, Adorno has made a critical inventory of protest motives, particularly in the negative dialectic, in order to evoke a demystification that shows only one thing: whoever imagines himself to be a product of bourgeois society of bourgeois ca 11 e and Indifference is free, he "cherishes illusions about the world and thus about himself."

History even offers the probability that no one could live without this cold. Therefore, the Negative Dialectics also demystifies human compassion as a modern myth. The power and effect of the system of administration shows its strength in the impossibility of identification with someone else's suffering, humiliation or alienation. This inability has devastatingly grown in all of us. Without elementary premises for participation in historical life, in communication, in experiencing (taking in) and taking action, even the clearest consciousness of humanism remains empty and is subject even more to philistinism and endless simulation. Let us return to Adorno's argument.

Precisely this inability to identify with someone else's suffering and death, with genocide, rationalizes the compulsion of conscience. Well, where a hold was possible, standing on the margins of the greatest terror, as Adorno puts it, which the conspirators learned of July 20, who - as is well known - prefer

"risking their painful demise as inaction" - here the protest action enters the medium of tragic consciousness, the tragic form of the event.

In any case, what now follows for us is the clear formulation of the conclusion that follows from the premises mentioned. Namely, when we demand from a distance to feel like the constants, who would rather risk death than inaction, then "confuses imagination with the violence of the immediate present," contemplation with the body of living action.

This wider context of the experience of contestation and rebellion against the repressive civilization, numbed by actionism as its

philosophy of life, keeps in mind the tragic motive and the limits of each action.

Adorno also underlines the consequences relevant to the philosophy of action. On the one hand he proves that pure self-protection in the 197

der abwesend ist »die Imagination des Schlimmsten« bremst: dabei ist er Handlungen ausgesetzt, die ihn dem Ärgsten ausliefern. Damit nimmt Adornos negative Dialektik auf eigene Art an der Kritik der bürgerlichen Kultur und Zivilisation teil. Wenn wir das alles im Auge haben, bleibt noch eine dialektische Mahnung: der, der erkennt, der Philosoph, der Soziologe, der Wissenschaftler usw., muß die Grenzen dieser Identifikation, die sich ihm objektiv aufdrängen im Auge haben, aber jene Identifikation, die mit seinem Anspruch auf Selbsterhaltung und Glück kollidiert; deshalb, sagt Adorno, darf er sich nicht benehmen, als wäre er schon ein Mensch dieser Art, die im Zustand der Freiheit vielleicht realisiert werden kann, also im historischen Ereignis ohne Angst und Repression.

III

1. *Die Revolution als dialektische Variation des Logos*

Die Avantgarde der zeitgenössischen Philosophie, besonders des Marxismus, wird sich in einer Verzweiflungsverwirrung finden, wenn sie auch weiterhin die bestehende Szenographie der Aktion versteckt, wenn sie auch weiter glaubt, im Usprung der Geschichte beheimatet zu sein, seine enzyklopädische Logik der Selbsterklärung und der Selbsttransparenz erläuternd. Ohne diese Einsicht wird z. B. Hegel (für uns) ein Vertreter a) der *Philosophie des Aktivismus* b) der *Philosophie der Möglichkeit des immanten Entwickelns, Änderns und der Vervollkommung des »Seins«.* Er wird zum Muster der Philosophie, die imstande ist, zu beweisen, daß die Welt, in der wir leben, »logisch« ist, beziehungsweise, daß sie logisch sein kann und muß. Er wäre nur nötig, den *Logos von seiner empirischen Erscheinung und Abgrenzung zu befreien.* Und auch die eigentliche Bedeutung der Revolution bezieht ihre philosophische oder alltäglich-politische Aktualität aus der Quelle des Logos. Sie ist da der Name für eine noch spekulative Organisation der Geschichtsmaterie.

Die Revolution erhält also den Anschein des Aussprechens alles dessen, was der Logos des Abendlandes verdeckt; es werden Tiefen berührt, deren absolute Maße der Logos selbst in der metaphysischen Macht der Geschichte *absolut* aussagen wollte. Die Revolution glaubt, daß mit ihr selbst verdeckte, unaussprechliche, unterdrückte Motive des Logos des Abendlandes geformt werden und zugleich verschwinden, transzendieren. Man muß bis an die äußersten Grenzen gehen. Es besteht ein *bestimmter temporal-historischer Punkt, der erreicht werden muß.* Eine unübertroffene dialektische Variation hat, scheint es, der ganzen Philosophie Hegel gegeben.

»Wie as aber eine leere Breite gibt, so auch eine leere Tiefe; – eine Extension der Substanz, die sich in endliche Mannigfaltigkeit ergießt, ohne Kraft sie zusammenzuhalten, so eine gehaltlose Intensität, welche als lautere Krast ohne Ausbeitung sich haltend, dasselbe ist, was die Oberflächlichkeit. Die Kraft des Geistes ist nur so groß als ihre Äusserung, seine Tiefe nur so tief, als er in seiner Auslegung sich auszubreiten und sich zu verlieren getraut.«

who is absent slows »the imagination of the worst«: in doing so he is exposed to actions that expose him to the worst.

In this way, Adorno's negative dialectic participates in the critique of

bourgeois culture and civilization in its own way. If we keep all this in mind, there remains a dialectical admonition: the one who recognizes, the philosopher, the sociologist, the scientist, etc., must keep in mind the limits of this identification that are objectively imposed on him, but that identification which clashes with his claim to self-preservation and happiness; therefore, says Adorno, he must not behave as if he were already a human being of this kind, which can perhaps be realized in the state of liberty, i.e. in the historical event without fear and repression.

Ill

1. The revolution as a dialectical variation of the logos The avant-garde of contemporary philosophy, especially Marxism, will find themselves in a state of desperate confusion if they continue to hide the existing scenography of action, if they continue to believe that they are at home in the origins of history , explaining its encyclopaedic logic of self-explanation and self-transparency. Without this insight z. B. Hegel (for us) a representative of a) the philosophy of activism b) the philosophy of the possibility of immanent development, change and the perfection of "being". He becomes the model of philosophy capable of proving that the world in which we live is "logical," or that it can and must be logical. It would only be necessary to free the logos from its empirical appearance and demarcation. And the actual meaning of the revolution also derives its philosophical or everyday political topicality from the source of the logos. It is the name of a still speculative organization of historical matter.

The revolution thus has the appearance of expressing everything that the logos of the West conceals; depths are touched, the absolute measure of which the logos himself wanted to express absolutely in the metaphysical power of history. The revolution believes that with it itself covert, inexpressible, suppressed motifs of the logos of the West are formed and at the same time disappear, transcend. You have to go to the outermost limits.

There is a certain temporal-historical point that has to be reached. An unsurpassed dialectical variation, it seems, has given Hegel to the whole of philosophy.

»But as there is an empty breadth, so there is also an empty depth; -

an extension of the substance, which pours into finite diversity without strength holding it together, such a meaningless intensity,

which, as a pure force without expansion, is the same as superficiality. The power of the spirit is only as great as its utterance, its depth only as deep as it dares to expand and lose itself in its interpretation."

2. *Der revolutionäre Substrat in der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Erkenntnis*

Im Licht dieses Substrates verwandelt sich der Logos in die absolute Macht des Handelns, die immer *über dem steht, was in der Geschichte entsteht,* die der Kritik der bestehenden Empirie immanent ist, ihre Logik, Mathematik, Philosophie, Soziologie, ihrer kosmischen Technologie. Zwischen uns und uns selbst, uns und der Vergangenheit, zwischen der Gegenwart und Zukunft quillt die *flüssige Materie des Logos.* So wird er zu Archetypus, zum Modell der Gestaltung der Geschichte, der Revolution. Deshalb fühlt der Revolutionär unter den Fingern die Anwesenheit dieser Substanz, die er mit seinem Werk berührt.

Nach dreitausend Jahren ist der Revolutionär vielleicht noch der einzig gebliebene Typus des konsequenten Menschen, von dem ich schon gesprochen habe. Nur er erbt den Optimismus der Vernunft, die unaussprechliche Hoffnung in ein vernunftmäßiges Ende der geschichtlichen Welt, in eine Einheit der Gegensätzte. Er vernichtet alles, um schließlich die Tiefe in die Breite und Höhe des Seins zu ziehen, in die Dimension der Geschichtlichkeit. Es gibt noch subtilere Differenzen als die, von denen ich jetzt spreche. Eine davon ist, daß der Revolutionär, mit der Erfahrung des Übels und der Entfremdung, mit der Totalität des Verderbten von allem, also mit der Revolution selbst konfrontiert, ein Wesen geworden ist, das-wenn es Talent hat, natürlich- zu den Archetypen der S p e k u l a t i o n übersiedelt ist. Deshalb ist er immer voran, sieht mehr als empirisch wahrzunehmen ist. Schmerzlich empfindet er die Differenz zwischen Sein und Erscheinen, zwischen Essenz und Existenz. W e n n a b e r d i e L e i d e n s c h a f t, d a u e r n d z u »ü b e r w i n d e n« a b s t i r b t, w e r d e n w i r u n s a l l e i n A b s t r a k t i o n e n u n d S t r u k t u r e n d e r t e c h n o l o g i s c h e n R a t i o n a l i t ä t a u s d r ü c k e n.

Es ist deshalb auch nicht ohne Bedeutung, die Konsequenzen der Gedanken darüber zu erfassen, daß niemand in seiner Aktion der bürgerlichen Kälte frei ist, daß wir immer weniger dem Diktat der objektiven gesellschaftlichen Tendenzen folgend die Möglichkeit besitzen, uns mit fremdem Leiden zu identifizieren. Auch der Mensch, der rebelliert, worauf der Revolutionär in der heutigen Industrie-Gesellschaft des Westens kommt, entdeckt, daß wir vor der Welt wie sie heute besteht nicht einmal mehr Angst haben können, uns genügend fürchten können.

Vergessen wir nicht, daß heute jemand nicht nur seinen Intellekt, auch sich selbst opfern kann; und dem konsequent folgend kann ihn niemand daran hindern, obwohl-erinnern wir uns an Adornos kritische Analyse--heute objektiv ein f a l s c h e s M a r t y r i u m besteht. Konsequent schließt Adorno, daß aus einem Opfer ein Gebot machen zum faschistischen Repertoire gehört. Adorno möchte sagen, daß die »Solidarität mit einer Sache, deren unvermeidliches Scheitern man durchschaut, mag erlessenen narzistischen Gewinn abwerten«. Von diesem Standpunkt aus ist die Solidarität allein so verrückt wie auch die

2. The revolutionary substratum in the science of knowledge

In the light of this substratum, the logos is transformed into the absolute power of action, always above what arises in history,

immanent to the critique of the existing empiricism, its logic, mathematics, philosophy, sociology, its cosmic technology. Between us and ourselves, between us and the past, between the present and the future, the liquid matter of the logos swells. In this way he becomes the archetype, the model for shaping history, for revolution. That is why the revolutionary feels the presence of this substance under his fingers, which he touches with his work.

After three thousand years, the revolutionary is perhaps the only remaining type of consistent man I have already spoken of. Only he inherits the optimism of reason, the unspeakable hope in a rational end of the historical world, in a unity of opposites. He destroys everything in order to finally draw the depth into the breadth and height of being, into the dimension of historicity. There are subtler differences than the ones I'm talking about now. One of them is that the revolutionary, confronted with the experience of evil and alienation, with the totality of the depravity of everything, that is with the revolution itself, has become a being who - if it has talent, of course - belongs to the archetypes of the S p e k u l a t i o n has moved. That is why he is always ahead, sees more than can be perceived empirically.

He painfully feels the difference between being and appearance, between essence and existence. W h e n b o r t h e s r i d e n -

s c h a f t , d a u e r n d z u » i i b e r w i n d e n « a b s t i r b t , w e r d e n w i r u n s a l l e i n A b s t r a k t i o n e n u n d S t r u k t u r e n d e r t e c h n o l o g i s c h e n R a t i o n a l i t a t a u s d r i i c -

k e n.

It is therefore also not without importance to grasp the consequences of the thought that nobody is free in his actions from the bourgeois coldness, that we are less and less able to identify ourselves with the suffering of others, following the dictates of objective social tendencies . Even the person who rebels, which is what the revolutionary in today's industrial society in the West comes from, discovers that we can no longer be afraid of the world as it exists today, can fear enough.

Let us not forget that today one can sacrifice not only his intellect, but also himself; and consequently nobody can prevent him from doing so, although—remember Adorno's critical analysis—there is objectively a false martyrdom today.

Consequently, Adorno concludes that turning a victim into a commandment is part of the fascist repertoire. Adorno might say that the

"Solidarity with a cause whose inevitable failure one sees through may devalue conferred narcissistic gain." From this point of view, Solidarity alone is as crazy as the 199

Praxis, von der Erlaubnis, Gutheißung erwartet werden, die aber schon im nächsten Moment widerrufen werden, denn-vergessen wir die Mahnung nicht- »kein Opfer des Intellekts den unersättlichen Ansprüchen der Geistlosigkeit je genügt.«

3. *Die Theorie im Fetisch und im Licht des Rationalismus*

Diese Art der Mahnung der negativen Dialektik, der Großen Verweigerung, drückt die Angst des zeitgenössischen Denkers aus, daß sich in den Formen des bürgerlichen Rationalismus und Instrumentalismus der Geist in seinen empirischen Formen verlieren könnte, in der Verwissenschaftlichung, in der Technisierung und Verifikabilität der Erkenntnis. Was ist eigentlich der bürgerliche Rationalismus? Indem wir die wirkliche Grundlage des Rationalismus suchen, eröffnet sich uns eine ganze Konstruktivität und Produktivität, die das Motiv und die Totalität der modernen Industrie- und Postindustriegesellschaft ist. Dabei haben wir vor uns, daß der Mensch heute endlich als *animal rationale* angesehen und gedacht wird, daß er seine *Subjektivität in die Objektivitäten des geschichtlichen Seins zerlegt hat,* daß er zum Synonym wurde für Prozesse, die alles in Frage stellen, alles als »endlich« überschreiten, als überwunden.

Auf die Frage-was ist mit dem Menschen innerhalb des bürgerlichen Rationalismus? – können wir antworten: er schlägt es zunächst aus, von *Ungewißheiten* auszugehen, von Zweideutigkeiten der Geschichte selbst, von Fragwürdigkeiten, von Undursichtigkeit; als Zweites sucht er in der Regel Rezepte für sein Handeln. Er ordnet sich selbst und die Natur rationalen Formen unter. Hier besteht natürlich ein Berührungspunkt mit dem Revolutionär, der die Theorie, die spekulative Imagination, die philosophische Seinsform im Abendland, nur noch als Instrument sieht oder als Rezept für eine unmittelbare, gesellschaftliche Aktion in der zeitgenössischen Geschichte.

4. *Die Revolution und das Eintauchen in die Landschaft des Rationalismus*

Hier eröffnen sich zwei Aspekte. Zunächst, daß sich hier dem Menschen, wie das Karl Jaspers sagen würde, in rationaler Form etwas Allgemeines, etwas Notwendiges, Geordnetes, »ein Gesetz als Pflicht«, als Rezept als heteronome Situation entgegenstellt; die Arbeit als Ausführung, die Freiheit als Selbstliquidierung, als Opfer. Als Zweites, alle Vielartigkeit des Rationalismus-man ist berechtigt, das zu sagen-gründet darin, daß er keine besondere Macht mehr ist, sondern er ist allein das Formen alles dessen was ist (K. Jaspers), und das bedeutet auf jeden Fall, daß er keine *prinzipielle Teilung der Welt* erträgt, Dualismus und Entfremdung: der Rationalismus läßt alle gegensätzlichen Mächte hinter sich, wirft sie in die Geschichte, in das, was zu Tode verurteilt

Practice from which permission and approval are expected, but which are revoked the very next moment, because - let us not forget the admonition - "no victim of the intellect ever satisfies the insatiable

demands of insanity."

3. Theory in the Fetish and in the Light of Rationalism This kind of reminder of the negative dialectic, of the Great Refusal, expresses the fear of the contemporary thinker that in the forms of bourgeois rationalism and instrumentalism the spirit in its emp i r i c h forms will lose itself -

r e n c o n t e , i n d e r i s s s e s s s a t i n g , i n d e r t e c h n i s i s i e n d a n d d e r i f i c a l i l i t a t o f t h e r k n t i s . W hat actually is bourgeois rationalism? Searching for the real basis of rationalism opens up a whole constructiveness and productivity that is the motive and totality of modern industrial and post-industrial society. We are faced with the fact that man today is finally viewed and thought of as animal rationale, that he has broken down his subjectivity into the objectivities of historical being, that he has become a synonym for processes that question everything, everything as "finite « exceed than overcome.

To the question - what about man within bourgeois rationalism? - we can answer: he initially refuses to start from uncertainties, from ambiguities in history itself, from dubiousness, from opacity; second, he usually seeks recipes for his actions. He subordinates himself and nature to rational forms. Here, of course, there is a point of contact with the revolutionary who sees theory, speculative imagination, the philosophical form of being in the West only as an instrument or as a recipe for immediate, social action in contemporary history.

4. The revolution and immersion in the landscape of rationalism

Two aspects emerge here. First of all, that here, as Karl Jaspers would say, in a r a t i o n al form man is confronted with something general, something necessary, ordered, "a law as a duty", as a recipe as a heteronomous situation; t h e w o r c e t a s e n g , t h e r e i h e i t a l s e l b s t -

l i q u i d i e r u n g , as sacrificial. Secondly, all the multiplicity of rationalism - one is justified in saying this - is based on the fact that it is no longer a particular power, but it is solely the form of everything that is (K. Jaspers), and that means in any case that it endures no principled division of the world, dualism and alienation: rationalism leaves behind all opposing powers, throws them into history, into what is condemned to death 2 0 0

ist, und vor sich, in der Zukunft, kann er nur Material sehen, Gegenstand der Produktion, zum aktuellen Formen. Der Begriff des Rationalismus ist deshalb ohne die Substanz des Futurismus nicht möglich.

Daraus folgt, daß es möglich wäre, daß auch die Revolution selbst unter den Einfluß und faszinante Macht der immer größeren Rationalisierung gelangt. Damit ist ihr ursprünglicher Impuls, der spekulative Arche-Typus in Gegensatz zu den Möglichkeiten ihrer empirischen Verwirklichung getreten. Das führt die Revolution wieder, wie auch ihr philosophisches Substrat, auf den mythologischen Status zurück. In diesem Fall ist der Revolutionär nur noch als Wesen möglich, das sich dem bestehenden defizienten Rationalismus entgegenstellt, jetzt aber in der Sphäre der spekulativen Imogination und Utopie, in der Sphäre der philosophischen Transzendenz. Nur im Kontrast zu den Mächten der Repression, den Mächten, die sich erfolgreich mit dem totalen Aktivismus und Produktivismus identifizieren, wird die Domäne des Denkens nicht nur zum Quell, auch zum Boden des Widerstandes, der revolutionären Lebens.

Auch die spekulative und utopische, sowie die philosophisch-transzendierende Dimension wird unter anderem auch von mystischen Momenten erhalten; besonders ein Erlebnis der Möglichkeit des realen und empirischen Vereinigung mit dem Absoluten, worin er sich wesentlich von der traditionell mystischen Literatur unterscheidet. Das Erlebnis des Außersinnlichen, Außerempirischen, des transzendierenden Substrates der Geschichte hat seine logischen, philosophischen, sowie psychologischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Voraussetzungen und Folgen.

Nichts weist darauf hin, daß das heute auf die richtige Weise in das Bewußten jener Kräfte eingedrungen ist, die rebellieren. Wahrscheinlich ist dieses Reduzieren der Revolution auf das Niveau des spekulativen Denkens und der Imagination klar, auf den Boden der utopischen Substantialität und Dialektizität der heutigen Geschichte, auf die Dimension der philosophischen Transzendenz.

5. Das Ende des Logos des Abendlandes als seine Endlosigkeit

Ein solcherart konzipierter Sinn des Reduzierens der Revolution – als des natürlichen Endes des Logos des Abendlandes, als derjenigen epochalen und ursprünglichen Veränderung, die fähig ist, in der Diskontinuität die Kontinuität zu verwirklichen mit den Grundmotiven und *vielleict auch Grundmöglichkeiten* des Denkens des Abendlandes – auf die spekulative und dialektische Ursprünglichkeit, ein solches Rückführen stellt uns der negativen Dialektik Theodor Adornos gegenüber.

Es konfrontier uns aber auch mit der Verwindung der gesamten Metaphysik des Abendlandes, der Metaphysik, die allen Sinn des Wirkens und der Produktivität im Denken konzentriert, genauer: in der Wirklichkeit, deren Kern Grund und Formen allein das *Denken* ist.

is, and in front of him, in the future, he can only see material, object of production, to form in actuality. The concept of rationalism is therefore not possible without the substance of futurism.

Daraus folgt, dafi es moglich ware, dafi auch d i e R e v o l u t i o n s e l b s t u n t e r d e n E i n f l u f i u n d f a s z i n a n t e M a c h t d e r i m m e r g r o f i e r e n R a t i o n a l i s i e r u n g g e l a n g t .

With this, its original impulse, the speculative arche-type, has come into conflict with the possibilities of its empirical realization. This brings the revolution back, like its philosophical substratum, back to mythological status. In this case, the revolutionary is only possible as a being that opposes the existing deficit rationalism, but now in the sphere of speculative imagination and utopia, in the sphere of philosophical transcendence. Only in contrast to the powers of repression, the powers that successfully identify themselves with total a c t i v i s m a n d p r o d u c t i v i s m , does the d o m a n e of t h e n t i n g t become to the source , also to the bottom of d e s r e s t a n d e s , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r l e s .

The speculative and utopian as well as the philosophical-transcendent dimension is also preserved, among other things, by mystical moments; especially an experience of the possibility of real and empirical union with the Absolute, in which it differs essentially from traditional mystical literature. The experience of the extra-sensuous, extra-empirical, of the t r a n s c e n d i e n d e n t e r t e s of history has its logical, philosophical, as well as psychological and socio-political prerequisites and consequences.

There is nothing to indicate that this has entered the consciousness of those forces that are rebelling in the right way today. This reduction of the revolution to the level of speculative thinking and imagination is probably clear, to the ground of the u t o p i c h substantiality and dialect i c i t a t of today's history, to the dimension of philo s o p h i c a l transcendence.

5. The end of the Logos of the Occident as its endlessness A sense of reducing the revolution conceived in this way -

as the natural end of the logos of the West, as that epochal and original change that is capable of realizing continuity in the discontinuity with the basic motives and maybe also basic possibilities of the thinking of the West

- leading to the speculative and dialectic originality, such a jerk confronts us with the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno.

But it also confronts us with the twisting of the entire metaphysics of the West, the metaphysics that concentrates all the meaning of action

and productivity in thinking, more precisely: in reality, the core of which is reason and form alone in thinking.

Eine solche Ablehnung drückt den klaren Standpunkt aus, daß das Denken überall auf unüberwindliche Grenzen stößt, auf Mauern, die es nicht überspringen kann.

In diesem historischen Moment führt uns dieser Standpunkt direkt zu Camus' Formulierung: »Mir selbst und dieser Welt fremd, ausgerüstet mit keinem anderen Hilfsmittel als mit einem Denken, das sich selbst negiert, sobald es eine Behauptung finden kann durch die Ablehnung des Wissens und des Lebens, in der die Eroberungslust an Mauern stößt, die diesen Begriffen trotzten!«

Der Vertreter aber der Negativen Dialektik, Theodor Adorno, sieht, wie wir gezeigt haben, daß das Denken in dieser industrialisierten bürgerlichen Zivilisation den »Kontakt mit seinem Objekt und den Sinn für Proportionen verliert«. Das Opfern des Denkens, des kritischen Intellekts, wenn es einmal beginnt, hat kein natürliches Ende, denn es ist schwer und unmöglich vorauszusetzen, daß eine bestimmte Konzession, wie er sagt, den »den unersättlichen Ansprüchen der Geistlosigkeit« befriedigen könnte. Dieser Geistlosigkeit, die sich am effektvollsten gerade im Triumph der positiven Wissenschaft, der Szientokratie und Bürokratie zeigt.

Es steht außer Zweifel, daß Adorno an Brechts Gedanken und Entscheidung teilhat, daß er es mit der Politik und nicht mit ihrem Ersatz zu tun hat; mit der Politik der historischen Erfahrung, die ihm erlaubt, mit sich selbst ehrlich zu sein. Nach allem, was wir wissen und ahnen, ist da auch das Theater mehr als eine Veränderung der Welt. Es ist konsequent und logisch, wenn Adorno schließt, das ein solches Bewußtsein in sich die Elemente der negativen Dialektik trägt, daß es deshalb das beste Korrektiv für die »neuen Tendenzen« im Theater, das heute durch die »Realität« substituiert wird, so wie das der Fall bei *happenings* ist, »welche zuweilen die Aktionisten inszenieren«.

Es scheint, als träfen wir auch hier, auf diesem Gebiet, Adornos dialektische Formulierung des Verhältnisses von Theorie und Praxis. Er verwirft auf seine Art die klassische spekulative Bestimmung, und damit unterscheidet er sich von Marx. Es handelt sich also darum, daß Theorie und Praxis nicht einmal unmittelbar identisch sind, noch sind sie absolut unterschiedlich. Ihr Verhältnis ist »eines von Diskontinuität«. Auf diese Art erüffnet sich Adorno ein neues zeitgenössisches dialektisches Verhältnis: es gibt keinen stetigen Weg, der von der Theorie zur Praxis führte. Die Theorie aber zum Ganzen der Gesellschaft, ist aber gleichzeitig autonom.

6. *Zwischen Wahrheit und Unwahrheit: die Versuchungen der Theorie und der Praxis*

Vom diesem Standpunkt ausgehend interveniert Adorno ziemlich radikal und ändert die klasische Formel. Die Praxis ereignet sich nicht unabhängig von der Theorie, noch die Theorie von der Praxis. Es gibt keinerlei Zweifel, daß Adorno von diesem Standpunkt aus den Gedanken gutheißen kann, dem zufolge die Praxis das Kriterium

Such a refusal expresses the clear position that thinking everywhere encounters insurmountable limits, walls that it cannot jump over.

At this historical moment, this point of view leads us directly to

Camus' formulation: "alien to myself and to this world, equipped with no other resource than a mind which negates itself as soon as it can find an assertion through the A of knowledge and life, in which the desire to conquer pushes up against walls that defy these concepts!«

But the representative of negative dialectics, Theodor Adorno, sees, as we have shown, that in this industrialized bourgeois civilization thought 'loses contact with its object and the sense of proportion'. The sacrifice of thought, of the critical intellect, once it begins, has no natural end, for it is difficult and impossible to suppose that any particular concession could satisfy, as he says, "the insatiable demands of mindlessness." This mindlessness, which shows itself most effectively in the triumph of posi t i ve sc i e n t i o n , s i e n t o c r a t i e a n d bi i r o c r a t i e t.

There is no doubt that Adorno shares in Brecht's thoughts and decisions, that he is dealing with politics and not with its substitute; with the politics of historical experience that allows him to be honest with himself. According to everything we know and suspect, the theater is more than a change in the world. It is consistent and logical, when Adorno concludes that such a sense of being contains within itself the elements of negative dialectics, that it is therefore the best corrective for the "new tendencies" in the theater, which today is substituted by "reality." , as is the case with happenings, »which the actionists sometimes stage«.

It seems that here, in this area, too, we encounter Adorno's dialectical formulation of the relationship between theory and practice.

In his own way he rejects the class i s p e c u l a t i v e determination, and in this he differs from M arx. The point, then, is that theory and practice are not even immediately identical, nor are they absolutely different. Their relationship is "one of discontinuity." In this way, Adorno opens up a new contemporary dialectic relationship: there is no continuous path leading from theory to practice. But the theory of society as a whole is autonomous at the same time.

6. Between truth and untruth: the temptations of theory and practice

From this point of view, Adorno intervenes quite radically and changes the classical formula. Practice does not occur independently of theory, nor theory of practice. There is no doubt that, from this point of view, Adorno can endorse the idea that practice meets the criterion 2 0 2

der Theorie ist, der Gedanke, der in der damaligen historischen und geistigen Situation des 19. Jhdts. nur eine spekulative Begeisterung sein konnte, und die absolute dialektische Voraussetzung von Karl Marx. Andererseits hätte die Praxis damals nicht das erreichen können, was sie will. Adorno will sagen, daß die Praxis, die sich an die Anleitungen der Theorie hält, an die Rezepte und Theoremen, sich in eine doktrinäre versteinert, und dabei kann sie einem Falsifizieren der Theorie nicht ausweichen.

Dem Gedanken Adornos folgend, vergißt man heute, daß das, was Robespierre und St. Just mit Rousseaus volonté générale, dem allgemeinen Willen, der eines gewissen repressiven Charakters nicht entbehrte, -daß das eigentlich das berühmteste Zeichen, nicht das einzige für einen solchen Prozeß war; ein Zeichen für eine Formel, derzufolge die Theorie das Motiv und das Rezept der praktischen Aktion ist. Demnach drückt der Denker der negativen Dialektik seine Skepsis der Lehre gegenüber aus, die die Einheit von Theorie und Praxis fordert. Wenn wir wahrnehmen, daß dieses Dogma undialektisch ist, daß es durch die historische Erfahrung- die nicht das Synonym für heutige empirische Formen ist – widerlegt ist, und wenn in uns das Bewußtsein erwacht, daß dieses Dogma »erschleicht dort simple Identität, wo allein der Widerspruch die Chance hat, fruchtbar zu werden«, dann beginnt in uns auch die Demystifizierung eines Absoluten, der Dialektik des Absoluten.

An dieser Stelle sind zwei Momente relevant für die Erfahrung der zeitgenössischen Philosophie. Erstens ist es klar, daß man die Theorie nicht aus dem Prozeß der gesellschaftlichen Totalität herausführen kann, und daß sie in dieser Totalität auch eine gewisse Selbstständigkeit besitzt. Zweitens ist die Theorie nicht mehr nur ein Mittel der Totalität, sie ist nicht mehr funktional, sondern auch Moment und Element der Differenzierung. Daraus folgt: wenn die Theorie nur ein Mittel der gesellschaftlichen und historischen Totalität wäre, dann wäre sie nicht fähig, sich der Totalität entgegenzustellen.

7. *Marxsche Lehre war praktisch: als Theorie*

Das bedeutet gleichzeitig etwas Wesentliches sowohl für das philosophische Substrat der zeitgenössischen Kontestation, als auch für die heutige Form des Rebellierens, besonders für die Eindimensionalität des philosophischen Aktionismus und Avantgardismus. Nach allem zu urteilen ist die Lehre von der Einheit wesentlich transformiert: das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis, -besonders wenn wir vor Augen haben, daß sie sich schon einmal voneinander entfernt haben-, ist der »qualitative Umschlag nicht der Übergang, erst recht nicht die Subordination«. Ganz im Gegenteil, Theorie und Praxis verhalten sich zueinander polar. Diese Formulierung Adornos müssen wir von der Last der Banalität befreien, und den der Phraseologie. Der einzig mögliche Sinn dieser Aussage der negativen Dialektik wäre dieser: nur dieser Theorie könnte die größte Hoffnung auf Verwirklichung und Ernstwerdung innewohnen, die nicht als

T h e r o r y is the thought which, in the historical and intellectual situation of the 19th century at that time. could only be a speculative enthusiasm, and the absolute dialectic assumption of Karl Marx. On

the other hand, the practice was not able to achieve what it wanted at the time. Adorno wants to say that practice, which adheres to the instructions of theory, to prescriptions and theorems, petrifies into a doctrinaire one, and in doing so it cannot avoid a fa 1 s i f i c i a e r e n g o f th e o r ies.

Following Adorno's thought, one forgets today that what Robespierre and St. Just with Rousseau's volontć genćrale, the general will, which was not without a certain repressive character, -that actually the most famous sign, not the only one for one such a process; a sign of a formula according to which theory is the motive and recipe for practical action. Accordingly, the thinker of the negative dialectic expresses his skepticism about the doctrine that demands the unity of theory and practice. If we perceive that this dogma is undialectical, that it has been refuted by historical experience - which is not the synonym for contemporary empirical forms - and if the consciousness awakens in us that this dogma "achieves simple identity by surreptitiously where alone the contradiction has the chance to become fruitful«, then the demyst i f i c i a t i o n o f o n o n a b s o l u te begins in us, the di a l e c tic o f the ab s o l u t.

At this point two moments are relevant to the experience of contemporary philosophy. First, it is clear that the theory cannot be taken out of the process of the social totality, and that it also possesses a certain autonomy in this totality. Secondly, the theory is no longer just a means of totality, it is no longer functional, but also a moment and element of differentiation. It follows that if theory were only a means of social and historical totality, then it would be incapable of countering totality.

z u s t e 11 e n.

7. Marx's teaching was practical: as a theory This means something essential both for the philosophical substrate of contemporary controversy and for today's form of rebellion, especially for the one-dimensionality of philosophical actionism and avant-gardism. Judging from everything, the teaching of oneness has been essentially transformed: the relationship between theory and practice - especially when we realize that they have already moved away from each other - the "qualitative transition is not the transition, only right not the subordination«. On the contrary, theory and practice are polar in relation to each other. We must free this formulation of Adorno from the burden of banality and that of phraseology. The only possible meaning of this statement of negative dialectics would be this; only this theory could harbor the greatest hope of realization and becoming

serious, which was not 203

»Anweisung auf ihre Verwirklichung gedacht ist«. Adorno vergleicht das mit Recht mit den Naturwissenschaften und den Ereignissen der Theorie über subatomare Prozesse und der Kernspaltung.

Dieses Analysieren zeigt einerseits, daß das Gemeinsame beibehalten wurde-dieses mögliche sich an die Praxis wenden-im »technologisch orientierten raison d'être«, nicht im Denken, das auf die Anwendung gerichtet ist. Lange dauerte es bis man erkannte, in Stunden später Erkenntnis, daß Marx' Einheitslehre sicher bestehen konnte, daß sie aus dem Vorgefühl erstanden ist, aus der Hoffnung und Ahnung.

Damit ist ein Vorurteil erschüttert, nach dem diese Lehre mit einem Datum im geschichtlichen Leben des Menschen rechnet, wenn von ihr verlangt wird: Jetzt oder Nie.

Auf der heutigen geschichtlichen und zivilisationsmäßigen Stufe würde das den legitimen Widerstand gegen die Verdinglichung bedeuten, gegen die Verdinglichung dessen, was Marx wesentlich war: was unaussprechlich in allem was auszusprechen ist, in seiner gesamten Lehre. Das wäre ein Kampf um Marx als Denker der geschichtlichen Ungewißheit, und nicht der historischen Determiniertheit und Unausweiclichkeit. Erst in der Philosophie-außer der Philosophie; im Denken-außer dem Denken usw.

Wie könnte man solchen Standpunkt deutlicher machen?

Marxsche Einheitslehre, erstand aus dem Quell der Vorgefühle, nach Adorno war sie praktisch: als Theorie dürfen wir nicht vergessen! Nun, das hat gefehlt, – der wahrhaft ausgefürten Theorie, der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie; »alle konkreten Übergänge zu jener Praxis steckten in einem technologisch orientierten raison d'être«. Was ist dann verständlicher, als endlich zu begreifen, daß »die Scheu von Marx vor theoretischen Rezepten eine klassenlose Gesellschaft positiv zu beschreiben«, was jedenfalls eine edle und zugleich illusionistische Absicht einiger Marxisten, Soziologen, Philosophen, Politologen, Futurologen und anderer ist.

In Einklang mit einem solchen Standpunkt der negativen Dialektik erfaßt Theodor Adorno, daß das »Kapital« von Marx eigentlich alles enthält: zahllose Entdeckungen, Wahrnehmungen über die Grundstruktur der bürgerlichen und Arbeitszivilisation, größtenteils Anklagen der politischen Ökonomen und Philosophen; es impliziert alles, außer einem Aktionsprogramm. Muß es uns dann wudern, daß der Aktionsgedanke, die Aktionspolitik und Kontestation »Das Kapital« als abstrakt und für die unmittelbare Aktion ungeignet verwerten? Keinesfalls.

Mehr noch, wenn wir die Aktionspolitik und Philosophie beiseite lassen, im Vergleich zum »Kapital«, folgern wir, daß aus der »Mehrwerttheorie nicht herauszulesen war, wie man eine Revolution machen soll«. Aus all dem soll nun Adornos Standpunkt Marx gegenüber erschlossen werden: heute überschreitet Marx, »der antiphilosophische Marx ging im Hinblick auf Praxis generell – nicht in politischen Einzelfragen – kaum über das Philosophem hinaus, die Emanzipation des Proletariats könne nur dessen eigene Sache sein; und damals war das Proletariat noch sichtbar«. Trotzdem muß man

»Instructions are intended for their realization«. Adorno rightly compares this with the natural sciences and the events of the theory of

subatomic processes and nuclear fission.

On the one hand, this analysis shows that the common has been retained - this possible turning to practice - in the "technologically oriented raison d'etre", not in thinking that is directed towards the application. It took a long time before people realized, hours later, that Marx's doctrine of unity could certainly exist, that it arose from anticipation, from hope and intuition.

This shatters a prejudice according to which this teaching reckones with a date in the historical life of man when it is asked of it: now or never.

At today's level of history and civilization, that would mean legitimate resistance to reification, to the reification of what was essential to Marx: what is unspeakable in everything that needs to be said, in his entire teaching. That would be a struggle for Marx as the thinker of the historical uncertainty, and not of historical determination and inevitability. Only in philosophy—on the other side of philosophy; in thinking-beyond thinking, etc.

How could such a point of view be made clearer?

Marx's doctrine of unity, arose from the source of the v o r g e -

f ii h 1 e, according to Adorno it was practical: as a theory we must not forget! Well, that was what was lacking - of the truly elaborated theory, of the critique of political economy; »all concrete transitions to that practice are embedded in a technologically oriented raison d'etre«. What is then more understandable than to finally understand that "Marx's reluctance to describe a classless society positively with theoretical prescriptions," which is at least a noble and at the same time illusionistic intention of some Marxists, sociologists, philosophers, political scientists, futurologists and others .

Consistent with such a standpoint of negative dialectics, Theodor Adorno grasps that Marx's "Capital" contains really everything: countless discoveries, perceptions about the basic structure of bourgeois and working-class civilization, mostly accusations of the political economists and philosophers; it implies everything but a program of action. Should we then be surprised that the concept of action, the policy of action and the contestation "The Capital"

exploit as abstract and unsuitable for immediate action?

no way.

Moreover, if we put action politics and philosophy aside, compared to 'capital', we conclude that 'the theory of surplus value did not tell us how to make a revolution'. From all of this, Adorno's point of view regarding Marx should now be deduced: today Marx goes beyond, "the anti-philosophical Marx went with regard to practice in general - not in individual political questions - hardly beyond the philosophem, the emancipation of the proletariat could only do that to be one's own and then the proletariat was still visible«. Nevertheless, one must 204

Adorno richtig verstehen: er meint, daß die Werke, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten entstanden, sind, wie »die Studien über die Autorität und die Familie, »Authoritarian Personality«, dann die heterodoxe Herrschaftstheorie, die dialektisch lucide in der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« erläutert ist, – daß alle diese Werke »ohne praktische Absicht« geschrieben wurden. Daß aber alle diese Werke in einem bestimmten Sinn eine praktische Wirkung zeitigten.

8. *Praxis – als kritische Theorie*

Es ist nötig, diesen Gedanken genauer zu beweisen, denn er ist das beste Korrektiv auch der zeitgenössischen *Philosophie des Aktionismus*. Aktionismus ist nicht nur die *Angst vor der Kontemplation* und *dem Passivismus*, sondern auch die legitime Konsequenz der Philosophie und Metaphysik des Abendlandes einerseits, auch Produkt totaler Repression und totaler Instrumentalisierung in der hochentwickelten bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Es muß gesagt werden, daß diese Werke, nach Ansicht Adornos, aus sich negative Dialektik strahlten. Man kann deshalb behaupten, daß das was erstrahlt aus diesen Werken nicht nur im Standpunkt liegt, daß in dieser Welt der Gedanke 1) zur Ware, zur rationalen Sache, zur Organisation, 2) zur rationalen Gesellschaft, 3) zur rational-mathematisch *verfügbaren* Natur wird sondern auch in der Überzeugung, daß man sich bei der Lektüre dieser kaum vorstellen kann, daß jemandem etwas »verkauft« wird.

Durchdenken wir das zu Ende, so kommen wir zu ungewöhnlichen Feststellungen: Adorno möchte sagen, daß dort, wo er im engeren Sinn unmittelbar interveniert hat, mit sichtbarer praktischer Wirkung, daß dies nur durch die Vermittlung der T h e o r i e geschah. Das war klar in der Polemik über die neuen Bewegungen in der Musik, in der Kritik am neudeutschen Jargon, über die Ursprünglichkeit und Authentizität, das heißt deutlich gegen Heideggers Fundamentalontologie gerichtet, gegen Jaspers' Existenz-Philosophie usw.

Eigentlich faßt Adorno das negative Denken als u r s p r ü n g l i c h e F o r m d e r W a h r h e i t a u f : wenn nämlich diese Ideologien ein falsches Bewußtsein sind, so bedeutet ihre Auflösung, was sich im Medium des Gedankens verbreitet hat, die Inaugurierung »einer gewissen Bewegung hin zur Mündigkeit«. Für Adorno ist diese Wirkung der Theorie-praktisch.

Weiter, wenn wir uns der Kritik Marx' erinnern, genauer seiner Persiflierung »der kritischen Kritik«- und wie lange sie angewandt wurde in der Tradition der marxistischen Dialoge mit einzelnen Philosophien, Soziologien und Historiographien, sollte man ernsthaft über Adornos Gedanken urteilen, daß dies ein Kalauen war; daß diese Kritik die Theorie damit liquidieren will, daß sie sie als Theorie verrät, und daß sie zuguterletzt »nur die Unsicherheit bei deren direkter Umsetzung in Praxis verdeckt«.

Soll auch gesagt werden, daß Marx diese Kritik, eigentlich ihr Substrat später modifiziert oder verraten hat? Adorno glaubt das zweifellos nicht; er hat es nicht verlassen, auch nicht nach der Erfahrung

Understand Adorno correctly: he means that the works that have emerged in the last few decades are, like "the studies on authority and the family, "Authoritarian Personality", then the heterodox theory of

domination, the dialectically lucid in the "Dialectic of enlightenment"

it is explained - that all these works were written "without any practical intention". But that all these works had a practical effect in a certain sense.

8. Practice - as critical theory

It is necessary to prove this thought more precisely, because it is the best corrective of the contemporary philosophy of actionism. Actionism is not only the fear of contemplation and passivism, but also the legitimate consequence of Western philosophy and metaphysics on the one hand, and also the product of total repression and total instrumentalization in highly developed bourgeois society. It must be said that, in Adorno's view, these works radiated negative dialectics from within.

One can therefore assert that what shines from these works lies not only in the point of view that in this world the thought 1) about goods, about rational things, about organization, 2) about rational society, 3) about rational-mathematically available nature but also in the conviction that when reading this one can hardly imagine that someone is being "sold" something.

If we think this through to the end, we come to unusual conclusions: Adorno might say that where he intervened directly in the narrower sense, with a visible practical effect, this only happened through the mediation of theory. This was clear in the polemics about the new movements in music, in the criticism of the new German jargon, about originality and authenticity, i.e. clearly directed against Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, against Jaspers’ existential philosophy, etc.

Adorno actually conceives negative thinking as originally p r i i n g l i -

c h e f o r m o f t r a t i o n : if these ideologies are a false consciousness, then their dissolution, which has spread through the medium of thought, signifies the inauguration

"a certain movement towards maturity". For Adorno this effect is theory-practical.

Furthermore, if we remember Marx's critique, more precisely his satirization of "Critical Criticism" - and how long it was applied in the tradition of Marxist dialogues with individual philosophies, sociologies and historiographies, one should seriously judge Adorno's thoughts

that this was a cheat; that this critique wants to liquidate the theory by betraying it as theory, and that, last but not least, it "only conceals the uncertainty in its direct implementation in practice."

Should it also be said that Marx later modified or betrayed this criticism, actually its substrate? Adorno undoubtedly does not think so; he did not leave it, not even after the experience 205

mit der Internationale und den Zwisten mit ihr. Deshalb ist die Praxis der »Motor von Theorie«, natürlich der Natur der Dinge gemäß nicht durch sie bestimmt. »In der Theorie erscheint sie lediglich, und allerdings mit Notwendigkeit als Obsession mit dem Kritisierten«. Nun, mir scheint Adornos Standpunkt in der heutigen Situation mehrsinnig aktuell, wenn er darauf besteht, daß die »kritische Theorie nicht in ihren Einzelheiten ausgeführt werden kann« ohne dabei gerade das Einzelne zu überschätzen und zu fetischisieren; andererseits wäre sie ohne Einzelheiten, ohne Sinn und historische Grundlage.

IV

1. *Komplementarität des Praktizismus und des absoluten Aktionismus*

Nach allem, was hier gesagt wurde, könnte man nicht sagen, daß der Gedanke heute ohne die tragische Erfahrung der Revolution möglich wäre. Noch mehr ohne geschichtliche Ernüchterung, die eine ernsthaste Kritik aller Konsequenzen der Metaphysik des Abendlandes voraussetzt. In diesem Sinn ist die negative Dialektik Theodor Adornos auf jeden Fall unumgänglich, sowie ihre Kritik des zeitgenössischen Praktizismus. Dabei habe ich den Schluß vor mir, daß sich der zeitgenössische Praktizismus »an ein vorherrschendes Moment lehnt«, das die sonst Adorno abscheuliche Sprache der Wissenssoziologie als etwas, das unter dem Verdacht der Ideologie steht mißbraucht hat. Zweifellos mystisiziert die Wissenssoziologie die Funktion der sozialen Interessen, die die Strukturen und geistigen Modelle bestimmen. Und doch sollten wir die historische Erfahrung hindurch das herausschälen, was uns die Macht der negativen Dialektik suggeriert: daß der Impuls der Kritik der Ideologie nicht kleinbürgerliche Geringschätzung ist, und nicht Verneinung des Geistes wegen seiner angeblichen Bedingtheit durch die Interessen, »die der skeptische Interessent auf den Geist projiziert«.

Die negative Dialektik versucht mit dieser Formulierung jede Ideologie abzufangen, vor allem die, die noch nicht so sichtbar ist, die historisch noch nicht erkennbar ist, die intellektuellen Denkgewohnheiten und die kategoriale Artikulierung der Welt aber zeigen ihre Ohnmacht der Identifikation dieser Ideologie. Es ist eigentlich von der Kritik der Ideologie die Rede, nicht nur der an der Wissenssoziologie, die, wie wir gesehen haben, keinen Grund und Impuls zur Kritik der Ideologie in der historischen »Erfahrung ihrer Unwahrheit« sieht. Es ist daher auch für unsere zeitgenössische Philosophie nicht ohne Bedeutung, ihre eigene Position zu reflektieren, die nicht nur ihre ist und nicht nur einer ihrer spezifischen Fehler. Denn wenn »die Praxis die eigene aktuelle Unmöglichkeit durchs »Opiat der Kolektivität« vernebelt, wird sie selbst ihrerseits zur-Ideologie.

with the International and the quarrels with it. That is why practice is the "motor of theory", of course, in accordance with the nature of things, not determined by it. "In theory it appears only, and of

necessity, as an obsession with what is being criticized." Well, it seems to me that Adomo's point of view is ambiguously relevant in today's situation when he insists that the "critical theories cannot be made out of their individual parts" without doing so to overestimate and fetishize the individual; on the other hand, it would be devoid of detail, without meaning and historical basis.

IV

1. Complementarity of practicalism and absolute actionism After all that has been said here, one could not say that the idea would be possible today without the tragic experience of the revolution. Still more without historical disenchantment, which presupposes a most serious criticism of all the consequences of Western metaphysics. In this sense, Theodor Adomo's negative dialectic is in any case unavoidable, as is its critique of contemporary practicalism. In doing so, I have the conclusion before me that contemporary o s s i c p r a c t i c i s m “leans on a dominant moment” that has misused the language of the sociology of knowledge, otherwise odious to Adorno, as something suspected of being ideologic. Undoubtedly, the sociology of knowledge mystifies the function of social interests that determine structures and mental models. And yet, throughout historical experience, we should elucidate what the power of negative dialectics suggests to us: that the impulse to criticize ideology is not petty-bourgeois contempt, and not denial of spirit because of its supposed conditionality through interests, "those of the skeptical prospect projected onto the mind«.

With this formulation, the negative dialectic tries to intercept any ideology, above all that which is not yet so visible, which is not yet recognizable historically, but the intellectual habits of thought and the c a t e g o r i a l art i c u l i n g o f the w o l l e d show their powerlessness to identify this ideologic . We are actually talking about the critique of ideology, not just that of the sociology of knowledge, which, as we have seen, sees no reason or impulse to criticize ideology in the historical "experience of its untruth." It is therefore also not without importance for our contemporary philosophy to r e f l e c t i o n its own position, which is not only its own and not only one of its specific faults. For if »practice equates its own current impossibility through the »opiate of collectivity«

obscured, it itself becomes ideologic.

Diesen Schluß zieht Adorno z. B. aufgrund bestimmter Zeichen: eines davon ist das automatische Verschwinden der Frage Was tun?, die jeden kritischen Gedanken beantwortet, bevor er richtig ausgesprochen ist, keinesfalls aber mitrealisiert. Damit in Verbindung übersieht Adorno nicht, daß der *Obskurantismus* nirgends so flagrant und angegriffen ist wie in der neuesten Tendenz der »Theoriefeindschaft«. Tatsächlich ist das nicht nur eine klassische Form des Praktizismus, sondern auch ein Zug der aggressiven und übertriebenen Formen der Kontestation und der Hippie-Philosophie. Gerade der Gegensatz zwischen negativer Dialektik und absolutem Idealismus, der-das fühlen wir heute schon am eigenen Leib – logisch im *absoluten Praktizismus* endet, und auf der Seite der »Kritik« im *absoluten Aktionismus* – scheint sich im Bewußtsein der Akteure verfestigt zu haben.

2. *Wirklichkeit der Kollektive: Abnützung der Gesellschaftlichkeit*

Das ist nicht deshalb, weil verschiedene Motive und Gegensätzlichkeiten nur gedämpft werden, die zur Koinzidenz des bürgerlichen Praktizismus und Aktionismus führen. Sei die negative Dialektik Theodor Adornos wie sie sein mag, sie geht so weit, daß sie die Anzweifelung der Metaphysik, auch in der Form eines bürgerlichen Industrialismus, als etwas bezeugt, das außerhalb des Streites steht. Ihre Alergie gegen die totale Repression dieser Zivilisation, die das Monopol der Wirkungskraft und Menschlichkeit übernommen hat, geht bis zur Demystifizierung der Solidarität.

Sind wir denn im heutigen historischen Augenblick erstaunt über die Tatsache, daß überall die Geste des Unterschreibens vorhanden ist, der Solidarität, was ein Synonym für Miteinschließung in die Welt der Hierarchie und Herrschaft ist. Des Menschen eigene Taten sind Zeugnisse von Selbstentsagung. Über die Aktion eines Einzelnen zu sprechen, bedeutet über die abgeschlossene Tat seiner Selbstquidation zu sprechen: das Versinken des Einzelnen im Kollektiven ist zur Verhaltensnorm geworden. Für den Intellektuellen bedeutet das zweifelsohne Selbstliqidation, kann er dem aber ohne Selbstbetrug und Demagogie widerstehen? Als Gegenleistung wird jedem Einzelnen ein Platz in der gesellschaftlichen Hierarchie versprochen, das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit und der Mitgliedschaft.

Die allgemeine Annahme dieser Geste hält sich auch auf höheren Niveaus verdeckt, sogar in der Sphäre der Rebellion und Kontestation. Der Grund liegt darin, daß die Schwäche auf diese Weise triumphiert, weil sie stark wird, empirisch, wissenschaftlich, organisatorisch, planetarisch. Die Angst ist zwar nicht überwunden, aber sie ist in operationale Inhalte überführt. Da wird sie unpersönlich und rational verfügbar. Damit spielt die negative Dialektik auf die allgemeine Philosophie des Handels und des Verhaltens an, was sicherlich »ein realer Umschlagspunkt im Irrationalismus« ist. Die Analyse der totalen Koordination des Einzelnen mit der bestehenden Gesellschaft trägt in gefährlichen und scharfgeistigen Einsichten Früchte. Diese Geste wird durch eine Unzahl wiederholter Sophismen und De-

Adorno draws this conclusion e.g. B. due to certain signs: one of them is the automatic disappearance of the question What to do?, which answers every critical thought before it is properly pronounced, but in

no way realises. In connection with this, Adorno does not overlook the fact that nowhere is obscurantism so flagrant and attacked as in the latest trend of "theophobia". In fact, this is not only a classic form of practicalism, but also a trait of aggressive and exaggerated forms of contestation and hippie philosophy. Precisely the contrast between negative dialectics and absolute idealism, which - we already feel this in our own bodies - logically ends in absolute practicalism, and on the side of "criticism" in absolute actionism - seems to have solidified in the consciousness of the actors.

2. Reality of the collective: wear and tear of sociality This is not because various motives and contradictions that lead to the coincidence of bourgeois practicalism and actionism are only muted. Whatever the negative dialectic of Theodor Adomo, it goes so far as to testify to the doubting of metaphysics, even in the form of a bourgeois industrialism, as something that stands outside the controversy. Their allergy to the total repression of this civilization, which has taken over the monopoly of effectiveness and humaneness, goes as far as demystifying solidarity.

At this historical moment, are we amazed at the fact that the gesture of signing is present everywhere, of solidarity, which is synonymous with inclusion in the world of hierarchy and domination. Man's own deeds are evidence of self-denial. To speak about the action of an individual means to speak about the completed act of his self-quidation: the sinking of the individual into the collective has become the norm of behavior. For the intellectual this undoubtedly means self-liquidation, but can he resist it without self-deception and demagogy? In return, each individual is promised a place in the social hierarchy, a sense of belonging and membership.

The general acceptance of this gesture remains obscure at higher levels, even in the sphere of rebellion and contestation. The reason is that weakness triumphs in this way because it becomes strong, empirically, scientifically, organizationally, planetarily. Although the fear has not been overcome, it has been translated into operational content. There it becomes impersonal and rationally available. Thus the negative dialectic alludes to the general philosophy of action and behavior, which certainly

"a real turning point in irrationalism." The analysis of the total coordination of the individual with the existing society bears fruit in dangerous and acute insights.

This gesture is accompanied by a myriad of repeated sophisms and

magogien verteidigt; sie wird durch alle möglichen humanistischen und pseudomoralistischen Druckmittel verteidigt; »Verzicht auf eigene Vernunft« und Urteilsfähigkeit zum Nutzen des anonymen und kollektiven Verstandes wird in der Gegenwart zum besonderen Mythos.

3. *Das Reifen eines Werkes auf dem Humus des individuierten Geistes*

Ich glaube, daß diese Bestimmungen ziemlich genau nicht nur die benigne Form der bürgerlichen und repressiven Zivilisation beschreiben, sondern auch Adornos Gegenstand der Kritik und Furcht. Aber eine Furcht, die schon in einen differenzierten Bewußtseinsstrom umgegossen ist, und die er nicht nur mit der Philosophie des Lebens, sondern auch mit der Existenz-Philosophie teilt. Mit anderen Worten, um die Wahrheit des Irrationalismus der modernen Rationalisierung zu entdecken und zu erkennen, ist dieser suspendierte, individuierte Geist notwendig, der dieser Zivilisation der Kultur als Gespenst erscheint. Die Anwesenheit des Einzelnen in der Struktur der diese Menschheit des Abendlandes keine andere-wird durch das Opiat des kollektiven Willens und Geistes, das System der Subordination verteidigt, die im Menschen ein disziplinäres, im Wesentlichen, arbeitsmäßiges Verhalten entwickelt.

In alldem ist für uns interessant, festzustellen, daß auch bei Adorno die Kritik aller disziplinären Attitüden vorhanden ist, die sich in der Form der Kommödie auch bei Pseudorevolutionären wiederholen. Ein Überblick der Rubriken der Geschichte des Kampfes um des Denkens von Marx, die Verwirklichung seiner Ideen, wenn wir den Kollektivismus ernsthaft betrachten, ohne den keine geschichtliche und empirische Realisierung möglich ist (so scheint es) wird uns die *Epoche der Verdinglichung der Geschichtlichkeit alles dessen, war der Denker gesagt hat zeigen, sowie auch dessen, was bei ihm ungesagt und unaussprechlich bleibt.* In diesem Kontext kommt eine besondere Perversität zutage: anstelle von Argumenten, Werken des individuerten Geistes, stoßen wir überall auf standardisiertes Denken, auf Politisieren der Philosophie, sowie das Rephilosophieren der Politik, auf den Prozeß, der seine Elite hat und Anhänger, Führer und Mitglieder.

Damit ist endlich der Boden bereit für die Interpretation von Adornos negativer Dialektik, die ein Plädoyer für die individuierten Vernunft und das Denken ist. Damit im Einklang ist es berechtigt anzunehmen, sie ganz entschieden den Verrat und die Liquidation des bürgerlichen Kultur und des Fortschrittes ist. Adornos gesamtes Werk ist eine Anstregung, diesen Verrat zu beweisen. Deshalb besteht ein großer Unterschied zwischen der Existenz-Philosophie und Adornos negativer Dialektik, besonders im Bezug auf den Existenzialismus Sartres. Unter ihnen gibt es neben Differenzen auch frappante Ähnlichkeiten. Aber die negative Dialektik selbst, so offen für alle Gegensätzlichkeiten und Dichotomien der Geschichte, wird, so wie sie auf der einen Seite das existenzialistische »Asyl des metaphysischen Absoluten« verachtet-auf der anderen Seite zum »Existenzialismus« der individuierten Vernunft.

magogien defended; it is defended by all sorts of humanistic and pseudo-moralistic pressures; "Renunciation of one's own reason" and

the ability to judge for the benefit of the anonymous and collective mind is becoming a special myth in the present.

3. The Ripening of a Work on the Humus of the Individuated Mind I believe that these definitions describe fairly accurately not only the benign form of bourgeois and repressive civilization, but also Adomo's object of criticism and fear. But a fear that has already been recast in a differentiated stream of consciousness, and which he shares not only with the philosophy of life, but also with the philosophy of existence. In other words, in order to discover and recognize the truth of the irrationalism of modern rationalization, this suspended, individuated mind that appears as a ghost to this civilization of culture is necessary. The presence of the individual in the structure of this Western humanity, no other, is defended by the opiate of the collective will and spirit, the system of subordination, which develops in man a disciplinary, essentially workless, behavior.

In all this it is interesting for us to note that in Adom o there is also a critique of all disciplinary attitudes which are repeated in the form of comedy even in pseudo-revolutionaries. An overview of the rubrics of the history of the struggle for Marx's thinking, the realization of his ideas, if we seriously consider collectivism, without which no historical and empirical realization is possible (it seems), the epoch of reification becomes us the historicity of everything that the thinker has said, as well as that which remains unsaid and unspeakable in his work. In this context, a particular perversity comes to light: instead of arguments, works of the individual mind, we encounter everywhere standardized thinking, politicizing philosophy, as well as rephilosophizing politics, the process, which has its elite and followers , leaders and members.

With that, the ground is finally ready for the interpretation of Adorno's negative dialectic, which is a plea for individuated reason and thinking. In line with this, it is reasonable to assume that it is decidedly the betrayal and liquidation of bourgeois culture and progress. Adorno's entire work is an effort to prove this betrayal. There is therefore a great difference between existentialism and Adomo's negative dialectics, particularly in relation to Sartre's existentialism. Among them there are not only differences but also striking similarities. But the negative dialectic itself, so open to all the opposites and dichotomies of history, just as it despises the existentialist "asylum of the metaphysical absolute" on the one hand, becomes "existentialism" on the other.

of individual reason.

4. *Das Verhältnis zu traditionellen Vorstellungen, die Gegenwart*

Es muß anerkannt werden, daß sich Adorno bemüht, alle fruchtbaren Momente der Tradition, der Philosophie und Kunst, der Literatur und Musik, der Mythologie und Soziologie zu verstehen. Prinzipiell aber anders als Ernst Bloch. Denn Bloch findet überall etwas heraus: die *Produktivität der Hoffnung*, die *dialektische Arbeit des Substrates des Denkens, der Tradition*, längst gedachter Projekte und Träume. Adornos Werke zeigen ihrerseits, daß in diesem spekulativen und »mystischen Materialismus« Blochs der optimistische Idealismus der schaffenden Materie der Geschichte selbst anwesend ist. Daher ist Blochs Ruf auch der Ruf der Hoffnung, der objektiven Fantasie der Natur allein, für Adorno aber war er nicht nur fragend, sondern auch die letzte Spur des Fatalismus der Natur. Auf jeden Fall hat damit Adorno teilweise selbst mit dem Fatalismus der Geschichte gebrochen, der ein mehr oder weniger versteckter Ruf an den Ursprung, an das alte Fatum, an die Idee, Gott, das Sein war. Denken wir das gut durch: die negative Dialektik will in den Mittelpunkt des Schöpfens eintauchen ohne Voraussetzung des Fatums und des Absoluten. Sicher hat sie nicht die Furcht verloren, in neue Formen der Illusion zu sinken, Blendungen und Annahmen.

Wenn wir dieses Phänomen genauer betrachten, nehmen wir folgendes wahr: Adorno verachtet gedanklich die Revisionisten, ihren Verrat am revolutionären Ton der Gegenwart, aber nicht weniger, wie das auch I. Fetscher bemerkt, auch die »brutale Degeneration der Revolution in der neuen Herrschaft bei den Orthodoxen«. Wir konnten wahrnehmen, daß die kritische Vernunft die Empfindlichkeit für den verbogenen Logos im historischen Leben, in historischen Werken, diese »tragische Existenz« gerade da als Adorno sie abwehrte, weil er Worte verachtet, die Reize leerer Gesten, weil er die Leiter metaphysischer Sensationen stürzt-wir konnten wahrnehmmen, daß das in der Gegenwart unübertroffene Zeichen in Adornos Denken sind. Wir werden zugeben, daß das heute nicht der Ton ist, der im Westen herrscht. Und niemand kann diesem Ton der negativen Dialektik folgen oder ihn nachahmen, ohne sie auszuschöpfen und zu verwüsten. Es ist nicht möglich, denn der Kampf gegen die Banlitäten der jetzigen bürgerlichen Zivilisation und Kultur, gegen die Brutalitäten der rationalen Manipultion und den Verrat der negativen Vernunft ist vom Standpunkt der negativen Dialektik aus nicht wiederholbar. Man könnte sagen, daß Adornos Negative Dialektik deshalb von Anbeginn an ein existenziell entwickelter und engagierter Kampf gegen die gefährlichsten Formen der Verdinglichung im Zusammenspiel der späten kapitalistischen Gesellschaft und des bürgerlichen Rationalismus ist.

4. The relationship to traditional ideas, the present It must be recognized that Adorno strives to understand all the fruitful aspects of

tradition, philosophy and art, literature and music, mythology and sociology. In principle, however, it is different from Ernst Bloch. For Bloch discovers something everywhere: the productivity of hope, the dialectical work of the substratum of thought, of tradition, of long-thought projects and dreams. Adorno's works, for their part, show that in this speculative and "mystical materialism" Bloch's op t i m i s t i c i d e a l i s m o f t h e c e t i n g m a t e r y of t h e s h o

c h t e l s e l b s t a n w e s e n d i st . Therefore, Bloch's call is also the call of hope, of the objective fantasy of nature alone, but for Adorno it was not only questioning, but also the last trace of nature's fatalism. In any case, Adorno himself thereby partially broke with the fatalism of history, which was a more or less hidden call to the origin, to the old fate, to the idea, God, being. Let's think this through carefully: the negative dialectic wants to immerse itself in the center of the forelock without presupposing fate and the absolute. Certainly she has not lost her fear of sinking into new forms of illusion, blinding and assumption.

If we take a closer look at this phenomenon, we perceive the following: Adorno mentally despises the revisionists, their betrayal of the revolutionary tone of the present, but no less, as I. Fetscher also notes, the "brutal degeneration of the revolution in the new rule the orthodox". We could perceive that the critical reason sensitivity to the twisted logos in historical life, in historical works, this "tragic existence" just as Adorno repelled it because he despises words, the charms of empty gestures, because he is the ladder of metaphysical sensations falls-we could perceive that the signs in Adorno's thinking are unsurpassed in the present. We will admit that this is not the tone prevailing in the West today. And no one can follow or imitate this tone of the negative dialectic without exhausting and wrecking it. It is not p o s s t i e t t i o t h e t h e s t h e t h e s t h e b e t h e t h e t h e b e n t i o t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t i o n t n a n d c u l t u r , against t h e b r u t a l t a t a t s o f th e r a t i o n a l m a n i p u l t i o n a n d t h e treason o f th e n e g a t i v e n p o u n t i s t i s t o th e n e -

g a t i v e d i a l e c t i c a n n o t h t e r t h a t e r h a l b a r . One could say that from the beginning Adomo's Negative Dialectics is an existentially developed and committed fight against the most dangerous forms of reification in the interaction of late capitalist society and bourgeois rationalism.

5. Negatives Denken: eine Form des Existentiellen

Der »Existentialismus« von Adornos negativer Dialektik, genauer gesagt: seine historischen Motive sind für uns nicht abgeschlossen. Sie selbst aber bleibt unter anderem eine Form der Ernüchterung, ein Suchen dieses Widerstandes, der nicht möglich ist ohne *Reflexion zum Ziel.* Die Überwindung der Naivität im Positivismus, auch der Ontologie, im klassischen Marxismus, ruft nicht mehr eine *Flut des Irrationalen,* der *Resignation und Skepsis hervor,* wie das bei uns der Fall ist.

Adorno präzisiert auch das Verhältnis zu großen Momenten des Geistes, in künstlerischen Werken, in der Poesie, im Drama, im Roman, in der Musik und Philosophie: so kann man die künstlerischen Normen z. B. nicht als etwas außerhalb Stehendes, *außer dem Humus der Lebenserfahrung* fixieren. Er führt uns wieder dazu zurück, daß für die Kunst keine anderen Gesetze und Normen bestehen, außer denen, die sich »als Logik ihrer eigenen Bewegung« kristallisiert haben. Es ist wahr, daß sich die Kunst selbst in der Folge dieser »unversteckten Individuierung« als *Objektivität* behaupten kann. Damit berührt Adorno auch jene »Besonderheit«, die sich im künstlerischen Werk kristallisiert, genauer als künstlerisches Werk allein. Das Besondere wird hier verallgemeinert. So sehen wir, daß sich Adorno der Metaphysik in seiner negativen Dialektik entgegenstellt, diesem Schicksal, das die Hierarchie des Wertes überall sucht und realisiert, den Vorzug des Momentes, des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen usw. Eine solche Hierarchie macht die Herrschaft der absoluten Allgemeinheit und Durchsichtigkeit zum Gesetz oder eben den Totalitarismus des Bosenderen, den totalitären Individualismus. So könnte man natürlich sagen, daß Adorno in diesem Präzisieren des Sinnes des künstlerischen Werkes alle Prämissen ahnt, die den Fall aller falscher und abstrakter Gegensätze zwischen der Ästhetik und der Soziologie der Kunst ermöglichen. Da wir seinen Standpunkt der Kunst gegenüber besonders erläutern wollen, erwähnen wir nur, daß für Adorno -nach einer besonderen Art Paradox-auch der Ethizismus z. B. eines Valery nicht nur Flucht, Refugium, sondern im Refugium auch Treue zu etwas, was die »Affirmatoren« des Geistes »verraten« haben. (I. Fetscher). Auf diesem Weise sind jene im Recht, die behaupten, daß Adorno »das Ziel anstrebend die kritische Treue« beibehalten wollte, so konnte er die nicht ertragen, die über »heile Welten« sprachen, mitten im Unheil, die in ihren Ideen oder Aktionen über die »heilbringenden« Strukturen wachen, als wären sie schon anwesend, und als ob sie sich realisieren ließen »mit ein wenig guten Willens« (I. Fetscher).

6. Der außerordentliche und unzerbrechbare Existentialismus

Seine reiche literarische Erfahrung dem Werk der Ernüchterung gewidmet, demystifiziert Adorno einen unendlichen Idealismus derer, die von der Vorstellung von »heilen Welten« besessen sind, und die sich so verhalten, als wäre der Mensch nach den Gesetzen der Freiheit kristallisiert oder sie glauben, er könnte durch einen radikalen

5. Negative Thinking: A Form of the Existential The "existentialism" of Adorno's negative dialectics, more precisely: his historical motives are

not finished for us.

But it itself remains, among other things, a form of disenchantment, a search for this resistance, which is not possible without reflecting on the goal. The overcoming of naivety in positivism, also in ontology, in classical Marxism, no longer evokes a flood of the irrational, of resignation and skepticism, as is the case with us.

Adorno also specifies the relationship to great moments of the spirit, in artistic works, in poetry, in drama, in the novel, in music and philosophy: B. do not fix it as something outside of the humus of life experience. He leads us back to the fact that there are no other laws and norms for art apart from those which have crystallized "as the logic of its own movement". It is true that as a result of this "unconcealed individuation" art can assert itself as objectivity. In doing so, Adorno also touches on that "specialness" that crystallizes in the artistic work, more precisely as an artistic work alone. The particular is generalized here. Thus we see that Adorno opposes metaphysics in its negative dialectic, this destiny that everywhere seeks and realizes the hierarchy of value, the privilege of the moment, the general and the particular, etc.

Such a hierarchy makes the rule of absolute universality and transparency the law or the totalitarianism of the more evil, totalitarian individualism. So one could say, of course, that in this precise definition of the meaning of the artistic work, Adorno senses all the premises that make possible the fall of all false and abstract oppositions between the aesthetics and the sociology of art. Since we particularly want to explain his point of view towards art, we only mention that for Adorno - according to a special kind of paradox - ethicism, too, e.g. B. of a Valery not only flight, refuge, but in the refuge also fidelity to something that the "affirmators" of the spirit have "betrayed". (I. Fetscher). In this way, those who claim that Adorno wanted to maintain "the goal striving for critical fidelity" are correct, so he could not stand those who talked about "perfect worlds" in the midst of calamity, who in their ideas or actions over the "salutary" structures are awake as if they were already there and as if they could be realized "with a little good will" (I.

Fetcher).

6. The Extraordinary and Unbreakable Existentialism Devoting his rich literary experience to the work of disenchantment, Adorno demystifies an infinite idealism of those.

who are obsessed with the idea of "perfect worlds" and who behave as if man were crystallized according to the laws of freedom or they believe he could through a radical 2 1 0

Beschluß zur epochalen Aktion und Revolution aus der Geisterhaftigkeit entkommen, aus der falschen Vorstellung der jetzigen totalen Repression inmitten der bürgerlichen, rationalen und wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation.

Einen solchen revolutionären Dezisionismus annehmen bedeutet auch eine neue Form der Aggressivität und sich Entscheidens anzunehmen: am Terror der Idee teilnehmen, die nichts erträgt, das sich zu ihr nicht kongruent verhält, ihr untergeben ist. Das Abendland aber zertrümmert noch seine Idee, seinen Logos, seine Metaphysik, die eine warme Verbrüderung mit der Politik geschafft hat, mit dem Futurismus, und beendet sie andererseits, in der Abdizierung, in der opportunistischen Ernüchterung. Die Durchsichtigkeit aber dieser Ernüchterung, die so betäubt ist von den Unveränderlichkeiten des zeitgenössischen Labyrinths und der Geistesverirrung, präzisiert Adorno in der Negativen Dialektik.

Adornos kritische Ausführungen über den Aktionismus und Opportunismus, so lucide sie auch sind, führen uns doch in ein naives Bild, an dem die Entschlossenheit und unübertroffene Differenziertheit der Negativen Dialektik teilhat. Und das vor allem dann, wenn die Ungewißheit von Anbeginn an auf ein apokryphes Manuskript des kritishen Geistes gerichtet wird, der in ultima linea der *Heilsweg aus der zeitgenössischen totalen Repression wäre.* So verläuft, glaube ich, auch die Ehrlichkeit dieses Denkers. Wir würden sagen: im kritischen und negativen Geist hat Adorno die *einzig mögliche Form des Absoluten* gefunden. Wie wir sehen werden, ist dieses Absolute nichts anderes als die Zersetzung und Überwindung des Absoluten.

Kierkegaardsche Motive, jetzt auf dem Feld der individuierten und negativen Vernunft, als *Form eines immer möglichen Widerstandes* gegen die repressiven Mächte der zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft, diese Motive stark umgewandelt, fruchtbar und vertraulich, schlingern und funktionieren problematisch in Adorno Negativer Dialektik. Aber wir werden sagen: das geschichtliche Schicksal wollte, daß Adorno zum gegenwartigen Kiergegaard wird, aber jetzt inmitten der *allgemeinen Gleichschaltung aller Gegensätzlichkeiten,* inmitten einer entwickelten Substanz der bürgerlichen Zivilisation und Kultur. Wir ahnen auch, daß das kein Bewahren ist, sondern äußerst differenziert und kritisch, neben einem bestimmten Denkmodell, noch weniger mit dem historischen Kierkegaard, über den er eine sehr provokative Studie geschrieben hat. Das müssen wir im Gegenteil als Adornos Wagnis ansehen, sich selbst den zeitgenössischen Dilemmas und Gegensätzlichkeiten gegenüberzustellen, den Dilemmas und Gegensätzlichkeiten einer *Welt als System.*

7. *Negative Dialektik situiert in der gegenwärtigen Realität*

Man könnte bisher annehmen, daß Adorno die dialektische Macht der Vernunft glorifiziert, einen Weg zur Wahrheit als einer Form der Emanzipation suchend. Zusammenbruch der Kultur ist daher an den Verlust der Wahrheit gebunden, des kritischen Lebenswirkens. Eigentlich ist die Niederlage der Kultur in ihrem Triumph sichtbar,

Deciding on epochal action and revolution to escape from the ghostly, from the misconception of the present total repression in the midst of bourgeois, rational and scientific civilization.

Adopting such a revolutionary decisionism also means accepting a new form of aggressiveness and decision-making: participating in the terror of the idea, which does not endure anything that does not relate to it, is subordinate to it. The West, however, still shatters its idea, its logos, its metaphysics, which has formed a warm fraternity with politics, with Futurism, and ends it elsewhere, in abdication, in opportunistic disenchantment. But the transparency of this disenchantment, which is so numbed by the immutability of the contemporary labyrinth and mental aberration, Adorno specifies in Negative Dialectics.

Adorno's critical remarks on actionism and opportunism, however lucid they are, lead us into a naive picture in which the determination and unsurpassed sophistication of the negative dialectic share. And that especially when the uncertainty is directed from the outset to an apocryphal manuscript of the critical spirit, which in ultima linea would be the way to salvation from contemporary total repression. I believe that is how the honesty of this thinker works. We would say: Adorno found the only possible form of the absolute in the critical and negative spirit. As we shall see, this Absolute is nothing other than the decomposition and overcoming of the Absolute.

Kierkegaardian motives, now on the field of individuated and negative reason, as a form of ever-possible resistance to the repressive powers of contemporary society, these motives greatly transformed, fertile and confidential, lurch and function problematically in Adorno Negative Dialectics. But we will say: historical destiny wanted Adorno to become the contemporary Kiergegaard, but now in the midst of the general conformity of all contradictions, in the midst of a developed substance of bourgeois civilization and culture. We also suspect that this is not preservation, but extremely differentiated and critical, in addition to a certain thought model, even less with the historical Kierkegaard, about whom he wrote a very provocative study. On the contrary, we must see this as Adorno's venture into confronting himself with the dilemmas and contradictions of the time, the dilemmas and contradictions of a world as a system.

7. Negative dialectics situated in the present reality Up to now one could assume that Adorno glorifies the dialectic power of reason, seeking a way to truth as a form of emancipation. The collapse of culture is therefore bound up with the loss of truth, of critical life

der Tod der Metaphysik erstrahlt ruhmreich in der wirklichen Behauptung ihrer Intentionen und Tendenzen. Das kritische Motiv der Kultur gebiert heute Formen der totalen Herrschaft. Wenn aber heute die Kulturformen noch eine mögliche Herrschaft ankündigen, folgen sie sicherlich der grundlegenden Idee und Intuition, dem Erbe des Abendlandes.

Deshalb will Adorno noch nicht die Geisteskraft durch den Körper der aktuellen Gegenwart, mit einer Fata Morgana der unmittelbaren Aktion verwechseln. Diese Bearbeitung der Chancen des kritischen Geistes übersieht nicht einen Augenblick, ein Ereignis noch im intellektuellen Wagnis des Denkens herbeizuführen; daß sie vor allem anwesend ist in der Theorie, in der sehr komplizierten Umsetzung der Antinomien in das Medium des kritischen Geistes, im Aussagen und Schreiben. An diese Gedankenreiche schließen sich Reflexionen und Schriften, die nach Adornos Tod erschienen. In ihnen sieht man, daß Adorno sein Leben »nur dem Zufall zu verdanken hat«. Dabei hat man natürlich vor Augen, daß es eine unleugbare Tatsache ist, daß dieser kritische Geist als Jude in Deutschland lebt, daß er da ist, nach Auschwitz, und keinen Augenblick vergessen hat, was das bedeutet (I. Fetscher). Das ist der entscheidende Punkt.

Nur in diesem Sinn kann gesagt werden, daß Adorno sich selbst nicht betrügen will. In seinem Standpunkt und kritischen Werk, in dem-von der Philosophie bis zur Soziologie, von der Ästhetik bis zur Musik -die Fähigkeiten der negativen Dialektik differenziert werden, weicht er *dem Philisterium der empirischen Revolution aus, aber auch einem besonderen, edlen Idealismus und Fanatismus der Revolutionäre,* die glauben, daß sie wenigstens in der *Idee* dem »Reich der Freiheit« näher sind. Nun muß man eine entscheidende Frage stellen: Ist nicht vielleicht die Philosophie des Aktionismus eine eigene Flucht vor dem *tragischen Denken, blind, der tragischen Existenz und Geschichte gegenüber?*

Ist sie nicht nur die moderne Art, vor den Antinomien des historischen Ereignisses zu fliehen? Um auf dem Gebiet der Empirie die Seele des Logos als des modernen Opiums zu erleben? Trifft das nicht auch tatsächlich die negative Dialektik Adornos? Man müßte viele deffiziente, falsche und phantasmagorische Traditionen überwinden, um gewisse Bedingungen zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen zu erfüllen. In Adornos Leben war diese Versuchung der Wirkung der Tradition an sichtbarer Stelle, an einer sehr raffinierten und differenzierten. Auch da ist vor allem nicht die Rede von Hegel, von seiner absoluten Dialektik der Durchschaubarkeit des Seins und der Geschichte. Nun, auch der jetztige geschichtliche Augenblick, getränkt vom Opium der Kontestation, des Rebellierens, der Hippie-Philosophie intoniert eine eigentümliche Dialektik des Verhaltens Adorno gegenüber. Vielleicht ist es deshalb notwendig, an einige Momente dieses Verhaltens zu erinnern: erstens war Adorno mit seiner negativen Dialektik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Studenten ein Modell der *kritischen Urteilskraft* und der Macht des kritischen Denkens, aber gerade sie werfen ihm vor, kein Revolutionär zu sein, was er scheinbar auch gar nicht sein wollte; zweitens drückt Adorno neben H. Marcuse am

the death of metaphysics shines gloriously in the real assertion of its intentions and tendencies. The critical motif of culture today gives birth to forms of total domination. But if today the forms of culture still announce a possible rule, they are certainly following the basic idea and intuition, the heritage of the West.

For this reason, Adorno does not want to confuse the mental power through the body of the actual present with a fata m organa of immediate action. This processing of the chances of the critical spirit does not overlook for a moment to bring about an event in the intellectual venture of thinking; that it is present above all in theory, in the very complicated implementation of the antinomies in the medium of the critical mind, in statements and writing. Reflections and writings that appeared after Adorno's death followed on from this realm of ideas. In them you can see that

Adorno owes his life »only to chance«. Of course, one has in mind that it is an undeniable fact that this critical spirit lives as a Jew in Germany, that he is there, after Auschwitz, and has not forgotten for a moment what that means (I.

Fetcher). That is the decisive point.

Only in this sense can it be said that Adorno does not wish to deceive himself. In his point of view and critical work, in which - from philosophy to sociology, from aesthetics to music - the capacities of negative dialectics are differentiated, he avoids the philistinism of empirical revolution, but also a special, noble idealism and fanaticism from the revolutionaries who believe that, at least in idea, they are closer to the 'realm of freedom'. Now one has to ask a crucial question: Isn't the philosophy of actionism perhaps its own escape from tragic thinking, blind to tragic existence and history?

Isn't it just the modern way of escaping the antinomies of the historical event? To experience the soul of the logos as the modern opium in the realm of empiricism? Doesn't that also apply to Adorno's negative dialectics? One would have to overcome many inefficient, false, and phantasmagorical traditions in order to meet certain conditions for answering these questions.

In Adorno's life this temptation to the effect of tradition was visible, in a very refined and subtle way.

Here, too, there is above all no talk of Hegel, of his absolute dialectic of the transparency of being and history. Well, even the present

historical moment, drunk on the opium of contestation, of rebellion, of hippie philosophy, intones a peculiar dialectic of behavior towards Adorno. Perhaps it is therefore necessary to recall a few aspects of this behavior: firstly, Adorno, with his negative dialectic, was a model of critical judgment and the power of critical thinking for the students in the Federal Republic of Germany, but it is they who accuse him of not being a revolutionary to be what he didn't seem to want to be; secondly, Adorno presses next to H. Marcuse on

lucidesten die Motive der kritischen Theorie und die Kritik an der Konsum-Gesellschaft aus, die er -wie I. Fetscher zurecht bemerkt – nicht erfunden hat, sowie auch Freud die Neurosen nicht erfunden hat. Und als nächstes, seit auch er die Vertreter der Macht, die Polizei gerufen hat die Studenten, die das Institut für soziale Forschung besetzt hatten zu vertreiben, wo er Direktor war, erhält sein Zwist mit den Studenten, ihrem Verhalten, eine gewisse *objektive Form*, und so betrachten ihn die Studenten als »Verräter«, Abgefallenen und »Salonkommunisten«.

Andererseite hört Adorno schlechtgemeinte, stupide und standardisierte Ablehnungen: einige seiner Kollegen bemerken boshaft, er habe die allgemeine Revolte in der Bundesrepublik entzündet und theoretisch motiviert- und er sei jetzt-man erinnert an das Schicksal des Zaubermeisters mit seinem Lehrling selbst ihr prominentes und erwünschtes Opfer. Das regte I. Fetscher dazu an, – nach seinem kürzlichen Tod –, zu bemerken, daß er aus persönlichen Zusammentreffen mit Adorno erfuhr, daß dieser das Bild, das von ihm existierte, kaum akzeptierte und wie er selbst, trotz aller Verfehlungen, Kurzschlüsse in der Aktion der Studenten – »die jungen Rebelle« positiv beurteilte. Im übrigen können die »Studenten, die sich gegen eine als bedrückend und entfremdend empfundende Welt, zur Wehr setzen, hatten seine ganze Solidarität auch wenn er die Mittel als illusorisch beurteilte, deren sie sich bedienten. Er hat ihre Schwäche gesehen-viele studentische Rebellen haben an ihre eigene Stärke geglaubt«.

8. *Der Abgrund der Verzweiflung, jenseits des Idols*

Es ist charakteristisch, daß Adorno konsequent in seinem eigenen kritischen Denken bleibt: deshalb hatte er kein Rezept für die Studenten, ihre Aktion, aber auch ein Verschweigen suggerierte er nicht. Trotzdem häufen sich die politischen Enttäuschungen, die hinter ihm standen, es waren zu viele. Aber woher sollte Adorno den Mut haben, eine »Anleitung zum Handeln« zu übernehmen? *I. Flescher* hat es übernommen, diese *Situationsdialektik der gesellschaftlichen und historischen Objektivierung von Adornos Denken* zu interpretieren. Wenn er davon spricht, daß Adorno die Konsequenz eines »zweiten Trennung von der revolutionären Theorie und der sozialen Realität« illustriert, meint er damit die Selbsterkenntnis der negativen Dialektik, denkt er an den Standpunkt, daß schon zehn Jahre der Französischen Revolution klarstand, daß die höchsten Ideale des Westens, die Ideale von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit sind-als Katapult für eine *begrenzte* Emanzipierung der bürgerlichen Klasse und der kapitalistischen Produktion gedient haben. Andererseits haben sich in Rußland nach dem Großen Oktober, zehn Jahre später, die »selbsternannten Sachwalter der proletarischen Emanzipierung ebenso von den Zielen sozialistischer Befreigungsbewegung emanzipiert, wie ihre Vorgänger sich von denen des bürgerlichen Humanismus«. Dies führt im Grunde zu einer gewollten und scharfsinnigen Einsicht: »Wer mit dem Weg der bürgerlichen Emanzipation vertraut war, könnte früher und klarer erkennen, was geschah«.

most lucidly the motives of the critical theory and the critique of the consumer society, which he - as I. Fetscher rightly remarks -

did not invent, just as Freud did not invent the neuroses. And next,

since he too called the representatives of the authorities, the police, to evict the students who had occupied the Institute for Social Research, where he was director, his quarrel with the students, their behavior, acquires a certain objective Form, and so the students regard him as a "traitor", a defector and a "parlour communist".

On the other hand, Adorno hears ill-intentioned, stupid and standardized rejections: some of his colleagues maliciously remark that he sparked the general revolt in the Federal Republic and theoretically motivated it - and he is now - one recalls the fate of the magician and his apprentice himself their prominent and desired victim . This prompted I. Fetscher to remark - after his recent death - that he learned from personal encounters with Adorno that the latter hardly accepted the image that existed of him and, like himself, despite all his failings, Short circuits in the action of the students - "the young rebels" judged positively.

For the rest, the "students who defend themselves against a world perceived as oppressive and alienating had his full solidarity, even if he judged the means they used to be illusory. He saw their weakness - many student rebels believed in their own strength.

8. The abyss of despair, beyond the idol It is characteristic that Adorno remains consistent in his own critical thinking: therefore he had no recipe for the students, their action, but he also did not suggest concealment.

Nevertheless, the political disappointments that stood behind him are piling up, there were too many. But how could Adorno have had the courage to adopt "instructions for action"? 7. Flescher has taken it upon himself to interpret this situational dialectic of the social and historical objectification of Adorno's thinking.

When he speaks of Adorno's consequence of a "second separation from revolutionary theory and social reality"

illustrated, he means the self-knowledge of the negative dialectic, he thinks of the point of view that ten years after the French Revolution it was clear that the highest ideals of the West, the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity are - as a catapult for a limited emancipation of the served the bourgeois class and capitalist production. On the other hand, in Russia, after the Great October, ten years later, the "self-proclaimed advocates of proletarian emancipation emancipated themselves from the goals of the socialist liberation movement, just as their predecessors emancipated themselves from those of bourgeois

humanism." Basically, this leads to a deliberate and astute insight: "Anyone who was familiar with the path of bourgeois emancipation could see earlier and more clearly what was happening."

Es ist sicher, daß diese kritischen Ansichten eine schlechte Stimmung nicht nur in Adornos Negativer Dialektik, auch bei verschiedenen Strömungen der zeitgenössischen Linken, beim allgemeinen Revolt, gegen die immer tiefere und zerstörerische Herrschaft der Arbeit als totaler Repression, ausdrücken. Daher gehört Adorno in die Reihe der modernen Intellektuellen-neben Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, B. Brecht, Herbert Marcuse – die als erste die metaphysische Wurzel und die Motive sowohl des empirischen Kapitalismus und des bestehenden Sozialismus erkannt haben. Doch es ist notwendig, neben allen Ähnlichkeiten von der Orientation Benjamins und B. Brechts zu unterscheiden, die – nach Fetscher – »in der Hoffnung lebten, die kommunistische Substanz würde über ihre brutale Degradierung triumphieren«.

Unzweifelhaft folgt auch hier Adorno der *Existentialität* des kritischen Widerstandes der Vernunft. Wie auch Kierkegaard, entscheidet er sich für den einsamen Kampf gegen die allgemeine Gleichschaltung, die stark aus der Substanz der modernen Welt erwächst, sowohl im Sozialismus als auch im Kapitalismus. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt ist es für uns entscheidend, (I. Fetscher) den Gedanken aufzufassen, daß Adorno das bewahren wollte, was die moderne Zeit verdrängt und in einen repressiven Rahmen stellt, das, was in der Idee ausbricht, sowohl im kapitalistischen als auch im sozialistischen Humanismus; erst von dieser Position betrachtet, von diesem Aussichtspunkt kritisiert Adorno die »moderne Welt«, verständlicherweise »insbesondere ihren kulturellen Ausdruck«. Auf jeden Fall zeigt sich die Existentialität der Vernunft als eine Möglichkeit der Kritik der repressiven Gesellschaft, ihrer Zivilisation und Kultur, ihrer Technologie, Soziologie und Philosophie, Theologie und Politik.

Es ist dennoch klar, daß Adorno von den Mächten der dialektischen Vernunft besessen ist. Und das deshalb, weil die Vernunft die Jugend des Seins, die *Möglichkeit der Wahrheit,* die Genialität des Werkes ist. Ohne revolutionäre Illusionen und Fata Morgana glaubt er an das Medium der Kritik, in dem das ausgedrückt werden muß, was die Repression der dominierenden Kategorien der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verwirft und in das *Unaussprechliche* verdammt, zum »Irrationalen« verurteilt, oder es brutal in die Welt der Gleichschaltung und Manipulierung zersetzt. Die Kritik ist also die Treue dem Leben gegenüber, dem sonst überall die Gefahr droht zu verschwinden.

Sicher ist die Kritik Adornos analog zur Geschichtlichkeit der Existenz in der Vielheit der Strömungen der modernen Philosophie der Existenz und Phänomenologie (z. B. in Husserls, auf der dritten Stufe der Historizität). Im selben Maße, in dem wir in uns entdecken, daß ideologische Momente, die in verschiedenen Künsten erscheinen und sich setzen, nicht nur substantielle Arten sind, sondern sie erstrecken sich-wie das Adorno klar gesagt hat-bis zur ästhetischen Komposition und Kristallisierung des Dinges selbst, in diesem Maß wird die *Kritik in uns, und das nur am Werk, Widerstand gegen alle Formen der Ideologie;* die Technik als Ideologie, die Wissenschaft als Ideologie. Gegen alle Totalitären Formen der Gesellschaft.

It is certain that these critical views express a bad mood not only in Adorno's Negative Dialectics, but also in various currents of the contemporary left, in the general revolt against the ever deeper and

destructive domination of work as total repression. Therefore, Adorno belongs in the ranks of modern intellectuals - along with Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, B. Brecht, Herbert Marcuse - who were the first to recognize the metaphysical roots and motives of both empirical capitalism and existing socialism. But it is necessary to distinguish, apart from all similarities, from the orientation of Benjamin and B. Brecht, who - according to Fetscher - "lived in the hope that the communist substance would triumph over its brutal degradation."

Here, too, Adorno undoubtedly follows the existentiality of the critical resistance of reason. Like Kierkegaard, he chooses the solitary struggle against the general conformity that grows strongly from the substance of the modern world, both in socialism and in capitalism. From this point of view, it is crucial for us (I. Fetscher) to grasp the idea that Adorno wanted to preserve what modern times repress and place in a repressive framework, what erupts in the idea, both in the capitalist and in the socialist humanism; It is only from this position, from this vantage point, that Adorno criticizes the "modern world", understandably "especially its cultural expression". In any case, the existentiality of reason appears as a way of criticizing the repressive society, its civilization and culture, its technology, sociology and philosophy, theology and politics.

It is nevertheless clear that Adorno is obsessed with the powers of dialectical reason. And that is because reason is the youth of being, the possibility of truth, the genius of the work. Without revolutionary illusions and fata m organa, he believes in the medium of criticism in which must be expressed what the repression of the dominant categories of bourgeois society rejects and condemns to the inexpressible, condemns to the "irrational," or brutally in the world of conformity and manipulation decomposed. Criticism is loyalty to life, which otherwise is in danger of disappearing everywhere.

Adorno's critique is certainly analogous to the historicity of existence in the multiplicity of currents in the modern philosophy of existence and phenomenology (e.g. in Husserl, on the third level of historicity). To the same extent that we discover within ourselves that

ideological moments that appear and take place in various arts are not only substantive species, but they extend - as Adorno has clearly said - to the aesthetic composition and crystallization of the thing itself, to this extent the critique becomes in us, and that only at work, resistance to all forms of ideologic; technology as ideologic, science as ideologic.

MARX ON ALIENATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Paul Restuccia

Montreal, Canada

Most Marxists have rightly pointed out that alienation for Marx is not ontological, that is, it is not a permanent condition of man's being. But in so doing, some have gone to the opposite pole in maintaining that the abolition of private property in the means of production will end human alienation. Critics of this view, on the other hand, have pointed to passages in Marx's early writings which are alleged to show that private property is not the cause of alienation. This is one of the reasons that the validity of a distinction between the »young« Marx and the »mature« Marx has been a major point of debate in the recent literature. The juxtaposition of Marx's early and later writings has led Marxists and non-Marxists alike to claim either that Marx contradicts himself or that he later abandoned his early »humanism«. Some light may be shed on this issue by means of a discussion of an alleged contradiction in Marx.

Marx is said to have contradicted himself or, at the very least, to have been inconsistent, concerning the locus of the cause of alienation as set forth in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*[1] and *The German Ideology*.[2] This inconsistency is taken by some critics to be an example of Marx's »Hegelianism« in the *Manuscripts* which was later abandoned in *The German Ideology* and later writings.

A. James Gregor contends that in the period from 1841 to 1845 Marx was preoccupied with overcoming the philosophy of Hegel through an analysis of Hegelian concepts and categories. The *Manuscripts*, written before this process of self-clarification was complete, contain, therefore, »residual Hegelianisms«. The concept of alienation, according to Gregor, is treated by Marx in a Hegelian manner. Thus Gregor writes, »Marx continued to speak the Hegelian language and referred to 'alienation' as though it were something in some sense

[1] Edited by Dirk Struik from the translation by Martin Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964).

[2] Edited with an Introduction by R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1947).

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prior to the specific forms of alienation which are the product of human enterprise in the empirical world«.[3] According to this account, Marx uses »alienation« as a logical concept from which he derives all empirical alienations. Alienation is used, moreover, to identify the process whereby man objectifies himself and thereby creates his world. Gregor writes:

> When Marx tells us that 'the object of labor is ... the objectification of man's species life ... and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created', and that 'labor is only an expression of human activity within alienation ...', he is obviously using 'alienation' as an abstract or metaphysical category in much the same way that Hegel might, as something logically prior to its particular empirical manifestations.[4]

From these remarks it is clear that Gregor is maintaining that, for Marx in the *Manuscripts*, objectification and labor *as such* are alienating activities. The purpose of this paper is to show that a consideration of the above quotations in their context shows Gregor's interpretation to be untenable.

Production, for Marx, is man's work upon the objective world in which he fashions that world in accordance with his needs and desires. It is through production that man proves himself to be a conscious »species being«, i. e., a being who produces, unlike the animal, by utilizing (at least potentially) all aspects of his material environment. In so doing, man produces on the basis of all production that has gone before him and for all humanity to come after him. Man, therefore, as Marx says, is a »universal being«. Moreover, Marx writes:

> Through and because of this production, nature appears as *his* work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the *objectification of man's species life:* for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his *species life*, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him.[5]

Marx does not say that the »category« or »concept« of estranged (alienated) labor takes away the worker's product. For Marx, as will be shown below, this would be impossible. It is equally wrong to imply, as Gregor does, that the objectification of labor in the product is an alienating activity. For Marx clearly states that man realizes himself in labor. It would be impossible for nature to appear as »*his* work and his reality« if labor were *necessarily* alienation.

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[3] *A Survey of Marxism* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[5] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, p. 114.

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The second part of the quotation (that »labor is only an expression of human activity within alienation«) is taken out of the context in which it appears. Labor is only an alienating activity when it is performed under conditions of an extreme and forced division of labor. The context makes clear that Marx is not speaking of labor as such.[6]

To cite one more of many instances where Marx makes it perfectly clear that alienation is not an ontological category somehow prior to its empirical manifestations, we turn to a passage which appears at the very beginning of the essay on alienated labor. (The use of the phrase »political economy« in the following quotation refers to the analysis made of society by the classical economists, an analysis which, Marx maintained, was essentially correct *given the assumptions* of these economists and the realities of nineteenth century capitalism.) Marx writes:

> The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the ***objectification*** of labor. Labor's realization is its objectification. In the sphere of political economy this realization of labor appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object* and bondage to it; appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*.[7]

The use of such phrases as »appears as« is admittedly Hegelian and is to be found, for example, throughout the *Phenomenology*. But this should not lead one to conclude that the Marxian analysis in the *Manuscripts* is on the level of »categories« and »concepts«. Rather than concentrating on the *form* in which Marx puts his theory, it is necessary to analyze the empirical and conceptual *content* of that theory.

Gregor's interpretation of alienation as ontological leads him to state that Marx speaks of »private property« in a similar sense. Thus Gregor writes:

> The concept of 'alienated labor' seems to refer to human sensuous activity as such. Its product, objective reality, is then spoken of as 'private property' in a similarly broad or *ontological sense*. This 'alienation' is 'rooted in the nature of human development'. It is the ***logical presupposition*** of human development itself.[8]

This manner of interpreting Marx enables Gregor to deal more easily with a passage that has puzzled many commentators. Gregor does not quote the passage in its entirety, with the result, as we shall see, that it is highly misleading. On Gregor's interpretation of the passage, he is enabled to juxtapose it with what Marx says in *The German Ideology* and declare that Marx contradicts himself. In what follows, I shall quote the portion of the passage which Gregor cites and set

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Gregor prefaces his quotation of Marx by stating that only on an interpretation which is based on the recognition of »residual Hegelianism« in the Manuscripts does it make sense for Marx to speak as he does of alienation and private property. He quotes Marx as follows:

> Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labor – i. e., of alienated man, of estranged labor, of estranged life, of estranged man. True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labor (of alienated life) from political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is really its consequence . . .[9]

Marx here seems to be saying that alienated labor causes private property. For Gregor this means that, somehow, the *concept* or *category* of alienated labor causes the *concept* or *category* of private property. But in *The German Ideology* we find, according to Gregor, something quite different. He writes:

> 'The division of labor and private property are . . . identical expressions', for 'with the division of labor . . . is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution (both quantitative and qualitative), of labor and its products, hence property . . .' *Out of these conditions arises* 'estrangement', 'alienation'. The order indicated in the Paris *Manuscripts* is reversed. The division of labor, private property, *causes* alienation. What had been a logical or speculative presupposition in the *Manuscripts* became, in *The German Ideology*, an attempt at empirical analysis, for history 'does not have to look for a category'.[10]

The alleged contradiction, or, at the very least, inconsistency, which Gregor claims Marx is guilty of, consists in this: Either »alienated labor causes private property« or, since »division of labor« and »private property« are »identical expressions«, according to Gregor, »private property causes alienation«.

Now, the passage from the *Manuscripts* has caused considerable consternation and puzzlement for some commentators. This is understandable. For how could Marx the »materialist«, the »historical determinist«, the man who holds that »social existence determines the

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consciousness of men«,[11] say something which seems patently opposed to these doctrines? How could Marx say that alienated labor causes private property when the whole point of his thought and action was to abolish private property in order to free man?

Some writers find evidence for Marx's »immaturity« in the quoted passage. For example, in referring to the *Manuscripts*, two Marxist writers state:

> In these notes Marx still regarded private property as the result of alienated labor rather than the reverse. Within four years the concept of alienation was displaced and what became central in the mature Marx was the exploitation of the working class, the concept of surplus value and the necessity of a social revolution led by the working class.[12]

Others proceed as if the passage did not exist. Thus, for example, Roger Garaudy writes, »As Marx points out in many formulations, alienation is born out of the private ownership of the means of production. It will disappear, therefore, when private ownership disappears«.[13] Still others regard the passage in question as a lapse of critical attention on the part of Marx. Thus Dirk Struik writes:

> If in estranged labor the product of the laborer is alien to the worker, to whom does it belong? The answer is clear: it belongs to the master of labor, the capitalist. Private property is thus the product of alienated labor. At one place Marx qualifies this by saying that in the last analysis private property is the consequence of alienated labor, that later there is a reciprocal relationship, but the whole tenor leads to Marx's conclusion of the preponderance of private property. We witness here historical materialism in the making.[14]

This method of dealing with the problem is understandable when one sees Struik's basic interpretive schema. »The importance, the validity«, he writes, »of the early writings can be judged only from the point of view of fully developed Marxism«.[15]

In order to show that Gregor's claim of contradiction or inconsistency is not valid, it is necessary to quote in full the passage in question. Immediately after Marx says that private property is really the consequence of alienated labor, he continues »... just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion.

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[11] Preface to *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in *Marx & Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), p. 43.

[12] Francis Bartlett and James Shodell, »Fromm, Marx, and the Concept of Alienation«, *Science and Society*, XXVII (Summer, 1963), 323.

[13] *Karl Marx: The Evolution of His Thought* (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 62.

[14] »Marx's Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts«, *Science and Society*, XXVII (Summer, 1963), 293.

[15] *Ibid.*, 285.

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Later this relationship [of alienated labor to private property] becomes reciprocal«.[16] Thus, two clues are provided as to Marx's meaning here. On the one hand, we are told that after the coming-to-be of alienated labor its relation to private property is reciprocal, that is, that the »institution« of private property causes alienated labor and *vice versa.* The problem here would seem to be to make sense of the claim that alienated labor causes private property. The second clue is Marx's mention of the gods. By equating the latter with private property, Marx leads us to believe that there is a sense in which private property is not real. The key to understanding Marx here, it seems to me, is to analyze what he means by private property.

A starting point for this analysis is provided by a remark of Louis Dupré. He writes: »The priority of the estrangement of labor in relation to private property is not so much that of a cause with respect to its effect, as that of the more *interior* principle (a man himself – in his operation) with respect to its external manifestation.[17] Private property, then, appears as a *result* of man's (more accurately, of a particular class of men) activity. But it still has to be shown that it is the result of a certain kind of activity, namely, alienated labor. In order to show this, we must go beyond Dupré's analysis and view private property not only as a result of a certain kind of activity but also, and just as importantly, as a result of a certain kind of *relation.*

In the *Manuscripts,* Marx criticizes the classical economists for failing to deal adequately with private property. »Political economy«, he writes, »starts with the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us«.[18] That is to say, political economy takes private property as a thing-in-itself, as a given, as a reality somehow fully formed and operative, independent of men. It is this way of viewing private property, it seems to me, which Marx seeks to combat. If this is what is meant by private property, then private property is not real. It is a fetish, a reification of certain kinds of relations among men and nature. Private property in this sense, therefore, conceals the relations which constitute it.

Again criticizing political economy, Marx writes, *»Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not considering the direct relationship between the worker* (labor) *and production«.* And further on we read: *»The direct relationship of labor to its products is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production.* The relationship of the man of means to the objects of production and to production itself is only a *consequence* of this first relationship – and confirms it.«[19] It is clear, then, that any relationship of the capitalist (»the man of means«) to the objects of production is dependent upon, is a consequence of, the relation of the worker to the objects of production.

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[16] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* p. 117.

[17] *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966), p. 130n.

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The solution of the problem is now at hand. It consists in showing that the relation of the capitalist to the objects of production is constitutive (but not solely) of private property and that this is only possible as an aspect or moment of that relation between capitalist and worker that is constitutive of alienated labor. It will then be the case that private property (a relation of the capitalist to the objects of production) is a *consequence* of alienated labor (a relation of the worker to the objects of production).

In *Capital,* Marx writes that »property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labor of others or its product, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the laborer, of appropriating his own product«.[20] (It is clear from the context that the »property« referred to is private property.) Mitchell Franklin adds to this passage the comment that »Genkin in his commentary on Soviet civil law, understands the same passage from Marx more accurately as 'the appropriation' of 'estranged, unpaid labor'.«[21] The products here being appropriated are commodities and it is thus products in the form of commodities which constitute private property. The commodity is thus the result of a certain *relation* between capitalist and worker. The commodity in its form as private property, therefore, results from the appropriation of the products of labor. And this appropriation can only take place because the products of the worker's labor (and the worker himself, since his labor power is appropriated) are alienated. Therefore, since, for Marx, as has been shown, the relation of the capitalist to the objects of production is a *consequence* of the relation of the workers to the objects of production, alienated labor is the cause of private property.

The conception of private property found in political economy conceals these complex relationships. Private property as a thing-in-itself, as a mere object, cannot *cause* anything. It is men, as Marx never tires of telling us, who make history.[22] The same analysis clearly applies to the quotations which Gregor gives from *The German Ideology,* and thus the charge of contradiction or inconsistency cannot be maintained.

The force of the present argument stems from the interpretation of alienation as primarily an appropriative *relationship* rather than as an ontological condition of man. It has been my purpose to show that interpreting alienation in this manner both accords with Marx's analysis and enables us to show a consistency in his views on the subject. The assertion that Marx abandoned his early humanism in favor of an »inhuman« economic analysis, with all its attendant implications for the separation of a »young« and »mature« Marx, rests on quite un-Marxian assumptions concerning the nature of Marx's humanism and his conception of private property. Marx's humanism, whatever

[20] *Capital* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.), I, 584.

[21] »On Hegel's Theory of Alienation and Its Historic Focre«, *Tulane Studies in Philosophy,* IX (1960), 77.

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2 * *

NIETZSCHES KRITIK DER HISTORISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN

Dieter Jähnig

Tübingen

I. Das wissenschaftliche Motiv von Nietzsches Wissenschaftskritik
II. Der Subjektivismus des methodischen Objektivitätsideals
III. Das historische Denken Nietzsches.

I

Die zweite der »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen«, »Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben«, ist neben dem »Zarathustra« eine der am frühesten berühmt gewordenen Schriften Nietzsches. Hier soll von ihr gehandelt werden in der Meinung, daß dieser Ruhm – im Gegensatz zu dem des »Zarathustra« – weniger ein Zeichen für die Problematik Nietzsches als ein Zeichen für die Problematik seines Verständnisses ist.

Dazu gehört bereits die Einschätzung, die der Schrift in ihrem Verhältnis zu Nietzsches späterem Denken, dem vermeintlich »eigentlichen« Nietzsche zuteil wird. Sie wird zumeist (im Zusammenhang mit Nietzsches Schopenhauer- und Wagner-Verehrung) als ein Teil seiner »Kulturkritik« verstanden, die er später, auf der Höhe seines Denkens, als peripher, als zu sehr zeitverhaftet, hinter sich gelassen habe.

Der Titel »unzeitgemäß« drückt ja in der Tat nur die besondere Art von *Zeitbezogenheit* dieser Betrachtungen aus. Sie sind in *der* Weise auf ihr Zeitalter gerichtet, daß sie nicht »mitlaufen«, sondern opponieren. »Unzeitgemäß« besagt: *zeitkritisch*. In einem Rückblick auf die Basler Zeit im »Ecce Homo« sagt Nietzsche: »Die vier *Unzeitgemäßen* sind durchaus kriegerisch (II, 1113). Wenn es aber so steht, dann reicht auch ihre Bedeutung für den späteren Leser nur so weit, wie das Kritisierte selbst noch akut ist. Und da scheint es nun doch so zu stehen, daß der Historismus, den Nietzsche in der zweiten Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung kritisiert, der *allgemeinen* Historismus-Kritik zwar immerhin um nahezu zwei Generationen voraus war, aber doch nicht mehr *unser* Problem ist, – so wenig wie etwa der kulturelle

NIETZSCH'S CRITICISM OF THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES

Dieter Jahnig

Tübingen

I. The scientific motive of Nietzsche's critique of science

II. The subjectivism of the methodological ideal of objectivity III. The historical thinking of Nietzsche.

I

The second of the "Untimely Reflections", "Of the Benefits and Disadvantages of History for Life", is, alongside the "Zarathustra", one of Nietzsche's writings that became famous at the earliest.

Here we shall deal with her in the opinion that this glory

- in contrast to that of "Zarathustra" - is less a sign of the problems of Nietzsche than a sign of the problems of his understanding.

This already includes the appraisal given to the writing in its relation to Nietzsche's later thinking, the supposedly "real" Nietzsche. It is mostly (in connection with Nietzsche's Schopenhauer and Wagner worship) as a part of his

Understood "cultural criticism," which he later left behind, at the height of his thinking, as peripheral, as too tied to the times.

The title "unzeitgemafi" in fact only expresses the special kind of time-relatedness of these considerations. They are geared towards their age in such a way that they do not "run along" but oppose. "Unzeitgemafi" means: time-critical. In a review of the Basel period in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says: The four Unzeilgemaflen are thoroughly warlike (II, 1113). If this is the case, however, then its meaning for the later reader only extends as far as what is criticized is itself still acute. And it seems that the historicism that Nietzsche criticizes in the second untimely reflection was, after all, almost two generations ahead of the general criticism of historicism, but it is no longer our problem - as little as something like the cultural 223

Fortschrittsoptimismus, den Nietzsche in der Person des »Bildungsphilisters« David Friedrich Strauss angreift (jenes Spenglers der Gründerzeit, der die *Vollendung* des Abendlandes unter Darwin, Moltke und Bismarck predigte), und ebenso wenig schließlich, wie uns Nietzsches damalige Vorbilder, Schopenhauer und Wagner, das sein können, was sie für Nietzsche damals waren: *Antipoden* des Zeitalters.

Die *Kulturkritik* des frühen Nietzsche erscheint uns zeitgebundener, zeitverhafterer als die spätere *Weltkritik* Nietzsches: seine Deutung des Christentums und des abendländischen Platonismus als einer Geschichte des »Nihilismus«, seine Konzeption des Lebens als des »Willens zur Macht« und seine Bestimmung der Gegenwart als einer »Umwertung aller Werte«.

Dieser Anschein einer bloßen, vom Hauptwerk überholten Früh*stufe* des Frühwerks gründet sich auf die äußeren, untereinander *verschiedenen* Einzelthemen dieser Zeit. (Man kann diese Zeit, die Jahre von 1869 bis 1876, nach Nietzsches damaligen Aufenthaltsort und seiner damaligen Tätigkeit, der Professur für klassische Philosophie an der Basler Universität und für griechische Sprache und Literatur an der Oberstufe des Basler Gymnasiums, die *Basler Zeit* Nietzsches nennen.) Außer den genannten vier veröffentlichten »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen« gehört dazu das umfangreiche Fragment einer fünften »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung«: »Wir Philologen«, eine Folge öffentlicher Vorträge: »Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten«, und schließlich – das früheste Buch dieser Zeit, nach Nietzsches späteren Urteilen aber zugleich das wichtigste und am weitesten vorausweisende – »Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik«.

Versucht man jedoch, die verschiedenen Themen etwas genauer zu fassen, dann verwandelt sich der undeutliche Pluralismus zu einem klaren *Dualismus*. Dieser ist schon vorgeprägt in der »Geburt der Tragödie«. Das Buch handelt einerseits von der Entstehungszeit der Tragödie, in der die *Kunst* dominiert, andererseits von der Folgezeit, von dem, was Nietzsche damals den *»Sokratismus«* nannte. Das Thema der ersten »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung« ist die Verbindung von Bildungsenthusiasmus und Stillosigkeit in der Gründerzeit. Das Thema der zweiten ist die Frage: welche Rolle spielt das Geschichts-*Bewußtsein* im geschichtlichen *Dasein* der Menschen? Das Thema der dritten ist der Philosoph der Weltentsagung, interpretiert als ein Nonkonformist, vor dem die *herrschenden* Ideale der Zeit – durch den Kontrast – Kontur gewinnen: das Bildungsideal und der moderne Gelehrtentypus. Das Thema der vierten schließlich ist Richard Wagner, der damals – vor Bayreuth – von Nietzsches (dann so tief enttäuschter) Hoffnung interpretiert wird als unzeitgemäße Wiedergeburt oder doch zumindest Erinnerung einer tragischen Kunst. Alle diese »Betrachtungen« sind also durch eine Gemeinsamkeit von zwei Themen verbunden: die alten *Griechen* und die moderne *Bildung* (die Wissenschaft, die Erzieher, die Gelehrten). Und beide Momente selbst sind unter sich verbunden durch ihre *Gegensätzlichkeit*. Der *einheitliche* Grund von allen Schriften der Basler Zeit ist ausgesprochen in dem Titel der geplanten fünften »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung«: »Wir Philologen«.

Optimism of progress, which Nietzsche attacks in the person of the "educational philistine" David Friedrich Strauss (that Spengler of the early days who preached the perfection of the West under Darwin,

Moltke and Bismarck), and finally just as little as Nietzsche's models at the time, Schopenhauer and W agner can be what they were for Nietzsche at the time: antipodes of the age.

The cultural criticism of the early Nietzsche seems to us more time-bound, more time-bound than Nietzsche's later world criticism: his interpretation of Christianity and Western Platonism as a history of "nihilism", his conception of life as the "will to power" and his definition of the present as a »revaluation of all values«.

This appearance of a mere early stage of the early work, superseded by the main work, is based on the four different individual themes of this period. (You can call this time, the years from 1869 to 1876, Nietzsche's time in Basel, after Nietzsche's place of residence and his activity at that time, the professorship for classical philosophy at the University of Basel and for Greek language and literature at the upper level of the Gymnasium in Basel.) In addition to the four published "untimely reflections" mentioned, there is also the extensive fragment of a fifth

"Untimely consideration": "We philologists", a series of public lectures: "On the future of our educational institutions", and finally - the earliest book of this time, but according to Nietzsche's later judgments at the same time the most important and most forward-looking - "Die Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music«.

If, however, one tries to define the various themes more precisely, then the vague pluralism turns into a clear dualism. This is already prefigured in The Birth of Tragedy. The book deals on the one hand with the time when the tragedy arose, in which art dominates, and on the other hand with the period that followed, with what Nietzsche called “Socratism us”. T he topic of the first "Untimely Consideration" is the connection between enthusiasm for education and a lack of style in the early days. T he subject of the second is the question: what role does the history Ztea/M/5£-

be in the historical existence of man? T he theme of the third is the philosopher of world renunciation, interpreted as a non-conformist against whom the dominant ideals of the time - by contrast -

Gaining shape: the ideal of education and the modern type of scholar.

Finally, the theme of the fourth is Richard W agner, who at the time -

before Bayreuth - is interpreted by Nietzsche's (then so deeply disappointed) hope as an untimely rebirth or at least a memory of a

tragic art. A ll these "reflections"

are thus linked by a commonality of two themes: the ancient Greeks and modern education (science, educators, scholars). And both moments themselves are connected through their opposition. The common ground of all writings of the Basel period is expressed in the title of the planned fifth "untimely reflection": "We philologists".

Im Vorwort zur Schrift »Über den Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie« sagt Nietzsche, er wolle nicht verschweigen:

> »daß ich nur, sofern ich Zögling älterer Zeiten, zumal der griechischen bin, über mich als ein Kind dieser jetzigen Zeit zu so unzeitgemäßen Erfahrungen komme« (I, 210).

Das heißt zunächst: Er verdankt dem Umgang mit den Griechen die kritische Distanz zur eigenen Zeit. Es heißt aber noch mehr: Dasjenige, *wogegen* sich in dieser Schrift seine Kritik richtet, die »historische Bildung«, das kennt er ja auch, *sofern* er »Zögling der Griechen« war und (wie wir hinzufügen können) Zöglinge der Griechen selbst erzieht. Er kennt die historische Bildung in der Gestalt der *Wissenschaft* vom Altertum. Was er kritisiert, das ist die Tätigkeit, der Beruf, die Welt des Zöglings von Schulpforta, des Studenten in Bonn und Leipzig (der aufgrund von Seminararbeiten zur altgriechischen Lyrik und zur Aristoteles-Überlieferung noch vor der Promotion den Lehrstuhl in Basel erhalten hatte) und schließlich des Gymnasial- und Universitätsprofessors selbst. Wenn Nietzsche als »Zögling der Griechen« zur Kritik einer Erscheinung der eigenen Zeit gelangt, dann hat das also den doppelten Sinn, daß er dieser Schule die *Maßstäbe* der Kritik verdankt (die Griechen als *Gegensatz* zur eigenen Zeit), zugleich aber auch den *Gegenstand* der Kritik (die philologisch-historischen Wissenschaften als einer *Erscheinung* seiner Zeit): »Wir Philologen«.

Damit ist nun freilich noch nicht die Frage beantwortet, ob die »Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen« und zumal diejenige über den Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie den Rahmen einer mehr oder weniger zeitgebundenen *Kultur*-Kritik überschreiten. Um das zu sehen, braucht man sich aber nur den Grund des genannten Gegensatzes klar zu machen. Wie kommt Nietzsche denn aus der Kenntnis der *Griechen* zur Kritik an der *Erwerbung* und *Vermittlung* dieser Kenntnis? Was bringt (anders gefragt) Nietzsche aus seiner eigenen Betätigung in der historisch-kritischen Forschung (noch dazu auf dem Gebiet, in dem mit Niebuhr und Boeckh die historisch-philologischen Wissenschaften im Ganzen methodisch begründet und entwickelt worden waren) und aus seiner eigenen Teilnahme an der historischen Bildung der Zeit (wiederum auf demjenigen Gebiet, das damals, zur Blütezeit des humanistischen Gymnasiums, als Fundament und Gipfel aller Bildung galt), was bringt ihn *von daher* zur Kritik an der »historischen Bildung«?

Zu vermuten ist, daß er darum zu einer Kritik an der Erkenntnisform im Namen des Erkenntnisinhaltes kommt, weil er das eine an dem anderen mißt, weil er – mit anderen Worten – *innerhalb* der Wissenschaft, *innerhalb* der Bildung eine Diskrepanz zwischen Form und Inhalt feststellt.

Die Art und Weise, *wie* in der Wissenschaft eine Sache erforscht, *wie* in der Bildung eine Sache angeeignet wird, widerspricht – nach Nietzsches Meinung – in solchen Fällen wie dem griechischen Altertum der Verfassung der Sache selbst. Zum Thema von Wissenschaft und Bildung gemacht, *ist* das griechische Altertum nicht mehr das, was es *in Wahrheit* ist.

In the foreword to the book "On the Benefits and Disadvantages of the Historic," Nietzsche says that he does not want to conceal:

"that I only, insofar as I am a pupil of older times, especially of the

Greeks, come to such untimely experiences about myself as a child of these present times" (I, 210).

First of all, this means that he owes his critical distance from his own time to his dealings with the Greeks. But it means even more: that against which his criticism is directed in this work, "historical education," he knows that too, insofar as he was "the pupil of the Greeks" and (as we may add) educates the pupils of the Greeks themselves.

He knows historical education in the form of the science of antiquity. What he criticizes is the activity, the profession, the world of Schulpforta's pupil, the student in Bonn and Leipzig (who, due to seminar work on ancient Greek poetry and the tradition of Aristotle, had received the chair in Basel before his doctorate) and and finally of the grammar school and university professor himself. When Nietzsche, as the »pupil of the Greeks«, arrives at the criticism of a phenomenon of his own time, then this has the double meaning that he owes the majesty of criticism to this school (the Greeks as opposed to the own time), but at the same time also the object of criticism (the philological-historical sciences as a phenomenon of his time): "We philologists".

Of course, this still does not answer the question of whether the "untimely considerations" and especially the one about the benefits and disadvantages of history go beyond the framework of a more or less time-bound cultural criticism. In order to see this, however, one only needs to make the reason for the contradiction mentioned clear to oneself. How does Nietzsche come from the knowledge of the Greeks to criticism of the acquisition and transmission of this knowledge? What does Nietzsche bring (putting it another way) out of his own activity in historical-critical research (in addition to that in the field in which the historical-philological sciences as a whole had been methodically founded and developed with Niebuhr and Boeckh) and from his own participation in of the historical education of the time (again in that field which at the time, at the peak of the humanistic Gymnasium, was considered the foundation and summit of all education), why did he criticize "historical education"?

It can be assumed that he came to a critique of the form of knowledge in the name of the content of knowledge, because he measured one against the other, because - in other words - within science, within education, he saw a discrepancy between form and content notes.

The way in which a thing is researched in science, how a thing is

appropriated in education, contradicts - in Nietzsche's opinion - in such cases as Greek antiquity the constitution of the thing itself Greek antiquity is no longer what it really is.

15 PRAXIS

Ob diese Ansicht berechtigt ist, was Nietzsche überhaupt konkret damit meint, soll im folgenden Abschnitt erläutert werden. Es ist zunächst nützlich, überhaupt diese *Fragestellung* Nietzsches zu bemerken. Denn schon damit wird ein verbreitetes Bild von Nietzsche korrigiert, das Bild von Nietzsche als eines Verächters der Rationalität, das Bild von seinem Frühwerk als einer bloßen, vom Schopenhauerschen Pessimismus und vom Wagnerschen Mystizismus entzündeten Polemik gegen den bürgerlich-liberalen Aufklärungsoptimismus. Die Korrektur an diesem Bild, soweit sie schon durch Nietzsches Fragestellung möglich wird, besteht aus zwei Momenten.

1. Die (zeitgebundene) Kulturkritik des Frühwerks ist nur der vordergründige Aspekt einer prinzipielleren Frage, nämlich der nach dem Wesen der modernen Wissenschaft. So sagt Nietzsche selbst – auf dem Kulminationspunkt seines Denkens, 1886, dem Jahr, in dem »Jenseits von Gut und Böse« und »Zur Genealogie der Moral« entstanden sind – in einer dem Frühwerk gegenüber sehr kritischen neuen »Vorrede« zur »Geburt der Tragödie«:

> »Was ich damals zu fassen bekam, etwas Furchtbares und Gefährliches ... heute würde ich sagen, daß es das *Problem der Wissenschaft* selbst war – Wissenschaft zum ersten Male als problematisch als fragwürdig gefaßt.« (I, 10)

Und die Begründung dafür, daß er gerade *dieses* Problem zuerst in einem Buch über die Entstehung der griechischen Tragödie zu fassen bekam, lautet:

> »Das Problem der Wissenschaft kann nicht auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft erkannt werden.« (I, 10)

Wenn man hier voreilig von Ästhetizismus spricht, verstellt man sich von vornherein den Sinn von Nietzsches Frage. Es geht hier *nicht* um Kunst *statt* Wissenschaft, sondern um einen Standpunkt, der zu Kunst *und* Wissenschaft gleichermaßen Distanz hat, so weit nämlich, daß *beides* nicht mehr selbstverständlich ist, konkreter gesagt, daß die Wissenschaft ebenso wenig selbstverständlich ist, wie dies die Kunst schon seit langem für die Wissenschaft ist.

»Die Wissenschaft als Problem« – da steckt dem Ansatz nach (und das will offensichtlich auch die Vorrede von 1886 sagen) bereits die Frage des späteren Denkens Nietzsches, das Problem der *Wahrheit*, die Frage (mit einer Formulierung aus der »Genealogie der Moral« zu sprechen):

> »... inwiefern der Wille zur Wahrheit selbst erst einer Rechtfertigung bedarf, hier ist eine Lücke in jeder Philosophie.« (II, 891; dritte Abhandlung, n. 24)

Der Zusatz soll sagen: Ebenso wichtig wie diese Frage selbst ist das *weitere* Problem, warum diese Frage bisher nicht gestellt worden ist, warum man hier gar keine Frage sah. In diesem Problem aber liegt

Whether this view is justified, and what Nietzsche actually means by it, will be explained in the following section. First of all, it is useful to note Nietzsche's questioning in general. Because this already corrects a

widespread image of Nietzsche, the image of Nietzsche as someone who despises rationality, the image of his early work as a mere polemic sparked by Schopenhauerian pessimism and Wagnerian mysticism against the bourgeois-liberal optimism of the Enlightenment. The correction of this picture, insofar as it is already possible through Nietzsche's questioning, consists of two moments.

1.

The (time-bound) cultural criticism of early work is only the superficial aspect of a more fundamental question, namely that of the nature of modern science. So says Nietzsche himself -

at the culmination point of his thinking, 1886, the year in which

"Beyond Good and Bose" and "On the Genealogy of Morals" were written - in a new "Preface" to the "Birth of Tragedy" which is very critical of the early work:

“What I got hold of then, something terrible and dangerous. . . today I would say that it was the problem of science itself - science recognized as problematic as questionable for the first time.« (I, 10)

And the reason why he was the first to grasp this problem in a book on the origin of Greek tragedy is as follows:

"The problem of science cannot be recognized on the basis of science." (I, 10)

If one speaks hastily here of aestheticism, one distorts the meaning of Nietzsche's question from the outset. It is not about art instead of science, but about a point of view that has an equal distance to art and science, to the extent that both are no longer self-evident, more specifically that science is just as little self-evident as art has been for science for a long time.

"Science as a problem" - the beginning (and the preface of 1886 obviously also wants to say this) already raises the question of Nietzsche's later thinking, the problem of truth, the question (with a formulation from the "Genealogy of M orally"

to speak):

» . . . to what extent the will to truth itself requires justification, there is a gap in every philosophy.« (II, 891; third treatise, n. 24)

The addition soli says: Just as important as this question itself is the further problem of why this question has not been asked before, why no question was seen here at all. But in this problem lies 226

(ganz gleich wie man sich dazu stellt) auf jeden Fall *mehr* vor als eine Kritik an der »Gründerzeit«. Hier geht es um den geschichtlichen Bereich, den Nietzsche mit den Namen »Platonismus«, »Christentum« und »Nihilismus« markiert hat.

Daß *dieses* Problem in der Tat bereits im Frühwerk den roten Faden ausmacht, das läßt sich auch bereits aus den *Themen* entnehmen. Wir brauchen nur noch eine weitere Schrift aus dieser Zeit zu nennen, die Nietzsche freilich nicht veröffentlicht hat, ein – wie er später sagt – »geheim gehaltenes Schriftstück«: den kleinen Aufsatz »Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn«. Mit »außermoralisch« ist die *Frage* gemeint: woher »der *Trieb* zur Wahrheit« stammt (III, 311). Diese Frage heißt nicht darum »außermoralisch«, weil Nietzsche hier etwa *gegen* die Wahrheit oder *gegen* die Moral polemisiert, sondern weil er den Tatbestand, daß das Streben nach Wahrheit von vornherein als eine »Tugend« angesehen, also *immer schon moralisch* beurteilt wird, selber noch zur Frage macht. Er nimmt also *hermeneutisch* einen Standpunkt »außerhalb der Moral« ein, eben um *fragen* zu können: wie kommt das, was ist der Grund, daß man die Wahrheit immer schon als einen moralischen Vorzug ansieht? Der Intention nach ist hier also schon ein wesentlicher, vielleicht der wesentlichste Gesichtspunkt des späteren Nietzsche da.

2. Damit, daß die Wissenschaft für Nietzsche um ihrer eigenen *Sache* willen zum Problem wird, muß die Vorstellung vom angeblichen Subjektivismus und Irrationalismus des frühen Nietzsche korrigiert werden. Denn wenn die Wissenschaft darum für Nietzsche zum Problem wird, weil sie ihrer *Sache* nicht genügend *angemessen* ist, dann ist der Grund seiner Kritik gerade ein Versagen der Wissenschaft gegenüber ihrem eigenen objetiven *Erkenntnisanspruch.*

Nietzsches primäre Sorge ist nicht, daß der »Geist« ein Widersacher der Seele sein könnte; seine Sorge ist im Gegenteil, daß der Anspruch des Geistes, der Anspruch, *Licht* in die Dinge zu bringen, *nicht genügend* erfüllt sein könnte, daß man sich ein falsches Licht vormacht, den Geist nämlich gar nicht überall und gar nicht hinlänglich an die Dinge kommen läßt. Es ist die *eigene* Intention, die eigene Wahrheitsintention der Wissenschaft, unter der Nietzsche die Wissenschaft selber noch zum Problem macht.

Hält man die beiden genannten Momente zusammen, so erscheint zwischen ihnen ein gewisser Widerspruch. Das zweite Moment enthält die Behauptung: Nietzsche *potenziere* die Wahrheitsintention der Wissenschaft, wenn er die Wissenschaft zur Frage macht; das erste: er mache eben diese *Wahrheits*intention zur Frage. In der einen (der ersten) Hinsicht fragt Nietzsche: ist die Wahrheit am Ende gar nicht jener höchste »Wert«, den zu sein sie vorgibt; in der anderen Hinsicht fragt er: stimmt die Wahrheitsintention der Wissenschaft mit ihrer Sache, d. h. mit der wahren Verfassung des zu Wissenden, also der Wirklichkeit überein?

Doch diese zweite Frage bezieht sich auf die erste. Sie bezeichnet das *Motiv* zu der ersten Frage. Nietzsche stellt die Wahrheit in Frage, *indem* er ihrem Anspruch folgt. Weit entfernt, ein rationales Den-

(regardless of what one thinks of it) definitely presents more than a critique of the »Günderzeit«. This is about the historical area that Nietzsche marked with the names "Platonism", "Christianity" and "nihilism".

The fact that this problem is in fact the common thread in the early work can already be inferred from the topics.

We only need to mention one more writing from this period, which Nietzsche admittedly did not publish, a - as he later says - "a document that was kept secret": the short essay "On Truth and Lie in the Non-Moral Sense." "Extramoral" means the question: where does "the drive towards truth" come from (III, 311). This question is not called "super-moral" because Nietzsche is polemizing here against truth or against morality, but because he considers the fact that the striving for truth from the outset to be a "virtue", i.e. is always judged morally , itself still makes a question. He thus adopts a hermeneutical standpoint 'outside morality' precisely in order to be able to ask: how is it, what is the reason, that truth has always been seen as a moral advantage? In terms of intention, there is already an essential, perhaps the most essential, point of view of the later Nietzsche here.

2.

With science becoming a problem for Nietzsche for its own sake, the notion of the alleged subjectivism and irrationalism of early Nietzsche must be corrected. For if science becomes a problem for Nietzsche because it is not sufficiently appropriate to its cause, then the reason for his criticism is precisely a failure of science in relation to its own objective claim to knowledge.

Nietzsche's primary concern is not that the "spirit" could be an adversary of the soul; On the contrary, his concern is that the spirit's claim, the claim to bring light into things, could not have been sufficiently fulfilled, that one is deluding oneself with the wrong light, namely not everywhere and not enough of the spirit let things come. It is science's own intention, its own truth intention, under which Nietzsche still makes science itself a problem.

If one holds the two moments mentioned together, a certain contradiction appears between them. The second moment contains the assertion: Nietzsche exponentiates the truth intention of science when he makes science a question; the first: he makes precisely this truth intention into a question. In one (the first) respect, Nietzsche asks: in the end, is truth not at all that highest "value" that it claims to be; in

the other respect he asks: does the truth intention of science agree with its cause, i. H. agree with the true constitution of what is to be known, i.e. with reality?

But this second question relates to the first. She describes the motive for the first question. Nietzsche questions truth by following its claim. Far away, a rational Den-227

ken zu verdunkeln, stellt Nietzsche einen Widerspruch der Rationalität selbst ins Licht des Denkens. Und das ist ein Widerspruch, den man in der *Welt* am Werke, am schlimmen Werke läßt, wenn man ihn *nicht* ins Denken einläßt, wenn man jeden verteufelt, der nach dem *Grund* der Logik fragt.

II

Aus der Betrachtung von Nietzsches *Fragestellung*, dem Ansatz seiner Kritik an den historischen Wissenschaften hat sich also zweierlei bereits ergeben, 1. die Bedeutung dessen, was hier das *eigentliche* Thema ist, für Nietzsches späteres Denken: »Wissenschaft als Problem«; und 2. die objektive und ausweisbare Intention dieser Kritik in Gestalt der Frage: wird die Wissenschaft ihrer eigenen Sache gerecht?

Diese sehr allgemeinen Behauptungen stützen sich freilich bis jetzt nur auf einen sehr speziellen Sachverhalt: die Philologie und die Griechen. Es ist noch nicht geklärt, was das für eine *Diskrepanz* ist, die Nietzsche hier zwischen der Wissenschaft und ihrer Sache, zwischen Form und Inhalt der Wissenschaft sieht, und von welcher *Tragweite* dieser spezielle Fall ist. (Gilt er für alle historisch-philologischen Wissenschaften? Wieso wird überhaupt Philologie und Historie in eins gesetzt? Ist das, was Nietzsche hier sagt, nicht vielleicht auf die Literatur- und Kunstwissenschaften eingeschränkt? Und schließlich: wie kommt Nietzsche dazu, von dieser philologisch-historischen Problematik her auf *die* Wissenschaft, die moderne Wissenschaft, schlechthin zu schließen? Das widerspricht doch der Gepflogenheit, den Prototyp von Wissenschaft in den Naturwissenschaften zu sehen und die historisch-philologischen Wissenschaften als »Geistes«- oder »Kultur«-Wissenschaften davon abzuheben.) Um das Recht von Nietzsches Kritik an der Historie als Wissenschaft einzusehen ist endlich auch noch die Frage notwendig, was Nietzsche selber tut, wie sich sein eigenes konkretes Denken zu Wissenschaft und Geschichte verhält (Abschnitt III).

Wenn von Nietzsches Kritik an der wissenschaftlichen Geschichtsbetrachutng die Rede ist, dann denkt man zuerst an zwei berühmt gewordene Sätze, in denen er das Verhältnis von Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie zum Ausdruck bringt:

> *»Nur aus der höchsten Kraft der Gegenwart dürft ihr das Vergangene deuten«* (I, 250; n. 6).
>
> *»Die Geschichte wird nur von starken Persönlichkeiten ertragen, die schwachen löscht sie vollends aus«* (I, 241; n. 5).

Der erste Satz klingt nach dem Ideal einer rein pragmatischen, die Geschichte den Interessen der eigenen Zeit (oder auch rein ideologischen, die Geschichte den Interessen der eigenen Klasse) unterwerfenden Interpretation, der zweite nach George; Subjektivismus und Heroismus also in extremer Form. Sind das aber Nietzsches Gedanken?

To obscure knowledge, Nietzsche places a contradiction in rationality itself in the light of thought. And that is a contradiction that one leaves at work in the world, at the worst work, if one does not allow it

to think, if one demonizes everyone who asks about the basis of logic.

II

From the consideration of Nietzsche's question, the beginning of his critique of the historical sciences, two things have already emerged: 1. the significance of what is the actual topic here for Nietzsche's later thinking: "Science as a problem"; and 2. the objective and verifiable intention of this critique in the form of the question: does science do justice to its own cause?

Of course, these very general statements are based up to now only on a very special state of affairs: philology and the Greeks. It has not yet been clarified what kind of discrepancy Nietzsche sees here between science and its subject, between the form and content of science, and what the scope of this special case is. (Does it apply to all historical-philological sciences? Why are philology and history equated at all? Isn't what Nietzsche says here perhaps restricted to the literary and artistic sciences? And finally: how did Nietzsche arrive at this philological- historical problematic to draw conclusions about science, modern science per se? That contradicts the habit of seeing the prototype of science in the natural sciences and the historical-philological sciences as "spiritual" or

"cultural" sciences.) In order to see the validity of Nietzsche's critique of history as science, the question of what Nietzsche himself is doing, how his own concrete thinking relates to science and history (Section III).

When Nietzsche's critique of the scientific view of history is discussed, one first thinks of two famous sentences in which he expresses the relationship between the benefits and disadvantages of history:

"Only from the supreme power of the present may you interpret the past" (I, 250; n. 6).

"History can only be endured by strong personalities, and it completely wipes out the weak" (I, 241; n. 5).

The first sentence sounds like the ideal of a purely pragmatic interpretation, subjecting history to the interests of one's own time (or purely ideological, history to the interests of one's own class), the second to George; Subjectivism and heroism in extreme form. But are these thoughts of Nietzsche?

Der zuerst zitierte Satz (aus dem Schluß des 6. Abschnitts), der scheinbar das Interesse, das Macht-Interesse der Gegenwart zum Maßstab der Geschichtsaneignung proklamiert, spricht von der *»höchsten Kraft«* der Gegenwart. Was damit aber in Wahrheit gemeint ist, sagt die Fortsetzung des Satzes:

> »... nur in der stärksten Anspannung eurer edelsten Eigenschaften werdet ihr erraten, was in dem Vergangenen wissens- und bewahrenswürdig ... ist« (I, 250).

Nietzsche macht diese Erklärung vollends unmißverständlich, indem er noch hinzufügt:

> »Sonst zieht ihr das Vergangene zu euch nieder« (I, 250).

Der kritisierten Geschichtsschreibung fehlt nach dieser Erklärung das Unterscheidungsvermögen für das *Wissens- und Bewahrungswürdige*. Der Mangel dieses Vermögens drückt sich darin aus, daß gerade eine solche Wissenschaft die Überlieferung nach den *eigenen* Maßstäben erforscht und mitteilt; und zwar ohne zu bemerken, *daß* es ihre eigenen Maßstäbe sind. Dieses Unwissen über sich selbst *versteht* sich dann als »Objektivität«:

> »Jene naiven Historiker nennen 'Objektivität' das Messen vergangener Meinungen und Taten an den Allerwelts-Meinungen des Augenblicks: hier finden sie den Kanon aller Wahrheiten; ihre Arbeit ist, die Vergangenheit der zeitgemäßen Trivialität anzupassen. Dagegen nennen sie jede Geschichtsschreibung 'subjektiv', die jene Popularmeinungen nicht als kanonisch nimmt.« (I, 246)

Nietzsches *Vorwurf* ist also gerade *nicht:* mangelnder Gegenwartsbezug, elfenbeintürmige Flucht in die Vergangenheit; Nietzsches Vorwurf ist: man verfehlt das Vergangene selbst, wenn man sich nicht über die Macht der Gegenwartsbefangenheit klar wird, die bereits in den (unwillkürlichen) *Maßstäben* jeder Forschung liegt. Sein Vorwurf ist das Gegenteil dessen, was man aus dem Satz heraushört. Nietzsche sieht, daß man sich gerade aus den Maßstäben seiner Zeit herausarbeiten muß, um zu den eigenen Maßen des Vergangenen in ein angemessenes Verhältnis zu gelangen. Gerade dazu, zu einer wirklichen und nicht nur eingebildeten Objektivität ist die höchste Anstrengung der eigenen Kräfte nötig.

Die Differenzierung der Forschungsgegenstände nach dem Grad der *Wissenswürdigkeit* wird von der Sache selbst verlangt – gesetzt, daß die Sachen selbst nach Rangunterschieden konstituiert sind. In einem vor dreißig Jahren erschienenen Aufsatz zur Methode *seiner* Wissenschaft sagt Ernst Buschor, es gehöre zur Erkenntnis der Sache, in diesem Fall der Denkmäler griechischer Kunst, daß sie nach »Rangstufen« gegliedert werden müssen. »Gleichsetzung des Ungleichwertigen mechanisiert und entstellt den lebendigen Sachverhalt, führt weit ab von objektiver Betrachtung.« (Zitat: s. die Anmerkung am Schluß.)

The sentence quoted first (from the conclusion of the 6th section), which apparently proclaims the interest, the interest in power of the present as the measure of historical appropriation, speaks of the

"highest power" of the present. The continuation of the sentence says what is actually meant by this:

» . . . only in the strongest exertion of your noblest qualities will you guess what is worth knowing and preserving in the past. . . is" (I, 250).

Nietzsche makes this explanation completely unmistakable by adding:

"Otherwise you will draw down what is past" (I, 250).

According to this explanation, the criticized historiography lacks the ability to distinguish between what is worthy of knowledge and preservation. The lack of this ability expresses itself in the fact that precisely such a science investigates and communicates the tradition according to its own standards; without noticing that they are their own standards. This ignorance about oneself then understands itself as "objectivity":

»Those naïve historians call 'objectivity' the measuring of past opinions and deeds against the commonplace opinions of the moment: here they find the canon of all truths; their work is to adapt the past to contemporary triviality. On the other hand, they call every historiography 'subjective' that does not take popular opinion as canonical."

(I, 246)

So Nietzsche's reproach is not: a lack of reference to the present, an ivory-towered flight into the past; Nietzsche's reproach is: one misses the past itself if one does not realize the power of the predicament of the present, which already lies in the (involuntary) standards of all research. His accusation is the opposite of what one hears from the sentence. Nietzsche sees that one has to work oneself out of the standards of his time in order to arrive at an appropriate relationship to one's own standards of the past. It is precisely for this, for a real and not just imaginary objectivity, that the greatest exertion of one's own strength is necessary.

The differentiation of the objects of research according to the degree of worthiness to know is required by the thing itself - assuming that the things themselves are constituted according to differences in rank. In an essay on the method of his science, published thirty years ago, Ernst Buschor says that it is part of knowing the matter, in this case the monuments of Greek art, that they

"Ranks" must be broken down. »Equating the unequal mechanizes and distorts the living material«

stop, leads far away from objective consideration.« (Quote: see the note at the end.)

Von daher fällt bereits ein Licht auf den anderen Satz (aus dem 5. Abschnitt), der einen Zusammenhang zwischen Geschichtsbetrachtung und »Persönlichkeit« behauptet. Hier scheint nun der Verdacht einer Verherrlichung der Subjektivität von Nietzsche selbst bestätigt zu werden, denn da sagt der Fortgang: die »schwache Persönlichkeit« sei »nicht kräftig genug«, »die Vergangenheit *an sich* zu messen« (Hervorhebung v. Verf.). Doch was heißt: »an sich zu messen«? Und *wozu:* »an sich«? Ein paar Zeilen weiter spricht Nietzsche von einer »Kongruenz zwischen dem Mann und seinem historischen Bereiche« (I, 241). Die Vergangenheit an mir zu messen, das heißt hier gerade nicht: das Vergangene meinen Maßstäben zu unterwerfen, sondern: es zu mir in einen Bezug zu bringen. *Wogegen* sich Nietzsche hier wendet, das ist wiederum das Verfehlen der *Sache* selbst in dem Glauben, man brauche nur sich selbst »auszuschalten« (z. B. durch geeignete Methoden), um damit schon die »Objektivität« gesichert zu haben.

> »Ja man geht so weit, anzunehmen, daß der, den ein Moment der Vergangenheit *gar nichts angehe,* berufen sei, ihn darzustellen. So verhalten sich häufig Philologen und Griechen zu einander: sie gehen sich gar nicht an – das nennt man dann wohl geradezu empörend.« (I, 249)

In einem noch etwas jugendlichen Pathos setzt Nietzsche hinzu:

> »Wo nun gerade das Höchste und Seltenste dargestellt werden soll, da ist das absichtliche und zur Schau getragene Unbeteiligtsein, die hervorgesuchte nüchtern-flache Motivierungskunst geradezu empörend.« (I, 249)

Die Behauptung, es sei eine *Kraft* notwendig, um die Vergangenheit »an sich messen« zu können, erläutert Nietzsche durch eine Frage:

> »Nehmen wir an, es beschäftige sich einer mit Demokrit, so liegt mir immer die Frage auf den Lippen: warum nicht Heraklit? Oder Philo? Oder Bacon? Oder Descartes? – und so beliebig weiter. Und dann: warum denn just ein Philosoph? Warum nicht ein Dichter, ein Redner? Und: warum überhaupt ein Grieche, warum nicht ein Engländer, ein Türke?« (I, 241)

Was Nietzsche im Hinblick auf die Geschichtswissenschaft »Kraft der Persönlichkeit« nennt, das ist also gerade die Fähigkeit zur Sach-Erkenntnis. Was er selber dabei *voraussetzt,* ist dies, daß eine Sache der Geschichte niemals einfach »vorliegt«, sondern selber geschichtlich *ist,* nämlich in einem eigenen – und das heißt für den Betrachtenden: *anderen* – Raum steht. Man reißt sie aus ihrem Raum, bildlich gesprochen: aus ihrem Element, heraus, wenn man sie unbesehen, unbesonnen mit Methoden erforscht, nach Maßstäben befragt, die aus dem Raum des »Erkenntnissubjektes« stammen.

From this, a light is already thrown on the other sentence (from the 5th section), which claims a connection between historical consideration and "personality". Here the suspicion of a glorification of

subjectivity seems to be confirmed by Nietzsche himself, because the progress says: the "weak personality"

was »not strong enough« »to measure the past against oneself«

(Emphasis added by the author). But what does “to measure against oneself” mean? And why: "in itself"? A few lines further on, Nietzsche speaks of one

"Congruence between the man and his historical realm"

(I, 241). Measuring the past against me does not mean subjecting the past to my standards, but rather: relating it to me. What Nietzsche is opposed to here is again the failure of the thing itself in the belief that one only needs to "eliminate" oneself (e.g. through suitable methods) in order to have already secured "objectivity."

"Yes, one goes so far as to assume that he who is not concerned with a moment of the past is called upon to represent it. This is how philologists and Greeks often behave towards each other: they don't care at all - that's what you call downright outrageous.« (I, 249)

In a somewhat youthful pathos, Nietzsche adds:

"Now where the highest and rarest is to be portrayed, the intentional and displayed indifference, the sober, shallow art of motivation that is sought out is downright outrageous." (I, 249)

Nietzsche explains the assertion that a force is necessary in order to be able to "measure the past against itself" with a question:

“Let's assume someone is studying Democritus, the question is always on my lips: why not Heraclitus?

Or Philo? Or bacon? Or Descartes? - and so on. And then: why a philosopher? Why not a poet, a speaker? And: why a Greek at all, why not an Englishman, a Turk?” (I, 241) What Nietzsche calls “power of personality” with regard to historical science is precisely the ability to acquire factual knowledge. What he himself presupposes is that a thing in history is never simply "existing" but is itself historical, namely in its own - and for the observer that means: different - space. One matures them out of their space, figuratively speaking: out of their element, out of their element, if one researches them indiscriminately, carelessly with methods, if one questions them according to standards that come from the space of the "knowledge subject".

Diese hermeneutische Problematik der Geschichtswissenschaften, die vor und nach Nietzsche ausführlich diskutiert worden ist (in H.-G. Gadamers »Wahrheit und Methode« auf einem letzten Höhepunkt), wird von Nietzsche in einem scheinbar banalen, zumindest unverbindlich oder unwissenschaftlich klingenden Sachverhalt begründet, der – vielleicht wegen dieses Anscheins – weder in der geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehensproblematik (die neuerdings, durch Gadamer und Habermas, von Dilthey wieder auf Hegel zurückgeführt wird) noch in der positivistischen Sicherungsproblematik, noch in der soziologischen Wert- und Praxis-Problematik eine Rolle spielt. In allen diesen Fällen nämlich wird geschichtliche Erkenntnis von vornherein begriffen (und zwar auch in dem hier am weitesten vorstoßenden Gedanken Gadamers von der »hermeneutischen Bedeutung des Zeitenabstandes«): als die Aufhebung der jeweiligen *Unkenntnis*, die in dem Unterschied zwischen dem *Damals* und dem *Heute* gründet, also (mit einer Formulierung, die auch Gadamer gebraucht) in der *Überwindung des Zeitenabstandes*. (Gadamers Begriff der »Wirkungsgeschichte« ist nur die Aufdeckung der letzten, *diesem* Ziel entgegenstehenden Naivität).

Zur Erläuterung von Nietzsches Einsicht sei zunächst eine, auf den ersten Blick besonders unverbindlich, nämlich ausdrücklich gefühlsbetont und insofern nun doch nach purer Subjektivität klingende Bemerkung Nietzsches angeführt. Er vergleicht (im 7. Abschnitt) die Art, wie »der junge Mensch« in die Geschichte eingeführt wird, mit der Art, wie »wir Moderne durch die Kunstkammern« laufen, wie wir Konzerte hören:

> »Man fühlt wohl, das klingt anders als jenes, das wirkt anders als jenes: dies Gefühl der Befremdung immer mehr zu verlieren, über nichts mehr übermäßig zu erstaunen, endlich alles sich gefallen zu lassen – das nennt man dann wohl den historischen Sinn, die historische Bildung.« (I, 255)

Daß das Gefühl der Befremdung verloren geht, soll danach ein *Fehler* der historischen Bildung sein. Wie könnte man demgegenüber behaupten, Nietzsches Kritik ziele auf ein höheres Maß an *Sachlichkeit* als die kritisierte Art von Wissenschaft? Die Antwort liegt bereits in dem Gedanken von der Wissenswürdigkeit. Wenn der Rang, die Seltenheit, die Unvergleichlichkeit zum Wesen einer Sache gehören, dann besteht die erste und die bleibende Bedingung der Erkenntnis darin, diese *Andersheit* und das heißt die Fremdheit selber wahrzunehmen. Um diesen einen Gedanken geht es in dem ganzen 5. Abschnitt (dem äußeren und inneren Mittelstück der Historienschrift).

Gleich zu Beginn dieses Abschnitts macht Nietzsche klar, daß es sich bei dem »historischen Sinn« und der »historischen Bildung« um eine ganz bestimmte Einstellung handelt – die als solche durchaus nicht auf die Wissenschaft von der Vergangenheit beschränkt ist, vielmehr eine Grundhaltung des modernen Menschen ausmacht, nämlich die Transponierung seines Bezuges zu jeder Art von vergangenem wie auch gegenwärtigem Geschehen in die Präsentierungsform der Vermittlungsmedien:

This hermeneutic problematic of the historical sciences, which was discussed in detail before and after Nietzsche (in H.-G. Gadamer's

"Truth and Method" at a final high point), is justified by Nietzsche in an apparently banal, at least non-binding or unscientific-sounding state of affairs, which - perhaps because of this appearance - plays a role neither in the spiritual-scientific problem of understanding (which Dilthey has recently, through Gadamer and Habermas, traced back to Hegel) nor in the positivist problem of security, nor in the sociological problem of value and practice . In all of these cases, historical knowledge is understood from the outset (and also in Gadamer's thought, which goes the farthest here, of the "hermeneutic meaning of the distance in time"): as the elimination of the respective ignorance that lies in the difference between then and now is based, i.e. (to use a formulation that Gadamer also uses) in overcoming the temporal distance. (Gadamer's concept of "effective history" is only the disclosure of the ultimate naivety that stands in the way of this goal).

In order to explain Nietzsche's insight, a remark by Nietzsche that sounds particularly non-binding at first glance, namely expressively emotional and insofar as it sounds like pure subjectivity, should first be mentioned. He compares (in the 7th section) the way in which "the young man" is introduced into history with the way in which "we moderns walk through the art chambers", as we listen to concerts:

"One feels well that this sounds different than that, that works differently than that: to lose this feeling of alienation more and more, no longer to be overly astonished at anything, finally to put up with everything - that is then probably called the historical sense, the historical education.« (I, 255)

Losing the feeling of alienation is said to be a mistake in historical education. On the other hand, how could one claim that Nietzsche's critique aimed at a higher degree of objectivity than the criticized type of science? The answer already lies in the idea of being worth knowing. If the rank, the rarity, the incomparability belong to the essence of a thing, then the first and the permanent condition of knowledge consists in perceiving this otherness and that means the strangeness itself. The entire 5th section (the outer and inner center piece of the historical writing) is about this one thought.

At the very beginning of this section, Nietzsche makes it clear that "historical meaning" and "historical education" are a very specific attitude - which as such is by no means limited to the science of the past, but rather a basic attitude of the modern people, namely the transposition of its reference to every kind of past as well as present events in the form of presentation of the mediation media:

> »Noch ist der Krieg nicht beendet, und schon ist er in bedrucktes Papier hunderttausendfach umgesetzt, schon wird er als neuestes Reizmittel dem ermüdeten Gaumen der nach Historie Gierigen vorgesetzt ... (Jede Tat wird) sofort mit dem historischen Zeitdach überspannt. (Man will) im Augenblick verstehen, berechnen, begreifen, wo man (auch hier darf die jugendliche Ausdrucksweise nicht am präzisen Sinn des Gemeinten vorbeisehen lassen) in langer Erschütterung das Unverständliche als das Erhabene festhalten sollte.« (I, 238)

Der präzise Sinn des Gesagten ist der, daß das *Aushalten* vor dem Unbegreiflichen, das *Stehenlassen* des Schrecklichen, das *Annehmen* des Unheimlichen hier allein *der Sache* angemessen wäre, während das *ungeduldige* Verstehenwollen, die Meinung, *sofort* begreifen zu müssen, dasjenige *beiseitigt*, was hier »gerade das Wichtigste« ist.

Ein bestimmtes Wissens-Ideal wird hier von Nietzsche als ein Grundzug der modernen *Welt* erklärt: die Tendenz, daß wir *alles* – auch, was eben jetzt geschieht – *historisch* betrachten, und damit, in der zeit- und raumüberwindenden Präsenz der Quellen- und Fakten-Vermittlung um seine Wirkung bringen. Wir machen uns alles, auch was eben geschieht, was eben noch im Gange ist, in der Weise präsent, daß es immer schon vergangen ist, – immer schon unschädlich ist.

> »Es mag was Gutes und Rechtes geschehen, als Tat, als Dichtung, als Musik: sofort sieht der ... Bildungsmensch über das Werk hinweg und fragt nach der Historie des Autors. Hat dieser schon mehreres geschaffen, sofort muß er sich den bisherigen und den mutmaßlichen weiteren Gang seiner Entwicklung deuten lassen, sofort wird er neben andere zur Vergleichung gestellt, auf die Wahl seines Stoffes, auf seine Behandlung hin seziert, auseinandergerissen, weislich neu zusammengefügt und im ganzen vermahnt und zurechtgewiesen. Es mag das Erstaunlichste geschehen, immer ist die Schar der historisch Neutralen auf dem Platze, bereit den Autor schon aus weiter Ferne zu überschauen.« »Die historische Bildung ... erlaubt gar nicht mehr, daß es zu einer Wirkung im eigentlichen Verstande, nämlich zu einer Wirkung auf Leben und Handeln komme.« (I, 242)

Neutralität ist danach eine Verweigerung der Wahrheit. Wenn Nietzsche hier von »Wirkung« spricht, so ist damit nicht in erster Linie eine praktische *Folge* gemeint, die zur theoretischen Erkenntnis noch hinzukommt (und die man darum zusätzlich mit einkalkulieren müßte), sondern dies, daß die Sache selbst, in dem, was sie von sich her ist, gar nicht anders erkannt werden kann, als in der Wirkung, die sie ausübt, noch deutlicher gesagt: als in einer Konfrontation mit dem Erkennenden selbst und seiner Lage. »Neutralität« hat hier den ganz buchstäblichen Sinn: weder Mann, noch Frau: »Es ist gleichgültig, was ihr treibt« (I, 241).

In der Vortragsreihe »Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten« erklärt Nietzsche dieses Wissens-Ideal der Neutralität als den Grund der Aversion gegen *sachliche* Probleme zugunsten methodi-

"The war isn't over yet, and it's already been translated into printed paper a hundred thousand times over, and it's already being served up

as the latest stimulant for the weary palates of those greedy for history. . . (Every act is) immediately covered with the historic tent roof. (One wants) to understand, to calculate, to comprehend in the moment, where (here too the youthful manner of expression must not allow one to overlook the precise meaning of what is meant) one should hold on to the incomprehensible as the sublime after a long period of shock.« (I, 238)

The precise meaning of what has been said is that enduring the incomprehensible, leaving the horrific as it is, accepting the uncanny would alone be appropriate to the matter here, while the impatient desire to understand, the opinion that one must grasp it immediately, eliminates what is here » just what is most important«.

A certain ideal of knowledge is explained here by Nietzsche as a basic feature of the modern world: the tendency that we everything -

also what is happening right now - to look at historically, and thus, in the time and space overcoming presence of the mediation of sources and facts, to lose its effect. We make everything present to ourselves, including what is happening, what is still going on, in such a way that it has always already passed - is always already harmless.

»Something good and right may happen, as a deed, as poetry, as music: immediately the . . . Educational man about the work and asks about the history of the author. If he has already created several things, he must immediately have the previous and the probable further course of his development interpreted, he is immediately placed next to others for comparison, dissected for the choice of his material, for his treatment, torn apart, wisely new put together and admonished and corrected as a whole. The most astonishing thing may happen, but there is always a group of historically neutral people on the spot, ready to look over the author from afar." "Historical education. . . no longer allows an effect in the real sense, namely an effect on life and action.' (I, 242) Neutrality is then a refusal of the truth. When Nietzsche speaks of "effect" here, he does not primarily mean a practical consequence that is added to theoretical knowledge (and which one therefore has to take into account), but that the thing itself, in what it is of itself cannot be recognized otherwise than in the effect it exerts, to put it even more clearly: than in a confrontation with the recognizer himself and his situation. "Neutrality" here has the very literal meaning: neither man nor woman: "It doesn't matter what you do" (I, 241).

In the lecture series "On the future of our educational institutions,"

Nietzsche explains this knowledge ideal of neutrality as the reason for the aversion to factual problems in favor of methodi-232

scher Reflexionen, das heißt gegen solche Probleme, aus denen man sich nicht selbst heraushalten kann. Er sagt (im 5. Vortrag), es sei an die Stelle der »Ausdeutung«

> »ein historisches, ja selbst ein philologisches Abwägen und Fragen getreten: was der und jener Philosoph gedacht habe oder nicht, oder ob die und jene Schrift ihm mit Recht zuzuschreiben sei oder gar ob diese oder jene Lesart den Vorzug verdiene.« (III, 255)

Was Nietzsche hier, als junger Basler Professor, das »neutrale Sichbefassen« mit den Dingen nennt, das nennt er später, in der »Genealogie der Moral«, den »Stoizismus des Intellekts«,

> »der sich das Nein zuletzt ebenso streng verbietet wie das Ja, jenes Stehen-bleiben-*Wollen* vor dem Tatsächlichen, dem *factum brutum,* jener Fatalismus der *'petits faits' (ce petit faitalisme,* wie ich ihn nenne), worin die französische Wissenschaft jetzt eine Art moralischen Vorrangs vor der deutschen sucht, jenes Verzichtleisten auf Interpretation überhaupt.« (II, 890)

Bei dieser äußeren Kritik, der Überlegung, daß ein bestimmter, sich selbst als »objektiv« ausgebender Standpunkt von vornherein die eigene Verfassung der Sache, ihren »Horizont«, verfehlt, läßt es Nietzsche aber nicht bewenden. Die äußere Kritik ist mit einer inneren Kritik, einer Interpretation der (unbewußten) *Motive* dieses Standpunkts verbunden, mit demjenigen also, was Nietzsche später als seine »psychologische Methode« bezeichnet. Und dabei dreht er den Spieß um, indem er an dem vorgeblichen Objektivitätsideal ein (unerkanntes, uneingestandenes) subjektives Interesse nachweist. Diese Gedanken – die, auf das Ganze der Wissenschaften gerichtet, in Nietzsches späterer Erkenntnislehre eine fundamentale Bedeutung gewinnen – seien hier nur in drei Aspekten angedeutet, die in der Historienschrift bereits ausgebildet sind.

Das erste ist Nietzsches Erklärung des geschichtswissenschaftlichen »Tatsachen«- oder »Wirklichkeits«-Begriffs aus dem Maßstab des *Erfolgs.* (Über das Recht zu einer solchen Erklärung hat – ohne auf Nietzsche einzugehen – Gadamer am Beispiel Rankes Aufschlußreiches nachgewiesen.) Als geschichtlich wirklich gleich geschichtlich relevant gilt, was sich geschichtlich, das heißt in der Folge bewährt. Auf die darin steckende praktische Konsequenz (nicht die praktischen Folgen, sondern die diesem hermeneutischen Maßstab selbst innewohnende praktische Haltung, vielleicht darf man sogar sagen: praktische Gesinnung) weist Nietzsche im 8. Abschnitt der Historienschrift. Er spricht von der

> »Bewunderung vor der 'Macht der Geschichte' . . . , die alle Augenblicke in nackte Bewunderung des Erfloges umschlägt und zum Götzendienste des Tatsächlichen führt: für welchen Dienst man sich jetzt die sehr mythologische und außerdem recht gut deutsche Wendung 'den Tatsachen Rechnung trage' allgemein eingeübt hat.«

Sheer reflections, that is, against such problems from which one

cannot keep oneself out. He says (in Lecture 5) that it is in place of the "interpretation"

»A historical, even a philological weighing up and questions arose: what this and that philosopher thought or not, or whether this and that writing is rightly ascribed to him, or even whether this or that reading deserves preference.«

(Ill, 255)

What Nietzsche calls here, as a young Basel professor, the "neutral dealing with things" he later calls in the "Genealogy of Morals" the "stoicism of the intellect".

"who in the end forbids the no just as strictly as the yes, that standing still before the facts, the factum brutum, that fatalism of the 'petits faits' (ce petit faitalisme, as I call it), in which French science is now seeking a kind of moral precedence over German science, that renunciation of interpretation altogether.' (II, 890) In this external criticism, the consideration that a specific standpoint that claims to be 'objective' is, from the outset, one's own constitution missed the "horizon" of the matter, but Nietzsche did not leave it at that. The external criticism is connected with an internal criticism, an interpretation of the (unconscious) motives of this point of view, that is, with what Nietzsche later called his "psychological method". And in doing so he turns the tables by demonstrating an (unrecognized, unacknowledged) subjective interest in the alleged ideal of objectivity. These thoughts - which, directed towards the whole of the sciences, gain a fundamental importance in Nietzsche's later epistemology - are only indicated here in three aspects that are already developed in the history writing.

The first is Nietzsche's explanation of the historical-scientific

"Facts" or "reality" concept from the measure of success. (Without going into detail about Nietzsche, Gadamer has demonstrated the right to such a declaration using the example of Ranke's revealing wealth.) What counts as historically really equally historically relevant is what is preserved historically, that is, in the sequel.

In the 8th section of the historical writing, Nietzsche points to the practical consequence of this (not the practical consequences, but the practical attitude inherent in this hermeneutic standard itself, perhaps one may even say: tactical attitude).

He speaks of the

"Admiration for the 'power of history . . ., which turns every moment into naked admiration of success and leads to the idolatry of the factual: for which service the very mythological and also very good German expression 'take the facts into account' has generally been practiced.«

23 3

Und er fährt fort:

> »Wer aber erst gelernt hat, vor der 'Macht der Geschichte' den Rücken zu beugen, der nickt zuletzt . . . sein 'Ja' zu jeder Macht, sei dies nun eine Regierung oder eine öffentliche Meinung oder eine Zahlen-Majorität, und bewegt seine Glieder genau in dem Takte, in dem irgendeine 'Macht' am Faden zieht.« (I, 263)

Der zweite Aspekt – ein Gedanke, der unter dem Ausdruck »Sokratismus« in der »Geburt der Tragödie« zuerst entwickelt wird – ist der, daß einem bestimmten wissenschaftlichen Selbstverständnis ein *»Glaube«* an die Begreiflichkeit der Welt zugrundeliegt (vgl. »Geburt der Tragödie«, n. 17: »Glaube an die Ergründlichkeit der Natur« I, 95; ähnlich: n. 15). Dieser Gedanke, den Nietzsche damals als Erkenntnis-»Optimismus« bezeichnet, wird später erweitert. In einem Aphorismus aus dem Nachlaß (»Wille zur Macht«, n. 677) kehren die Formulierungen aus der »Geburt der Tragödie« fast wörtlich wieder, aber um einen wesentlichen Zusatz ergänzt:

> »Die *wissenschaftliche* Welt-Betrachtung: Kritik des psychologischen Bedürfnisses *nach* Wissenschaft. Das Begreiflich-machen-wollen; das Praktisch-, Nützlich-, Ausbeutbar-machen-wollen . . . Der Wert allein, was gezählt und berechnet werden kann« (also, modern gesprochen, was programmiert und prognostiziert werden kann). Nietzsche schließt den Passus: » . . . Furchtbar, wenn gar die *Geschichte* in dieser Weise in Besitz genommen wird . . .!« (III, 867).

Der dritte Aspekt, der alles zusammenfaßt, was Nietzsche *kritisch* zur Wissenschaft sagt, ist ausgesprochen in dem Rückblick auf die zweite »Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung« im »Ecce Homo«. Hier bezeichnet er als deren Thema: »unsere Art des Wissenschafts-Betriebs«, und als ihr Fazit: die Einsicht, »der Zweck geht verloren, die Kultur – das Mittel, der moderne Wissenschafts-Betrieb *barbarisiert«*. Das Mittel wird zum Selbstzweck. (Über den Zusammenhang dieses Gedankens mit Nietzsches Basler Beruf: s. Karl Reinhardt, »Die klassische Philologie und das Klassische«, besonders das darin zitierte Bekenntnis von Reinhardts Lehrer Wilamowitz.) Was Nietzsche hier sieht oder zu sehen glaubt, ist der geheime Nihilismus, der sich gerade in der (bei Wilamowitz noch mit missionarischem Pathos vorgetragenen) Positivitäts-Gläubigkeit verbirgt und den Nietzsche später in dem Satz ausspricht:

> »Nicht der Sieg der *Wissenschaft* ist das, was unser 19. Jahrhundert auszeichnet, sondern der Sieg der wissenschaftlichen *Methode* über die Wissenschaft.« (»Wille zur Macht«, n. 466; III, 814).

III

Bis jetzt war nur von Nietzsches Kritik *an* der Wissenschaft die Rede, an derjenigen Weise von Wissenschaft, die er als einen Grundzug des modernen Zeitalters ansieht. Doch ist damit auch die andere

And he continues:

"But once you have learned to bow your back to the 'power of history', you nod at last. . . his 'yes' to every power, be it a government

or public opinion or a majority of numbers, and moves his limbs exactly in time with any 'power' pulling the thread.« (I, 263) Der The second aspect - an idea first developed under the expression "Socratism" in The Birth of Tragedy - is that it fits into a certain scientific self-understanding

"Faith" in the comprehensibility of the world (cf. "Birth of Tragedy", n. 17: "Faith in the intelligibility of nature" I, 95; similarly: n. 15). This idea, which Nietzsche then called epistemological 'optimism', will be expanded later. In an aphorism from the Nachlass (»Wille zur Macht«, n. 677), the formulations from the »Birth of Tragedy« are repeated almost verbatim, but supplemented by an important addition:

»The scientific view of the world: criticism of the psychological need for science. T he wanting to make it understandable; the wanting-to-make-practical, useful, exploitable . .. The value alone, which can be paid and calculated«

(ie, in modern terms, what can be programmed and predicted). Nietzsche closes the passage: » . . . Terrible when history is taken possession of in this way. . .!« (Ill, 867).

The third aspect, which sums up everything that Nietzsche says critically about science, is expressed in the review of the second "untimely reflection" in "Ecce Homo". Here he describes the topic as: "our way of doing science," and as its conclusion: the insight that "the purpose is lost, the culture

- the means that barbarizes modern science operations«. The means becomes an end in itself. (On the connection of this thought with Nietzsche's Basel profession: s. Karl Reinhardt, "The Classic Philology and the Classic", especially the confession of Reinhardt's teacher Wilamowitz quoted therein.) What Nietzsche sees or thinks he sees here is the secret Nihilism, which is concealed precisely in the belief in positivity (still presented with missionary pathos in Wilamowitz) and which Nietzsche later expresses in the sentence:

"It is not the victory of science that characterizes our 19th century, but the victory of the scientific method over science."

I 1 1

So far we have only spoken of Nietzsche's critique of science, of that kind of science which he regards as a fundamental feature of the modern age. But that also means the other 234

Frage, wie es mit seinem eigenen Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft steht, im Grunde schon beantwortet. Wir brauchen, um das zu sehen, nur den Blick vom Gegenstand seiner Kritik auf diese Kritik selbst zu wenden. Wenn sich gleich zu Anfang, aus der Fragestellung heraus, sagen ließ, daß Nietzsche die *Wahrheitsintention der Wissenschaft potenziert,* so läßt sich nun noch deutlicher sagen, daß diese Potenzierung gerade eine Potenzierung der *historischen* Frageweise ist.

Nietzsches *Ansatz:* die Wissenschaft selbst noch »zum Problem« zu machen, geht nicht nur aus der Konfrontation mit einem historischen Gegenstand (den Griechen) hervor, er wird auch *in historischer Weise* ausgeführt. Das *Problem* der historischen Wissenschaften ist für Nietzsche das Problem der *Entstehung* des modernen Bewußtseins, der modernen Welt; es ist für ihn ein *geschichtliches Problem.* Und noch mehr: »Geschichtlich« hat hier nicht lediglich den Sinn einer »Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart«, sondern einer *Kritik* der Gegenwart durch die Erkenntnis ihrer Herkunft.

Nietzsche bestimmt das Wesen des modernen wissenschaftlichen Geschichtsbewußtseins aus einer dreifachen historischen Stufung: erstens aus dem *Wandel um 1820* als dem Beginn eines ausdrücklich und reflektiert historischen Verhaltens in Europa, zweitens aus dem spezifisch *historischen* (nämlich teleologischen und eschatologischen) Geschichtsbewußtsein der Römer und des Christentums – das er in Hegel kulminieren und von da aus in den Historismus des 19. Jahrhunderts umschlagen sieht (der Gedanke also, den Karl Löwith ausgearbeitet hat – freilich unter Vernachlässigung des von Nietzsche in seiner Wichtigkeit erkannten römischen Geschichtsbewußtseins), und endlich drittens aus dem Wandel von mythischen zum »psychologischen« Denken im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. in Griechenland.

Die Griechen werden in der Weise der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft (die sie in Gestalt von Nietzsches Basler Beruf zu ihrem »klassischen« Thema gemacht hat) konfrontiert, daß sie selbst (in ihrem älteren, »archaischen« Zeitalter) als eine wesenhaft *»unhistorisch«* denkende Epoche begriffen werden.

Eietzsche macht also die historische Wissenschaft zum Problem auf historische Weise, auf die Weise, daß er nach der eigenen Herkunft, nach dem Ursprung des »historischen Sinns« und der »historischen Bildung« fragt. Diese Dialektik wird von ihm im 8. Abschnitt der Historienschrift formuliert:

> »Der Ursprung der historischen Bildung ... *muß* selbst wieder historisch erkannt werden, die Historie *muß* das Problem der Historie selbst auflösen, das Wissen *muß* seinen Stachel gegen sich selbst kehren – dieses dreifache *Muß* ist der Imperativ des Geistes einer 'neuen Zeit', falls in ihr wirklich etwas Neues, Mächtiges, Lebenverheißendes und Ursprüngliches ist.« (I, 261)

Das erste Resultat dieser Steigerung der historisch-wissenschaftlichen Frageweise ist Nietzsches erste und zugleich unbestrittenste geschichtliche Erkenntnis: seine Entdeckung des vorsokratischen Griechentums – und damit die »Umwertung« des klassischen Zeitalters und Neueinschätzung der »Antike« überhaupt.

Question about his own relationship to science, basically already answered. In order to see this, we need only shift our gaze from the object of his criticism to this criticism itself. If we can say right at the

beginning, from the questioning, that Nietzsche exponentiates the truth intention of science, it can now be said even more clearly that this exponentiation is precisely an exponentiation of the historical questioning.

Nietzsche's approach: making science itself "a problem" not only emerges from the confrontation with a historical object (the Greeks), it is also carried out in a historical manner. For Nietzsche, the problem of the historical sciences is the problem of the emergence of modern consciousness, of the modern world; for him it is a historical problem. And even more: "Historical" does not only have the meaning here

»Location of the present«, but a critique of the present through the recognition of its origin.

Nietzsche determines the essence of modern scientific historical consciousness from a threefold historical gradation: firstly from the change around 1820 as the beginning of an explicitly and reflected historical behavior in Europe, secondly from the specifically historical (namely teleological and eschatological) historical consciousness of the Romans and Christianity - which he sees culminating in Hegel and from there turning into the historicism of the 19th century (that is, the idea that Karl Lowith worked out - albeit neglecting the Roman historical consciousness recognized by Nietzsche in its importance), and finally, thirdly, from the change from mythical to "psychological" thinking in the 4th century B.C. in Greece.

The Greeks are confronted, in the manner of modern historical scholarship (which they have made their "classic" subject in the guise of Nietzsche's Basel profession), that they themselves (in their older, "archaic" age) as an essentially "unhistorical"

thinking epoch can be understood.

Eietzsche thus turns historical science into a problem in a historical way, in such a way that he asks about one's own origins, about the origin of "historical meaning" and "historical education." He formulated this dialectic in the 8th section of the historical writing:

»The origin of historical education . . . It must itself be recognized historically again, history must solve the problem of history itself, knowledge must turn its sting against itself - this threefold must is the imperative of the spirit of a new age, if it really contains something new, powerful, promising life and original is.« (I, 261) The first result of this intensification of the historical-scientific way of questioning is

Nietzsche's first and at the same time most undisputed historical knowledge: his discovery of the pre-Socratic Greekness - and with it the »revaluation« of the classical age and reassessment of the » Antiquity« at all.

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Entscheidend aber für das spätere Denken Nietzsches ist seine Radikalisierung des wissenschaftlichen Grundtriebes nach Beseitigung des Scheines, der Illusionen. Sie besteht darin, daß er den Schein (das »Zurechtmachen der Dinge«) selber noch – in den vielfältigsten Gestalten – als einen objektiven Faktor der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit erkennt.

Nietzsches Denken ist nicht nur in einer Periode, sondern zu aller Zeit – wenn auch nicht in allen Schriften gleichermaßen – *kritisch*. Entscheidend für den Sinn und damit die mögliche Verbindlichkeit seiner Äußerungen ist nicht das positiv Gesagte für sich genommen, sondern die jeweilige Stoßrichtung. In dem Aphorismus 212 aus »Jenseits von Gut und Böse«, in dem Nietzsche die Philosophen als »das böse Gewissen ihrer Zeit« apostrophiert, spricht er von der Notwendigkeit, das Eine zu der einen, das Andere (die »umgekehrte Lehre«) zu der anderen Zeit zu sagen, und dies darum, weil die Philosophen *»jedes Mal«* aufdecken, »wieviel Heuchelei, Bequemlichkeit, Sich-gehen-lassen und Sich-fallen-lassen, wie viel Lüge unter dem bestgeehrten Typus ihrer zeitgenössischen Moralität versteckt, wieviel Tugend *überlebt* sei; jedes Mal sagten sie: 'wir müssen dorthin, dorthinaus, wo *ihr* heute am wenigsten zu Hause seid.« (II, 677). In dieser Situationsbezogenheit des Denkens liegt das eigentliche Gegenteil zu jedem historischen Relativismus, denn nur im Bezug zu dem jeweiligen »Heute«, dem jeweils »bestgeehrten Typus« einer Zeit kann das *»Aufdecken«* der jeweils darin steckenden »Lüge«, das heißt: Wahrheit, zustandekommen.

Zitate: nach der Nietzsche-Ausgabe von Karl *Schlechta* (1. Auflage, 1955/56).

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Jürgen *Habermas*, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Vortrag, zuerst veröffentlicht in Merkur 1965) jetzt in: Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, 1968 (edition suhrkamp 287).

Karl *Reinhardt*, Die klassische Philologie und das Klassische (Vortrag von 1941), in: Reinhardt, Die Krise des Helden, 1962 (dtv 93), S. 115–143; über Nietzsche und über Wilamowitz: S. 127–130.

Ernst *Buschor*, Begriff und Methode der Archäologie (aus dem Handbuch der Archäologie, 1939), jetzt in: Buschor, Von griechischer Kunst, Piper-Verlag München, 1956, S. 184–198; das Zitat: S. 194.

What is decisive for Nietzsche's later thinking, however, is his radicalization of the basic scientific drive to eliminate appearances and illusions. It consists in the fact that he gives the appearance (that

"Preparing things") itself still recognizes - in the most diverse forms - as an objective factor of historical reality.

Nietzsche's thinking is critical not only in one period, but at all times - even if not in all writings to the same extent.

What is decisive for the meaning and thus the possible bindingness of his statements is not what is said positively in itself, but the respective direction of the thrust. In the aphorism 212 out

»Beyond good and evil«, in which Nietzsche describes the philosophers as

Apostrophizing "the evil conscience of their time," he speaks of the need to say one thing at one time and the other (the "reverse doctrine") at another, and this because philosophers uncover "every May." , »how much hypocrisy, laziness, letting oneself go and letting oneself fall, how many lies hidden under the most honored type of their contemporary morality, how much virtue has survived; every May they said: 'We have to go there, out there, where you are least at home today' (II, 677). In this situation-related thinking lies the actual opposite of any historical relativism, because only in relation to the respective

»Today«, the »most honored type« of a time can do that

"Revealing" the "lie" contained in each case, that is: truth, coming about.

Quotations: based on the Nietzsche edition by Karl Schlechta (1st edition, 1955/56).

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Handbook of Archeology, 1939), now in: Buschor, From Greek Art, Piper-Verlag Munchen, 1956, pp. 184-198; the quote: p. 194.

ZUM UTOPISCHEN CHARAKTER DES GESCHICHTLICHEN

ODER
WIE STEHT ES MIT DER UTOPIE?

Milan Kangrga

Zagreb

»Dieser kontradiktorische, zweidimensionale Denkstil ist die innere Form nicht nur der dialektischen Logik sondern auch jeder Philosophie, die die Realität zu bewältigen sucht. Die Sätze, die die Realität bestimmen, affirmieren dasjenige als wahr, was nicht *(unmitelbar) ein solches ist.«*

Herbert Marcuse

»Denn das, was ist, kann nicht wahr sein.«

Ernst Bloch

Der Begriff der Utopie sowie die Frage nach dem Sinn und der Bedeutung des Utopischen wird in der jüngsten Zeit immer häufiger zum Gegenstand des theoretischen (philosophischen) aber auch des praktischen Interesses. Die Spannweite dieses Interesses, das durch das Weltgeschehen in den letzten Jahren, und ganz besonders durch die Studenten- und Jugendbewegungen in vielen Ländern hervorgerufen wurde, erstreckt sich von dem Insistieren auf dem Utopischen als dem *einzig möglichen* Weg oder Ausweg aus den drastischen Widersprüchen der heutigen Welt bis zu jenen Bestimmungen, die selbst den Begriff der Utopie disqualifizieren wollen und sie als – *tollwütig*[1] bezeichnen. Wenn das der Stand der Dinge ist, ist es gerechtfertigt, ja fast unumgänglich, folgende Frage zu stellen: Wie steht es den eigentlich mit der Utopie?, weil heute jede mögliche Antwort auf diese Frage, nolens volens, auch eine praktische und politische Stellungnahme im weitesten Sinne des Wortes impliziert und weil daraus weitreichende, geradezu geschichtliche Konsequenzen und Reperkussionen hervorgehen oder zumindest hervorgehen können. In dieser

[1] Wie zum Beispiel Danilo Pejović in seinem Aufsatz »Die tollwütige Utopie«, Kritika Nr. 7/1968.

THINKING AND REALITY

TO THE UTOPIC CHARACTER OF HISTORY

OR

WHAT ABOUT UTOPIA?

Milan Kangrga

Zagreb

»This adversarial, two-dimensional way of thinking is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but also of every philosophy that seeks to master reality. The propositions that determine reality affirm as true what is not (directly) such."

Herbert Marcuse

"For what is cannot be true."

Ernest Bloch

The concept of utopia and the question of the meaning and meaning of the utopian has recently become an object of theoretical (philosophical) as well as practical interest. The range of this interest, which has been aroused by world events in recent years, and more particularly by the student and youth movements in many countries, extends from the insistence on the utopian as the only possible way or way out of the drastic contradictions of today's world up to those determinations that want to disqualify the concept of utopia and describe it as - rabid1. If that is the state of affairs, it is justified, indeed almost inevitable, to ask the following question: what is the actual state of utopia? because today every possible answer to this question, willy-nilly, also requires a practical and political statement in the implied in the broadest sense of the word and because far-reaching, downright historical consequences and repercussions result or at least can result from it. 1 Like, for example, Danilo Pejović in his essay »The Rabid Utopia«, Critique No. 7/1968.

Frage hat sich nämlich – vielleicht nicht ganz zufällig – die Entscheidung konzentriert, ob und wie der heutige Mensch und die Menschheit sein könnten ohne Rücklicht auf mögliche und bestehende, theoretische und praktische Gegenstandpunkte. Deshalb hat die Aktualität des Begriffes des Utopischen einen tieferen Sinn. Es wird nämlich sichtbar, daß schon die Diskussion über diese Frage hie und da den Anschein von Zügellosigkeit und Maßlosigkeit erhalten hat, wo sonst von der Utopie und nur von ihr Maß gefordert wird; so daß auch das ein eigentümliches und nicht so unwichtiges Zeichen ist, »daß hier doch etwas los ist«, worüber es sich nachzudenken lohnt.

Es ist hier jedoch nicht unsere Absicht, indem wir die genannte Frage zu erleutern versuchen, ausschließlich im Bereich des Politischen zu denken, wie es oft oder zumindes häufig getan wird, sondern wir beabsichtigen primär auf dem Standpunkt des Fragestellens, also in der Dimension der Philosophie zu bleiben, denn »wir haben diese Politik in der Philosophie schon satt«. Außerdem wird unserer Meinung nach – und das ist das wichtigste – mit dem Begriff des Utopischen auch eine wesentliche, kritische, *eminent philosophische* (oder wenn es unbedingt sein muß: spekulative) Frage gestellt, die jeden partiellen wissenschaftlichen und jeden partiellen praktischen Aspekt überschreitet und demzufolge auch die Sphäre der Politik als Politik, obwohl gerade auf diesem »methodischen« Standpunkt nicht nur einige neutralen theoretischen Mißverständisse sichtbar und ihre Form erhalten, sondern auch bestimmte Interessenspositionen und politisch-praktische Entscheidungen gegenübergestellt werden. Darauf kommen wir aber etwas später.

Wenn wir also auf dem Niveau der *philosophischen* Erörterung unserer Frage bleiben und uns wenigstens ein Minimum an Logik bewahren, dann ist hier vor allem von der dynamischen Entwicklungstendenz die Rede, und nicht von der faktographischen Beschreibung einzelner empirischer Geschehnisse (Fälle und Unfälle). Deshalb können wir die Frage, was dieses Phänomen »bedeuten könnte« nicht absichtlich beiseite schieben, bloß weil uns interessiert, was dieses Phänomen faktisch ist; das wäre eine verteufelt wunderliche Gedankenakrobatik, wobei wir uns selbst widersprechen müßten. Denn die Frage, was ein Phänomen bedeuten könnte, geht eben aus der dynamischen Tendenz seiner Entwicklung her – vor und umgekehrt, die dynamische Entwicklungstendenz hat und erhält ihren Sinn nur durch das, was sie bedeutet, also was ihre Bedeutung ist. Einzig dadurch ist ein Phänomen das, was es ist, andernfalls wäre es nicht einmal sichtbar.

Die grundlegende, für unseren methodischen Zugang zum Phänomen des Utopischen relevante Frage würde lauten: Können wir überhaupt an das Phänomen der Utopie auf solche Weise herantreten, daß uns nur das interessi rt, was faktisch ist, wenn der Begriff des Utopischen schon das, was nicht ist oder noch nicht ist (was jedoch vom Standpunkt der dynamischen Entwicklungstendenz vielleicht sein könnte) impliziert, wenn also das Phänomen selbst in der Dimension des Noch-Nicht-Bestehenden in Erscheinung tritt? Eine partielle, zumindest eine partielle Antwort auf diese Frage ist in der Akzentsetzung enthalten: daß *uns interessiert,* was es faktisch ist, so daß von

The question focused - perhaps not entirely by accident - on the decision as to whether and how modern man and humanity could be without considering possible and existing, theoretical and practical

issues. Therefore the actuality of the concept of the utopian has a deeper meaning. It is becoming apparent that the discussion of this question has here and there given the appearance of lack of restraint and lack of measure, where otherwise measure is demanded of utopia and only of it; so that this is also a peculiar and not so unimportant sign, "that something is going on here after all", which is worth thinking about.

It is not our intention here, however, by trying to explain the question mentioned, to think exclusively in the area of politics, as is often or at least often done, but we intend primarily from the standpoint of questioning, i.e. in the dimension of to remain philosophy, because "we are already fed up with this politics in philosophy". In addition, in our opinion - and this is the most important thing - the concept of the utopian also poses an essential, critical, eminently philosophical (or if it absolutely has to be: speculative) question that transcends every partial scientific and every partial practical aspect and consequently also the sphere of politics as politics, although precisely from this "methodological" point of view not only a few neutral theoretical misunderstandings become visible and retain their form, but also certain positions of interest and political-practical decisions are contrasted. But we'll get to that a little later.

So if we remain at the level of the philosophical discussion of our question and keep at least a minimum of logic, then we are talking here primarily about the dynamic development tendency, and not about the factographic description of individual empirical events (cases and accidents). Therefore, we cannot intentionally brush aside the question of what this phenomenon "could mean" simply because we are interested in what this phenomenon actually is; that would be a devilishly whimsical mental acrobatics, in which we would have to contradict ourselves. Because the question of what a phenomenon could mean arises from the dynamic tendency of its development - before and vice versa, the dynamic development tendency only has and maintains its meaning through what it means, i.e. what its meaning is. Only then is a phenomenon what it is, otherwise it would not even be visible.

The fundamental question relevant to our methodological approach to the phenomenon of the utopian would be: can we at all approach the phenomenon of utopia in such a way that we are only interested in what is factual, if the concept of the utopian already includes what is not is or is not yet (which however might be from the point of view of the dynamic development tendency) implied, that is, when the phenomenon itself appears in the dimension of not-yet-existing? A

partial, at least a partial, answer to this question is contained in the emphasis: that we are interested in what it actually is, so that from 238

dieser Gewichtsverschiebung von jenem »was es faktisch ist« auf das »uns interessiert« abhängt, was für eine *Bedeutung* es (»für uns«, selbstredend!) erhalten wird. Sonst würde das, was faktisch besteht, uns in keiner Form als Bestehendes erscheinen, es würde vielmehr ein leeres Nichts oder etwas völlig Irrelevantes bleiben. Dadurch wird zumindest bestätigt, daß es sich bei dem, was faktisch ist, auch (oder sogar primär) um uns handelt. Für uns kann also der Begriff der Utopie – in der Sphäre der reinen Subjektivität oder gar Willkür – was immer für eine Bedeutung oder Bestimmung erhalten, ja sogar diejenige, daß sie toll geworden ist. Allerdings wäre das dann mehr als unzulänglich; denn man kann nicht auf einer bloßen subjektiven Meinung unter dem Deckmantel des objektiven Kriteriums verharren, sondern man muß, sich und der dynamischen Entwicklungstendenz treubleibend, die Frage stellen, was ein Phänomen, in diesem Falle das Utopische, *objektiv sein kann*. Und dasjenige, das objektiv sein kann, also die Frage nach der objektiven Möglichkeit dessen, was ist und was sich ereignen kann überragt nicht nur die bloße Faktizität des Bestehenden, sondern es ermöglicht sie vielmehr, es erschließt den Bereich der Möglichkeit, damit (dem Sinne und der Bedeutung nach) überhaupt etwas sein kann und nicht nur einfach ein Nichts, wodurch zugleich nicht nur auf die grundlegende metaphysische Frage eine Antwort gegeben wird, sondern auch die Metaphysik selbst in Frage gestellt wird.

Wir wollen also zunächst von der Frage ausgehen, von welchem Standpunkt aus die Utopie als tollwütig erscheint und was für eine Bedeutung und welchen Sinn diese Bestimmung hat? Vielleicht wird uns das anhand eines aktuellen Beispiels gelingen, nämlich anhand des bekannten Ausspruchs, der im Mai 1968 während der revolutionären Bewegungen der Pariser Studenten auf der Sorbonne im Umlauf war und der lautet:

»Soyons réalistes, demandons l'impossible.«

Wenn man in dieser Kampfparole mehr sehen will als ein geistreiches Paradoxon, dann steht es dafür, nach ihrem wahren inneren Sinn sowie nach der durch sie ausgesagten Wahrheit zu forschen.

Das erste, was hier sofort auffällt, ist die In-Verbindung-Setzung, besser gesagt die Identifizierung des Realistischen und des Unmöglichen. Einerseits wird hier Kritik geübt an jedem Realismus (am politischen, theoretischen, lebensnahen, alltäglichen usw.), auf den sich meistens der Gemeinverstand beruft, wenn ein bestimmtes Interesse um des status quo willen gerechtfertigt werden soll, wobei die Möglichkeit auf den Bereich dessen, was ist und immer war, beschränkt wird, was im Grunde genommen der Behauptung gleichkommt, die bestehende Realität wäre zugleich die einzige Möglichkeit und die Dimension des »wahren« Lebens des Menschen. Oder anders formuliert: Verlangt nicht das Unmögliche! worin impliziert ist, daß nur das, was bereits ist, möglich ist.

Dem gegenüber, also einer ganzen Welt gegenüber, die sich als einzige reell mögliche Welt auffaßt und deklariert, lebt und fühlt, wird jenes Realistischsein hervorgehoben, die in dem Unmöglichen die wahre Dimension eines menschenwürdigen Daseins sieht. Der Realis-

this shift in emphasis from that "what it actually is" to that

"we are interested" depends on what meaning it ("for us", of course!) will receive. Otherwise what actually exists would not appear to us as existing in any form, but would rather remain an empty nothing or something completely irrelevant. This at least confirms that what is factual is also (or even primarily) about us. For us, then, the concept of utopia - in the sphere of pure subjectivity or even arbitrariness - can have whatever meaning or definition, even that it has gone mad. However, that would then be more than inadequate; for one cannot remain on a mere subjective opinion under the cloak of the objective criterion, but one must, remaining true to oneself and to the dynamic trend of development, ask the question what a phenomenon, in this case the utopian, can be objective. And what can be objective, i.e. the question of the objective possibility of what is and what can happen, not only transcends the mere factuality of the existing, but rather makes it possible, it opens up the realm of possibility, so that (the sense and meaning) can be anything at all and not just nothing, which at the same time not only provides an answer to the fundamental metaphysical question, but also calls metaphysics itself into question.

So we want to start with the question from what point of view does utopia appear rabid and what is the meaning and sense of this determination? Perhaps we can do this with a recent example, namely the well-known saying circulating in May 1968 during the revolutionary movements of the Parisian students at the Sorbonne, which reads:

»Let's be realistic, demand Vimpossible.«

If one wants to see more in this battle slogan than a witty paradox, then it stands to search for its true inner meaning as well as for the truth it expresses.

The first thing that immediately strikes you here is the connection, or rather the identification of the realistic and the impossible. On the one hand, there is a critique here of any realism (political, theoretical, real-world, everyday, etc.) to which common sense mostly appeals when a particular interest is to be justified for the sake of the status quo, with the possibility extending to the realm of what is and always was, is limited, which basically amounts to the assertion that the existing reality is both the only possibility and the dimension of the "true" life of man. Or to put it another way: Don't ask for the impossible! which implies that only what already is is possible.

In contrast to this, i.e. in relation to a whole world, which understands and declares, lives and feels itself as the only real possible world, that realism is emphasized, which sees the true dimension of a humane existence in the impossible. The Kealis-239

mus des Unmöglichen wird dem Realismus des Bestehenden gegenübergestellt, wobei die Hauptbetonung eben auf diesem »l'impossible« liegt. Das ist das Feuer, das uns über das Bestehende als solches hinaus tragen sollte und zu einer Dimension führen sollte, die uns das Neue Unbekannte enthüllen würde, das in erster Linie dem Bestehenden entgegengesetzt wäre.

Und dennoch, wenn man sich eingehender mit dieser Frage befaßt, wird man in der oben erwähnten Parole einen inneren Widerspruch entdecken, der nicht nur bedeutend, sondern eher entscheidend für die ganze Sache ist. Falls hier an etwas *Wesentliches* gedacht und damit bezweckt wird, was bis in das Sein der bestehenden (bürgerlichen) Welt, um die es sich hier handelt, vordringt, dann heißt jenseits dieser Welt stehen wollen soviel wie auf dem Standpunkt der *Möglichkeit* einer neuen nicht-mehr-bürgerlichen Welt stehen, und das ist die einzige, wesentliche und entscheidende Frage unserer Epoche, also die epochale geschichtliche Frage, vor die wir gestellt sind. Selbstverständlich muß diese Möglichkeit (oder besser diese Möglichkeiten) aus der bestehenden Welt hervorgehen, oder noch besser aus ihrer *wesentlichen Negation* als jener »dynamischen Entwicklungstendenz«, falls wir uns nicht in einem reinen geschichtlichen Vakuum wiederfinden wollen. Wenn also gesagt wird: »Fordern wir das Unmögliche«, muß die Frage gestellt werden: In Bezug auf was fordern wir dieses Unmögliche? Die Antwort ist implizite bereits gegeben: In Bezug auf die bestehende (»alte«) Welt!

Aber gerade hier liegt der oben genannte Widerspruch, der den wahren Sinn dieser Forderung verschleiert. Das *Unmögliche* wollen in Bezug, trotz, über oder außerhalb der bestehenden Welt heißt, die bestehende Welt in ihrer Ganzheit oder in ihrem Wesen ansehen und beurteilen als etwas – Mögliches! Deshalb bewegt sich alles andere und wesentlich andersartige in der Dimension der Unmöglichkeit. Wenn aber die bestehende Welt noch immer etwas Mögliches ist oder in sich solche Möglichkeiten enthält, dann fällt eo ipso schon dem Sinne nach jede Forderung nach etwas anderem, also nach dem Unmöglichen ins Wasser. Unter diesem »Unmöglichen« wird jedoch das verstanden, was im Rahmen oder unter den wesentlichen Voraussetzungen der bestehenden Welt nicht möglich ist, was aber unter den Voraussetzungen einer neuen Welt, die aus der radikalen Negation der alten Welt hervorgehen würde, möglich wäre. Hier wird also die Möglichkeit (des Neuen) und nicht die Unmöglichkeit (des Alten) gefordert. Denn die Möglichkeit der bestehenden Welt besteht darin, daß immer wieder das, was *dieser Welt bis in die letzten Konsequenzen wesentlich angemessen ist* produziert und reproduziert wird. Unter ihren (bürglichen) wesentlichen Voraussetzungen ist *keine* andere Möglichkeit (als eine bürgerliche) *reell möglich*. Deshalb kann die wesentliche Möglichkeit der neuen Welt nur *jenseits* der bestehenden Welt erahnt werden.

In diesem Sinne müßte die angeführte revolutionäre Parole der Studenten – als sich nicht widersprechend – eigentlich lauten:

»Seien wir Realisten, fordern wir das Mögliche«!

The impossibility is contrasted with the realism of the existing, with the main emphasis on this "l'impossible"

lies. T hat is the fire that should carry us beyond the existing as such

and lead to a dimension that would reveal to us the New Unknown, which would be primarily opposed to the existing.

And yet, if one looks more deeply into this question, one will discover an inner contradiction in the above-mentioned slogan, which is not only important, but rather crucial to the whole matter. If something essential is being thought of here and the aim is to penetrate into the being of the existing (bourgeois) world, which is the subject here, then wanting to stand beyond this world means as much as not wanting to stand on the standpoint of the possibility of a new one -more-bourgeois world, and that is the only essential and crucial question of our epoch, that is, the epochal historical question we are faced with. Of course, this possibility (or rather these possibilities) must emerge from the existing world, or better still from its essential negation as that "dynamic developmental tendency", if we do not want to find ourselves in a pure historical vacuum. So when it is said, "Let us demand the impossible," the question must be asked: In relation to what do we demand this impossible? The answer is already given implicitly: in relation to the existing ("old") world!

But it is precisely here that the above-mentioned contradiction lies, which obscures the true meaning of this requirement. Wanting the impossible in relation to, in spite of, above or outside of the existing world means viewing and judging the existing world in its entirety or in its essence as something - possible! That is why everything else and essentially different moves in the dimension of impossibility.

If, however, the existing world is still something possible or contains such possibilities within itself, then eo ipso any demand for something else, that is, for the impossible, falls through the cracks. By this "impossible," however, is meant that which is not possible within the framework or under the essential assumptions of the existing world, but which would be possible under the assumptions of a new world that would emerge from the radical negation of the old world. Here the possibility (of the new) and not the impossibility (of the old) is demanded. Because the possibility of the existing world consists in the fact that that which is essentially appropriate to this world down to the last consequences is produced and reproduced again and again. Given its (civil) essential assumptions, no other possibility (than a civil) is really possible. Therefore, the essential possibility of the new world can only be glimpsed beyond the existing world.

In this sense the cited revolutionary slogan of the students - as not contradicting itself - should actually read:

Es ist aber offensichtlich, daß uns eine auf diese Weise formulierte Forderung geradeswegs in den Rahmen jener nur zu gut bekannten und abgedroschenen alltäglichen Phrasen der theoretisch-praktischen »realistischen« (und selbstverständlich immer »gutgemeinten«) Stellungnahmen, Weltanschauungen und Ratschläge führt, die dasselbe Thema zum Ausdruck bringen oder variieren, das vielleicht folgendermaßen formuliert werden könnte: »Wir wollen nicht unersättlich sein und wollen lieber im Rahmen der reellen Möglichkeiten bleiben«, »fordern wir nicht das Unmögliche«, »seien wir reell«, man sollte die bestehenden Möglichkeiten nützen und ihnen zustimmen und nicht mit dem Kopf durch die Wand wollen«, »man muß sich nach der Decke strecken«, »lassen Sie doch diese Utopien, das Leben ist ganz was anderes« usw., usf. Das wahre Gewicht der oben formulierten Forderung ist auf diese Weise völlig devalviert, des tieferen Sinnes beraubt, weil es bereits bürgerlich integriert und instrumentalisiert ist. Sie ist im Einklang mit dem Bestehenden. Der Sinn einer Forderung wird auf diese Weise verwässert bis zum nackten Spießertum, Scheinheiligkeit, Opportunismus, Heuchelei und Lüge, und zwar jener Lüge, die die wirkliche Wahrheit dieser entfremdeten, verdinglichten, manipulierten und pervertierten Welt und der Lebensweise auf dem Niveau einer gut eingespielten Zoologie ist. Denn hier ist nicht mehr die Rede von irgendwelchen Möglichkeiten, am wenigsten von den menschlichen Möglichkeiten, da sich hier, wie es leicht zu sehen ist – jede Möglichkeit unmittelbar und täglich in ihr Gegenteil verwandelt, d. h. in die *bloße Gegebenheit* um desjenigen willen, das schon irgendwie ist.

Deshalb liegt der tiefers Sinn der revolutionären Parole der Studenten gerade in ihrer authentischen Formulierung, da unter jenem »l'impossible« eigentlich das verstanden wird, was – im Gegensatz zu allen jenen operational-pragmatistischen, gemeinverständlich-wissenschaftlichen, lebensrealistischen, utilitaristisch-erfolgreichen und instrumental-gegenständlichen »Möglichkeiten« als Gegebenheiten – als *wesentliche Möglichkeit* bezeichnet wird.

Darüber sagt Marcuse folgendes:

»Aber die wesentliche Möglichkeit liegt nicht wie viele andere Möglichkeiten *in dem gegebenen* Universum der Beurteilung und der Aktion; die wesentliche Möglichkeit ist ganz anderen Ranges. Ihre Verwirklichung impliziert die Umstürzung des Bestehenden, denn ein mit der Wahrheit im Einklang stehendes Denken bedeutet die Verpflichtung zu einem Existieren im Einklang mit der Wahrheit ... So drängt der zerstörende Charakter der Wahrheit dem Gedanken eine *imperativische* Eigenschaft auf. Die Logik zentriert sich um die Urteile, die als demonstrative Behauptungen imperativisch sind – das prädikative »ist« impliziert ein »es soll«.[2]

Worin besteht aber dieser »zerstörende Charakter der Wahrheit«, auf den Marcuse hinweist? Und damit eng verbunden ist auch die zweite Frage, was heißt »Existieren im Einklang mit der Wahrheit«?

[2] Herbert Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch, zitiert nach der serbokroatischen Übersetzung, erschienen bei »Veselin Masleša«, Sarajevo, 1968, S. 130.

But it is obvious that a requirement formulated in this way falls squarely within the framework of those well-known and hackneyed everyday phrases of theoretical-practical

"realistic" (and, of course, always "well-intentioned") statements, worldviews, and advice that express or vary the same theme, which could perhaps be phrased as follows: "We don't want to be insatiable and prefer to stay within the realms of possibility." ,

»Let's not demand the impossible«, »Let's be real«, one should use the existing possibilities and agree to them and not want to bang one's head through the wall«, »One has to reach for the ceiling«, »Leave these utopias alone 'Life is something completely different', etc., etc. The true weight of the demand formulated above is completely devalued in this way, robbed of its deeper meaning because it is already integrated and instrumentalized by the bourgeoisie.

It is in harmony with the existing. In this way, the meaning of a demand is diluted to the point of sheer silliness, hypocrisy, opportunism, hypocrisy and lies, namely those lies that denote the real truth of this alienated, reified, manipulated and perverted world and way of life on the level of a good well-rehearsed zoology is. For here there is no longer any talk of any possibilities, least of all human possibilities, since here, as is easy to see -

every possibility immediately and daily transformed into its opposite, id. H. into the mere given for the sake of that which already somehow--

how is.

That is why the deeper meaning of the students' revolutionary slogan lies precisely in its authentic formulation, since under that

"l'impossible" is actually understood as what - in contrast to all those operational-pragmatistic, commonly understood-scientific, life-realistic, utilitarian-successful and instrumental-objective "possibilities" as givens -

identified as a significant possibility.

Marcuse says the following about this:

'But the essential possibility, like many other possibilities, does not lie in the given universe of judgment and action; the essential possibility is completely different range. Its realization implies the overthrow of

the status quo, for to think in accordance with truth means to commit to existing in accordance with truth. . . Thus the destructive character of truth imposes an imperative quality on thought. The logic is centered around the judgments, which as demonstrative assertions are imperative - the predicative "is" implies an "it shall".2

But what is this "destructive character of truth" to which Marcuse refers? And closely related to this is the second question, what does "existing in accordance with the truth" mean?

* Herbert Marcuse, The one-dimensional man, quoted from the serbokroat!-

translation, published by »Veselin Maslela«, Sarajevo, 1968, o. 130.

Vor allem haben wir ständig mit prozessualen Bewußtseinsabläufen (Abläufen des Denkens) und des Geschehens zu tun, also mit einem bestimmten geschichtlichen Geschehen, in dem das, was »faktisch ist«, ohne seine konstitutive Dimension nicht erscheint und nicht erscheinen kann, die in jenem »es soll« enthalten ist, wovon bereits Hegel auf seine Weise gesprochen hat (in seiner Metapher vom Maulwurf, der ständig wühlt«, wie auch durch die Stellungnahme von der tätigen Anwesenheit des Unendlichen im Endlichen, damit das Endliche überhaupt etwas Reales wäre). Dieses »es soll« hält als Träger und Initiator des Möglichen die Geschichtlichkeit des Prozesses offen, in dem das, was »faktisch ist«, als *geschichtliche* Gegebenheit erscheint. Deshalb weist Marcuse darauf hin, daß derjenige, der sich den unmittelbaren Tatsachen hingibt, das Erkennen der *Faktoren hinter den Tatsachen* vereitelt.[3] Schon die Sprache verdeutlicht uns dieses Verhältnis: *Tat*-sache = das Ge-*tan*-e, hinter dem der *Tät*-er steht (lat. factor, factum von facio = tun, machen, arbeiten, verursachen, anregen).

Jenes »es soll« weist also auf das hin, was in diesem »ist« nicht oder noch nicht ist, weckt es aus dem Ruhezustand, zieht es aus der Dunkelheit der Unbeweglichkeit und der Inertheit hervor und schaltet es in den geschichtlichen Prozeß ein, das heißt, es erschließt die Dimension seiner Möglichkeit, aufgrund derer dieses faktische »ist« erst seine Wirklichkeit als ein reales Etwas erhält, es nimmt also eine bestimmte »Bedeutung« in der Ganzheit des Prozesses an. Denken können an das, was ist, heißt also von seiner unmittelbaren Gegebenheit *abstrahieren,* heiß sich jenseits seiner selbst befinden, heißt auf dem Standpunkt dessen, was dieses »ist« noch nicht ist, was aber sein könnte und sollte stehen, heißt letzten Endes ein kritisch-zerstörendes Verhältnis zu ihm haben. Und jenseits sein oder auf dem Standpunkt dessen, was (noch) nicht ist, heißt *auf dem Standpunkt der Utopie* stehen. Daraus ergibt sich weiter, daß jeder wirkliche Gedanke als Abstraktion vom Bestehenden und um der geschichtlichen Dimension dessen, was ist, willen seinem wesentlichen Charakter nach kritisch, also eben *utopisch* ist. Nach der Möglichkeit dessen, was faktisch »schon ist«, fragen, und das ist die grundlegende, wesentliche und einzige wirklich philosophische Frage, die die »Welt« als »topos« der Dinge, Seienden, all dessen, was als real und objektiv möglich ist, als geschichtlich Mögliches erschließt – heißt bereits in der Dimension des

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[3] Indem Marcuse von der Spannung zwischen dem »ist« und dem »es soll« spricht, sagt er: »Die erhaltene Spannung durchdringt das zweidimensionale Universum der Beurteilung, in dem der kritische, abstrakte Gedanken am Werk ist. Die zwei gegebenen Dimensionen sind antagonistisch, und die Realität ist in beiden enthalten, während die dialektischen Begriffe wirkliche Widersprüche entwickeln. In seiner eigenen Entwicklung ist der dialektische Gedanke zur Auffassung des geschichtlichen Charakters des Widerspruchs und des Prozesses ihrer gegenseitigen Vermittlung als eines geschichtlichen Prozesses gelangt. So erscheint die »zweite« Dimension des Gedankens als *geschichtliche* Dimension – die Potentialität erscheint als geschichtliche Möglichkeit und ihre Realisierung als geschichtliches Geschehen.

Die Verdrängung dieser Dimension in der gesellschaftlichen Totalität der Operationalität ist eine *Verdrängung* der Geschichte, und dies ist keine akademische Frage mehr sondern eine politische. Das ist ein Verdrängen der eigenen Vergangenheit der Gesellschaft – und ihrer Zukunft, weil sich diese Zukunft einer qualitativen Veränderung, der Negation des Bestehenden zuwendet.« – Ibid. S. 101–102.

Above all, we are constantly dealing with processes of consciousness (course of thought) and events, that is, with a specific historical event in which what "factually" does not and cannot appear without its

constitutive dimension, which is in that "it should" be contained, of which Hegel has already spoken in his own way (in his metaphor of the mole that is constantly digging", as well as by the statement of the active presence of the infinite in the finite, so that the finite would be something real at all). As the bearer and initiator of the possible, this "it should" keeps open the historicity of the process in which that which "is factual" appears as a historical given.

That is why Marcuse points out that he who devotes himself to the immediate facts thwarts the recognition of the factors behind the facts.3 The very language makes this relation clear to us: fact = the G c-tan-e, behind the which stands T a t-tr (lat.

factor, factum from facio = do, make, work, cause, stimulate).

That "es should" thus points to what is not or is not yet in this "is", awakens it from the state of dormancy, pulls it out of the darkness of immobility and inertness and engages it in the historical process , that is, it opens up the dimension of its possibility, on the basis of which this factual "is" first receives its reality as a real something, so it takes on a specific one

"meaning" in the whole of the process. Being able to think about what is means abstracting from its immediate givenness, means being located beyond oneself, means from the point of view of what this "is" is not yet, but what could and should be, means ultimately end up having a critically destructive relationship with him. And to be beyond or to be on the standpoint of what is not (yet) is to stand on the standpoint of utopia. It also follows from this that every real thought, as an abstraction from what exists and because of the historical dimension of what is, is critical for the sake of its essential character, i.e. utopian. After the possibility of what factual

"already is," and that is the fundamental, essential, and only truly philosophical question that opens up the "world" as the "topos" of things, beings, of everything that is real and objectively possible, as historically possible - already in the dimension of the 3 By Marcuse means the tension between the "is" and the "it should"

speaking, he says: "The tension obtained permeates the two-dimensional universe of judgment in which critical, abstract thought is at work.

The two dimensions given are antagonistic and reality is contained in both, while the dialectical concepts develop real contradictions.

In its own development dialectical thought has come to understand the historical character of contradiction and the process of their mutual mediation as a historical process. This is how the »second« appears

Dimension of thought as a historical dimension - the potentiality appears as a historical possibility and its realization as a historical event.

The displacement of this dimension in the social totality of operationality is a displacement of history, and this is no longer an academic question but a political one. This is a suppression of society's own past - and its future, because this future turns to a qualitative change, the negation of the existing.« - Ibid. pp. 101-102.

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Noch-nicht-Bestehenden sein oder sein wollen, und das ist gerade die utopische Dimension! Die Geschichtlichkeit des Geschichtlichen ereignet sich also als u-topos der eminent menschlichen Welt, als eine ununterbrochene Erschließung des Raumes, der Zeit, des Sinnes und der Bedeutung dessen, was faktisch als jenes reales Etwas in Existenz tritt. Sonst ist, bleibt oder wäre es einfach ein *»Nichts«*. Wodurch etwas möglich wird, also die Frage nach der Möglichkeit von etwas, in der auch die Frage, ob das, was ist, auch anders sein könnte, als Forderung enthalten ist, überragt, oder besser überragt auf geschichtlich-utopische Weise die metaphysische Frage, warum etwas und nicht einfach ein Nichts ist als Frage nach dem Sein (oder dem Sinn des Seins) von allem Bestehenden, überschreitet also den Horizont der Ontologie *als* Ontologie, deren Möglichkeit bereits auf die Welt der bestehenden Realität beschränkt ist als eine der (modalen) Kategorien des Seienden als Seienden.

Der Ausweg aus diesem geschlossenen Horizont dessen, was wesentlich ist oder sich ereignet, liegt nicht in Hegels (oder jeder anderen) *Ontologisierung* der Geschichte, da man dadurch zwangsläufig nur bis zum Konzept der Geschichte als einem nichterleuchteten Geschehen der Vergangenheit (und der Gegenwart als ihrer Perpetuierung) geführt wird, weil man mit Hilfe einer solcherart aufgefaßten Geschichte nie und auf gar keine Weise in die Dimension der Zukunft vordringen kann, die hier von vornherein aus dem Horizont des Möglichen getilgt ist. Auch der Begriff der »offenen Möglichkeit« (was eine reine Tautologie ist, denn was wäre denn eine »geschlossene Möglichkeit«?) weist nicht den Weg zur wirklichen Überschreitung der Grenzen und Überwindung der wesentlichen Voraussetzung einer in sich geschlossenen Welt, da auch diese »offene Möglichkeit« als reines Palliativum bereits so erdacht ist, daß sich ihr Ausgangspunkt und ihr Prinzip eben in dem befinden, was wesentlich hier ist, so wie es ist, so daß die Möglichkeit dieser Welt nur in dem Horizont und dem Rahmen der bestehenden Realität (wie sie bereits entstanden ist) gesehen werden. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen ist die Frage nach der Möglichkeit dessen, was ist und was gewesen ist, immer nur eine *post festum* Bestimmung des Geschichtlichen, in dem auch der Begriff der Geschichte als Philosophie der Geschichte *am Ende* des Vergangenen steht, woraus es seine Vision der Geschichte als der Vergangenheit entnimmt.[4]

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[4] Dieses metaphysische Bild der Geschichte als der Vergangeheit hat am konsequentesten Hegel dargestellt in seiner bekannten Behauptung: »Dies, was der Begriff lehrt, zeigt notwendig ebenso die Geschichte, daß erst in der Reife der Wirklichkeit das Ideale dem Realen gegenüber erscheint und sich dieselbe Welt, in ihrer Substanz erfaßt, in Gestalt eines intellektuellen Reichs erbaut. Wenn die Philosophie ihr Grau in Grau malt, dann ist eine Gestalt des Lebens alt geworden, und mit Grau in Grau läßt sie sich nicht verjüngen, sondern nur erkennen; die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug.« – G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 4. Aufl. 1955, S. 17.

Marx hat darauf repliziert: »Da der absolute Geist nämlich erst post festum im Philosophen als schöpferischer Weltgeist zum *Bewußtsein* kommt, so existiert seine Fabrikation der Geschichte nur im *Bewußtsein*, in der Meinung und Vorstellung des Philosophen, nur in der spekulativen Einbildung.« – K. Marx-F. Engels, Die heilige Familie, in K. Marx-F. Engels Werke, Bd. 2, Dietz, Berlin 1958.

To be or want to be what does not yet exist, and that is precisely the utopian dimension! The historicity of the historical thus occurs as a u-topos of the eminently human world, as an uninterrupted disclosure of

space, time, meaning and the meaning of what actually comes into existence as that real something. Otherwise it is, remains or would simply be a »nothing«. What makes something possible, i.e. the question of the possibility of something, which also includes the question of whether what is, could also be different, as a requirement, towers over, or better towers over in a historical-utopian way the metaphysical question, why something is and not simply nothing as a question of the being (or the meaning of being) of everything that exists, thus transcends the horizon of ontology as ontology, the possibility of which is already limited to the world of existing reality as one of the (modal) Categories of beings as beings.

The way out of this closed horizon of what is essential or happening does not lie in Hegel's (or any other) ontologization of history, since that inevitably leads only to the concept of history as an unenlightened happening of the past (and the present as its perpetuation), because with the help of a history conceived in this way one can never, in no way, advance into the dimension of the future, which here is erased from the outset from the horizon of the possible. The concept of "open possibility"

(which is a pure tautology, because what would be a "closed possibility"?) does not point the way to really crossing the borders and overcoming the essential prerequisite of a self-contained world, since this "open possibility" as a pure palliative already does so is conceived that its point of departure and principle resides precisely in what is essential here as it is, so that the possibility of this world can only be seen within the horizon and framework of existing reality (as it has already come into being). . Under these conditions, the question of the possibility of what is and what has been is always only a post festum determination of history, in which the concept of history as philosophy of history stands at the end of the past, from which its vision of history derives than the past reveals.4

4 This metaphysical picture of history as the past was presented most consistently by Hegel in his well-known assertion: “What the concept teaches necessarily shows history as well, that only when reality has matured does the ideal appear in relation to the real and the same world, grasped in its substance, built in the form of an intellectual empire. When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then a form of life has grown old, and with gray in gray it cannot be caught, only recognized; Minerva's owl does not begin its flight until dawn." - G. W. F.

Hegel, Basic Lines of the Philosophy of Law, Felix Meiner, Hamburg,

4th ed.

1955, S. 17.

Marx replied: "Since the absolute spirit only becomes conscious post festum in the philosopher as a creative world spirit, its fabrication of history only exists in the consciousness, in the opinion and imagination of the philosopher, only in the speculative imagination." - K - Marx-F. Engels, The Holy Family, in K. Marx-F. Engels works, vol. 2, Dietz, Berlin 1958.

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Die Beschränktheit dieser Position besteht eben darin, daß diese Schranke noch nicht geschichtlich *überschritten ist* (gerade im Sinne der Hegelschen Bestimmung).[5] Und daraus ergeben sich dann weiter zwangsläufig alle ihre Inkonsequenzen: Wenn die Geschichte schon gewesen ist, wie ist es möglich, daß sie sich überhaupt ereignet hat, beziehungsweise wie ist die Geschichte als Prozeß des realen Geschehens überhaupt möglich, wenn in ihrem Grund, also »in allem Anfang« nicht die Möglichkeit liegt, das zu sein, was sie war? Um mit Hegel zu sprechen, wissen wir das vielleicht erst jetzt, und die Geschichte zeigt uns in der Tat, was uns der Begriff schon gelehrt hat, aber zugleich wissen wir auch *etwas mehr:* daß sich das Ideale (jenes »es soll«!) bereits am Anfang, in dem Grund, im Ursprung dem Realen (dem, was »ist«) widersetzt und nicht erst in der Reife der Wirklichkeit, in der es dann so »augenfällig« wird.

Daß uns etwas post festum *sichtbar* und in seinem Wesen erkennbar (»augenfällig«) wird, heißt keinesfalls, daß es sich seinem Wesen nach auch post festum *ereignet* hat! Die Geschichte als Zukunft, als Möglichkeit, anders zu sein als es ist, als u-topos des faktischen Geschehens (des topos) einer bestimmten Welt, als Überschreitung der Schranken der bestehenden Realität (= Faktizität) ist ständig am Werk seit ihres eigenen Ursprungs. Und dennoch, historisch-chronologisch betrachtet ist diese Einsicht, diese Erkenntnis oder besser: Selbsterkenntnis des wahren Grundes der Welt des Menschen ein Ergebnis, und war ein epochales Ergebnis des modernen Denkens, das mit Descartes einsetzt, ihren tiefgründigsten »Wendepunkt« jedoch in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie als der geschichtlichen Sinnhaltigmachung der französischen Revolution erreicht. Erst da wird es real sichtbar (aber zugleich auch ontologisch verschleiert und durch Hegel fast völlig annulliert) und zwar als »historische Tatsache« in seiner ganzen »Augenfälligkeit« – daß *das, was ist, mit der Möglichkeit* (eines andersartigen als es einfach ist, einer neuen Welt usw.) *beginnt,* die dem nachträglichen, faktischen Geschehen wie auch dem gegenständlichen Verhältnis vorangeht, in dem alle Dinge (für das Bewußtsein) eine bestimmte, geschichtliche spezifische Beleuchtung, einen Sinn und eine Bedeutung (in diesem Falle eben eine bürgerliche Bedeutung) erhalten. Hier ist die geschichtliche Dimension der Revolution als Revolution am Werke, die durch ihren Utopiecharakter, das heißt durch den Standpunkt, der seine wesentlichen Kräfte von jenseits des Bestehenden herleitet, von dem was noch nicht ist aber sein sollte, den Raum für die Möglichkeit – des *kritischen Denkens* erschließt (was auch eine Tautologie ist, denn ein Denken, das nicht kritisch- also radikal, gründlich und bis zu den Wurzeln vordringend ist, das nicht nach den Wurzeln der Sache fragt und das nicht utopisch – ist kein wirkliches Denken eines Subjekts, sondern eine instrumentalische Operation, auf das Bestehende als solches gerichtet).[6]

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[5] Siehe dazu: G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), F. Meiner, Hamburg 1959, § 60, S. 84.

[6] Ein Beispiel dafür bietet uns die jugoslawische Revolution, die ein eigenartiger »Sturm auf den Himmel« ohne Präzedens war und vom Standpunkt der bestehenden (sowohl altjugoslawischen als auch der globalen) Realität in der Tat die reinste »tollgewordene Utopie« war, sowohl in theoretischer Hinsicht (als gedankliches

The limitation of this position consists precisely in the fact that this limit has not yet been transcended historically (precisely in the sense of Hegel's determination).5 And from this all its inconsistencies

inevitably follow: If history has already happened, how is it possible that? it happened at all, or how is history possible at all as a process of real events if the possibility of being what it was does not lie in its foundation, i.e. "in the very beginning"? To use Hegel's language, we may only know this now, and history does indeed show us what the concept has already taught us, but at the same time we also know something more: that the ideal (that

"es soli"!) already at the beginning, in the reason, in the origin, opposed to the real (that which "is") and not only in the maturity of reality, in which it then becomes so "obvious".

The fact that something is visible to us post festum and recognizable in its essence (»obvious«) in no way means that its essence also happened post festum! History as the future, as the possibility of being different from what it is, as the u-topos of factual events (the topos) of a certain world, as exceeding the limits of existing reality (= facticity) has been constantly at work since its own origin. And yet, viewed historically and chronologically, this insight, this knowledge, or better: self-knowledge of the true basis of the human world, is a result and was an epochal result of modern thinking, which begins with Descartes, but its most profound "turning point" in of classical German philosophy as the historical meaning of the French revolution. Only then does it become really visible (but at the same time also ontologically veiled and almost completely annulled by Hegel), namely as a "historical fact" in all its "obviousness" - that what is with the possibility (of something different from it simply is, a new world, etc.), which precedes the subsequent, factual events as well as the objective relationship in which all things (for consciousness) have a certain, historically specific illumination, a sense and a meaning (in this case just a civil meaning). Here the historical dimension of the revolution as a revolution is at work, which through its utopian character, i.e. through the point of view that derives its essential forces from beyond the existing, from what is not yet but should be, the space for the possibility - of critical thinking (which is also a tautology, because thinking that is not critical - i.e. radical, thorough and penetrating to the roots, that does not ask about the roots of the matter and that is not utopian - is not real thinking of a subject, but an instrumental operation aimed at the existing as such).6

6 See: G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), F. Meiner, Hamburg 1959, § 60, p. 84.

• An example of this is offered by the Yugoslav revolution, which is a

peculiar one

"Assault on Heaven" was without precedent, and from the point of view of existing (both old Yugoslav and global) reality, it was indeed the purest

"Utopia gone mad" was, both in theoretical terms (as an intellectual

Was nun das genannte »post festum« sowohl in geschichtlicher als auch in methodologischer Hinsicht (oder besser: in geschichtlich-methodologischer Form) anbelangt, darüber hat Marx folgendes gesagt:

»Das Konkrete ist konkret, weil es die Zusammenfassung vieler Bestimmungen ist, also Einheit des Mannigfaltigen. Im Denken erscheint es daher als Prozeß der Zusammenfassung, als Resultat, nicht als Ausgangspunkt, *obgleich es der wirkliche Ausgangspunkt* und daher auch der Ausgangspunkt der Anschauung und Vorstellung ist. Im ersten Weg wurde die volle Vorstellung zu abstrakter Bestimmung verflüchtigt; im zweiten führen die Abstrakten Bestimmungen zur *Reproduktion* des Konkreten im Weg des Denkens. Hegel geriet daher auf die Illusion, das Reale als Resultat des sich in sich zusammenfassenden, in sich vertiefenden, und aus sich selbst bewegenden Denkens zu fassen . . .«[7]

Dasjenige also, das auf den ersten Blick als fertiges Resultat oder ein post festum erscheint, ist der geschichtliche Ausgangspunkt, und das, was uns als beendete Vergangenheit vorkommt, mußte durch die Zukunft beginnen, dank derer sich erst die Möglichkeit der Geschichte erschließt. Sonst wäre uns diese ganze Vergangenheit, die in sich selbst alle Dimensionen der Geschichtlichkeit erschöpft, überhaupt nicht verständlich, weil wir nicht einmal post festum (gedanklich) an ihr teilhaben könnten. So würde für uns auch das Kulturerbe ein reines Vakuum bleiben, denn das, was bloß war, würde in unseren Augen jedes Kriteriums und jeder sinnhaltigen Bestimmung entbehren, ähnlich einem Haufen von irgendwelchen Überbleibseln, auf den wir weitere Reste aufhäufen.

Deshalb hat auch Marx in diesem Zusammenhang gesagt, daß die Anatomie des Menschen der Schlüssel zur Verständnis der Anatomie des Affen ist, die bürgerliche Ökonomie der Schlüssel zur antischen usw. und am Ende schließt er:

»So kam bürgerliche Ökonomie erst zum Verständnis der feudalen, antiken, orientalen, *sobald die Selbstkritik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft begonnen.*«[8]

Und die Selbstkritik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft kann – geschichtlich betrachtet – als *wesentliche Kritik nur jenseits* derselben Gesellschaft geübt werden, einer Gesellschaft, die erst dadurch »klar«, »durchschaubar« und in ihrem wahren Sinn »sichtbar« wird als jenes, was nur »faktisch ist« – also eine verfremdete, verdinglichte usw. Gesellschaft. Deshalb hat *erst mit Marx' radikaler Kritik* an der bestehenden Realität der bürgerlichen Welt – weil Marx bereits jenseits

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Konzept) als auch ihrer praktischen Form (im Hinblick auf die reale Kräfteverteilung, Mittel, Aussichten usw.). Von der anderen Seite betrachtet hat aber erst die Revolution den Raum für ein wirklich kritisches Denken erschlossen, das auf dem Niveau des zeitgenössischen geschlichtlichen, d. h. sozialistischen Geschehens ist oder sein könnte, falls sie nämlich sich selbst treu bleibt. Ohne diese Revolution wären wir faktisch jene Provinzler geblieben, die wir auch (vor dem Krieg) waren; die Aufgabe des Denkens wäre nun, dieses geschichtlich erkämpfte Niveau eben durch seine »andere« aber wahre utopische Dimension zu halten, die ihren »Sitz« in der Idee der Revolution hat.

[7] Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Dietz, Berlin, 1953, S. 21–22. (Unterstrichen von M. K.).

[8] Ibid. S. 26 (Unterstrichen von M. K.).

As far as the post festum mentioned is concerned, both from a historical and a methodological point of view (or better: in a historical-methodological form), Marx said the following about it:

»The concrete is concrete. because it is the combination of many determinations, i.e. the unity of the manifold. In thinking, therefore, it appears as a process of summing up, as a result, not as a starting point, although it is the real starting point and therefore also the starting point of intuition and imagination.

In the first way, the full idea was evaporated into abstract determination; in the second, the abstract determinations lead to the reproduction of the concrete in the path of thought. Hegel therefore fell into the illusion of grasping the real as the result of thinking that summarizes itself, deepens itself, and moves on its own. . ."7

That which appears at first glance as a finished result or a post festum is the historical starting point, and what appears to us as the past having ended must begin with the future, thanks to which the possibility of history first opens up. Otherwise this entire past, which in itself exhausts all dimensions of historicity, would not be comprehensible to us at all, because we could not even (mentally) participate in it post festum. In this way, the cultural heritage would also remain a pure vacuum for us, because what was mere would, in our eyes, lack any criterion and any meaningful definition, similar to a heap of whatever remains on which we pile more leftovers.

That is why Marx also said in this connection that human anatomy is the key to understanding ape anatomy, bourgeois economics is the key to ancient etc., and in the end he concludes:

"Thus bourgeois economy only came to an understanding of the feudal, ancient, oriental economy as soon as the self-criticism of bourgeois society had begun."s And the self-criticism of bourgeois society can - viewed historically - be practiced as an essential criticism only beyond the same society, a society which only then "clear",

"transparent" and "visible" in its true sense as that which only "is factual" - that is, an alienated, reified, etc. society. Therefore, only with Marx's radical critique of the existing reality of the bourgeois world - because Marx is already beyond concept) as well as its practical form (in terms of the real distribution of power, means, prospects, etc.). Viewed from the other side, however, it was only the revolution that opened up the space for really critical thinking, which was at the level of the contemporary, simple, i. H. socialist events is or could be if it stays true to itself. Without this revolution, we remained in fact the same provincials that we were (before the war); the task of thinking would now be to maintain this historically fought level precisely through its "other" but true utopian dimension, which has its

"seat" in the idea of revolution.

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7 Karl Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy, Dietz, Berlin, 1953, pp. 21-22. (Underlined by M.K.).

1 Ibid. p. 26 (underlined by M.K.).

dieser Welt stand auf dem Standpunkt dessen, was noch nicht ist (also auf dem Standpunkt des Sozialismus, Kommunismus, der neuen Welt, der wahren menschlichen Gemeinschaft usw.), das heißt in der Dimension der Utopischen – deshalb hat also dieselbe Realität das Attribut der Entfremdung, Verdinglichung usw. bekommen können, also erst nachdem ihre Grenze *überschritten worden war.* Und sie war schon dadurch überschritten, daß in jeder Marxschen Stellungnahme, die die bestehende Realität der bürgerlichen Welt betrifft (analysiert), jenes »es soll« enthalten ist, das auf etwas andersartiges als das, was ist, hinweist (es fordert) und worin dann seine Kritiker und Interpreten fälschlich das »ethische Moment« seines Gedankens sehen oder sogar eine Ethik zu finden versuchen. Diese Grenze ist insofern überschritten, weil Marxens Gedanke ein par excellence geschichtlich-utopischer, im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes spekulativer Gedanke ist, in seiner Abstraktion zu jener Dimension erhoben, wo er sich mit dem Grund der Welt der Menschen – *mit ihrer Möglichkeit,* berührt (oder auf sie »zurückgreift«). Marx hält auf diese Weise ständig die Möglichkeit eines andersartigen als es ist, offen, und das ist die einzige wahre Quelle der Marxschen Kritik an dem Wesen der bestehenden bürgerlichen Welt.

Wenn wir nun wieder auf die Hegelsche Gegenüberstellung des Idealen und Realen zurückgreifen, können wir sagen, daß sich nur in dieser Gegenüberstellung dasjenige, das wir als Geschichte bezeichnen, ereignen konnte und kann.

Im Lichte desjenigen, was bis jetzt gesagt wurde, erhält die These, daß »dasjenige, was ist, nicht wahr sein kann« (Bloch) ihren Sinn, da »wahr ist, was nicht (unmittelbar) ein solches ist« (Marcuse). Daraus ergibt sich dann selbstverständlich auch die Umkehr dieses Standpunktes, die lauten würde: Wenn die Realisierung der wesentlichen Möglichkeit – worüber Marcuse spricht – »den Umsturz des Bestehenden einschließt, denn das Denken im Einklang mit der Wahrheit bedeutet zugleich die Verpflichtung, im Einklang mit der Wahrheit zu existieren«, dann muß das *Existieren (wie auch das Denken) im Einklang mit dem, was ist, zwangsläufig unwahr sein.* Das wäre also ein verlogenes Existieren wie auch ein verlogenes Denken, das das Existieren in dieser Lüge noch bestätigt und rechtfertigt. Marx würde es als ideologisches Denken bezeichnen, das dem entfremdeten Dasein des Menschen (der entfremdeten Welt) adäquat ist.

Damit im Zusammenhang drängt sich die Frage auf, was für einen Sinn die Behauptung, besser gesagt die Beurteilung der Studentenbewegung hat, die am häufigsten (nicht ohne sichtbare Schadenfreude) folgendermaßen formuliert wird (und der die Studenten aufgrund der Logik der »einzelnen Fälle oder Unfälle« auch selbst manchmal auf den Leim gehen): »Diese Studenten wissen, was sie nicht wollen, aber sie wissen nicht, was sie wollen!« Zurückgeführt auf die Sphäre des Politischen (denn hier wurde sie eigentlich geboren) wird diese Beurteilung »erhärtet« durch jenes bekannten Ausspruch: »Sie haben ja kein positives Programm.«

Sollte man zur Annahme neigen, daß damit die ganze Gelegenheit ad acta gelegt ist, könnte einem mit Recht entgegengehalten werden, daß sich diese »superioren Beurteiler« eigentlich sehr irren, und zwar

of this world stood on the standpoint of what is not yet (that is, on the standpoint of socialism, communism, the new world, the true human community, etc.), i.e. in the dimension of the utopian - that is why the

same reality has the attribute of the alienation, reification, etc., i.e. only after their limit has been crossed. And it was already transcended by the fact that in every Marxian statement that concerns (analyzes) the existing reality of the bourgeois world, that

"es should" is contained, which points to something other than what is, (it demands) and in which its critics and interpreters wrongly see the "ethical moment" of his thought or even try to find an ethic. This limit has been exceeded insofar as Marx's thought is historical-utopian par excellence, speculative in the truest sense of the word, raised in its abstraction to that dimension where it touches the ground of the human world - with their possibility (or "recourses to" them). Marx thus constantly keeps open the possibility of something different than it is, and this is the only true source of Marx's critique of the nature of the existing bourgeois world.

If we now go back to Hegel's juxtaposition of the ideal and the real, we can say that only in this juxtaposition could and can what we call history happen.

In the light of what has been said so far, the thesis that "what is cannot be true" (Bloch) makes sense because

"true is what is not (immediately) such" (Marcuse). Of course, this also results in the reversal of this point of view, which would read: If the realization of the essential possibility - what Marcuse talks about - "includes the overthrow of the existing, because thinking in accordance with the truth means at the same time the obligation, in accordance with the Truth to exist', then existing (like thinking) consistent with what is must necessarily be untrue. So that would be a mendacious existence as well as a mendacious thinking that still confirms and justifies the existence in this lie. Marx would call it ideological thinking adequate to man's alienated existence (the alienated world).

In connection with this, the question arises as to the meaning of the assertion, or rather the assessment of the student movement, which is most often (not without visible malicious joy) formulated as follows (and which the students based on the logic of "individual cases or U Accidents" sometimes fall for the trick themselves: "These students know what they don't want, but they don't know what they want!" When traced back to the political sphere (because it was actually born here), this assessment is "hardened « by that well-known saying: »You don’t have a positive program.«

If one tends to assume that the whole opportunity is thereby shelved, one could justifiably object that these "superior judges" are actually very wrong, namely 246

gerade im Wesentlichen. Denn wenn auch einzelne Studenten oder einzelne Gruppen als *empirische Kategorien* nicht wissen, wovon im wesentlichen die Rede ist, so weiß es doch die ganze Bewegung als solche: Sie wissen zuverlässig (und das ist eben jenes »existentielle Wissen«, das auch ausgedrückt werden kann als: Leben, Fühlen, Selbstgefühl, Erleben, Erleiden, Einsehen, Wollen, Suchen, Irren, Fordern, sich Orientieren in der Welt, Suche nach dem Sinn, einer Möglichkeit, Perspektive usw.) – die Studenten wissen also, daß ein Leben oder Denken im Einklang mit dem, was ist, zwangsläufig unwahr, also verlogen sein muß, und zwar ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob sie Bloch und Marcuse gelesen haben oder nicht. Sie wissen also auch, daß das wahre Existieren und Denken vorkommen kann (vielleicht, denn das ist nur eine Möglichkeit, aber doch wenigstens eine Möglichkeit und nicht gar keine!) und zwar jenseits des Bestehenden. Und das ist, wie man sehen kann, eben jenes »positive« Wissen, das die bestehende Realität vom Standpunkt ihres *eigenen Elements* oder der »zweiten Dimension« (»der dynamischen Entwicklungstendenz«, wenn wir es noch in Erinnerung haben!?) genau trifft in jenem »es soll«, das die Negation dessen, was faktisch ist, darstellt. Wenn also die bestehende Realität (die bestende Welt) allmählich *existentiell unerträglich und sinnlos* wird oder es bereits geworden ist, dann ist das die größte (eigentlich geschichtlich tiefste) Wahrheit, die aus ihr hervorgehen könnte. Das wäre ein Selbstgefühl wie jene Selbsterkenntnis, die, unter der Voraussetzung der notwendigen Massenanteilnahme ihre wahre geschichtliche Dimension erschließen könnte, die die Welt auf das Niveau der wesentlichen Möglichkeit bringen würde, deren Verwirklichung das einschließt, was die Studenten anstreben: den Umsturz des Bestehenden.

Die Rede ist also von der geschichtlichen Dimension (von der bereits Hegel behauptet hat, die bürgerliche Gesellschaft habe sie eingebüßt) oder von jenem utopischen »was noch nicht ist«, vor dem sich die bestehende, in dem, »was ist« fest verankerte Realität fürchtet, so daß in diesem Sinne die Studentenbewegung (aber nicht sie allein) weiß, sowohl was sie nicht will als auch, was sie will: Sie will kein Existieren und Denken im Einklang mit dem Bestehenden, das wesentlich unwahr ist (keine Ideologie), und sie will ein Existieren und ein (abstraktes, kritisches und utopisches) Denken im Einklang mit der Wahrheit. Dieses »Wissen« bewegt sich auf dem Niveau der Totalität dieser geschichtslosen Welt, so daß es als solches nicht *unmittelbar* operationalisiert und instrumentalisiert werden kann im Sinne eines bestimmten *politischen Programms,* wodurch es sich in die bestehende Realität einfügen würde. Als operationalisiertes und instrumentalisiertes würde sich dieses Wissen zwangsläufig in ein bürgerlich organisiertes politisches Wissen im Rahmen der bestehenden Ordnung verwandeln und dadurch alle Tendenzen ersticken, die es jenseits seiner selbst leiten könnten. Gerade deshalb kann man mit Recht sagen: die Mißerfolge. Fehlschläge und Abweichungen der Studentenbewegung sind in erster Linie eigentlich die Mißerfolge, Fehlschläge und die Irrtümer der bestehenden Realität, denn die Studentenbewegung (und nicht nur sie) – das ist kein Zufall! – ist das wahre (negative) Element derselben Realität. So fällt das »schwerwiegendste« Argument der

just essentially. For even if individual students or individual groups as empirical categories do not know what is essentially being discussed, the whole movement as such knows it: they know reliably (and that is precisely that "existential knowledge" that can also be expressed as: living, feeling, feeling for oneself, experiencing, suffering, seeing, wanting, searching, making mistakes, demanding, orienting oneself in the world, searching for meaning, a possibility, perspective, etc.) - the students therefore know that a life or Thinking in accordance with what is, necessarily untrue, i.e. must be mendacious, regardless of whether you have read Bloch and Marcuse or not. So you also know that true existence and thinking can occur (perhaps, for that is only one possibility, but at least one possibility and not none at all!) beyond the existing. And that, as you can see, is that very "positive" knowledge that understands existing reality from the standpoint of its own element or "second dimension."

(»of the dynamic development tendency«, if we still remember it!?) hits the nail on the head with the »es should«, which represents the negation of what is factual. So when the existing reality (the best world) gradually becomes existentially unbearable and meaningless, or has already become so, then that is the greatest (actually historically deepest) truth that could emerge from it. That would be a sense of self like that self-knowledge which, given the necessary mass participation, could reveal its true historical dimension, which would bring the world to the level of essential possibility, the realization of which involves what the students aspire to: the overthrow of the existing.

We are therefore talking about the historical dimension (which Hegel already claimed was lost in bourgeois society) or about that utopian "what is not yet" before which the existing one is firmly anchored in "what is". anchored reality fears, so that in this sense the student movement (but not it alone) knows both what it does not want and what it does want: It does not want to exist and think in accordance with the existing, which is essentially untrue (no ideologic), and it wants an existence and a thinking (abstract, critical and utopian) in accordance with the truth. This "knowledge" moves on the level of the totality of this ahistorical world, so that it cannot be directly operationalized and instrumentalized as such in the sense of a specific political program, whereby it would fit into the existing reality. As operationalized and instrumentalized, this knowledge would inevitably transform into a bourgeois organized political knowledge within the framework of the existing order, thereby suffocating any tendencies that could guide it beyond itself. Precisely for this reason one can rightly say: the failures. Failures and deviations of the student

movement are in the first place actually the failures, failures and errors of the existing reality, because the student movement (and not only them) - this is no coincidence! - is the true (negative) element of the same reality. Thus falls the "most serious" argument of the 247th

Kritiker an den Studentenbewegungen und an allem progressiven Wollen und Denken, daß die nämlich »nicht wissen, was sie positiv wollen« auf die Kritiker selbst zurück, die, indem sie vorgehen, »genau zu wissen, was sie wollen«, sich selbst wesentlich verurteilt haben. Auf diese Weise befinden wir uns wirklich »auf dem festen Boden der Realität« und bestehender Faktizität, deren einzig möglicher Horizont zu ihrer Unterbringung und zum Operieren im Rahmen und um des Gegebenen als solchen willen die Dimension der wesentlichen Unwahrheit ist. Diese »Sicherheit« des Wissens, was man will, ist schon von allen Seiten zur Genüge beleuchtet, sie ist bekannt und in der Praxis erprobt in allen ihren (bürgerlichen und »sozialistischen«) Tragweiten, so daß sie keine unbekannte Größe mehr ist.

Aber trotz allem muß hier folgende Frage gestellt werden: Wie kann man mit solcher Sicherheit *wissen*, was man will (falls man nämlich nicht nur das, was hier unmittelbar präsent ist, d. h. dieses Bestehende! will), wenn gerade hier das größte und schwierigste, ja das wesentliche Problem unserer Epoche liegt: auf welche Weise sollen die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen dieser entfremdeten und verdinglichten bürgerlichen Welt als Ganzes abgeschafft und aufgehoben, also geschichtlich transzendiert werden?! Hier steht uns nämlich – theoretisch betrachtet – kein gegebener und fertiger Kategorienapparat zur Verfügung, der uns jenseits der bestehenden Welt führen würde, so daß uns also nur die *Mühsal der Erforschung* bleibt, was eben im wesentlichen (und sogar per definitionem!) – der Weg *ins Unbekannte und Noch-nicht-Gewesene ist.* Anderseits bewegt sich die Praxis dieses möglichen Vorstoßes, wie es das letzte halbe Jahrhundert des zeitgenössichen geschichtlichen Geschehens gezeigt hat, immer wieder und noch immer im Rahmen der bekannten, gut eingespielten Abläufe der bürgerlichen Erfahrung, so daß hier bislang *praktisch* kein wahres Novum in Erscheinung getreten ist. Es bleiben also nur *Versuche.*

Wenn man aber diesen Versuchen ein genau fixiertes politisches Programm um jeden Preis aufoktroyieren will (»die Studentenbewegungen haben ja kein eigenes positiv-politisches Programm«!), und die Rede ist eben von versuchten Überschreitungen (neben anderem oder vor allem) der Sphäre des Politischen, wie sie sich in ihrer dominanten Form in der modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft der manipulierten Parteidemokratie konstituiert hat (in einer Gesellschaft, die par excellence eine *politische* ist), dann handelt es sich entweder um ein totales Mißverständnis oder um eine bewußte Unterstellung! Meistens ist es das letztere, da es um bestimmte (eben politische) Interessen geht. Eben darum verwandelt sich – objektiv betrachtet – jeder Versuch des Denkens, Wirkens, Wollens, Lebens oder gar der Träumerei, des Liebens, des Sichfreuens, mit einem Wort der eigenständigen Bestätigung des menschlichen Wesens außerhalb oder trotz dieses gut eingespielten politischen Mechanismus – der tagtäglich sowohl geistig als auch moralisch und physisch Millionen von menschlichen Existenzen frustriert, zerbricht, verunstaltet, pervertiert, verdirbt und zermalmt – dieser Versuch verwandelt sich in eine Gefahr, eine Drohung, eine Störung, ein Ärgernis, eine Abweichung usw., was alles unbarmherzig und

Critics of the student movements and of all progressive wanting and thinking, namely that they "don't know what they positively want" go back to the critics themselves, who, by proceeding to "know exactly

what they want," themselves essentially have condemned. In this way we are really "on the solid ground of reality" and existing factuality, whose only possible horizon for its accommodation and for operating within and for the sake of the given as such is the dimension of essential untruth. This "certainty" of knowing what one wants has already been adequately illuminated from all sides, it is known and tested in practice in all its (bourgeois and "socialist") consequences, so that it is no longer an unknown quantity is.

But despite everything, the following question must be asked here: How can one know with such certainty what one wants (if one does not only want what is immediately present here, i.e. this existing thing!), when precisely here is the greatest and most difficult thing Yes, the essential problem of our epoch lies: how should the basic prerequisites of this alienated and reified bourgeois world as a whole be abolished and abolished, i.e. historically transcended?! Here we have - from a theoretical point of view - no given and ready-made category apparatus at our disposal that would lead us beyond the existing world, so that we are left with the hardship of researching what essentially (and even by definitionem!) - the W eg into the unknown and not-yet-been. On the other hand, the practice of this possible advance, as has been shown in the last half century of contemporary historical events, moves again and again and still within the framework of the well-known, well-established processes of bourgeois experience, so that up to now there has been practically no true novelty has appeared. So there are only attempts left.

But if one wants to impose a precisely fixed political program on these attempts at any price ("the student movements do not have their own positive-political program"!), and we are talking about attempted transgressions (among other things or primarily) of the sphere of the Political, as it has constituted itself in its dominant form in modern bourgeois society of manipulated party democracy (in a society that is political par excellence), then it is either a question of a total misunderstanding or a conscious insinuation! Most of the time it is the latter, since it is about certain (ie political) interests.

That is why - viewed objectively - every attempt at thinking, doing, wanting, living or even dreaming, loving, rejoicing, in a word transforms the independent confirmation of human nature outside of or despite this well-established political mechanism - the daily both mentally as well as morally and physically frustrates, breaks, disfigures, perverts, corrupts and crushes millions of human existences - this attempt turns into a danger, a threat, a disturbance, a nuisance, a deviation, etc., all of which is ruthless and 248

skrupellos eliminiert werden soll um eines nichtbeeinträchtigten Funktionierens und einer Vervollkommnung dieses Mechanismus willen, das Kraft der inneren Logik seines Fortschreitens die Menschheit unweigerlich in eine Katastrophe führt!

Von diesem Standpunkt aus, der, wie wir sehen, ein sehr »realer« und »realistischer« ist, weil er sich fest und mit sicheren Mitteln tief in den Bunker jenes »faktisch ist« eingegraben hat, ist alles andere und andersartig Mögliche nichts als eine pure tollwütige Utopie. Also nicht diese bestehende Realität ist völlig irrsinnig, schrecklich und menschlich unerträglich geworden, sondern der Versuch, einen Ausweg daraus zu finden, wird als Tollheit bezeichnet! Und jede Revolte und Rebellion der menschlichen Natur, die das nicht mehr ertragen kann, jede Hoffnung, jeder Traum von der Möglichkeit eines Andersartigen, jedes »Nein« an diese Welt, jede Suche nach einem Sinn, jedes Recht, auf diesem Weg auch zu irren, das Ziel zu verfehlen, Mißerfolge zu haben, für Augenblicke den festen Boden unter den Füßen oder die Orientierung im Ansturm der diluvialen Kräfte der bestehenden Ordnung zu verlieren – all das soll im Interesse des status quo in den Abfallkorb wandern oder als tollgewordene Utopie bezeichnet werden!

Wenn solche, sei es theoretische, sei es praktische Stellungnahmen aus den bestehenden, herrschenden politischen Strukturen hervorgehen, dann ist das wenigstens in dem Sinne »klar« und »verständlich«, daß man weiß, wovon die Rede ist. Wenn sie aber mit der *Prätention auf Wahrheit* auch philosophisch sich aufdrängen wollen, dann bleibt allerdings eine Frage offen: Wovon ist nun eigentlich die Rede? Zu welchem Zweck? Weil dann nämlich (bewußt oder unbewußt, willkürlich oder unwillkürlich) die wesentliche Dimension des Philosophischseins eines Gedankens desavouiert oder ganz aufgegeben wird. Und diese Dimension besteht im Folgenden: *Der kritische Gedanke* (der, um ein kritischer zu sein, seine Quelle hat und seine Kraft aus jenem utopischen »noch nicht« schöpft) *ist immer ein »tollwütiger«, weil er eine Existenz im Einklang mit der noch-nicht-bestehenden Wahrheit anstrebt.* Tollgeworden ist nicht und muß nicht sein jener Gedanke – falls es sich dann noch um einen Gedanken handelt – der Prinzip und Kriterium seiner Möglichkeit im Bereich der bestehenden Welt findet. Es handelt sich in dem Falle, philosophisch ausgedrückt, um einen positivistischen Gedanken, und geschichtlich betrachtet, ist es ein gedankliches Herabsetzen der menschlichen Natur auf das Niveau der Dinge und der bloßen Objekte zwecks jeder möglichen Manipulation, weil es der menschlichen Natur die Dimension der Möglichkeit nimmt und den Horizont der Geschichtlichkeit schließt, wodurch sowohl der Mensch als auch seine Welt als etwas ursprünglich Sinnvolles sind. Mit einem Wort, weil es das utopisch-schöpferische Element der Werdung der Welt zur wahren menschlichen Welt in den Fundamenten tilgt, oder, um mit Hegel zu sprechen, weil es »die Humanität mit Füssen tritt«. Und hier kann selbstverständlich von einem Erkennen an den Physiognomien nicht die Rede sein. Die jüngste Geschichte hat das Gegenteil bewiesen!

should be unscrupulously eliminated for the sake of an unimpaired functioning and a perfection of this mechanism, which, by virtue of the inner logic of its progression, is inevitably leading mankind into a

catastrophe!

From this point of view, which, as we see, is a very "real"

and is "more realistic" because he has dug himself deep into the bunker that "factually is" firmly and with safe means, everything else and otherwise possible is nothing but a pure rabid utopia. So it is not this existing reality that has become completely insane, terrible and humanly intolerable, but the attempt to find a way out of it is called madness! And every revolt and rebellion of human nature that can no longer bear it, every hope, every dream of the possibility of something different, every »No« to this world, every search for meaning, each right, on this path too to err, to miss the target, to have miserable successes, to lose the firm ground under one's feet for a moment or the orientation in the onslaught of the diluvial forces of the existing order - all of this should be thrown away in the interest of the status quo or labeled as a utopia gone mad become!

When such statements, be they theoretical or practical, emerge from the existing, dominant political structures, then it is at least "clear" and "understandable" in the sense that one knows what is being talked about. But if they also want to impose themselves philosophically with their pretension to truth, then one question remains unanswered: what is actually being talked about? For what purpose? Because then (consciously or unconsciously, voluntarily or involuntarily) the essential dimension of the philosophical nature of a thought is disavowed or given up entirely. And this dimension consists in the following: the critical thought (which, in order to be a critical one, has its source and draws its strength from that utopian "not yet") is always a "mad" one, because it has an existence in harmony with the still - strives for non-existent truth. That thought hasn't gone mad and doesn't have to be -

if it is then still a matter of a thought - which finds the principle and criterion of its possibility in the realm of the existing world.

Philosophically speaking, it is a positivist thought, and historically speaking, it is a mental reduction of human nature to the level of things and mere objects for the purpose of every possible manipulation, because it gives human nature the dimension of possibility and closes the horizon of historicity, whereby both man and his world are originally meaningful.

In a word, because it wipes out the utopian-creative element of the world becoming the true human world from the very foundations, or,

to use Hegel's phrase, because it "kicks humanity with its feet." And here, of course, there can be no talk of recognition from the physiognomies. Recent history has proven otherwise!

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Denn der Philosoph sowie der Künstler sind eine Potenz oder ein Übermaß oder Überschluß des Menschlichen und nicht seine Degradierung oder ein Manko, sie sind keine Unzulänglichkeit. Man muß die Kraft und den Willen aufbringen, im Einklang mit der Wahrheit zu leben und zu denken. Deshalb wird die Utopie auch weiterhin – tollwütig sein! Ihre Kraft befindet sich nämlich jenseits vom Bestehenden, in dem Grund der Welt des Menschen, im Kern der menschlichen Natur. Nur in dem Augenblick da (oder falls) der Mensch vom Erdboden verschwinden sollte (was durch dieses Bestehende als solches sehr leicht verursacht werden könnte), wird der utopische Maulwurf in seinen Tiefen zu wühlen aufhören.

For the philosopher as well as the artist are a potency or an excess or superfluity of the human and not its degradation or a deficiency, they are not an inadequacy. One must find the strength and the will to live

and think in accordance with the truth. That is why the utopia will continue -

be rabid! Namely, its power is beyond the existing, in the bottom of the human world, in the core of human nature. Only at the moment (or if) man should disappear from the face of the earth (which could very easily be caused by this existence as such) will the utopian mole stop burrowing in its depths.

SELF-MANAGEMENT EGALITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Veljko Rus

Ljubljana

After almost twenty years of self-management we could probably say that there is some sort of weariness in connection with this phenomenon of our reality. One has the impression that self-management has become obsolete before maturing into a dominant system of social activity. The reason, in my opinion, is not that normative systems do not agree with actual processes in our worker organization, nor is it that they do not determine social activity as a whole, but rather that they motivate this activity less and less. As long as certain normative systems are not realized they can be a very great impetus to social changes, but when they are considered unrealizable they lose their dynamic function. The apparent obsolence of self-management evidently derives precisely from a feeling that it is a Utopian scheme which we have not and shall not be able to realize in our social activity.

The new social phenomena which have appeared in the past five years (the student movement, unemployment and emigration, as well as national conflicts) have completely overshadowed self-management and created the impression that it is no longer essential for our further social development. This does not mean that it is no longer needed, but it means that it has not provided an answer to those phenomena which characterize a new period in our social life. If we do not want self-management to be sidetracked we shall have to confront self-management aspirations and normative structures with what is actually happening in our workers' organizations. Further, we shall have to abandon the idea of workers' collectives as monolithic groups which can be activated in a single model of conflictless participation and, finally, we shall have to confront once more the self-management practice with the basic values of our society.

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If we picture a social organization not only as a formal normative system but also as a series of coalition groups which are in conflict and co-operative relations of various degrees among themselves and which are regulated with the dominant coalition because it formulates its goals as the goals of the organization,[1] then self-menagement is of interest to us not only as a normative scstem of power but also as a social framework in which various interest groups with different degrees of social power come into mutual confrontation.

On the basis of this concept of social organization, we are interested neither in the normative distribution of power as such nor in the actual relationship of power as such, but rather in the relationship of both. Both distributions are in a certain sense factual, because every social system of activity is determined not only by existing conditions but also by goals; both form that social reality which we call possibility and which is present neither as a causal nor final set of acts but as the probable social activity. If we realize that between goals and the actual situation cannot exist congruence but the gap which makes the social dynamic possible, then the difference between the actual distribution of power and the normative distribution becomes normal for us. Critics who seek to discredit the self-management system by pointing out that the real distribution of power in worker organizations does not coincide with the distribution of power envisioned in the constitution, statutes and other normative documents follow a line of infantile moralizing according to which everything that is happening is sordid reality because it does not conform to the values and norms.

However, if a difference between normative and actual structure does not mean moral discrediting but the dynamic element of social activity it also does not mean that we consider every difference to be a positive phenomenon. Consequently, we should find criteria for determining when differences between normative and actual structures are positive and when they are negative. We assume that it is possible to find many criteria for measuring positive or negative differences between these two structures. A very general and perhaps most adequate criterion would be the degree of dynamism provoked by differences: if the gap between the normative structure and the actual structure intensifies the social dynamics, then this gap has a positive dynamic function. But if this gap impedes social activity, than it has a negative function. This criterion takes into consideration only the quantum of social dynamics and not its direction. From the standpoint of functional analysis it is too general, for it tells us nothing about the degree to which an organization's goals are realized. If we want to evaluate the difference between normative and actual structures from that standpoint then we shall have to find out whether the trend of those differences is convergent or divergent.

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Empirical investigations in our worker's organizations have constantly indicated a rather large gap between the normative distribution (structures) of power defined by the constitution and statutes and the actual distribution (structures) of power. Even though the workers, the workers' council and the management committee should have maximum influence in the enterprises and the director and other administrative groups should have a subordinate role, the actual situation is exactly the opposite. This discovery would not be symptomatic if it had been made in the mid-1950s (at the beginning of self-management) and if it had been at least partially revised in the fifteen years since then. But it is symptomatic because from the first empirical investigations in the early 1960s to the present day the gap between the normative and actual distribution of power in workers' organizations has remained unchanged.

But we might explain even this invariance in terms of cultural and historical factors which could not be overcome in the course of only ten years of self-management. However there is another change which we have noticed in the past two years and which relates to the aspirations of the employees in connection with the redistribution of power in the enterprises. While from 1962 to 1967 it was found that employees wanted the distribution of power according to normative model or such a distribution of power which is closer to normative than to actual structures of power, in the past two years we have found that employees' aspirations approach closer and closer to actual structures and move further and further from normative ones.[2]

We do not yet have an analysis of the factors which have caused this change in employees' aspirations in connection with the redistribution of power in the enterprises. However, we do have a series of empirical studies of self-management in this country, as well as a series of studies of joint-management in Western countries, so that on this basis we can draw certain tentative conclusions.

It is very instructive for us that British nationalized industry has also not achieved the redistribution of power of various organized groups, even though this was expected. The conclusion drawn by Allan Flanders on this basis is that functional status in an organization is much more important nowadays for this distribution than is the status which comes from property relationships.[3]

This consequence is obvious in our own experience since the workers' council, although it has all the more important functions of ownership does not have the greatest amount of power in the enterprise. Of course, this practical consequence also evokes another, much

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more general reorientation which relates to evaluation of the teachings of Marx and Durkheim. In following Marx, we have assumed that private ownership is the most important factor in the unequal distribution of power and goods and that therefore the elimination of private ownership wil also make possible the redistribution of power and the redistribution of goods. Opposed to this, Durkheim saw the division of labour to be the main cause of the prevailing distribution of power and goods. Our daily experience in our enterprises at least intuitively assures us that division of labour is more important than the form of ownership: if an organization wants to be efficient it can distribute power in accord with a system of roles: a role without power is fictitious, and power without a role is not legitimate.

Division of labour is the deciding criterion for the distribution of power only if the existence of society as a whole and of individual organizations depends on high efficiency or pressure from distribution of power which is based exclusively on perpetuation of the dominant status of the ruling group: it must be directed toward maximum organizational efficiency. In our society, in which we are seeking to limit bureaucratization, the division of labour ought to be a far more important criterion for the distribution of power, thereby becoming all the more significant precisely those antinomies predicted by Durkheim. The division of labour as a criterion for the distribution of power in enterprises is a knife with two edges; it hinders strengthening of political bureaucracy as well as such democratization which in accordance with the ideals of liberation of labour transcends functional limitations. We are assuming that the above quoted idea serves as an explanation of the change in aspirations of those employed in our organizations. Previous experience has shown innumerable times that a disfunctional power is the source of arbitrariness and inefficiency regardless of whether or not these phenomena occur in professional, political or self-management groups. Accordingly, the reorientation of aspiration indicates the passing from an illusory to a real sphere of social activity.

But this realism has another side: it could be characterized by resignation and a decline of social activity. At the moment in which certain normative structures are perceived as illusory, they are no longer stimuli of social activity nor of intensifying social processes; they rather are counter-stimuli which demoralize social activity. On the basis of employee aspirations which more and more correspond to existing power structures we can foresee a social stagnation until will exist identification of aspirations with the actual distribution of power and until the normative structure of power has been thoroughly replaced by the actual structure. We can expect a degeneration of the self-management system not because of any gap which exists between normative and actual power structures but rather because the convergence of aspirations with the actual distribution of power in causing bifurcation of social activity into the absolute fiction of the future of self-management as well as into absolute reality which has nothing to do with self-management. After all it is this deep fissure between society; Helenism and medieval society were

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not societies without a future, but rather the societies with fictitions future. It would appear then that we find ourselves in some insolubly paradoxical situation. In so far as we adhere to existing structures, we are opting for social stagnation, and in so far as we insist upon the self-management system we are opting for a social fiction. In the first case, we are making a bad choice, and in the second case, we are making an even worse one.

Of course, this consequence is of a logical nature, and contemporary systems of social activity have an open-ended character which arises from the fact that they are continuously subject to new environmental changes as well as being subject to the contradictions produced within the system itself. These factors are the cause of discontinuity and dissolve old contradictions in an »illogical« manner.

One of these new factors (they are of course new in the sense of their being enclosed into a perceptive plane) is control as a special type of social power. If we should define the decision-making power as an active power, then we should define control or supervisory power as a passive power. The relationship between these two types of power opens up to us at least theoretically new possibilities with regard to the redistribution of power structures within the enterprises. Heretofore, we have been considering the democratization of enterprises as being bound exclusively with the redistribution of active power. We have been striving for even distribution of decision-making power which has resulted in the decentralization in enterprises and in the collectivization of management functions. The centralization of decision-making has been synonimous with bureaucratization while at the same time every concentration of decision-making power within professional and management circles has been synonimous with the uncontrolled arbitrariness of those groups. In order to prevent these phenomena the trend has been to seek a wider dispersion of decision-making authority. In so far as this wider dispersion of decision-making authority has been realized, organizations have been transformed into battlegrounds of mutually antagonistic pressure groups which have appeared in various departments and on various levels. These groups which possess decision-making authority and are yet free from control are the inevitable result of that conception of democratization, which seeks to establish as even as possible a distribution of active power while at the same time completely neglecting to regulate the control system as a model of passive power.

The other concept of democratization which strives towards an equilibrium of both active and passive power admits greater possibilities sor the realization of a functional democratization within enterprises. What is perhaps most important of all is the fact that this concept does not identify bureaucratization with centralization nor does it identify decentralization with democratization, but rather allows for the possibility of democratic or undemocratic centralization as well as for democratic or undemocratic decentralization. Whether or not centralization or decentralization is democratic depends upon the balance of forces between active and passive power. If this balance is absent, then we have to deal with an undemocratic or anar-

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chistic distribution of power. This also holds true for the concentration of power in the hands of management or professional bodies within different levels. The actual amount of decision-making power is not of essential importance, but what is of essential importance is that the greater amount of active power should be accompanied by a correspondingly greater amount of pasive power. Any given director or a certain associate may be in possession of a great deal of decision-making authority and not be an arbitrary dictator as long as his work is under intensive supervision. Conversily, any given director may have relatively little decision-making authority, but if his authority is not subject to supervision, he is ipso facto an autocrat whether he wants to be or not.

The functional character of this second conception of democratization, which is based upon the balance of active and passive power and no longer upon the uniform distribution of active power alone, manifests itself by neither prescribing the limits for the processes of centralization, nor does it put the limits for decentralization. Likewise, neither does it place limitations on the concentration of active power in the hands of management groups, but rather demands that this concentration be accompanied by a corresponding increase in supervision. A résumé of what we have been discussing is given in Table No. 1.

PASSIVE POWER

great amount	small amount
1) central status	2) dominant status
3) subordinate status	4) marginal status

From this table it is obvious that we have four fundamental types of power distribution, taking into consideration the relationship between active and passive power. If there exists a balance between active and passive authority, then there is possible the existence of a central or marginal status among individuals, groups or organizations. A large amount of decision-making authority accompanied by intensive supervision creates a central status within a system of social activity, and a small amount of decision-making authority accompanied by a small amount of supervision creates a marginal status within the over-all system of social activity. In the case that there is no balance between active and passive power, then there is created a dominant status free from supervisory or subordinate status in which there is not much decision-making but a great deal of intensive supervision. In the first example we may speak of socialized power or of responsible power, while in the second example we are speaking of power which serves as a means for eluding supervision and responsibility. In the third example, we are speaking of power which serves as a means of repression, in the fourth example, of lack of power and of low integrated groups which are only partially engaged in the system of activity.

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Some empirical investigation have at least partially and indirectly confirmed the above hypothesis. The joint research of B. Kavčič, A. Tannenbaum and the author[4] has indicated that enterprises with a greater centralization of active power are not only more productive but also more democratic. According to the first concept of democratization as an even distribution of active power, this finding is surely absurd; however, from the standpoint of the second concept, it is quite conceivable.

An even more significant contribution to the above-mentioned theses is presented in the findings of the author's preliminary study of two enterprises and in the joint study undertaken by Stane Možina and Janez Jenovšek in twenty industrial enterprises.[5] The findings of both studies indicated that productive enterprises do not differ from the unproductive ones in the distribution of active power but that they differ from one another fundamentally with regard to the distribution of passive power. The distribution of active power is for the most part similar in all enterprises inasmuch as it is somewhat more centralized in the productive ones; but the distribution of passive power in the productive organizations is much more correspondent to the distribution of active power than is the case in unproductive enterprises. We can at least say that the relationship between active and passive power is much more relevant to the organizations productivity than is the distribution of active power alone. Finally, certain findings in these studies also lead us to conjecture that the relationship between active and passive power is also relevant to the democratization of the enterprises.

CONFLICTS AND PARTICIPATION

If we accept Kurt Lewin's definition of power, then obviously all power implies contradiction and conflict. If we define power as the proportion between the maximum amount of force which the powerful person is able to induce over another person and the maximum amount of resistance which this person is able to offer in return,[6] then power is obviously a contradictory phenomenon. Contradiction is the cause of application of power as well as the inevitable consequence of that application. We therefore activate our power in order to overcome a given resistance, but at the same time having overcome that given resistance, we inevitably produce a new resistance. Accordingly, we can speak of the paradox of power which consists in the fact that our greater power is proportionate to greater resistance.

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[5] Veljko Rus: Comparative Analysis of Communications, Power and Responsibility in Two Industrial Enterprises, Inštitut za sociologijo in filozofijo pri Univerzi v Ljubljani, 1968; Stane Možina and Janez Jerovšek: Determinants Influencing Effectivenes of Management in Industrial Enterprises, Inštitut za sociologijo in filozofijo pri Univerzi v Ljubljani, 1969.

[6] Kurt Lewin: Field Theory in Social Science, Harper, New York, 1951.

Some empirical investigation have at least partially and indirectly confirmed the above hypothesis. The joint research of B. Kavčič, A.

Tannenbaum and the author4 has indicated that enterprises with a

greater centralization of active power are not only more productive but also more democratic. According to the first concept of democratization as an even distribution of active power, this finding is surely absurd; however, from the standpoint of the second concept, it is quite conceivable.

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When we assumed that by abolishing private ownership in enterprises there would be created a social dynamic based upon a harmony of interests and upon co-operation as a dominant form af activity, we based the entire self-management model on conflictless participation. The integration of the working organization was supposed to be created and reproduced by means of the direct mass participation of its members. Of course, in this collectivist vision, neither power nor conflict were any longer to be important categories. If these categories are made use of, they are connected solely with the past: conflict and the use of power are justified as a means for settling accounts with class enemies and with vestiges of capitalist society. However, this logic has its own paralogical inversion: everybody who is in conflict and everything which is overcome by the use of force is classified as a class enemy or something which must be excluded from social activity. The same logic is applied to these contradictions which arise within the new society as well as to those vestiges of the old society. and this means that the new society itself embarks upon its own destruction. If it is attempted to deny every contradiction born within the new society by eliminating one aspect of that contradiction, then the creation of a stable social dynamic is absolutely impossible. If it is attempted to abolish every newly arisen contradiction as a »negative moment« of the dialectical dynamic instead of trying to sustain and channel it, then in this manner the dynamic as well as the stability of the new system of activity is lost.

If we want to achieve a somewhat more thorough comprehension of the implicit social consequences of the above-mentioned self-management model then it would be advantageous if we compared it with the other correspondent models. In table No. 2 it can be discerned that self-management which is classified in the first quadrant as an integrated model, would, with regard to the phenomena mentioned heretofore, coincide also with those models which we have classified into the fourth quadrant. The implications of the first model are universal harmony, co-operation, classlessness as well as the presence of a high degree of identification of the organization's members with the goals of the organization. The fundamental characteristics of the social dynamic in this case are the high degree of flexibility and instability.

INTEGRATION

great	small
1. agreement, conflictless participation and co-operation	2. realistic conflicts, bargaining. compromise, contracts
3. unrealistic tensions, depersonalization, formalizations of relationships, bureaucratization	4. antagonism, struggles, elimination and dissolution

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IN T E G R A T IO N

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The implications of the fourth model are characterized by underlying conflicts and an uncompromising disintegration of the organization into conflicting groups by way of struggle and segmentation. The coincidence of both models creates a certain kind of social dynamic comprising absolute inter-group cohesiveness which does not allow any internal differentiation as well as comprising absolute inter-group segmentation which does not allow any compromise; co-operation and struggle, unity and radical confrontation do not allow any manner of mediation. Compromise is a synonym for betrayal and weakness of character. Because of increasing of social differentiation within the new society, becomes this logic of social activity absurd and conservative, since every contradiction, thereby thwarting the new dynamic as well as the structuralization of the evolving society. Instead of passing on to model two, it continues to keep on the model four, thereby causing model one to degenerate into model three. Instead of passing from a model of domination to model of compromise and regulation of relationship between the opposing groups which constitute the social dynamic within the new society, it persists in adhering to the old »technique« of eliminating all opposition. The consequence of this has been the degradation of the self-management model as a model of conflict-less participation into a bureaucratic model of integration which is characterized by the nonparticipatory, passive adaptation of its members to the existing system of activity. By impersonalisation, this system prevents the transformation of contradictions into conflicts; but at the same time transforms these realistic conflicts into unrealistic ones.[7] The so-called bureaucratization of self-management, which has been mentioned more and more often as of late, was the consequence of the incompatibility of model one with model four in a society in which environmental contradictions have become relative and in which the internal organizational structure is far more differentiated.

The mentioned inadequate model for the resolution of new contradiction has blocked the existing participatory model. In place of conflictless participation, there has been developed nonparticipatory integration, full of latent conflicts. In place of the institutional regulation and maintenance of conflict as a source of social dynamic and structural differentiation, there were abstract conflict and impersonal bureaucratic structures. By means of systemic changes, attempts have made to resolve all of these contradictions which arise from conflicts of interest but at the same time there have not been formed new institutional instruments which should regulate those differences.

The persistence of model four has caused the constant elimination of new contradictions and conflicts and has simultaneously been the cause of the continuous uncontrolled reproduction of these same contradictions and conflicts. The elimination of contradictions which

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[7] Lewis Coser (The Functions of Social Conflict, The Free Press, New York, 1968) separates conflicts into two basic categories: realistic and unrealistic conflicts. According to the author, the first type of conflict has special goals, the second universal; the first allows substitution and, consequently, negotiation while the second is expressive and does not lend itself to manipulation.

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arise within the new society could not be definitive, since this would bring about the definitive elimination of the new society as well. In such a manner as this, the constant procedure of elimination has transformed itself into a constant suppresion of realistic conflicts into unrealistic ones. The so-called opposite pole or »enemy« has never constituted itself into an opposition group with defined, positive goals, rather it has been consistenly reduced to the level of a resistance group with negative, abstract and general goals.

If we are able to say that student movements have consciously adopted the model of a resistance group, we nevertheless cannot say the same with regard to social, organizational or professional group within the enterprises. We can assume that because of a rigid institutional structure which has not permitted the specification of goals or the localization of conflicts they have grown from potential opposition groups into resistance groups which have no longer been engaging in the struggle for concrete goals but rather have been struggling against bureaucracy in general. In this manner, tensions were no longer capable of being relieved but have rather accumulated and intensified. With the increasing freedom of speech, the intensification of these tensions has to a certain extent declined while, however, their accumulation has not.

By the intensification of the second model and the abandonment of the fourth we could probably also engender the activization of the first participatory model to the detriment of the third model. In other words the development of instrumentalities which enable the institutional regulation and maintenance of conflict would probably provide impetus for greater participation and thereby slow down the processes of bureaucratization within self-management as a system of conflictless participation. We base this assumption on the long-term findings of Scanlon's plan which is characterized by the simultaneous application of models one and two. Even though one of the essential conditions of this plan's success is the non-compensatory relationship between the first and second models, even though it is impossible to solve the problem of participation by means of bargaining instruments or, conversely, to solve the problems of bargaining by means of participation, the successful solution of conflicts of interest is nevertheless an essential condition of worker participation. In short, we assume that a combination of models one and four is to be temporary, and we envision that the real alternative lies in the coincidence of models one and two or three and four.

Since the value complex has directed us towards the realization of the first alternative (participation – bargaining), we cannot agree with the thesis which states that self-management is the instrument of the organization and emancipation of the working class[8] nor can we agree with the thesis which states that self-management is the »bargaining place« for the resolution of conflicts of interest between various organizational or professional groups within the enterprise.

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As an institution which is based upon the generalisation of working criteria in the distribution of labour, power and goods, self-management is a negation of the working class as well as an instrument for the integration of that class into society as a whole. Therefore, self-management is not an institution which has to protect the specific interests of the working class, rather it is an institution which must deny the interests of the working class, of meritocracy and intellectuals as separate interests (on the basis of the universalization of working criteria). It is not an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is constituted in the domination of one set of interests and the elimination of certain others, rather it is a supra-class institution which must by means of »principal« compromises which must always be based upon the evaluation of labour mediate the particular interests of various groups within the enterprise.

However, this does not mean that the reduction of self-management exclusively to a bargaining instruments is either possible or even reasonable. Self-management cannot be a successful instrument of negotiation, reconciliation or of contractual agreements concerning the redistribution of functions, powers and goods if there does not exist a certain degree of professional and social participation among groups active in the bargaining proces. Participation endows these groups with a degree of social supervision without which the contractual relationship is nothing but a meaningless pile of paper.

Self-management as an instrument of bargaining and participation represents a kind of bridge between so-called formal and informal systems. Contemporary theories of dynamic, participatory management as well as organic theories of organization are oriented towards the convergence of formal and the informal systems. Today, self-management can perform a similar function. By attempting to institutionalize the revolutionary movement within a sub-system of economic activity self-management neither represents pure institution nor a pure movement. This contamination can of course have a double effect. On the one hand it can affect the dynamic process within the institution and the prolongation of the movement itself, and on the other hand it can lead towards the bureaucratization of the movement and towards the disintegration of institutional structures. As to what direction this contamination will take, is probably not a matter of individual enterprises but concern the total organization of society. This will be spoken of in the final chapter. Previous empirical analyses give us sufficient warning of the actuality of the above hypotheses. These investigations have pointed to the frequent strikes occurring in recent years whhci bear witness to the fact that as an institution self-management has not yet developed the instruments needed for the legal resolution and regulation of labour disputes.[9] In spite of the fact that these strikes in the workers' organizations of the great majority of enterprises have been more and more frequent, up until now the procedures of reconciliation, mediation and arbitration have

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not been established. But even where these procedures have been formally established, they are limited to the arbitration of property disputes, and mixed arbitrations have been limited to the regulation of status relationships between individual parts of the organization and the organization as a whole.

If we take into consideration these strikes that have been officially registered, we see that in most cases they had as their goal the increase of personal income, were most often participated in by 60 to 120 workers and lasted for the most part less than four hours, we can then assume that their origins are of a realistic rather than an unrealistic character. However, in cases where we do not have corresponding regulatory procedures for their resolution, there exists a tendency for these strikes to extend over a longer period of time as well for them to become more firmly organized, which may be symptomatic of their transformation from collective labour disputes into unrealistic conflicts.

The finding of the above-mentioned study undertaken by Stane Možina and Janez Jerovšek are very important with regard to the problematics of conflict. This study has confirmed that the productive enterprises fundamentally difter from the unproductive ones, with regard to the fact that content of the conflict in the first type is predominantly of an organizational technical nature while in second type it is predominantly of a socio-economic nature. The resolution of social and economic conflicts allows the greater concentration of attention on productive and organizational conflicts which surely does not have a negative effect on the productivity of enterprises.

SELF-MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

By the formation of institutional instruments for the legal regulation of conflict we will certainly not yet solve the problem of successful resolution and regulation of conflicts within the enterprises. First and foremost is the fact that the forms of conflict resolution should not be in opposition to the structure of interests which forms the basis of the relevant conflict. It the interests of the conflicting groups are of a mutually exclusive nature, then it is absolutely utopian to search for a compromise. In such cases, only the elimination of one polarity and the subsequent domination of the other can provide a form of resolution and »integration« of both into a unified system of activity. Thus this seems to be a very significant limitation, particularly with respect to the near future in which we assume that compromise as a reaction against the totalitarian method of elimination, domination and »synthesis«, will probably appear as the universal model of conflict resolution.

In situations wherein conflict is not the result of mutually exclusive interests, the method of eliminating one polarity is of course completely inadequate. The majority of conflicts which arrise from the division of labour, and consequently from the unequal distribution of power and goods, are more or less based upon continual opposition

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but at the same time upon opposition the source of which lies in the evaluation of labour. If elimination is made use of in these examples, then we find ourselves in a destructive and inadequate situation.

The very frequent application of the totalitarian method of elimination in reconciling contradictions is not only the result of a certain historical inertia but is also related with certain structural and value factors of our contemporary social practice. In this context we are first of all thinking of the isolation of self-management institutions in individual enterprises, what we sometimes call self-management monadology. If conflict between two socio-professional groups within the framework of the enterprise does not permit the engagement of a third group ar a third body which is simultaneously both a relevant and objective factor in the conflict, then it is not very likely that the conflict will be adequately regulated. Without a »third party« there can be no conciliation, mediation or arbitration. In any event, this third party is capable of being either a mixed arbitration commission, as a judicial body, or even the organs of local government. Accordingly, if we are being precise, it would be hard to say that there are no bodies which could fulfill the rôle of mediator. The question is solely: whether or not these mediators have adequate position and enough power. We can say that the resolution of these conflicts has not proceeded successfully, a fact confirmed by the more than 1,300 registered strikes which have taken place in the last eight years. The underdevelopment of self-managamental structures within individual organizations is probably only one of the reasons for the unsuccessful resolution of prevailing conflicts.

Another perhaps more important cause probably consists in the fact that our enterprises are very frequently monohierarchial. Power in the enterprises is often concentrated in the hands of one dominant group which controls all economic, professional and political channels of communication. By the complete control of all channels of communication with the environment the dominant groups create an extremely closed system of activity, which in case of conflict prevents individuals or individual groups within the enterprise to make contact with those bodies outside the enterprise which would be able to play the rôle of a third party or mediator. In view of this fact, the problem of pluralism becomes more urgent as the structure of interests in the enterprise becomes less antagonistic and at the same time less uniform. In any case, the enterprise in contemporary society is characterized by partial inclusion of its members and by the high rate of interest differentiation which is caused by the division of labour. Consequently, we are more and more frequently being confronted within the enterprise with a great number of realistic conflicts and less and less frequently with universal and radical conflicts between two primary social groups. The small number of participants and the short duration of previous strikes are two characteristics which till now do not refute the assumptions concerning the larger number of realistic conflicts as a typical characteristic of the contemporary enterprise which is made up of numerous heterogeneous professional groups.

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TTie underdevelopment of self-managamental structures within individual organizations is probably only one of the reasons for the unsuccessful resolution of prevailing conflicts.

Another perhaps more important cause probably consists in the fact that our enterprises are very frequently monohierarchial. Power in the enterprises is often concentrated in the hands of one dominant group which controls all economic, professional and political channels of communication. By the complete control of all channels of communication with the environment the dominant groups create an extremely closed system of activity, which in case of conflict prevents individuals or individual groups within the enterprise to make contact with those bodies outside the enterprise which would be able to play the role of a third party or mediator. In view of this fact, the problem of pluralism becomes more urgent as the structure of interests in the enterprise becomes less antagonistic and at the same time less uniform. In any case, the enterprise in contemporary society is characterized by partial inclusion of its members and by the high rate of interest differentiation which is caused by the division of labour. Consequently, we are more and more frequently being confronted within the enterprise with a great number of realistic conflicts and less and less frequently with universal and radical conflicts between two primary social groups. The small number of participants and the short duration of previous strikes are two characteristics which till now do

not refute the assumptions concerning the larger number of realistic conflicts as a typical characteristic of the contemporary enterprise which is made up of numerous heterogeneous professional groups.

Pluralism as the model which allows better communication with the organizational environment and as model which allows engagement of various professional or organizational groups in resolution of conflict is nowadays prerequisite for the activization of extant instruments of mediation and arbitration; it is also the basis for the development of the self-management mechanism of conciliation and mediation on an interorganizational level.

But if monohierarchial power structures will be reproduced within the enterprises, then all conflict will inevitably be reduced to the elimination of the opposing grups, and this will occur regardless of what kind of bargaining mechanisms we might constitute. We have already forseen the implication of such a situation: there will exist a single dominant monogroup of informal, and therefore, irresponsible status which will maintain within the organization a primitive monopolism, with which it averts the process of structural differentiation as well as the process of subsequent reintegration.

The consequence of the fact we did not formulate legitimate pluralistic models earlier, is that today the monolithic structure is splitting apart and subjected to uncontrolled differentiation which, if this situation continues, will probably be the cause of even more frequent wildcat strikes in our enterprises. The persistence of monolithic models accompanied by uncontrolled differentiation is most probably leading towards a certain kind of social situation which will be characterized by an ever greater coincidence of the totalitarian methods of elimination with occasional compromises.

This oscillation between abstract »revolutionary radicalism« and »occasional compromise« is caused by the rigid system of basic values of our society which have remained during the last fifteen years more or less the same. The fact that for a very long time there has been no re-evaluation of the fundamental values of our society is the third cause of the unsuccessful resolution of the increasingly frequent conflicts in our enterprises. In spite of the fact that we are assuming that the majority of conflicts do not arise from antagonistic interests, these conflicts have frequently an antagonistic character. The reason for this phenomenon is not only a lack of institutional and societal mediation but also adequate mediation of vales. Of course, we have constituted an entire range of fundamental categories, such as the emancipation of labour, democratic socialism, social equality, etc. However, these categories are more and more becoming abstractions since their immutable generality has transformed them into abstract symbols, that is, they have become indifferent to a concrete social situation and to the concrete content of conflict.

Neither radical criticism nor even so-called functional criticism have concerned themselves with the task which we might call the reevaluation of the fundamental values of our society as an integrative model of social activity. It is true that radical criticism attacks everyday practices from a standpoint of fundamental values. But this radical criticism of everything which exists was dogmatic in the sense that it had never attempted a »revision« of fundamental values in the name of practice but rather merely emphasized the fact that

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social practice is far removed from proclaimed ideals. Even though this confrontation between ideals and reality was productive to the extent that it intensified social tensions and in this manner indirectly accelerated social precesses; it was not creative to the extent that it did not point out the necessity of certain reinterpretations or redefinitions of the fundamental values which were the starting point of this criticism.

Functional criticism did not make confrontation between ideals and reality but rather stressed the inconsistency of institutional structures or the inefficiency of individual instruments. More precisely speaking, that which in this country is called functional criticism was in the majority of cases a pragmatic criticism economic efficiency, and not analysis of the relevance of the means used for the realization of the organizational goals. Since this »functional« criticism had been fairly influential in recent times, we concentrated almost all of our efforts in structural changes, at the same time neglecting to place these in confrontation wth the fundamental values of our society. And yet if we then take into consideration the fact that values are the basic means by which we achieve integration on the level of interinstitutional relations and on the level of reciprocal co-ordination of basic sub-systems (economic, political, educational, etc.), then it is understandable that we did not see the forest for the trees.

In spite of painstaking structural changes and systematic reorganization, we found ourselves in a situation in which we did not know how to react to those phenomena which had in fact opened up a new era in the history of our society. Here we are thinking of the unsatisfactory interpretation of the student movements, of the mass emigration of our workers as well as of nationality problems. All of these processes are occurring as a result of the uncontrolled differentiation in our society and a development along tragic lines because we have not found the corresponding models for reintegration of that which is now subject to the intensive processes of differentiation. If the processes of differentiation are a dynamic element and if every process of unification provokes the paralysis and stagnation of social activity, then the hypothesis concerning the great importance of the re-evaluation of our basic social values is rather convincing. Without the abovc-mentioned re-evaluation we will be operating on the basis of old models for the integration of our society, which will have a double consequence, i. e., reduction of inevitable differentiation, thereby engendering a deceleration of the social dynamic, and also inadequate integration of social activity.

At first glance, these processes seem to have nothing to do with self-management. The student movement, employment abroad and nationality tensions seem to be problems belonging to another world. But if we take into consideration the passivity and formality of self-management activity, then we can say that self-management passively reflects that which the above phenomena reflect actively. Many unreoslved conflicts seem to be irreconcilably so because they are not subject to a corresponding mediation of values. If a given conflict can be channelled through institutional mechanism and if power re-

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lations can be regulated, it can only be resolved by confronting opposing interests with common or more general values. If these general values remain undefined, they assume the role of formal stereotypes and are consequently useless in a concrete situation.

The majority of conflicts, especially collective ones, are caused by disputes over the distribution of income. The reasons for conflicts are therefore apparently economic and not social. But if on the basis of previous studies we assume the principal cause of dissatisfaction to be unfair distribution within a particular organization or branch of production and not primarily low personal incomes, then we can assume that the basic problem lies in the undefined principles of distribution relative to undefined vales upon which the effectivenes of labour is based.

The definition of the equality which allows the process of social differentiation is as much the central problem of the distribution of incomes in the enterprises as it is the central problem of the distribution of power and investments in the field of nationality relations. Equality is also the central concept of the student movements which are exposing the problem of equal opportunities in obtaining an education and employment, which in turn relates to the problem of the right to work and the impossibility of realizing that right as tragically manifested by the economic emigration of our citizens in recent years.

If we do ont want socialism to become sooner or later merely a common phrase, we must find an answer to these questions: What is the meaning of equality in a society which is in the process of social differentiation? What degree of inequality can we tolerate without entirely negating the concept of equality? In what areas will we enforce inequality (economic) and in what areas will we enforce equality (educational)? What are the specific characteristics of equality in socialist and non-socialist societies?

Since equality is an integrative concept, it must be, in terms of the prevailing social processes, the first value to undergo a precise re-evaluation. The second value which is in the base os the self-management system is the freedom of work. In terms of the concept of alienation, it forms a positive pole representing concretization of the concept of disalienation. Although this concretization was a great step forward, it is nowadays an abstraction incapable of exerting any influence on social events. Previous operationalization of the values inherent in the freedom of work, which has usually been formulated as the unity between the work process and work, as the unity of work and products of work, as the unity of means and work, has given rise to the vision of a direct re-integration on the level of the work places or within worker groups. Later this vision expanded to the level of the whole enterprise, which is the reason for attempts to transform the entire enterprise into the type of a total organization in which the worker is supposed to obtain satisfaction for all his needs, whether professional, economic, social, cultural or recreational. Such a conceptualization of the freedom of work as the direct re-integration of the workers' activity at the level of the work-place, work group or enterprise as a whole is a kind of anachronism which leads to the

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formation of autonomous, self-contained, self-isolated mini-systems of social activity which on the whole create an absurdly narrow horizon of social communication.

Marx stressed that man's wealth is born in universal exchange, which is the base of the universality of certain needs, capabilities and pleasures.[10] This means that re-integration on the level of micro-groups, co-operative or local communities is anti-human and unsupportable provincialism. But if we attempt to avoid this concept of the liberation of work as direct re-integration, we of necessity open up the question of the relationship between the liberal ideal of the individual harmonious and integrated personality and that of a socially integrated, universal personality. We must also discuss the problem of relations between micro and macro-groups, the problem of the possibility of a macro-group existing as a real system of social activity and not only as a nominal symbol, and also the question of the means possible for creating an intermediate formula for the re-integration of human activity. If the problem of the freedom of work is not limited within the framework of a particular enterprise, then we are confronted with a new question. That is, how do we regulate relations between the enterprises and other social organizations which constitute the relevant environment? How do we regulate the relations between working time and leisure time? How do we integrate all of these into an unalienated system of social activity?

In our opinion, the future of self-management depends far more upon the answers to these questions than it does upon the answers to certain disfunctional problems. Nowadays, basic values are more relevant to the structural and institutional infrastructure in so far as it becomes more apparent that organizational consistency is not based upon the direct functional interdependency of organizational units but on indirect sinchronization of organizational parts with the goal of the organization as a whole. This new architectonic principle, called the »higher order«,[11] assumes a direct confrontation of values seen as integrative principles and co-ordinative criteria, with the system of roles existing as institutional structures. In our opinion, this confrontation ought to become a fundamental methodological principle of criticism as well as of the construction of the self-management system.

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[10] Karl Marx: Grundrisse, p. 387.
[11] Peter Blau: The Structure of Small Bureaucracies, American Sociological Review 1966, No. 2.

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Georg Lukács:

Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein

Lichterhand Verlag, 1968

Es ist bereits fünfundvierzig Jahre her, daß eines der hervorragendsten Werke des Marxismus im 20. Jh. – Lukács' Buch »Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein« – erschienen ist. Die erste Auflage war im Jahre 1923 bei Malik in Wien erschienen, in dem bekannten Verlag also, der in jener Zeit so viele bedeutende marksistische und gesellschaftswissenschaftliche sowie avantgardistische Werke herausgebracht hatte. Die vorliegende zweite Auflage der Originalfassung in deutscher Sprache (in der Zwischenzeit sind mehrere Übersetzungen, beispielweise ins Französische und Italienische erschienen, und die jugoslawische Ausgabe in serbokroatischer Sprache befindet sich gerade in Druck) ist bei Luchterhand erschienen als zweiter Band einer Gesamtausgabe von Lukács' Werk von dem schon einige Bände vorliegen. Lukács' »Werke« sollen in dieser Ausgabe in fünfzehn umfangreichen Bände erscheinen, so daß auch dieser zweite Band nicht nur die genannte Schrift sondern auch eine größere Anzahl dem Umfang nach kleinerer aber ebenso bedeutender Werke von Lukács aus der gleichen Epoche enthält, wovon noch später die Rede sein wird.

Dieses Werk von Lukács muß zu den fundamentalen Werken der marxistischen Philosophie gezählt werden, und die Neuauflage scheint uns um so bedeutenter, als die alte Originalausgabe schon lange vergriffen und praktisch unauffindbar ist. (In Jugoslawien gibt es, soweit wir unterrichtet sind, nur ein einziges Exemplar, und in anderen Ländern ist die Situation auch nicht viel besser.) »Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein« bezeichnet einen Wendepunkt in der Entwicklung der marxistischen Philosophie, vielleicht könnte man auch sagen, in der europäischen Philosophie überhaupt. Nach einer äußert unfruchtbaren Periode während der II Internationale, einer Epoche in der marxistischen Theorie, die sowohl vom Vulgärmaterialismus und mechanizistischen Materialismus, als auch vom Evolutionismus und kritischen Realismus, ja sogar vom neokantischen Idealismus und Empiriokritizismus geprägt war, hat Lukács' Werk den genuinen marxistischen dialektischen Gedanken wiederhergestellt. Während sich bis zu jener Zeit auch die hervorrangendsten marxistischen Denker und Philosophen überwiegend mit allgemeindialektischen Fragen befaßten, denen man die Bedeutung für die allgemeine Methodologie natürlich nicht absprechen kann, hat sich Lukács ganz entschieden jenem Problemkreis zugewandt, der für den Menschen der relevanteste ist – nämlich der Geschichte und dem Menschen selbst. Indem er die Dialektik als geschictliche Dialektik auffaßte, hat er diejenige Konzeption innerhalb des Marxismus inauguriert, die in der Dialektik eben nur die Dialektik der Geschichte sieht. Dank seiner Fähigkeit, die wesentlichen Probleme der Zeit theoretisch zu untermauern, hat Lukács der Analyse der menschlichen und geschichtlichen Situation völlig neue philosophische Dimensionen erschlossen. Lukács' »Endeckung« der Entfremdungstheorie sowie seine subtilen Analysen des Phänomens der Verdinglichung, noch bevor die Marxschen »Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripte« aus dem Jahr 1844 veröffentlicht und bekannt geworden waren, haben den ganzen offiziellen, links- und rechtsgerichteten Marxismus überrascht, so daß

COMPTE-RENDUS AND NOTES

Georg Lukdcs:

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Light hand publishing house, 1968

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Lukács gleichzeitig sowohl von Kautsky als dem Vertreter des politischen Opportunismus und Revisionismus als auch von Zinovjev, Deborin und anderen als den Vertretern des revolutionären Marxismus und Bolschewismus angegriffen wurde. Keine von den beiden Parteien hatte verstanden, daß auf dem Gebiete der marxistischen Philosophie ein Werk erschienen war, das wirklich als genial bezeichnet werden kann und das in gedanklicher Hinsicht nicht einmal mehr von Lukács selbst überboten werden konnte (auf die Gründe dafür wollen wir jetzt nicht eingehen).

Es soll hier noch einmal hervorgehoben werden, welche außergewöhnliche Sensibilität Lukács für die wesentlichen Probleme unserer Zeit, für die exstentielle und historische Situation des heutigen Menschen entwickelte, und das zu einer Zeit, als die vollen Konsequenzen einerseits der verdinglichten Welt des bürgerlichen Demokratismus und andererseits des sozialistischen Etatismus die Bühne der Geschichte noch nicht betreten hatten. Man könnte noch hinzufügen, daß auch die wichtigsten Hauptwerke des europäischen Existentialismus, der das Problem »Mensch« ins Zentrum seiner Philosophie gestellt hat, erst nach dem genannten Werk von Lukács erschienen sind. Aus allen diesen Gründen stellt die Neuauflage der Originalausgabe von »Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein« für die Philosophie und den Marxismus ein Ereignis ersten Ranges dar.

Der zweite Band dieser Ausgabe von Lukács' Werken enthält außer dem genannten Haupwerk noch eine Reihe anderer Artikel, Abhandlungen und Rezensionen aus dieser Zeit, die alle für die Rekonstruktion von Lukács' damaligen Anschauungen von größter Bedeutung sind. Eine größere Anzahl von Aufsätzen stammt aus der Zeit zwischen 1919 und 1922, und viele von ihnen bilden im Grunde genommen eine Art von Prolegomena zur »Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein«. Was die in ihnen behandelten Probleme anbelangt, gehören zu dieser Gruppe auch die Aufsätze über Taktik und Ethik, Klasse und Partei, zum Problem des orthodoxen Marxismus und des Parlamentarismus (Lukács gehörte demals dem linksradikalen Flügel in seinem Werk »Die Kinderkrankheiten des Linksradikalismus im Kommunismus« kritisiert wurde), zum Problem der Spontaneität der Massen und der Aktivität der Partei, zu Fragen der Organisation und der revolutionären Initiative u. a. m. Alle diese Abhandlungen erleuchten nicht nur Lukács' demalige Standpunkte, sondern sie bilden auch eine wichtige Ausgangsbasis zum Verständnis der Weiterentwicklung Lukács' seit dem Jahre 1923.

Im Zuge der Bemühungen um das Verstehen des Kommunismus und vieler Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Revolution, des Proletariats, der Partei, des Imperialismus, der Diktatur des Proletariats und insbesondere wegen des marxistischen dialektischen Zugangs zu allen diesen Problemen ist auch eine andere, in diesen Band aufgenommene Abhandlung aus jener Zeit sehr wichtig, nämlich die Abhandlung über Lenin (1924). Da zur gleichen Zeit die bekannte Interpretation des Leninismus in den Vorträgen von Stalin auftaucht – später in seinem Buch über Fragen des Leninismus erschienen – ist ein Vergleich dieser beiden Werke sehr lehrreich. Während Stalin die wesentlichen Voraussetzungen für ein tieferes Verständnis der marxistischen Dialektik abgehen und während er diejenigen von Lenins Stellungnahmen, die seinen eigenen bürokratisch-etatistischen Konzeptionen des Sozialismus dienlich sind, verabsolutiert, beharrt Lukács gerade auf jenen zutiefst dialektischen Momenten bei Lenin, in denen er unübertroffen ist.

Aus der Epoche von 1924–1925 stammen mehrere Rezensionen, die ebenfalls in diesem Band abgedruckt wurden (über Bernstein und Kautsky anläßlich des siebzigsten Geburtstags von Kautsky, sowie Gelegenheitsartikel in der Festschrift der »Gesellschaft«, weiter über Buharin und Wittfogel), von denen die Rezension über Buharins Werk »Theorie des historischen Materialismus« für das Problem der Theorie am interessantesten ist. Es ist sehr lehrreich und nützlich, Lukáscs' und Buharins Konzeptionen in Bezug auf die Geschichte und den Menschen zu vergleichen Lukács beanstandet bei Buharin vor allem, daß seine Theorie den Charakter einer falschen Objektivität annimmt und fetischistisch wird. Ferner kritisiert er, daß Buharin die Produktionskräfte einzig auf die Technik zurückführt, daß er die Theorie von der Methode absondert und die Art, wie Buharin die Kategorie des »Gesetzes« und die Theorie des Gleichgewichts auffaßt. Es ist bekannt, daß ähnliche kritische Anmerkungen zu diesem Werk auch Gramsci in seinen Gefängnisnotitzen gemacht hat. Buharin verfiel oft in einen Mechanismus und Vulgärmaterialismus und hat mit diesen

Lukics at the same time both by Kautsky

lungs illuminate not only Lukics' de-

as representing political opportunistic viewpoints, but they constitute tunism s and revisionism as well

also an important starting point for

by Zinovjev, Deborin and others as

Understanding the advancement Luden representatives of the revolutionary Markacs' since the year 1923.

Xism and Bolshevism attacked

In the course of efforts to

became. Neither of the two parties

Understanding Communism and many

had understood that in the area

Issues related to the Reder Marxist philosophy a work-volution, the proletariat, the party,

had appeared, which can really be described as gedes imperialism, the dictatorship of the Pronial and that in letariats and especially because of the

mentally not even anymore

Marxist dialectical approach to

be fiberboted by LukAcs himself

all these problems is also one

could (on the ground daffir want

others included in this volume

we will not go into now).

Treatise from that time very soft

It should be emphasized here once again

tig, namely the treatise on life, which exceptionally nin (1924). Because at the same time the

Sensitivity Lukacs for the essential

well-known interpretation of Leninism

problems of our time, for which

appears in Stalin's lectures

al and historical situation of today

- later in his book on questions

gene humans developed, and that too

of Leninism appeared - is a unifying time when the full consequences of these two works are very instructive - on the one hand the reified world of

rich. While Stalin the essential

bourgeois democracy and other

Prerequisites for a deeper wrong side of socialist statism

standpoint of Marxist dialectics

the stage of the story has not yet

go and while he those of

had kicked. You could add

Lenin's statements, which reflect his zealous, that the most important main genes bureaucratic-statist concept

works of European existentialism,

functions of socialism are proper,

which focuses on the problem »man«

absolutized, Lukacs insists

his philosophy, only after

on those profoundly dialectical moments

the mentioned work by LukAcs with Lenin, in which he appeared to

be unrecognized. For all these reasons

fen is.

presents the new edition of the original

From the era of 1924-1925

of "History and Class Consciousness"

men several reviews that also

his" for the philosophy and the Marin were printed in this volume
xism represents an event of the first order.

(about Bernstein and Kautsky on occasion

The second volume of this edition of

of Kau's seventieth birthday

Lukacs' works contain another series on the getsky, as well as
occasional articles in the main work mentioned

Festschrift of the »Society«, more

other articles, treatises and reviews

on Buharin and Wittfogel), of decensions from this period, all for a
review of Buharin's work

the reconstruction of LukAcs' dama

»The theory of historical materialis-

current views are of great importance for the problem of theory
management. A larger number of

most interesting is. It is very educational

Essays are from the period between

and useful, LukAscs' and Buharins

1919 and 1922, and many of them formed

conceptions related to the

den basically a kind of

compare chtc and man

Prolegomena to "History and Class"

Lukacs objected to Buharin before

consciousness«. what the inside of them

all that his theory character

dealt with problems belong

assumes a false objectivity and

on this group also the essays on

becomes fetishistic. Furthermore, he criticizes

tactics and ethics, class and party,

that Buharin, as a problem of orthodox Marxism, tens of times reduces the productive forces to technology, that he

and parliamentarism (LukAcs ge-

separates theory from method

At that time, he was opposed to the radical left-wing wing

and the way Buharin the category

in his work Die Kinderkrankhci-

of the "law" and the theory of

of left-wing radicalism in the

balance perception. It is known,

nism« was criticized), to the Prodafi similar critical comments on the blem of the spontaneity of the masses and

this work also Gramsci in his

the activity of the party, to questions of

made prison notes. Buha

Organization and the revolutionary

rin often fell into a mechanism and

initiative etc. m. All this hand

vulgar materialism and has with these

seinen Stellungnahmen auf einige sowjetische Theoretiker Einfluß ausgebüt. So kann man viele von den Mängeln der Konzeptionen Buharin in Stalins Schriften über den dialektischen und historischen Materialismus wiederfinden, allerdings vermißt man in den letztgenannten jene Kultur, die Buharin auch auf diesem Gebiet besaß.

Der Band enthält außer diesem noch einige kleinere Werke Lukács' aus derselben Periode. In erster Linie den bekannten Aufsatz über Moses Hess und die idealistische Dialektik (1926), in dem Lukács' aufs neue auf der Hegelschen Dialektik insistiert, ganz besonders auf der »Phänomenologie des Geistes«, indem er – vielleicht nicht immer mit Recht – annimt, daß die Rolle von M. Hess in Bezug auf Marx' Entwicklung überschätzt wurde. Diesem Artikel folgen noch zwei Rezenzionen über O. Spann und C. Schmitt aus dem Jahr 1928, sowie die bekannten »Blum-Thesen« (Auszüge aus dem Jahr 1928) zu den Problemen der KP Ungarns, ihrer damaligen Lage und ihrer Tätigkeit.

Wie aus all dem ersichlich ist, umfaßt der bei Lichterhand erschienene Band von Lukács Werken einige äußerst bedeutende Arbeiten, aufgrund derer Lukécs in die Reihe der bedeutendsten marxistischen Denker eingeordnet werden muß und durch die im Marxismus eine Entwicklungstendenz einsetzte, die in den letzten Jahrzenten am fruchtbarsten war.

Predrag VRANICKI

Umberto Cerroni

Metodologia e scienza sociale

Edizioni Malella, Lecco, 1968, 236 S.

Der angesehene marxistisch orientierte italienische Theoretiker Umberto Cerroni ist unserem Leserpublikum bereits bekannt: seine Aufsätze erschienen in einer ganzen Reihe jugoslawischer Zeitschriften (Praxis, Kulturni radnik, Gledišta, Teorija in praksa); außerdem hat Cerroni an verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Institutionen in Jugoslawien Gastvorlesungen gehalten. Er ist Verfasser mehrerer bedeutender Werke, unter denen in erster Linie *»Marx e il diritto moderno«* (Marx und das moderne Recht, Rom, 1962). *»Kant e fondazione giuridica«* (Kant und die juridische Fundierung, Mailand, 1962). *»La libertà dei moderni«* (Die Freiheit der Modernen, Rom, 1967) zu nennen sind. Cerroni ist auch der Autor einer umfangreichen Anthologie politischer Gedanken (*Il pensiero politico*, Rom, 1966, 1323 S.), die er mit einer ausführlichen Einleitung, Kommentaren und erschöpfenden biobibliographischen Angabe versehen hat. Obwohl seine theoretischen Interessen sehr vielseitig sind, kann man doch sagen, daß sein engeres Fachgebiet die Theorie des Rechts und der Politik sind.

Das vorliegende Werk ist in drei Teile gegliedert. Im ersten Teil behandelt der Verfasser die Möglichkeit einer Gesellschaftswissenschaft und gibt eine Darstellung und zugleich eine kritische Interpretation der verschiedenen Versuche, in der modernen Epoche eine einheitliche Wissenschaft von der Gesellschaft zu konstituieren. An erster Stelle analysiert der Verfasser auf kritische Weise die Entstehungsgründe der sogenannten »zwei Kulturen« – der *humanistischen* und der *wissenschaftlichen*, die zur Zeit der Renaissance ein einheitliches Ganzes bildeten. Diese Einheit ist, der Meinung des Verfassers nach, der Tatsache zu verdanken, daß »beide Kulturen« sozusagen das gleiche gedankliche Programm aufweisen. Erst später, durch Lockes' Empirismus einerseits und Descartes' Rationalismus anderseits kommt es zur Spaltung in physikalisch-naturwissenschaftliche Disziplinen und in die Wissenschaft vom Menschen. Diese Spaltung erhält ihre endgültige Ausformung bei Kant, so daß man sagen kann, daß auf Kants Dichotomie zwischen der intelligiblen und der noumenalen Welt die gesamte moderne Teilung in Wisseschaft und Kultur, beziehungsweise in Natur und Menschen (in Naturwissenschaften und Gesellschaftswissenschaften) fußt. Hegel hat zwar versucht, diesen Kantschen Dualismus zu überwinden, aber in Wirklichkeit hat er dem »äußeren« Dualismus nur noch den »inneren« Dualismus hinzugefügt, d. h. den Dualismus des positiven Wissens von den verschiedenen Gebieten der Geschichte und der Logik, die die treibende Kraft und die Seele des ganzen Inhalts ist. Es handelt sich nämlich um die Versöhnung und die Synthese der Vielfältigkeit aber ausschließlich in der Idee. »Natur und Geschichte nehmen nur eine allegorische Konsistenz an..., da ihre authentische Positivität nur

his comments on some Soviet

ne Recht, Rom, 1962). »Kant e fonda-

tical theorists exerted influence. So

legal position" (Kant und die juridi-

you can see many of the flaws of

sche foundation, Milan, 1962). »L a

Buharin's conceptions in Stalin's writing

libcrta dei moderni« (The freedom of the

ten about the dialectic and histo

Moderns, Rome, 1967).

rediscovering materialism, al

Cerroni is also the author of a

however, in the last few

extensive anthology of political names that culture, which Buharin also thanked (II pensiero politico, Rome, 1966, possessed in this area.

1323 p.), which he explains with a detailed

The volume also contains this one

Introduction, comments and exhaustive

some smaller works of LukAcs from

required biobibliographical information

same period. Primarily the

has seen. Although its theoretical

knew Essay on Moses Hess and

Interests are very varied, you can

the idealistic dialectic (1926), in which

but say that it is his narrower field of expertise

LukAcs' again on the Hegelian

the theory of law and politics

Dialectic insists, especially on

are.

of the "phenomenology of spirit" in that

This work is divided into three parts

he - maybe not always right -

le divided. treated in the first part

assumes that the role of M. Hess in

the author the possibility of a

reference to M arx’s development fiber-

social science and gives a

was appreciated. Follow this article

representation and at the same time a critical one

two more reviews about 0 . instep

Interpretation of the various Versuund C. Schmitt from the year 1928, soche, in the modern epoch a one-like the well-known »Blum theses« (Aus-

common science of the Gesellzfige from the year 1928) to constitute the pro-stitute. First of all

problems of the Hungarian Communist Party, the author analyzes their critical situation and their activities at the time.

Way the origin of the so-called

As can be seen from all this, um-

called "two cultures" - the humani

fafit the one published by Lichterhand

tical and scientific, the volume of Lukac's works some au- at the time of the Renaissance a unified

fis important work, due to de-

form a whole. This unit is

rer Lukecs in the series of significant

in the opinion of the author, the

most Marxist thinkers

Thanks to the fact that "both cultures had to be developed and through which, in Marxism," so to speak, the same thought-mus began to develop,

program. Later,

which have been fruitful in recent decades

by Lockes' empiricism on the one hand and

burst war.

Descartes’

rationalism

on the other hand

Predrag V RAN ICKI

there is a split into physical

scientific disciplines and

into human science. This split receives its final form in Kant, so that one can say

can, that on Kant's dichotomy between

Umberto Cerroni

of the intelligible and the noumen-

al w orld the entire modern division

Methodology and social science

in science and

culture,

running-

hungwise in nature and people (in

Malella Editions, Lecco, 1968, 236 S.

natural sciences and social

science) fufit. Hegel has

tried this Kantian dualism

The respected Marxist-oriented

to overcome, but in reality has

the

Italian theorists

Umberto

he only left the "exterior" dualism

Added to our readership, Cerroni is already aware of the "inner" dualism: his essays were published

i.e. H. the dualism of positive knowledge

in a whole series of Yugoslav

sens from the different areas of the

Magazines (Praxis, Kulturni radnik,

history and the logic that drives

Viewpoints, Theory and Practice); aufierdem

living power and the soul of it all

has Cerroni at various knowledge

content is. It is about

scientific institutions in Yugoslavia

the reconciliation and the synthesis dcr

held guest lectures in vienna. He is

Diversity but exclusively in the

Author of several important works

Idea. »Take nature and history

among which primarily »M arx e il

only an allegorical consistency. . . ,

diritto moderno* (Marx and the moderda their authentic positivity only 270

dann verstanden werden kann, wenn sie in den Gegenstand des Denkens verwandelt wird. Um sie jedoch als solche zu erkennen, bedürfen wir nicht der Wissenschaft sondern der Philosophie der Wissenschaft, nicht der Geschichte, sondern der Philosophie der Geschichte.« (S. 27).

Der sich daraus ergebende Positivismus stellt einen Schritt auf die Emanzipationen der einzelnen Wissenschaften hin dar, bleibt jedoch in der letzten Konsequenz im Rahmen der metaphysischen Denkweise. Kritik an dem Positivismus übt einerseits der Experimentalismus (in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften: hier gebührt den Ansichten des Verfassers nach Durkheim und Pareto eine Sonderstelle), und andereseits der Historismus (Dilthey, Rickert, an die sich dann Max Weber anschließt, dem der Verfasser seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit widmet).

In dem zweiten Teil behandelt der Autor das Thema – *vissenschaftliche Erkenntnis und das Recht*, wo seine hervorragenden Kenntnisse über die ganze Problematik der modernen Rechtslehren zum Ausdruck kommen. Sein Hauptinteresse widmet er den Versuchen (beispielsweise von Kelsen, Ross und anderen), eine mögliche Wissenschaft vom Recht als dem System der »reinen Normen« zu gründen. In dem Versuch, eine autonome Wissenschaft vom Recht zu gründen, die die (moralischen und politischen) Begründungen distanzieren und so zur echten Wissenschaft werden würde, haben diese Autoren zur Forderung nach »reinen rechtlichen Normen« Zuflucht genommen; dadurch erhalten wir eigentlich – wie es Heck formuliert hat, der dann von Cerroni paraphrasiert wird – eine Rechtswissenschaft, die an einen Hexenmeister erinnert, der nur denjenigen zu helfen bereit ist, die an ihn glauben.

Der dritte Teil des Buches handelt von der *Wirtschaftswissenschaft und der Ideologie*. Der Verfasser gibt zuerst eine kritische Darstellung von Schumpeters These und den Thesen einiger anderer moderner bürgerlicher Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, um dann ausführlich auf das Aristotelische ökonomische Denken als den »ersten Versuch der wissenschaftlichen Explizierung der ökonomischen Erscheinungen« zurückzugreifen. Aristoteles hat als erster festgestellt – und darin liegt sein großes Verdienst – daß der Austausch eigentlich eine Gleichsetzung verschiedener Dinge ist; demzufolge muß etwas bestehen, wodurch sie ermöglicht wird, und das heißt, daß neben dem Gebrauchswert auch ein Umsatzwert besteht, der meßbar ist, ohne Rücksicht auf seinen nominalen Weit. Weiter ist Aristoteles jedoch nicht gekommen. Es wäre falsch anzunehmen, meint Cerroni, daß Aristoteles in seiner weiteren konsequenten wissenschaftlichen Analyse von der traditionellen Ideologie gehemmt worden wäre, weil sie ihn genauso hätte hindern können, den Unterschied zwischen dem Gebrauchswert und dem Umsatzwert festzustellen. Deswegen hat Marx Recht, wenn er sagt, daß die Aristotelische Analyse einfach deshalb halt gemacht hat, weil Aristoteles den *Begriff des Wertes*, der nicht aus dem analysierten Gegenstand abzuleiten war, d. h. aus der Struktur der griechischen Gesellschaft, einfach nicht besessen hat (siehe das erste Buch des *Kapitals)*. Das muß besonders hervorgehoben werden, um wirklich verständlich zu machen, was die »gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit« einer Theorie ist. und um nicht in simplizistische Deutungen zu verfallen, die oft auch unter den Marxisten vorkamen, die ihrerseits gern bei einer Theorie der Ideologie ähnlich derjenigen, die die moderne Wissenssoziologie bietet (z. b. Mannheim) Zuflucht suchten. Der Verfasser gibt ferner eine minutiöse Analyse aller Formen des Aristotelischen ökonomischen Gedankens und weist auf seinen Beitrag zur Konstituierung einer modernen Wirtschaftswissenschaft hin, deren Konstituierung der Verfasser anhand der bekanntesten Namen, von Petty bis einschließlich Keynes, Dobb, Sweezy und Barana verfolgt.

In der Schlußfolgerung insistiert der Verfasser besonders auf der Geschichtlichkeit der wissenschaftlichen Kategorien und polemisiert heftig gegen eine starre Teilung – die auch in bestimmten marxistischen Kreisen eigebürgert ist – in sogenannte wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Ideologien. Diese Teilung und die Gegenüberstellung, die sich daraus ergibt, »negiert im Grunde genommen den Erkenntniswert und verdeckt durch seinen Apell an den Instinkt und die Intuition den radikalen Erkenntnisskeptizismus, was dazu führt, daß die Geschichte des menschlichen Denkens als eine ‚unbrauchbare' Geschichte von Fehlern beurteilt wird; das ist eine typisch rationalistische Anschauung, und sie stellt die symptomatische Kehrseite des verkappten Empirismus dar, wonach

then can be understood if they

things is; therefore something must be

hi understand the object of thought, which makes it possible, transforms it. However, to them as such

and that means that in addition to the

to recognize, we do not need the

use value also be a sales value

science but philosophy

stands, which is measurable, without regard

of science, not of history,

on its nominal wide. Next is

but the philosophy of history.«

Aristotle, however, did not come. It

(S. 27).

would be wrong to assume, says Cerroni,

The resulting positive

dafi Aristotle in his further konmus represents a step towards the emanzi-sequential scientific analysis

pations of the individual sciences

by the traditional ideology

towards, but remains in the last

had been inhibited because she

Consequence in the context of metaphys-

nauso had been able to prevent the

sian way of thinking. criticism of the

difference between utility value

tivism practices on the one hand the experiment

and determine the sales value. Of-

talism (in the social

because Marx is right when he says

schaften: here due to the views

that the Aristotelian analysis is simple

of the author after Durkheim and Padeshalb stopped because Aristoreto has a special place), and on the other hand teles the concept of value, which is not historicism (Dilthey, Rickert,

from the analyzed object

who then joined Max Weber,

lead was, d. H. from the structure of

which the author gave his special

Greek society, just not

dedicates attention).

possessed (secure the first book of

capital). That must be particularly hcrvogc-

In the second part, the

to be really understood

Author the subject - scientific

to do what the »social

knowledge and the law, where its

conditionality" of a theory. and around

excellent knowledge of the whole

not into simplistic interpretations

Problems of modern jurisprudence

expire, which are often expressed under the Marxizum. His main in-st occurred, which in turn liked to

interest he devotes to the experiments (be-

a theory of ideology similar to-

e.g. von Kelsen, Ross and others who offer modern sociology of knowledge (e.g. Mannheim) refuge

law than the system of "pure norselves." The author also gives a men' to be found. In an attempt to

meticulousness Analysis go Formen of

autonomous science of law

Aristotelian fikonomic thought

that dissociate the (moral and political) and points to his contribution to the con-tical) reasoning

establishment of a modern economic

to become real science

science out, its constitution

dc, these authors have to claim

the author based on the best known

according to »pure legal norms«

names. from Petty up to and including

escaped thereby we get

Keynes, Dobb, Sweezy und Barana ver-

actually - as Heck put it.

follows.

which is then paraphrased by Cerroni

In the conclusion he insists

- cine jurisprudence, which at one
author especially on the historical
warlock who only
scientific category
nigen is willing to help, sent to him
rien and polecmized violently against one
believe.
rigid division - which is also in certain
The third part of the book is about
inspired by Marxist circles -
from economics and
into so-called scientific and
the ideology. The author first gives non-scientific ideologies. This
a critique of Schum
division and counterfiber position, the
peter's thesis and the theses of some
resulting from it, »essentially negates
other modern bourgeois economy
taken the cognitive value and
academics, in order to then perform
oppresses with its appeal to instinct
Lich on the Aristotelian economic
and the intuition the radical recognition
Thinking as the 'first attempt at dcr

skepticism, which leads to the fact that the

scientific explication of the oko

history of human thought

nomic phenomena«

as a 'useless' story of

grasp. Aristotle was the first to

error cm is judged; that's a typo - and therein lies his great pictorial rationalist view, and

Merit - that the exchange actually represents the symptomatic reverse side of an equation of different

of disguised empiricism, according to which

die Gegenwart ohne jede Rücksicht auf die Zukunft entifiziert wird.« (S. 225–226).

Cerronis Buch stellt einen Beitrag zur Erläuterung der Grundlagen der modernen Gesellschaftswissenschaften dar, denn es bewertet und mißt auf eine intelligente Weise und vom marxistischen Standpunkt aus Lage und Tendenzen der Gesellschaftswissenschaft und ihrer Methodologie.

Vjekoslav MIKECIN

Danko Grlić:

»Wer ist Nietzsche«

Zodijak, Beograd 1969

Das voreingenommene Verhältnis zur bürgerlichen Kultur, das bei uns noch immer hie und da wie ein trauriger Rückfall in die »Diamat-Sünde« in unserer theoretischen Denkweise aufscheint, tritt in der jüngsten Zeit doch immer bemerkbarer hinter einem rationalen Dialog zürück, dessen Zweck keineswegs eine leichtfertige, politische, den Tagesbedürfnissen angepaßte Disqualifizierung ist, sondern die Bemühung um einen relevanten kritischen Standpunkt, von dem aus nicht alles, was »bürgerlich« ist, von vornherein verdammt werden soll seitens einer eingebildeten nihilistischen Unterschätzung im Namen irgendeiner (meist sehr schlechten) Interpretation von Marx, sondern in seiner historischen Bedingtheit und allein schon dadurch in seiner zwangsläufigen gedanklichen Beschränktheit gesehen werden soll.

Nach Hegels Rehabilitierung von einer ganzen Reihe von politischen Anschuldigungen, die ihm von dem stalinistischen Positivismus unterstellt wurden, ist in einem gewissen Sinne das Verhältnis zu Nietzsche zu einem Scheideweg zwischen dem überkommenen Dogmatismus und der neuen Orientierung geworden, die als schöpferischer Marxismus bezeichnet wird; die Dilemmata »pro et contra«. die einerseits die Verwerfung Nietzsches als den Ideologen des Nazismus und Schöpfer des Mythos von der »blauen Bestie« implizieren, bzw. anderseits das Gegenteil davon, die Anerkennung Nietzsches als schonungslosen Kritiker einer Welt, die zusammen mit ihm im Untergang der Vernunft versank, als Kritiker, der eine radikale Zerstörung dieser Vernunft und eine Umwertung aller traditionellen Werte der europäischen christlichen Kultur gefordert hat, seine Anerkennung als Denker, der zwar in einer ungewöhnlichen Sprache aber mit seltener Hellsichtigkeit nach einer neuen Gattung des Menschen gesucht hat, einer Gattung, die alle theologische Transzendenz abschaffen und die Stelle des gestorbenen Gottes einnehmen würde – diese Dilemmata haben sich also transformiert in einen zuverlässigen Anzeiger des theoretischen Niveaus unserer Denkweise und ihrer Fähigkeit, nicht die vulgär verstandene »ideologische Koexistenz« zu akzeptieren, sondern sich um einen autonomen, von außen nicht beeinflußten Zugang zu den Problemen der Zeit zu bemühen.

Danko Grlić hat in dem vorliegenden Werk gezeigt, wie auf eine wirkliche marxistische Weise ein Verhältnis zur Kultur der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft aufgebaut werden kann, ohne sie a priori und gedankenlos zu verwerfen oder apologisieren; indem er drei wichtige Themen aus Nietzsches Werk aktualisiert – den Tod Gottes, die Erscheinung des Übermenschen und die Existenz als die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen – und indem Grlić auf die ungerechten politischen Unterstellungen aufmerksam macht, die durch die Falsifikationen der krankhaft ambitiösen Schwester Nietzsches, Elisabeth Förster, möglich wurden, hat Grlić die Beweise von zwei wesentlichen Tatsachen überzeugend ausgeführt – daß sich nämlich einerseits Nietzsche in die Tradition des europäischen humanistischen Gedanken einfügt, der nach der Zerstörung der »jenseitigen Welt der Wahrheit die Wahrheit der diesseitigen Welt hätte herstellen sollen« (Marx), und unnachgiebig darauf beharrt hat, dass der Mensch den ihm wirklich zukommenden Platz im Weltall einnehmen solle, und daß anderseits Nietzsche mit dem später aufgekommenen deutschen Nazismus ebensowenig gemein hat wie auch eine Verachtung für den deutschen Philister mit seinem späteren angeblichen germanischen Chauvinismus.

Denn Nietzsche hat – nach Grlićs Worten – indem er dem Gedanken daß Gott gestorben ist, Ausdruck verlieh, eigentlich die Bestrebung des Menschen postuliert, endlich zum Subjekt des eigenen Schicksales zu werden, die Ver-

the present without any regard to

the course of reason sank when criticism of the future is de-identified.'

ser reason and a revaluation al

Cerroni's book makes a contribution to

the traditional values of European

elucidation of the foundations of modern Christian culture, the social sciences of which

his recognition as a thinker who

because it evaluates and mifits on an in-

although in an unusual language

intelligent way and from the Marxist

but with rare clairvoyance after

Standpoint from situation and tendencies

a new species of man

of social science and its

searches, a genus that all theo-

Methodology.

abolish logical transcendence and

Vjekoslav M IKECIN

the place of the dead god

would take - these dilemmas have thus been transformed into a reliable indicator of the theoretical

Danko Grlic:

levels of our thinking and theirs

ability, not the vulgar understood

»ideological coexistence« to be accepted

»Who is Nietzsche«

animals, but an autonomous Zu-Zodijak not influenced from outside, Beograd 1969

approach the problems of the time

bemuhen.

Danko Grlić has in the present

The biased relationship to

Factory shown as on a real one

civil culture, that's still with us

Marxist way a relationship to

always here and there like a sad one

Culture of civil society

Relapse into the "Diamate Sin" in

can be built up without discarding them a priour theoretical way of thinking on-ori and thoughtlessly or

seems, but occurs in recent times

apologise; by mentioning three important

always noticeable behind a rationa

Themes from Nietzsche's work updated

a dialogue, the purpose of which

- the death of God, the appearance of a frivolous, political, dis-tence of the upper man and the exide adapted to the needs of the day as the eternal return of the

qualification, but the

Same - and adding Grlić to the

hung around a relevant critical

unjust political allegations

point of view from which not everything

draws attention. through the fall

what is "bourgeois" from the outset

sifications of the morbidly ambitious

be damned on the part of one

Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth F5r-

imaginary nihilistic subdivision

ster, Grlić has the

statement on behalf of someone (usually

Evidence of two essential facts-

very bad)

interpretation of

things done convincingly - dafi

Marx, but in his historical

namely, on the one hand, Nietzsche in the

Conditionality and because of that alone

tradition of the European humanisti in his inevitable intellectual thoughts that after the

limitations should be seen.

Destruction of the »world beyond

After Hegel's rehabilitation of ei

truth the truth of this world

whole series of political

world was supposed to create" (Marx),

owed him by the

and has adamantly insisted

Linistic positivism assumes that man really has what is due to him is, in a certain sense, that

take up space in the cosmos

relationship to Nietzsche to a pseudo

should, and on the other hand Nietzsche

deweg between the traditional

with the later emerging German

Dogmatism and the new Orientietschen Nazism have just as little commonality as creative

has as well a contempt for the

called Marxism; the Dilem German Philistines with its later mata "pro et contra", which on the one hand the

alleged Germanic chauvinism

rejection of Nietzsche as the ideological

mus.

gene of Nazism and creator of the

Because Nietzsche has - according to Grlićs

Myth of the "blue beast" implied

words - by giving up to the thought

decorate, or on the other hand the opposite

God died, gave expression

of it, the recognition of Nietzsche

actually the striving of man

as a relentless critic of a world

postulates finally becoming the subject of the eidie along with him in

the subgene destiny, the Ver-272

antwortung für seine Handlungen als selbstbewußtes Wesen, das die alte, auf den verlogenen Werten und im Kultus der religiösen Vorsehung aufgebaute Welt zerstört, zu übernehmen und eine neue Welt aufzubauen, in deren Fundamenten alles Seins der Wille zur Macht stehen würde als höchster Akt der existentiellen Bestätigung und als eine Art der permanenten Überhöhung des Daseienden, in der Mensch sich selbst übertreffen, die Grenzen aller beschränkten empirischen Zustände überschreiten und letzten Endes als Übermensch wiederkehren würde. »Obzwar der Übermensch nirgedwo konkret und empirisch beschrieben ist«, hebt der Verfasser hervor, »ist er doch nirgends als intelligibiles Wesen oder ethisches Ideal dargestellt. Der Übermensch ist ein Wesen, das den Menschen aus den jenseitigen Entfremdungen dem wahren Menschen zurückgeben wird, damit der Mensch endlich seine wahre und wirkliche Kraft erkenne, damit er aufhöre, Schachfigur der ihm fremden Mächte zu sein, damit er autonom handele ohne irgendein anderes Gesetz als sein eigenes anzuerkennen. (S. 131). Auf diese Weise wird eines von Nietzsches strittigsten Themen nach und nach entmystifiziert mit Hilfe einer Kategorie, die nur scheinbar eine ausschließlich Hegelsche oder Marxsche ist: mit Hilfe der Kategorie der Entfremdung. Nietzsche war nämlich genauso wie Marx fest besessen von der Suche nach dem authentischen Menschen, der aus der universellen Entfremdung in einer verdinglichten und entfremdeten, in der Aussöhnung mit ihrer alltäglichen Beschränktheit abstossenden Welt, die auch noch so klein im Vergleich mit den äusseren Mächten ist, zu sich selbst zurückkehrt als zu einem aufs neue gewonnenen Ursprung und Quelle aller Lebensinspirationen.

Selbstverständlich, wenn man wie Georg Lukács von der aprioristischen These ausgeht, daß »es keine unschuldige Weltanschauung gibt« und daß jeder Denker für die objektiven Folgen seiner Philosophie verantwortlich sei, dann kann man leicht Nietzsche anklagen, er wäre der ideelle Vorgänger eines nazistischen Gauleiters in dessen Selbstauffassung als eines selbstberufenen »Übermenschen«; aber in diesem Falle hört jede Möglichkeit des Philosophierens auf, denn wo ist der Denker – und wird es ihn je geben – der von vornherein von jeder mutwilligen Aufgreifung seiner Ideen seitens der verschiedensten, ja auch der rückständigsten gesellschaftlichen Kräfte sicher ist; auf diese Weise leistet man, wenn auch wider Willen, gute Dienste jenen reaktionären Kreisen die zum Beispiel Marx die Schuld für den Stalinismus und Hegel die Schuld für den Faschismus geben, und dabei nicht unterscheiden wollen zwischen dem wirklichen Wesen einer Lehre und der Qualität jener Bewegungen, die sie deklarativ, aber aus ganz bestimmten Interessensgründen annehmen.

Ein besonderes Verdienst dieses Buches von Grlić ist darin zu sehen, daß es eine solche nichtkritische und dogmatische Stellungnahme Nietzsche gegenüber kritisiert; aber auch in diesem Werk bleibt das Dilemma »Nietzsche – pro et contra« offen, nicht weil es unlösbar wäre, sondern deshalb, weil jede von vorherein postulierte Entscheidung, statt zu einem kritischen Dialog zu ungerechtfertiger Glorifizierung oder Verdammung führen würde. Der Verfasser hat selbst die große Gefahr solcher Einseitigkeit bemerkt. »Sowohl die Verurteilung der nichtkritischen Beweihräucherung«, schreibt er, »als auch die Veruteilung der schablonenhaften aber rigorosen Verdammung sowie die philosophische Bewertung des gigantischen Lebenswerkes Nietzsches in der Zeit und dem Raum der europäischen Wirklichkeit am Ende am des 19. Jhts. bleibt auch witerhin eine dringende Aufgabe jener Forscher, die das Kulturerbe vom Standpunkt der Dialektik und der Geschichte beurteilen wollen«. (S. 128). Wir sind der Meinung, daß wir nicht fehlgehen, wenn wir sagen, daß gerade diese Offenheit von Grlićs Buch einer seiner grössten Vorzüge ist, dank dem es reifer und frischer wirkt als jene Abhandlungen, (wie beispielsweise jene von Lukács), die auf einen unwiderruflich Urteil über Nietzsche Anspruch erheben.

Fuad MUHIĆ

Paul Blumberg:

Industrial Democracy: the Sociology of Participation

Constable, London 1968, 278 pp.

Blumberg's thesis begins with the conviction. which he presents immediately in the introduction and which is thereafter expanded upon troughout the entire

responsibility for his actions as

various, yes also dcr rfickstan-

self-confident being, the old one, on

most important social forces

the mendacious values and in the cult

is; this is how you perform when

built up by religious providence

even against your will, good service to those

world destroyed, to take over and a

reactionary circles, for example

to build a new world in whose foundation

Blame Marx for Stalinism

ment of all being is the will to power

and Hegel blamed for the fascist

stand as the highest act of the existing

must give, and thereby not differential confirmation and as a way of wanting between the real

the permanent elevation of the

Essence of a doctrine and of quality

beings, in man himself

those movements that they declarative,

surpass the limits of all

but for very specific interests

ten empirical states

assume.

and ultimately as superman

A special merit of this book

would return. »Although Grlić's Oberches can be seen in the fact that people are nowhere concrete and empirical

it such a non-critical and dogmatic

is described,« the author emphasizes hertic statement against Nietzsche, »but it is nowhere described as an intelligent

over criticized; but also in this work

bile being or ethical ideal presented

the dilemma remains »Nietzsche - pro

puts. The upper man is a being

et contra« openly, not because it is insoluble

that to the people from the otherworldly

ware, but because each of

Alienations from the true human being

previously postulated decision, instead

will return so man

to a critical dialogue

finally its true and real power

justifiable glorification or vcr-

recognize, that he may cease, SchachTigur

insulation. The author

of powers alien to him, there is itself the great danger of acting autonomously without any

Oneness noted. “Both the

law other than his own

assessment of the non-critical

recognize. (p. 131). In this way

smoking," he writes, "as well as the

becomes one of Nietzsche's most controversial

Condemnation of the stereotyped though

Themes gradually demystified

rigorous condemnation as well as the phi-

using a category that only

losophical assessment of the gigantic cn

apparently an exclusively Hegelian one

Life's work of Nietzsche in time

or Marxian is: with the help of the Ka and the space of the European effective category of alienation. Nietzsche was reality at the end of the 19th century. remains

namely just as obsessed as Marx

still an urgent task

from the search for the authentic

those researchers who study the cultural heritage of

people who are from the universal

Viewpoint of dialectics and Ge

Alienation in a reified

want to judge layer«. (p. 128).

and alienated, in reconciliation

We think we don't

with their everyday limitations

err when we say that the repulsive world, no matter how open Grlić's book is

small in comparison with the outer ones

one of its greatest assets is thanks

power is returning to oneself

whom it seems cooler and fresher than those

than to a new won primal

Treatises (such as those

leap and source of all life inspiration

from Lukacs), which are based on an irrevocable

rations.

verdict on Nietzsche's claim

Of course, if you like

Georg Lukacs from the a priori

thesis that »there are no

there is a different world view« and that

every thinker for the objective consequences

Paul Blumberg:

responsible for his philosophy

be, then one can easily learn Nietzsche

Industrial Democracy: the

accuse that he was the ideal event

Sociology of Participation

ger of a Nazi Gauleiter in

whose self-conception as one

Constable, London 1968, 278 pp.

appointed "superman"; but in this case every possibility of philosophizing ceases, for where is that

Blumberg's thesis begins with the con

thinker - and will he ever exist -

viction. which he presents immediately

from the outset of any willful

in the introduction and which is theregen taking up of his ideas by the after expanded upon troughout the entire

book, that workers' self-management is capable of becoming one of the fundamental questions of industrial society during the final thirty years of this century.

He quotes André Gorz (Strategy for Labor – A Radical Proposal, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967) who says that a developed society must not only fulfill quantitative but also qualitative requirements; the issue at hand does not only deal with the necessity for the consumption of material goods, but likewise with the need for liberation not only from exploitation but equally from pressure and alienation arising in the course of work and leisure time.

Speaking of the forgotten lessons of the Mayo experiments, the author stresses that the element of participation has helped to explain the change for the better which occurred in the test laboratory. Workers' self-determination is an important factor which forms a part of the background for all those investigations. The experiments have shown that alternations in the »supervisory system« have surprising effects upon workers' morale and productivity even though the technical processes of labor remained unchanged. The forgotten variable of those experiments is the so-called phenomenon of »workshop-democracy«. The author considers that the conclusions arrived at by Mayo and his associates lay too much emphasis upon the significance of the worker's »status«, and neglect the concepts of industrial authority and supervision. In this regard, he is relying upon Mills' criticism of the Warner sociological school, even though he does not enter into a deeper analysis of social motives which came into existence after the above-mentioned experiments. Accordingly, it is because of this that the distinction between the concepts of »status«, »authority«, and »supervision« is not sufficiently precise or clear, which is a shortcoming in consideration of the fact that this is precisely one of those points over which there arises serious disputation between the adherents of workers' participation and those who look upon it as simply a manipulative stratagem by means of which capital is consolidating its authority within the framework of new conditions.

The analysis of the arguments most often cited in opposition to workers' participation in the management of the enterprise is really the criticism of Hugh Clegg, a leading British expert in the field of industrial relations and author of the books *Industrial Democracy and Nationalization,* 1951, and *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy 1960.* Clegg states that democracy is founded upon the existence of an opposition.

Accordingly then, industrial democracy is impossible if there does not exist an opposition to the powers of management and ownership. Trade unions represent one form of such a strong opposition. If we want a democratic atmosphere in industry there must exist a viable opposition and a management which accepts that opposition and is amenable to compromise. In this regard, Clegg condudes that trade unions should never be permitted to participate in management affairs, since every attempt to do so disrupts the very basis upon which industrial democracy is founded. In Clegg's opinion, industrial democracy can be realized within the framework of private ownership as well as within that of social ownership. Participation leads towards a new form of industrial despotism, since if the trade union assumes the responsibility for management, it will no longer be in a position to defend the interests of the workers.

Blumberg's refutation of Clegg'ss arguments is comprised in the statement that the aspirations of the worker cannot be solely ascribed to the desire for higher wages and better working conditions. In explaining and verifying this assertion, Blumberg cites certain individual examples. Thus, from data for the year 1950 which show that 90% of all German workers had voted for co-determination of management affairs, he draws the conclusion that the interests of contemporary industrial workers in developed countries cannot be confined to the desire for higher consumption. In addition, it must be kept in mind that Hitler came to power with the help of the capitalist monopolists, and so it is reasonable to assume that only workers' participation in industry is capable of preventing similar diversion of democratie values.

In the first chapter which concerns Yugoslavia, the author attempts to answer the question as to how workerss'seflmanagement came to be introduced in this country. Did this come about as a necessary reaction to external pressure, or was it a matter of free choice? While the reigning opinion in the west is that the first statement is correct, Yugoslav theoreticians are demonstrating that there had already existed for a long time

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Approach to Industrial Democracy 1960.

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essential differences between Soviet and Yugoslav methods of economic development and that the acute tension arising from those differences was not the consequence, but rather the cause of the subsequent conflict. Blumberg is here tending to favor the viewpoint of western theoreticians and says further »that the Yugoslavs cannot defend their thesis by relying on concrete examples, since up to 1948, Yugoslav communism was a slavish imitation of the Soviet model« (p. 178).

The author goes on to state that one of the fundamental arguments which the Yugoslavs developed in the course of the struggle with the Russians consists in the assertion »that the abolition of private ownership by itself does not guarantee the end of exploitation« (p. 179). This polemic has to do with the question of the future rôle of the state. Support for this contention is sought in Marx's thoughts on the Paris Commune and in Lenin's book »State and Revolution«. The Yugoslavs are constantly emphazising that the dictatorship of the proletariat must simultaneously fight on two fronts: against the restoration of capitalism and against bureaucratic tendencies within its own ranks, since certain groups while professing to rule in the name of the working class, are actually transforming themselves into a »privileged class, which lives at the expense of society as a whole.« (M. Đilas) (p. 177). Blumberg maintains that the Yugoslavs have accepted the thesis suggested by Berle and Đilas, according to which management is the crucial element of ownership. That is, the effective owner is he who manages the means of production without regard to nominal ownership. This means that under »state capitalism«, the state appoints administrators to manage the economy, while accordingly the position of the working class in relation to the means of production is in every respect similar to its position under capitalism (p. 178).

Following the Yugoslav argument there is the thesis concerning the withering away of the state. In this regard, the author adds »that the power of the secret police (UDB) was drastically reduced already after 1945« (p. 180). He goes on to state that the cornerstone of Titoism is economic decentralization and the introduction of workers' self-management. According to the author, the Yugoslavs in this manner developed an ideological force which subsequently they themselves could not restrain and which finally turned against them. He looks upon Đilas' metamorphosis from a doctrinaire into a democratic socialist as the personification of that development which will someday be characteristic of Yugoslav society as a whole, while today there continues to exist in Yugoslavia a contradiction between a monolithic party and a democratic ideology (p. 183).

One of Blumberg's theses which is not sufficiently explained or verified consists in the assertion that in the self-managing reconstruction of their society, the Yugoslavs could not rely upon Marx, Engels and Lenin, but rather accepted the ideas originally developed by the English and French socio-syndicalists (p. 193).

In discussing the relationship between workers' self-management and political democracy, the author poses the question of whether or not industrial democracy is compatible with a one-party system. He quotes Živko Topalović who says that there can be no democracy in the enterprise if the state itself is undemocratic, since even an autocratic regime can allow democracy to exist in those areas where the essential interests of (state) authority are not threatened. And yet, in this matter, the author has more confidence in a report from the International Bureau of Labor in Geneva (»Workers' management in Yugoslavia,« Geneva, 1962) which says that workers' self-management in Yugoslavia is an autonomous institution, and not simply a meaningless title behind which is hidden one-party control.

Taking this document as a basis, the author comes to the conclusion that self-management is a genuine alternative between western capitalism and the classic Soviet system of central planning. He carefully analyzes data on the composition of the workers' councils, in which unskilled and semi-skilled workers are poorly represented. Yet, this notwithstanding, the author thinks that Yugoslav self-management should be viewed as an instrument which increases the mobility of the worker, an opportunity which is otherwise denied him in other systems. Self-management is in Blumberg's opinion a basis for increasing the productivity of labor, which is especially obvious if one analyses the appropriate data for the period 1950–1960. In this period, the population's living standard rose considerably.

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Yugoslav methods of economic developnally turned against them. He looks upon ment and that the acute tension arising

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(»Workers' management in Yugoslavia,«

that the Yugoslavs have accepted the

Geneva, 1962) which says that workers'

thesis suggested by Berle and Đilas,

self-management in Yugoslavia is an

according to which management is the

autonomous institution, and not simply

crucial element of ownership. That is,

a meaningless title behind which is hidthe effective owner is he who manages den one-party control.

the means of production without regard

Taking this document as a basis, the

to nominal ownership. This means that

author comes to the conclusion that selfunder »state capitalism«, the state apmanagement is a genuine alternative points administrators to manage the

between western capitalism and the claseconomy, while accordingly the position sic Soviet system of central planning. He

of the working class in relation to the

carefully analyzes data on the composimeans of production is in every respect tion of the workers' councils, in which

similar to its position under capitalism

unskilled and semi-skilled workers are

(P- 178).

poorly represented. Yet, this notwith

Following the Yugoslav argument

standing, the author thinks that Yugothere is the thesis concerning the witherslav self-management should be viewed ing away of the state. In this regard, the

as an instrument which increases the

author adds »that the power of the secret

mobility of the worker, an opportunity

police (UDB) was drastically reduced alwhich is otherwise denied him in other ready after 1945« (p. 180). He goes on

systems. Self-management is in Blum-

to state that the cornerstone of Titoism • berg’s opinion a basis for increasing the is economic decentralization and the inproductivity of labor, which is especially troduction of workers’ self-management.

obvious if one analyses the appropriate

According to the author, the Yugoslavs

data for the period 1950-1960. In this

in this manner developed an ideological

period, the population’s living standard

force which subsequently they themrose considerably.

After that there followed the period which was noted for over-investment, followed by the economic reform and the related phenomenon of unemployment. Relying upon the research of Jiri Kolaj *(Workers Counsils: the Yugoslav Experience*, London 1965), Blumberg analyses the system's weaknesses. He says that it is hard to convince workers of peasant background of the need for modernization and the raising of the so-called social standard. The majority of workers seek to individually distribute realized profit surpluses. This notwithstanding, the author considers worker identification with the enterprise to be incomparably greater in Yugoslavia than in other socialist countries, the main reason for this being the existence of workers' councils. In conclusion, it is said that workers' self-management in Yugoslavia either functions badly or, in most cases, does not function at all. For the most part it is either the director or the party or someone else who makes the decisions. The author maintains that it must nevertheless be stressed that today in Yugoslavia there still exists a legal and moral framework for the development of workers' self-management.

This is the real context in which the struggle for the management of the enterprise is evolving. In other words, this means that it in great measure depends upon the workers themselves whether or not self-management will develop in their enterprise. Of course, there also exist many other factors, although the author is not acquainted with the actual circumstances and therefore cannot speak about them authoritatively. However, on the basis of the documents with which he is acquainted, the author comes to the conclusion that in cases of a weak workers' council, the director or someone else, exploits levers of authority and other factors in order to establish complete control. In his opinion, the system in Yugoslavia has nonetheless functioned well, if one takes into consideration the low level of education, primitivism and the lack of democratic traditions. A clear indication of the fact that Yugoslavia is headed in the direction of ever greater democratization is the ousting of Ranković and hundreds of other functionaries who had been opponents of the reform and self-management. These elements are now clearly on the retreat, and the liberals dominate within the Party (p. 233).

Among the fundamental limitations of the book must be included the fact that it is written exclusively on the basis of other works, and these works are written exclusively in the English language. This fact has in great measure affected the perspective from which the author has viewed the problems. The book is written from a liberal-reformist viewpoint. This viewpoint has received its most definitive expression in James Burkham's book *Managerial Revolution* which represents the thesis that »management« and not »ownership« is the principal distinguishing feature among the various systems of authority. And so, in this respect, there are no essential differences between capitalism and socialism. The author diverges from Burnham's thesis in that he is not convinced that the future lies in the hands of technocrats. Rather, on the contrary, he believes that we are entering a period of participatory industrial democracy. From the author's viewpoint, participatory experiments in American industry and the Yugoslaw workers' self-management system can be discussed on the same plane. For us, this is totally unacceptable, if it is kept in mind that the so-called inter-personal relations movement, which arose on the basis of the above-mentioned experiments, was inspired by the interests of the employers, and as such has been discredited in the progressive workers' movement.

Otherwise, it must be stressed that on the whole the book evaluates the Yugoslav workers' self-management system very favorably. In spite of its numerous shortcomings, the author considers our system to be the strongest expression of those tendencies which will become increasingly dominant in the industrialized world by the end of the century. In a brief annotation which was added as a supplement at the beginning of the book, the author expresses his conviction that last years' events which occurred throughout the world, and especially in France, at least partially justify his prophecies.

Ivan KUVAČIĆ

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ECOLE D'ETE DE KORČULA
VII• SESSION INTERNATIONALE

HEGEL ET NOTRE TEMPS

KORČULA
Du 19 au 26 août 1970

Président
RUDI SUPEK, Zagreb

Vice-président
VELJKO KORAČ, Beograd

Comité de direction

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MIHAILO ĐURIĆ, Beograd
DANKO GRLIĆ, Zagreb
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MILAN KANGRGA, Zagreb
ANDRIJA KREŠIĆ, Beograd
IVAN KUVAČIĆ, Zagreb
MIHAILO MARKOVIĆ, Beograd
VOJIN MILIĆ, Beograd
GAJO PETROVIĆ, Zagreb
DUŠAN PIRJEVEC, Ljubljana
LJUBO TADIĆ, Beograd
PREDRAG VRANICKI, Zagreb

Secrétaire
NIKOLA SKLEDAR, Zagreb

PROGRAMME DES CONFÉRENCES PLENAIRES

19. VII 1970.

17h – Ouverture de la Session
Rudi Supek: Discours d'ouverture
Ernst Bloch: Geschichtliche Vermittlung und das Novum bei Hegel

20. VIII 1970.

9h – Vojin Simeunović (Sarajevo): Aktualno značenje Hegelove Fenomenologije duha (Aktuelle Bedeutung von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes)

11h – Enzo Paci (Milano): Fenomenologia e storia nel pensiero di Hegel

12h – Pierre Naville (Paris): Hegel et le problème de bureaucratie

D E

KORČU L A

Vile SESSION INTERNATIONALE

H E G E L E T N O T R E T E M P S

KORČU L A

August 19 to 26, 1970

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Vice-president

R u d i S u p e k , Zagreb

Veljko Korač, Belgrade

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P r e d r a g V r a n i c k i , Zagreb

Secretary

N i k o l a S k l e d a r , Zagreb

PR O G R A M M E D E S C O N F E R E N C E S P L E N A IR E S

19. V II 1970.

5 p.m. - Opening of the Session

Rudi Supek: Opening speech

Ernst Bloch: Historical mediation and the novelty in Hegel

20. 5 3 1970.

9h - Vojim Simeunović (Sarajevo): Actual meaning of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Aktuelle Bedeutung von Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes)

l l h - Enzo Paci (Milan): Phenomenology and history in Hegel's thought

12 p.m. - Pierre Naville (Paris): Hegel and the problem of bureaucracy

21. VIII 1970.

9h – Zvonko Posavec (Zagreb): Sloboda i pravo (La liberté et le droit)
11h – Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Köln): Hegels absolute Negation und ihre Bedeutung für uns
12h – Ernesto Grassi (München): Hegels Ablehnung der philosophischen Bedeutung der lateinischen und humanistischen Tradition

22. VIII 1970.

9h – Duško Pirjevec (Ljubljana): Hegel i pitanje umjetnosti (Hegel und die Frage der Kunst)
11h – Hans-Georg Gadamer (Heidelberg): Der Vergangenheitscharakter der Kunst und das Ende der Geschichte
12h – Milan Kangrga (Zagreb): Hegel – metafizika ili revolucija? (Hegel – Metaphysik oder Revolution?)

24. VIII 1970.

9h – Danko Grlić (Zagreb): Revolucija i teror . Uz Fenomenologiju duha (Revolution und Teror. Zur Phänomenologie des Geistes)
11h – Dieter Jähnig (Tübingen): Die Beseitigung der Geschnichte durch Bildung und Erinnerung
12h – Karl Löwith: (Heidelberg): Die Problematik von Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie

25. VIII 1970.

9h – Lellio Basso (Roma): La Nouvelle gauche et révolution dans les pays développés.
11h – Maximilien Rubel (Paris): Fonotion historique de la nouvelle bourgeoisie.
12h — Ernest Mandel (Bruxelles): Actualité de la théorie d'organisation léniniste, à la lumière des luttes ouvrières récentes (en France et en Italie)

26. VIII 1970.

9h – Mihailo Marković (Beograd): Nova levica i kulturna revolucija (New Left and the Cultural Revolution)
11h – Débat général.

Présidents des sessions plénaires: *Branko Bošnjak* (Zagreb), *Mihailo Đurić* (Beograd), *Uladimir Filipović* (Zagreb), *Eugen Fink* (Freiburg), *Ernst Fischer* (Wien), *Ivan Focht* (Sarajevo), *Jürgen Habermas* (Frankfurt am Main), *Andrija Krešić* (Beograd), *Vjekoslav Mikecin* (Zagreb), *Veljko Rus* (Ljubljana), *Svetozar Stojanović* (Beograd), *Vanja Sutlić* (Zagreb), *Ljubo Tadić* (Beograd), *Kurt Wolff* (Newton).

21. V I I I 1970.

9 a.m. - Zvonko Pasavec (Zagreb): Freedom and law (L a liberte et le droit)

l l h - Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Cologne): Hegel's absolute negation and its meaning for us 12h - Ernesto Grassi (Munich): Hegel's rejection of the philosophical meaning of the Latin and humanistic tradition V I I I 22, 1970.

9 a.m. - Duško Pirjevec (Ljubljana): Hegel and the question of art (Hegel und die Frage der Kunst)

l l h - Hans-Georg Gadamer (Heidelberg): The past character of art and the end of history

12:00 - Milan Kangrga (Zagreb): Hegel - metaphysics or revolution?

(Hegel - metaphysics or revolution?)

24. V I I I 1970.

91' - Dan'ko Grlić (Zagreb): Revolucija i teror . Uz Fenomenologiju duha (revolution and teror. To the phenomenology of the mind) l l h - Dieter Jah n ig (Tiihi/ngen): The elimination of history through education and memory

12h - Karl Lowith: (Heidelberg): The problematic of Hegel's Ge-sohi oh'tsph'i 1 osoph i e

25. V II I 1970.

9 am - Lellio Basso (Roma): The New Left and revolution in developed countries.

l l h - Maximilden Rubel (Paris): Historical notion of the new bourgeoisie.

12 p.m. — Em est M and d (Brussels): Actuality of Leninist organization theory, in the light of recent labor struggles (in France and Italy)

26. V I I I 1970.

9 a.m. - Mihailo Marković (Belgrade): New Left and the Cultural Revolution

l l h - General debate.

Pr6sidenits des sessions plenary: Branko Bošnjak (Zagreb), Mihailo Đurić (Belgrade), Vladimir Filipović (Zagreb), Eugen Fink (Freiburg), Ernst Fischer (Wien), Ivan Focht (Sarajevo), Jurgen Habermas

(Frankfurt am Main), Andrija Kresić (Belgrade), Vjekoslav Mikecin (Zagreb), Veljko Rus (Ljubljana), Svetozar Stojanović (Belgrade), Vanja Sutlić (Zagreb), Ljubo Tadic (Belgrade), Kurt Wolff (Newton).

TRAVAIL DES SECTIONS

L'Ecole travaillera en quatre sections avec une des langues suivantes: anglaise, française, allemande et serbo-croate.

— *Section de la langue anglaise:* Hegel and positivism *(Zaga Pešić-Golubović,* Beograd)
— *Section de la langue allemande:* Aktualität der Hegelschen Rechts- und Geschichtsphilosophie (*Gajo Petrović,* Zagreb)
— *Section de la langue française:* Le monde bourgeois et la nouvelle gauche (*Vojin Milić,* Beograd)
— *Section de la langue serbo-croate:* Lenjin, lenjinizam, socijalizam Lénine, léninisme, socialisme (*Predrag Vranicki,* Zagreb)

– Rapporteurs dans les sections et les participants actifs: Jovan Aranđelović (Beograd), Rudolf Berlinger (Würzburg), Norman Birnbaum (Amherst), Rade Bojanović (Beograd), Heinz Brandt (Frankfurt am Main), Paul Brockelman (Durham), Franc Cengle (Sarajevo), John W. Chapman (Pittsburgh), Octavian Chetan (Bucuresti), Milan Damnjanović (Sarajevo), Branko Despot (Zagreb), Ivan Dubsky (Praha), Jagoš Đuretić (Beograd), Iring Fetscher (Frankfurt am Main), Werner Flach (Remlingen), Helmut Fleischer (Berlin), Boro Gojković (Sarajevo), Veselin Golubović (Zagreb), David De Grood (Bridgeport), Tine Hribar (Goričica), Trivo Indić (Beograd), Božidar Jakšić (Sarajevo), Jan Kamaryt (Praha), Arnold Künzli (Basel), Wolfgang Leonhard (Manderscheid/Eifel), Franz Marek (Wien), Dragoljub Mićunović (Beograd), Stefan Morawski (Varszawa), Fuad Muhić (Sarajevo), J. R. Nunez Tenorio (Caracas), Nebojša Popov (Beograd), Stanka Rummel (Stuttgart), Mario Spinella (Milano), Jiřy Suchy (Bratislava), Robert Paul Sylvester (Durham), Đuro Šušnjić (Novi Beograd), Ivo Urbančić (Ljubljana), Žarko Vidović (Beograd), Marx Wartofsky (Boston), Gerd Wolandt (Bonn), Miladin Životić (Beograd), Pavel Apostol (Bucuresti), Donald M. Borchert (Ohio), Mladen Čaldarović (Zagreb), Hans Heinz Holz (Zürich), Zoran Konstantinović (Beograd), Giuseppe Vacca (Bari).

Les sections travailleront dans l'apres-midi (de 17 heure à 20).

La liste de conférences et de participants n'est pas encore définitive et quelques modifications du programme sont possibles.

Pour la reservation aux hôtels et chez les particuliers prière de s'adresser à: »Generalturist« (madame Derado), Zagreb, Praška 5, telephon: 35-545, 34-256, telex: 21-100

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TRAVAILDESSCTIONS

The School will work in four sections with one of the following languages: English, French, German and Serbo-Croatian.

— English language section: Hegel and positivism (Zaga Pešić-

-Golubović, Belgrade)

— Section de la langue allemande: Aibtualitat der Hegel's philosophy of law and history {Gajo Petrović, Zagreb)

— French language section: The bourgeois world and the new left (Vojin Milić, Beograd)

— Section de la langue Serbo-Croat: Lenin, Leninism, Socialism Lenine, Leninisme, Socialisme [Predrag Vranicki, Zagreb)

- Rapporteurs dans les seotions et les participants actifs: Jovan ArandeJović (Belgrade), Rudolf Berlinger (Wurzburg), Norman Bimbaum (Amherst), Rade Bojanović (Belgrade), Heinz Brandit (Frankfurt am Main), Paul Brockelman (Durham), Franc Cengle (Sarajevo), John W. Chapman (Pittsburgh), Octavian Chetan (Bucharest), Milan Damnjanović (Sarajevo), Branko Despot (Zagreb), Ivan Dubsky (Prague), Jagoš Diuretic (Belgrade), Iring Fetscher (Frankfurt am Main), Werner Flach (Remlingen), Helmut Fleischer (Berlin), Boro Gojković (Sarajevo), Veselin Galubović (Zagreb), David De Grood (Bridgeport), Tine Hribar (Goričica), Trivo Inđić (Belgrade), Božidar Jakšić (Sarajevo) , Jan Kamaryt (Prague), Arnold Kiinzli (Basel), Wolfgang Leonhard (Mandenscheid/Eifel), Franz Marek (Wien), Dragoljub Mićunović (Belgrade), Stefan Morawski (Warszawa), Fuad Miuhić (Sarajevo), J.R. Nunez Tenorio (Caracas) (Belgrade), Marx Wartofsky (Boston), Gerd Wolandt (Bonn), Miladin Zdvotić (Belgrade), Pavel Apostol (Buouresti), Donald M. Borchert (Ohio), Mladen Čaldarović (Zagreb), Hans Heinz Holz (Ziirich), Zoran Konstantinović (Belgrade), Giuseppe Vacca (Bari).

The seotions will work in the afternoon (from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m.).

The list of conferences and participants is not yet final and some changes to the program are possible.

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LENIN, LENINISM AND SOCIALISM (1. 8. 1970)
HEGEL AND OUR TIME (1. 9. 1970)
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SELF-GOVERNMENT AND MANIPULATION (1. 11. 1970)
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUALS TODAY (1. 1. 1971)
THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIALISM (1. 1. 1971)
SARTRE AND MARXISM (1. 3. 1971)
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